Salamanca 1812- Wellington’s Year of Victories

by Peter Edwards

  The detachment of the 94th regiment, when descended into the ditch, is to turn to its left to the main breach.

  The 5th regiment will issue from the convent of Santa Cruz 10 minutes before 7.

  At the same time a party consisting of 180 sappers, carrying bags containing hay, will move out of the second parallel, covered by a fire of the 83rd regiment, formed in the second parallel, upon the works of the place, which bags are to be thrown into the ditch, so as to enable the troops to descend the counterscarp to the attack of the breach: they are to be followed immediately by the storming party of the great breach, which is to consist of the troops of Major General McKinnon’s brigade. Major General McKinnon’s brigade is to be formed in the first parallel, and in the communications between the first and second parallel, ready to move up to the breach immediately in rear of the sappers with bags. The storming party of the great breach must be provided with six scaling ladders, 12 feet long each, and with 10 axes.

  The ditch must likewise be entered by a column on the left of the great breach, consisting of three companies of the 95th regiment, which are to issue from the right of the convent of St Francisco. This column will be provided with three ladders, 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be pointed out to them by Lieutenant Wright: on descending into the ditch, they are to turn to their right, and to proceed towards the main breach; they are to have 10 axes, to enable them to cut down the obstacles which may have been erected to impede the communication along the ditch on the left of the breach.

  Another column, consisting of Major General Vandeleur’s brigade, will issue out from the left of the convent of St Francisco, and are to attack the breach to the left of the main breach; this column must have 12 ladders, each 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be shown them by Captain Ellicombe: on arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to their left, to storm the breach in the fausse-braie, on their left, of the small ravelin, and thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place: as soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach, in the fausse-braie wall, a detachment of five companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of Major General McKinnon’s brigade, by the principal breach, and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and communicate with the rampart of the main breach: as soon as this communication can be established, endeavour should be made to open the gate of Salamanca.

  The Portuguese brigade in the 3rd division will be formed in the communication to the first parallel and behind the hill of St Francisco (upper Teson), and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel, ready to support Major General McKinnon’s brigade.

  Colonel Barnard’s brigade will be formed behind the convent of St Francisco, ready to support Major General Vandeleur’s brigade; all these columns will have detached parties especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during the above.

  The men with ladders, and axes, and bags, must not have their arms; those who are to storm, must not fire.

  Brigadier General Pack, with his brigade, will make a false attack upon the outwork of the gate of St Jago, and upon the works towards La Caridad.

  The different regiments and brigades to receive ladders are to send parties to the engineers’ depot to receive them, three men for each ladder.

  (Wellington)

  APPENDIX 2

  Orders for the Attack on Badajoz 6 April 1812

  There may be some alteration in this plan, which will be communicated by reference to the number of the paragraph altered.

  The fort of Badajos is to be attacked at 10 o‘clock this night.

  The attack must be made on three points; the castle, the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the flank of the bastion of Sta. Maria.

  The attack of the castle to be by escalade; that of the two bastions by the storm of the breaches.

  The troops for the storm of the castle, consisting of the third division of infantry, should move out from the right of the first parallel at a little before 10 o’clock, but not to attack till 10 o‘clock.

  They should cross the river Rivillas below the broken bridge over that river, and attack that part of the castle which is on the right, looking from the trenches, and in the rear of the great battery constructed by the enemy to fire on the bastion of La Trinidad.

  Having arrived within the castle, and having secured the possession of it, parties must be sent to the left along the rampart, to fall on the rear of those defending the great breach in the bastion of La Trinidad, and to communicate with the right of the attack on that bastion.

  The troops for this attack must have all the long ladders in the engineers’ park, and six of the lengths of the engineers’ ladders. They must be attended by twelve carpenters with axes, and by six miners with crowbars, &c.

  The 4th division, with the exception of the covering party in the trenches, must make the attack on the face of the bastion of La Trinidad, and the light division on the flank of the bastion of Sta. Maria.

  These two divisions must parade in close columns of divisions at 9 o’clock. The light division, with the left in front; the 4th division with its advanced guard, with the left in front; the remainder with the right in front. The 4th division must be on the right of the little stream, near the picquet of the 4th division, and the light division must have the river on their right.

  The light division must throw 100 men forward into the quarries, close to the covered-way of the bastion of Sta. Maria, who, as soon as the garrison are disturbed, must keep down by their fire the fire from the face of the bastion of Sta. Maria, and that from the covered-way.

  The advance of both divisions must consist of 500 men from each, attended by twelve ladders; and the men of the storming party should carry sacks filled with light materials, to be thrown into the ditch, to enable the troops to descend into it. Care must be taken that these bags are not thrown into the covered-way.

  The advance of the light division must precede that of the 4th division; and both must keep as near the inundation as they possibly can.

  The advance of both divisions must be formed into firing parties and storming parties. The firing parties must be spread along the crest of the glacis to keep down the fire of the enemy; while the men of the storming party who carry bags will enter the covered-way at the place d’armes, under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad; those attached to the 4th division on its right, those to the light division on its left, looking from the trenches or the camp.

  The storming party of the advance of the light division will then descend into the ditch, and turning to its left, storm the breach in the flank of the bastion of Sta. Maria, while the storming party of the 4th division will likewise descend into the ditch, and storm the breach in the face of the bastion of La Trinidad. The firing parties are to follow immediately in the rear of their respective storming parties.

  The heads of the two divisions will follow their advanced guards, keeping nearly together, but they will not advance beyond the shelter afforded by the quarries on the left of the road till they will have seen the heads of the advanced guards ascend the breaches: they will then move forward to the storm in double quick time.

  If the light division should find the bastion of Sta. Maria intrenched, they will turn the right of the intrenchment by moving along the parapet of the bastion. The 4th division will do the same by an intrenchment which appears in the left face, looking from the trenches of the bastion of La Trinidad.

  The light division, as soon as they are in possession of the rampart of Sta. Maria, are to turn to their left, and to proceed along the rampart to their left, keeping always a reserve at the breach.

  The advance guard of the 4th division are to turn to their left, and to keep up the communication with the light division. The 4th division are to turn to their right, and to communicate with the 3rd division, by the bastion of St Pedro, and the demi-bastion of St Ant
onio, taking care to keep a reserve at the bastion of La Trinidad.

  Each (the 4th and light) division must leave 1,000 men in reserve in the quarries.

  The 4th division must endeavour to get open the gate of La Trinidad; the light division must do the same by the gate called Puerto del Pillar.

  The soldiers must leave their knapsacks in camp.

  In order to aid these operations, the howitzers in No. 12 are to open fire upon the batteries, constructed by the enemy to fire upon the breach, as soon as the officers will observe that the enemy are aware of the attack, which they must continue till they see that the 3rd division are in possession of the castle.

  The commanding officer in the trenches is to attack the ravelin of St Roque with 200 of the covering party, moving from the right of the second parallel, and round the right of the ravelin, looking from the trenches, and attacking the barriers and gates of communication between the ravelin and the bridge, while 200 men, likewise of the covering party, will rush from the right of the sap into the salient angle of the covered-way of the ravelin, and keep up a fire on its faces. These last should not advance from the sap, till the party to attack the gorge of the ravelin will have turned it. That which will move into the covered-way on the right of the ravelin looking from the trenches, ought not to proceed further down than the angle formed by the face and the flank.

  The remainder of the covering party to be a reserve in the trenches. The working parties in the trenches are to join their regiments at half-past seven o’clock. Twelve carpenters with axes, and ten miners with crow-bars, must be with each (the 4th and light) division. A party of one officer and 20 artillerymen must be with each division.

  The 5th division must be formed, one brigade on the ground occupied by the 48th regiment; one brigade on the Sierra del Viento; and one brigade in the low grounds extending to the Guadiana, now occupied by the pickets of the light division.

  The pickets of the brigades on the Sierra del Viento, and that in the low grounds towards the Guadiana, should endeavour to alarm the enemy during the attack by firing at the Pardaleras, and at the men in the covered-way of the works towards the Guadiana.

  The Commander of the Forces particularly request the General Officers commanding divisions and brigades, and the Commanding Officers of regiments, and the Officers commanding companies, to impress upon their men the necessity of their keeping together, and formed as a military body after the storm, and during the night. Not only the success of the operation, and the honour of the army, but their own individual safety, depend upon their being in a situation to repel any attack by the enemy, and to overcome all resistance which they may be inclined to make, till the garrison have been completely subdued.

  (Wellington)

  Note upon the 6th Paragraph — It is recommended that the attack of the 3rd division should be kept clear of the bastion of St Antonio, at least till the castle, which is able and commands that bastion, will be carried.

  Note upon the 9th Paragraph — This arrangement of the columns is made in order that the light division may extend along the ramparts to the left; and that the 4th division, with the exception of the advanced guard, which is to communicate by its left with the light division, might extend along the ramparts to the right. It may be necessary, however, for these divisions mutually to support each other, and attention must in this case be paid to the formations.

  No. 13 will run thus: – after the words ‘while the men of the storming party who carry bags will enter the covered way,’ insert, ‘those of the light division, at the place d’armes on the left, looking from camp, of the unfinished ravelling; those of the 4th division, on the right of that ravelin, at the place d’armes under the breached face of the bastion of La Trinidad.’

  No. 14 General Colville will observe that a part of the advance of the 4th division must be allotted to storm the new breach in the curtain.

  Note on No. 15 — The place here pointed out may be too distant. The heads of the columns should be brought as near as they can without being exposed to fire.

  Note on No. 19 – It will be necessary for the commanding officer of the light division to attend to the ditch on his left as he will make his attack. He should post a detachment in the ditch towards the salient angle of the bastion of Santa Maria, so as to be covered by the angle from the fire of the next bastion on its left, looking from the trenches.

  Note upon No. 22 – Some signal must be arranged between the commanding officer of the artillery and the officer who will command the attack on the castle, for ceasing the fire in No. 12.

  Note upon No. 23 — It would be better that this attack should move from the right of the sap. The commanding officer in the trenches must begin it as soon as he will observe that the attack of the 3rd division on the castle is perceived by the enemy.

  No. 26 The commanding officer of the light division will attend to this. General Power will likewise make a false attack on the tête-de-pont. (19)

  APPENDIX 3

  A Memorandum Critical to his Army

  General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., to Officers Commanding Divisions and Brigades

  Freneda, 28th November, 1812

  Gentlemen,

  I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries &c., which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions of Brigades.

  But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

  It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

  We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

  I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the Officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

  I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the Officers of the army; and I am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

  Unfortunately the inexperience of the Officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, th
e period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions; and the regulation of all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

  These are the points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonment. The Commanding Officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the noncommissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the noncommissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they well know that their officers and their non-commissioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.