Salamanca 1812- Wellington’s Year of Victories

by Peter Edwards

  Lord Wellington came down from the neighbourhood where he had been examining the enemy’s left, at a rapid gallop accompanied only by Colonel de Lancey (but followed immediately afterwards by Colonel Sturgeon) and gave us orders for the attack verbally – first to me (whom he had first met with) and then to General Pakenham.

  D’Urban of course had Arentschildt’s 1st Hussars KGL and the 14th Light Dragoons, as well as his own 1st and 11th (Portuguese) Dragoons – some 1,200 sabres.

  William Grattan of the 88th, in Wallace’s brigade, recounts his version of the meeting:

  As Lord Wellington rode up to Pakenham every eye was turned towards him. He looked paler than usual; but, notwithstanding the sudden change he had just made in the disposition of his army, he was quite unruffled in his manner, as if the battle to be fought was nothing but a field-day. His words were few and his orders brief. Tapping Pakenham on the shoulder, he said, ‘Edward, move on with the 3rd Division, take those heights in your front – and drive everything before you.’ ‘I will, my Lord,’ was the laconic reply of the gallant Sir Edward. A moment after, Lord Wellington was galloping on to the next Division, to give (I suppose) orders to the same effect.

  His Lordship doubtless added to this dramatic version, short as it is on the practicalities of generalship, that D‘Urban was to be on his right, and that Leith and Le Marchant were to attack from the north. Grattan’s words, of course, were hearsay, since he would not have been among those officers present at the head of the column, the 88th not being the front regiment but the second. Someone who was at the head of the column with the leading regiment (the 45th) and who, therefore, might actually have heard the words, was Captain Thomas Lightfoot:

  His Lordship’s orders to General Pakenham in our hearing were: ‘Pakenham, you will carry that height where the enemy’s left is posted by storm, and when you have gained it, go at them hard and fast with the bayonet.’ ‘Yes my Lord’ said Pakenham ‘That I will by God’ and galloping off, placed himself at our head.

  (Lightfoot wrote this eight weeks later.) The Division had only just halted, the men looking to get a meal going at last – on the march since 11am, and before that an early breakfast – but ‘our camp kettles were in a moment overturned, and mounted on the mules. Many men looked blank at having to go without their meal’ (94th’s Regimental History). The country being passable everywhere, the Division was not confined to any road. It formed in four columns. The eastern-most was Wallace’s Brigade of the 1st/45th (Nottinghamshire), the 74th (Highlanders) and the 1st/88th (Connaughts); the next being Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell’s Brigade of the 1st and 2nd/5th (Northumberland), his own 94th (Scotch Brigade) and the 2nd/83rd; the outside (westernmost) column was Power’s Portuguese Brigade of the 9th and 21st Line and the 12th Caçadores; and outside of all was D’Urban’s and Arentschildt’s horse. Two artillery batteries were present: Bull’s 6-pounder RHA and Douglas’ 9-pounder battery. The advance and left flank guards comprised all seven light companies, three companies of the 5th/60th and the 7th Caçadores —around 1,000 men. There is a track running south from Aldea Tejada for about a mile, which then turns south to Miranda de Azan, with a low feature to its east running down to join the Pico de Miranda.

  Wallace’s Brigade Major, Captain James Campbell wrote:

  To me, as Brigade Major of the right brigade (i.e. senior) Sir Edward Pakenham, in his quick decided manner, pointed out the direction we were to take, and desired me to tell Colonel Wallace, 88th regiment, the officer in temporary command of the brigade, to move on with as much rapidity as possible, but without blowing the men too much. The division was soon under arms, and moved off rapidly in open column, right in front, the 45th regiment leading . . . We soon descended into a kind of valley, or rather hollow, and having brought up our left shoulders a little, we pushed on at a quick pace, but in excellent order, to the right; the side of the hollow towards the enemy concealing our movements from their sight. The whole scene was now highly animating. The left brigade, headed by the 5th regiment, was, I saw, marching parallel to the right, so as to be ready to form a second line. The Portuguese brigade followed the right, and the whole of the left flank of the columns was covered by a cloud of sharpshooters, composed of light infantry companies, and riflemen of the 5th battalion, 60th regiment.

  The battalions moved briskly, company behind company, each in two lines, some twenty men broad (the average bayonet strength of Pakenham’s battalions, excluding the large 1st/5th, was only 400 men), with sufficient space that each, given the simple order ‘Left Form’, would pivot left into a battalion line. The uncased Colours moved between the two centre companies. Thus if all three columns formed left Pakenham would have his 2 Brigade immediately supporting 1, with the Portuguese in rear. Brigadier D’Urban rode ahead of his squadrons, to the right of the 3rd Division.

  The enemy was marching by his left along the wooded heights, which form the southern boundary of the valley of the Arapiles, and the western extremity of which closes in a lower fall, which descends upon the little stream of the Azan, near the village of Miranda. As the head of our column approached this lower fall, or hill, skirting it near its base, and having it on our left, we became aware that we were close to the enemy, though we could not see them owing to the trees, the dust, and the peculiar configuration of the ground. Anxious, therefore, to ascertain their exact whereabouts I had ridden out a little in front, having with me, I think, only my brigade-major Flangini and Da Camara, when upon clearing the verge of a small clump of trees, a short way up the slope, I came suddenly upon the head of a French column of infantry, having about a company in front, and marching very fast by its left. It was at once obvious that, as the columns of the 3rd Division were marching on our left, the French must be already beyond their right, and consequently I ought to attack at once.

  Curto, commanding Marmont’s Light Cavalry Division, and who was tasked to look after Thomières, does seem to have been entirely absent from this northern flank; why he should think the southern to be his prime care, no-one knows. His choice allowed D‘Urban a free run at Thomières’s point battalion from the 101st Ligne. The only description we have is in Charles Oman, who had privileged access to D’Urban’s unpublished diary:

  This was apparently the leading battalion of the French 101st, marching with its front absolutely uncovered by either cavalry vedettes or any exploring parties of its own. D’Urban galloped back, unseen by the enemy, and wheeled his leading regiment, the 1st Portuguese dragoons – three weak squadrons of little over 200 sabres – into line, with orders to charge the French battalion, before it should take alarm and form square. The 1st Portuguese, and two squadrons of the British 14th Light Dragoons, which had only just arrived on the ground, being the foremost part of Arentschildt’s brigade, followed in support. The charge was successful – the French were so much taken by surprise that the only manoeuvre they were able to perform was to close their second company upon the first, so that their front was six deep. The two squadrons of the Portuguese which attacked frontally suffered severe loss, their colonel, Watson, falling severely wounded among the French bayonets. But the right-handed squadron, which overlapped the French left, broke in almost unopposed on the unformed flank of the battalion, which then went to pieces, and was chased uphill by the whole of the Portuguese horsemen, losing many prisoners.

  Notwithstanding the above, other accounts vary on the formation of the 101st when its leading battalion was caught by the 1st (Portuguese) Dragoons: square or line. They are even at odds on the immediate success or otherwise of D‘Urban’s charge. Oman’s narrative therefore seems to be an attempt at compromise. Where no doubt exists, however, is that D’Urban’s ultimate success removed, as a formed body, one fifth of Thomières’s force, which in any event was already heavily outnumbered. He now would have four battalions to hold Pakenham’s approaching ten battalions. For the 1st Ligne seems to have been halted earlier by Thomières, farther back on the Monte de Azan, possibly to form a link w
ith Maucune. His now 2,000 bayonets faced the 3rd’s 5,600. Still, he had the high ground, which always counts a lot, and he had (somewhere) Curto’s 1,800 sabres.

  While Pakenham made best speed behind D‘Urban’s horse, Lord Wellington made straight for the low ridge in front of Las Torres, behind which his heavy cavalry lay. There the 1,000 dragoons of Le Marchant’s Brigade were halted, dismounted and awaiting orders, with Anson’s Brigade nearby. According to Le Marchant’s biographer son, he was told

  That the success of the movement to be made by the Third Division would greatly depend on the assistance they received from the cavalry; and that he must therefore be prepared to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to charge the enemy’s infantry. ‘You must then charge,’ said Lord Wellington, ‘at all hazards.’ After some brief remarks on the chances of the day, Lord Wellington rode towards the centre, having desired the Dragoons to remain in the same position until the time of action was come.

  He went next to Sir James Leith, at forty-nine his oldest general with the largest Division. The 5th comprised eight British and three Portuguese battalions, some 6,300 bayonets, in rear of Arapiles village on Cole’s right. The Division was deployed in two lines, Greville’s Brigade in front. To equalise the lines, Pringle’s 1st /4th (King’s Own) had been placed with Greville. Pringle’s other battalions and Spry’s Portuguese formed the second line. Greville had forty-five battalion companies (his five light companies being forward) with a first line of some 1,300 men, who thus stretched perhaps 900 or 1,000 paces behind the village. Those on the right were rather more exposed to the French artillery. The men were lying down under the continuous fire from Bonnet’s and Maucune’s guns described as the ‘heaviest cannonade I have ever been exposed to’ by Leith’s DAQMG Major (later Field Marshal) William Gomm. Corporal John Douglas, 3rd/1st (Royal Scots) wrote:

  Down we lay on the slope of the hill for the purpose of letting the round shot pass over us as quickly as possible. In this position we loaded. The 2nd Brigade formed in our rear. The 3rd Brigade on coming down did not please Sir James. He marched them back under the whole fire in ordinary time and back again to make them do it in a soldier-like manner. The Brigade, on coming to its ground, the centre sub-division of the 15th Portuguese was struck with a shot (I mean cannon shot) which did fearful execution. It scarcely left a man standing. On the 2nd Brigade forming a man of the 44th was killed and lay for a few minutes, when a shell fell under him and exploding drove him into the air. His knapsack, coat, shirt body and all flew in every direction. A Dublin lad lying on my right looks up and exclaims with the greatest gravity, ‘There’s an inspection of necessaries.’

  The Division had been lying beneath the ricochets for about an hour, with General Leith riding up and down his line to calm the men, when Lord Wellington and his staff officers, who had now caught up with him, arrived from Las Torres. He gave his orders, according to Leith’s ADC Andrew Leith Hay ‘in a clear, concise, and spirited manner, there was no appearance of contemplating a doubtful result.’ Leith was to await General Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade coming in from the rear to his right, so as to provide a line with Pakenham, and then he was to attack Maucune. By then Pakenham would be up on the ridge, threatening Maucune’s flank. Cole would advance on his left. Espana’s 3,000 and Le Marchant and Anson would be behind his right shoulder, and the 7th Division would be in support in rear. ‘His instructions,’ says Leith Hay ‘concluded with commands that the enemy should be overthrown and driven from the field.’

  Edward Pakenham’s men now emerged from their covered approach. Wallace’s Brigade Major, James Campbell:

  Having moved a considerable distance in this order, (field officers and adjutants prolonging the line of march,) the head of the column, by bringing up the right shoulder, began gradually to ascend the hill, on the top of which we expected to find the enemy still extending to their left. At length, having fairly outflanked the French left, the whole formed line, and with Sir Edward Pakenham in front, hat in hand, the brigades advanced in beautiful style, covered by our sharpshooters, the right of the first line admirably supported by the left brigade.

  Thomières’ men were caught in column, two battalions of the 101st Ligne leading, the survivors of their 3rd battalion now being chased back by D’Urban; then came two battalions of the 62nd with quite a gap to the 1st Ligne. There was probably time for Thomières to send forward the voltigeurs of the 101st — say 150 men – but these were heavily outnumbered. Even so, a contemptuous comment by William Grattan, a man with little time for his Portuguese allies, indicates it didn’t go without incident:

  A number of Caçadores commanded by Major Haddock were in advance of us. The moment the French fire opened, these troops, which had been placed to cover our advance, lay down on their faces, not for the purpose of taking aim with more accuracy, but in order to save their own sconce from the French fire. Haddock dismounted from his horse and began belabouring with the flat side of his sabre the dastardly troops he had the misfortune to command, but in vain; all sense of shame had fled after the first discharge of grape and musketry, and poor Haddock might as well have attempted to move the great cathedral of Salamanca as the soldiers of his Majesty the King of Portugal.

  Grattan’s account of the attack, somewhat over-blown in places, very much catches the smell of it. Nor should we forget that his regiment, his beloved Connaughts, were the centre regiment and because of their strength it comprised nearly half of Wallace’s line.

  All were impatient to engage, and the calm but stern advance of Pakenham’s right brigade was received with beating of drums and loud cheers from the French, whose light troops . . . [ran] down the face of the hill in a state of great excitement ... [and] commenced an irregular and hurried fire . . . Regardless of the fire of the riflemen, and the showers of grape and canister, Pakenham continued to press onward; his centre suffered, but still advanced; his left and right being less oppressed by the weight of the fire, continued to advance at a more rapid pace, and as his wings inclined forward and outstripped the centre, his right brigade assumed the form of a crescent ... it so happened that all the British officers were in front of their men – a rare occurrence. The French officers were also in front; but their relative duties were widely different: the latter, encouraging their men into the heat of battle; the former, keeping their devoted soldiers back! ... the soldiers, with their firelocks on the rest, followed close upon the heels of their officers, like troops accustomed to conquer. They speedily got footing upon the brow of the hill, but before they had time to take breath, Thomières’s entire division, with drums beating and uttering loud shouts, ran forward to meet them, and belching forth a torrent of bullets from five thousand muskets, brought down almost the entire of Wallace’s first rank, and more than half of his officers. The brigade staggered back from the force of the shock, but before the smoke had altogether cleared away, Wallace, looking full in the faces of his soldiers, pointed to the French columns, and leading the shattered brigade up the hill, without a moment’s hesitation, brought them face to face before the French had time to witness the terrible effect of their murderous fire.

  Astounded by the unshaken determination of Wallace’s soldiers, Thomières’s division wavered; nevertheless they opened a heavy discharge of musketry, but it was unlike the former, – it was irregular and ill-directed, the men acted without concert or method, and many fired in the air. At length their fire ceased altogether, and the three regiments, for the first time, cheered! The effect was electric; Thomières’s troops were seized with a panic . . . The French officers did all that was possible, by voice, gesture, and example, to rouse their men to a proper sense of their situation, but in vain. One, the colonel of the leading regiment . . . seizing a firelock, and beckoning to his men to follow, ran forward a few paces and shot Major Murphy dead at the head of the 88th, however, his career soon closed: a bullet, the first that had been fired from our ranks, pierced his head; he flung up his arms, fell forward, and
expired.

  The brigade, which till this time cheerfully bore up against the heavy fire they had been exposed to without returning a shot, were now impatient, and the 88th greatly excited: for Murphy, dead and bleeding, with one foot hanging in the stirrup-iron, was dragged by his affrighted horse along the front of his regiment; the soldiers became exasperated, and asked to be let forward. Pakenham, seeing that the proper moment had arrived, called out to Wallace ‘to let them loose’. The three regiments ran onward, and the mighty phalanx, which but a moment before was so formidable, loosened and fell in pieces before fifteen hundred invincible British soldiers fighting in a line of only two deep.

  Two items in Grattan’s account were totally inaccurate, of course: the number of Frenchmen and Wallace’s casualties, both exaggerations. Yet we are left with a clear picture of the three battalions climbing the Pico de Azan and curling round the French. The British line might be 600 yards wide, the Pico half of that, still less the ridge’s top. The angle of slope would make for slightly awkward progress on the flanks. Not surprisingly, we don’t know how Thomières’s battalions were formed. One strong possibility, given the ground, is that the four battalions were one behind the other, each in column of Divisions i.e. two companies wide i.e. twelve companies deep among the top of the Pico. If so their frontage could be no more than eighty yards wide (assuming eighty men per company), although it is possible that, at the last minute, Thomières brought up a second battalion, so that the 101st fought four companies wide over say 150 yards. Grattan refers not to a line but to ‘the French column’, as does William Brown, 45th.

  The former’s regiment, in the centre, suffered double the casualties of the 45th and 74th on the flanks, but of course the outcome could scarcely be doubted. Wallace commanded some 1,500 muskets, even excluding his three companies of riflemen of the 5th/60th, and all these pieces could be brought to bear. If Grattan was right and Thomières did not present a line – and in the swiftness of the circumstances it seems most unlikely – but was on a width of four companies, he could not volley fire with more than about 300 muskets. That, however was academic. Wallace’s men fired but one shot – to revenge Major Murphy – and it was their electrifying cheer which seemed enough to panic the 101st, together with the lowered bayonets and, doubtless, the Connaughts’ scream. That no ball was expended is confirmed by Wallace’s Brigade Major, Captain James Campbell: