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The Shock of the Anthropocene

Page 33

by Christophe Bonneuil


  76René Barjavel, ‘Vénus et les enfants des hommes’, Les Nouvelles littéraires, 13 December 1962.

  77All these and other oppositions are tackled by the various authors of the recent collective work: Pessis, Topçu and Bonneuil, Une autre histoire des ‘Trente Glorieuses’.

  78Kenneth I. MacDonald, ‘The Devil Is in the (Bio)diversity: Private Sector “Engagement” and the Restructuring of Biodiversity Conservation’, Antipode, 42, 2010: 513–50.

  79Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

  CONCLUSION

  Surviving and Living

  the Anthropocene

  Thinking the Anthropocene means taking on board the data and models of the Earth system sciences that tell us in increasingly certain terms of a disturbance on the geological timescale that will radically overturn the conditions of human existence (Chapter 1). It means taking the measure of the telluric force of industrialization and commodification, which has derailed the Earth beyond the stable parameters of the Holocene, and of the need to give our freedom different material foundations; it means mobilizing new environmental humanities and new political radicalisms (movements of buen vivir, common goods, transition, degrowth, eco-socialism and many more) in order to escape the blind alleys of industrial modernity (chapters 2 and 11).

  Thinking the Anthropocene also means challenging its unifying grand narrative of the errant human species and its redemption by science alone (chapters 3 and 4). It means meticulously listening to scientists and putting their results and conclusions into public and democratic discussions, rather than sinking into a geocracy of technological and market-based ‘solutions’ to ‘manage’ the entire Earth. The less that the science of the Anthropocene pretends to stand above the world, the more solid and fruitful it will be, and the less the seductive concept of the Anthropocene will risk serving as a legitimizing philosophy for an oligarchic geopower.

  Thinking the Anthropocene, finally, means abandoning the hope of emerging from a temporary ‘environmental crisis’. The irreversible break is behind us, in that brief and exceptional moment of two centuries of industrial growth. The Anthropocene is here. It is our new condition. We have therefore to learn to survive, that is, to leave the Earth habitable and resilient, limiting the frequency of catastrophes and sources of human misery. But surviving is not enough. To continue to thrive as communities, individuals and citizens, we all must strive for change. We have to strive for a decent life for everyone, in a diversity of cultures and an equality of rights and conditions, in relations that liberate human and non-human alterities, in an infinity of aspirations, a sobriety of consumption and a humility of interventions.

  ‘What words must we sow, for the gardens of the world to be fertile again?’ asked the poet Jeanine Salesse. What histories must we write to learn to inhabit the Anthropocene?

  First of all, we must make sense of what has happened to us, producing multiple, debatable and polemical narratives rather than a single hegemonic narrative that is supposedly apolitical. Rather than a universal history of the ‘human species’ distorting the ‘Earth system’, we have proposed seven historical workshops, seven possible narratives.1 First of all, we have shown the technological contingencies (other choices would have been possible) and political dimensions of our new geological epoch. The entry into the Anthropocene was intrinsically bound up with capitalism, with the commercial nation-state and the genesis of the British Empire, which dominated the world in the nineteenth century and forced other societies to serve its model or seek to follow it. Similarly, the Great Acceleration cannot be understood without the Second World War, the Cold War in which two blocs rivalled one another in the mobilization of the globe, and – since it emerged victorious – without American imperialism (Chapter 5). The history of capitalist world-economies lies at the heart of the change in the Earth’s geological regime (Chapter 10), with their Soviet and Chinese avatars being simply a part of this. Secondly, military apparatuses, war and the logic of power, with the unsustainable technological choices subsequently imposed on the civilian world, bear a heavy responsibility in the disturbance of local environments and the whole Earth system (Chapter 6). Thirdly, the history of the Anthropocene is also one of the unfurling of a capitalist world-economy, a world of increasing commodification; a history of the genesis of a new system of material needs and consumerist subjectivities that today are globalized (Chapter 7). Finally, it is impossible without fundamental self-deception to represent the last 250 years as the progressive emergence from an initial unawareness of environmental damage, from a model of industrial development at the end of which we are supposedly now better equipped with the skills for inflecting our trajectory (Chapter 8), nor as the gradual rise of an environmental movement that was initially embryonic and gradually matured (Chapter 9).

  The contemporary moment is not one of a new awareness, nor one of a moral leap leading us towards a better humanity and a nice planet governed by sustainable geo-management, nor one of a reconciliation with Gaia. We have not suddenly passed from unawareness to awareness, we have not recently emerged from a modernist frenzy to enter an age of precaution. One of the determining aspects in the history of the Anthropocene is that of disinhibitions that normalize the intolerable: public-health policies that rejected the environmental medicine of the eighteenth century; the technological norm that undermined challenges and formed the ontology of dealing with environmental nuisances; the proliferation of objects that constructed the free-floating anthropological subject; GDP and the notion of an ‘economy’, which naturalized the absurd idea of limitless growth; technoscientific ‘solutions’ that claimed at every point to manage nature for a maximal sustainable yield; and many others more.

  By envisaging the Anthropocene as a geohistorical event, we have avoided the gesture of the clean slate, of grandiose and impotent narratives about modernity. The multiplicity and variety of the processes of disinhibition reminds us that modernity is not this majestic, inexorable and spiritual movement that philosophers speak of. On the contrary, it can be conceived as a series of successive small coups, of imposed situations, of normalized exceptions. Rather than incriminating certain familiar monstres sacrés that are too enormous to be inflected (the biological gift of intelligence made to Homo sapiens but poorly used; demographic fate; the Judeo-Christian stance of domination of nature; blind ‘modernity’, separating and dominating), we should rather learn much from the various tactics and mechanisms of disinhibition that have made it possible for two and a half centuries to ignore successive environmental knowledges and warnings, and defeat those challenges and alternatives that opposed themselves to industrial and consumerist action.

  The history we have proposed may seem depressing, i.e., that our ancestors destabilized the Earth and its ecosystems despite knowing what they were doing. Since there was not a transition from unawareness to awareness, since the present financialized capitalism has its own new forms of disinhibition, everything leads us to fear that things will continue as they have up till now.

  But to abandon the official narrative of an awakening permits a more lucid and fruitful dialogue with the warnings of the Earth system scientists. We also have in hand several histories of the Anthropocene that invite us to conceive in political terms the metabolisms of energy and matter commanded by those mechanisms – of production, exchange and consumption – that were invented and imposed by quite particular groups, imaginaries and institutions, and in specific circumstances. These histories invite us to take a political grip on the institutions and oligarchies, the powerful symbolic and material systems, that led us into the Anthropocene: military apparatuses, the system of consumerist desire and its infrastructure, the gaps of income and wealth, the energy majors and the financial interests of globalization, the technoscientific apparatuses when these work in commodity logics or silence criticisms and alternatives.

  To strive for decent lives in the Anthropocene therefo
re means freeing ourselves from repressive institutions, from alienating dominations and imaginaries. It can be an extraordinary emancipatory experience.

  ______________

  1Many other historical narratives remain to be written, in particular a global and non-teleological history of technology, which the Anthropocene calls on us to rethink (see: David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology in Global History since 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), or again accounts of the Anthropocene starting from the experience of its subalterns and victims.

  Illustration Credits

  Figure 1: Trends from 1750 to 2010 in (a) globally aggregated indicators for socio-economic development; (b) indicators for the structure and functioning of the Earth System

  1a. Data from igbp.net; Will Steffen, ed., Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under Pressure, New York: Springer, 2005, 132–3.

  1b. From Will Steffen, Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen. Gaffney and Cornelia Ludwig, ‘The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration’, The Anthropocene Review, January 2015: 1–18.

  Figure 2: Temperature and human history over 100,000 years

  Climate data from GRIP Ice Core Data, Greenland; archaeological data from Tim Appenzeller, ‘Human Migrations: Eastern Odyssey’, Nature, 485:3, May 2012: 24–6.

  Figure 3: Standard representations of human activities in relation to the Earth system

  3a. The famous ‘Bretherton Diagram’ (1986). From Earth System Science Overview: A Program for Global Change (NASA science advisory committee, 1986, 19).

  3b. After Berkes, Folke and Colding (2003).

  3c. After Benett, Peterson and Gordon (2009).

  Figure 4: CO2 emissions, 1750–2009 and 1750–1913

  Data from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, cdiac.ornl.gov.

  Figure 5: The Earth seen from midway to the Moon, Apollo 17, 7 December 1972

  NASA/Apollo 17 crew

  Figure 6: Annual energy consumption per capita in England and Italy (in megajoules)

  Graph from Tony Wrigley, Energy in the Industrial Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 95; on the basis of data from Paul Warde, Energy Consumption in England and Wales, Naples: CNR-ISS, 2007, 115–36.

  Figure 7: Annual emissions in thousand tonnes of carbon

  Data from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), cdiac.ornl.gov.

  Figure 8: UK and USA’s share in global cumulative CO2 emissions

  Data from Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), cdiac.ornl.gov.

  Figure 9: Defoliant spraying in South Vietnam, 1961–1971

  Figure 10: The Japanese seen as lice in a wartime US magazine

  From Leatherneck, 28 March 1945.

  Figure 11: German motorways in 1936

  Figure 12: The post-war world as technological consumerist paradise, General Electric advertisement, 1943

  Figure 13: Thomas Burnet, ‘Ideas of Different Stages in the Formation of the Earth’

  Engraving from Sacred Theory of the Earth, vol. 1 (1690), London: John Hooke, 1726, 312. (© BNF: French National Library)

  Figure 14: Material balance of six major groups of countries since 1950

  Graph formed from data presented in Anke Schaffartzik, A. Mayer, S. Gingrich, N. Eisenmenger, C. Loy, F. Krausmann, ‘The Global Metabolic Transition: Regional Patterns and Trends of Global Material Flows, 1950–2010’, Global Environmental Change 26, 2014: 87–97. We thank the authors for offering their raw data.

  Figure 15: Creditor and debtor countries in terms of ecological footprint in 1973

  From Global Footprint Network, storymaps.esri.com/global footprint.

  Figure 16: Le Sauvage satirique

  Journal of Gravelle, ‘naturien’ anarchist paper, 1898

  Figure 17: L’En dehors (The outsider)

  Postcard from a woodcut by Louis Moreau, 1922

  Index

  Page numbers in bold refer to figures.

  Advanced Conservation Strategies 219–20

  advertising 149, 155–6, 163

  Afghanistan 129

  African World Reparations and Repatriation Truth Commission 235

  Agamben, Giorgio 90

  Agent Orange 127

  agnotology 198

  aircraft industry 146, 147

  air quality 205–6

  aluminium production 145–6

  Aly, Götz 166

  American continent, conquest of 16

  Amerindian population, demographic collapse 16, 39, 234

  Ammonia, synthesis 136–7

  Anders, Günther 280

  Annales School 38

  Anthropocene shock 17–18

  Anthropocene xi–xii, 3–5, 12–13, 19, 47–9, 73–4

  adapting to 288–91

  causes 69

  cultural precondition 29–30

  narratives xiii–xiii, 70, 72–9, 87, 94

  onset 14–17, 15, 50

  quantifying 53–6, 54

  stages 49–53, 54–6

  violence of 25

  anthropocenologists 48–9, 66, 67, 69, 83–4, 84–6, 93

  anthropocentrism 4, 20, 40

  anthropology 31

  Apollo programme 62, 63

  Arendt, Hannah 61, 63, 280

  Arrhenius, Svante 77

  artificial soda 135–6

  Association for the Prevention of Smoke 263–4

  atmosphere 3, 12–13, 218

  atom bomb 76–7

  Atomic Energy Commission 131–2

  Australia 266

  awakening narrative 72–9

  Aykut, Stefan 218

  Babbage, Charles 205

  back-to-nature socialism 271–6, 274, 275

  Bairoch, Paul 237, 248–9

  banks and banking 156–7, 231

  Banks, Joseph 179

  Barjavel, René 284

  Barthes, Roland 166

  Baudrillard, Jean 148

  Beck, Ulrich 74–5

  Bell, Daniel 148–9, 216

  Bergerie, Jean-Baptiste Rougier de la 179

  Berkes, Fikret 33, 35

  Bernanos, Georges 283

  Bertalanffy, Ludwig von 57

  Bertrand, Philippe 183

  biocentrism 40

  biodiversity, collapse of 6–7, 12, 24, 52

  biological globalization 15–16

  biological productivity 89

  biomass 7, 12–13, 242–3

  biopower 88

  bioproductive capacity 245–6

  biosphere 89

  biotechnology 217

  Blatchford, Robert 271–2

  Boltanski, Luc 268

  Borgström, Georg 225n

  Boulding, Kenneth 216

  Bourg, Dominique 41

  Boussingault, Jean-Baptiste 205–6

  Brandis, Dietrich 48

  Braudel, Fernand 29, 37, 223–4

  Braun, Werner von 62

  Bretton Woods Agreements 244

  Brundtland Report 90

  Brunhes, Bernard 192

  Buckland, William 204

  Budyko, Mikhail 91–2

  Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc de 4, 27, 28, 47, 48, 173, 177–8

  Burckhardt, Jacob 37

  Burnet, Thomas 177

  Callicott, J. Baird 40

  Canada 266

  cancer 168

  capitalism and capital flows 36, 67, 86, 222–52, 280, 290, 291

  British world system 229–42

  and climate change 227–8

  ecological footprint 225–6

  finance 237–8

  fossil 199–206, 238

  and the Great Acceleration 242–52

  industrial 228–35

  late 220

  unequal exchange 225–6, 233–4

  world-systems 223–7

  carbon credits 218

  carbon cycle 190

  carbon dioxide 26, 68, 99–121

  concentration rise 5–6, 12, 14–15, 16, 50, 51–2, 56, 99

/>   emissions 52, 53–4, 54, 103, 104, 116–21, 117, 118, 205–6, 218, 238

  energy history 100–12

  political history 112–16

  cardiovascular illness 168, 169

  Carnot, Sadi 203, 204

  car ownership 157, 162, 164

  Carson, Rachel 285

  Silent Spring 134, 281

  Carter, Jimmy 148

  Castro, Eduardo Viveiros de 63–4

  Chadwick, Edwin 188, 208

  Chakrabarty, Dipesh 42, 67, 227–8

  Chalmers, Thomas 207

  Chaptal, Jean-Antoine 135, 142, 193

  Charbonneau, Bernard 280–1, 283

  Char, René 94–5

  Chase, Stuart 149

  chemistry, of nature–society relations 185–90

  Chile 119

  China 52, 102, 103, 136–7, 232–3, 233–4, 240, 249

  Christianity 68

  Churchill, Winston 130, 143

  circumfusa and environment 172–6, 209

  Clausius, Rudolf 191–2

  climate, and environmental reflexivity 176–9

  climate change 14, 15, 24, 52, 56, 107–8, 176, 227–8, 257–8

  acceptable levels 25

  and biodiversity loss 6–7

  and deforestation 178–9

  economization 218

  and history 39

  responsibility 117–21

  threat of 92–3

  tipping points 22

  climate engineering 91–2

  climatology 30

  closed world views 59–60

  Club of Rome, Limits to Growth 22–3, 149, 216, 286

  coal 50–1, 201–6, 229

  CO2 emissions 53–4, 54, 205–6

  consumption 102, 108, 112–13, 117–20, 141–3, 232–3

  exhaustion 193–4, 195, 201–2

  prices 102, 103

  Coase, Ronald 217

  Cobb, Charles 212

  Cold War Keynesianism 163–5

  Cold War 58, 60, 87, 89, 91–2, 123, 243–4, 248, 250, 289

  Cologne 125

  commodification 198

  commodity fetishism 148

  Commoner, Barry 285

  Comte, Auguste 31

  Conference for the Protection of Nature 270

  conservation 22–3

 

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