The Shah

by Abbas Milani

  In Moscow, Qavam met twice with Stalin. Tehran was rife with rumors that Qavam had made a “secret deal” with the Russians to overthrow the Shah. The British Embassy at the time reported that “Qavam might yield to Soviet pressure and become the president for a democratic front.”58 Shortly after arriving back in Tehran, Qavam went to the Court to report on his trip to the Shah. If the intent of the meeting was to dispel any anxieties the Shah might have had about what “deal” Qavam had made with Stalin, it failed. The Shah tried to fend off Qavam’s plans in several ways.

  Eventually, the Shah decided to warn Qavam directly about his ambitions. It was a measure of the two men’s estrangement that when the Shah decided to warn his prime minister about the dangers of flirting with the Soviet Union, he needed the help of the American Ambassador. Through the Ambassador, the Shah told Qavam that if the Soviets had promised to “install him in high office” they would do so, but that once they had squeezed him dry, they would toss him aside. In fact, the day before the Shah’s plea, the American Ambassador had, on his own, warned Qavam about rumors from Moscow “to the effect that he might be tempted toward disloyalty.” Qavam denied the charges, but the Ambassador remained convinced that Qavam had not “told full story of Moscow plans.”59

  So worried was the Shah about the Soviet threat and about Qavam’s conspiracies that for a while he reduced the number of his public appearances. His mood grew increasingly despondent. In a June 1946 meeting with the British Embassy, the Shah was “obviously weary about his future” and articulated “defeatist ideas about the end of all regimes of constitutional monarchy.” He predicted that neither the King of Greece, nor the King of Spain have “an outside sporting chance of staging a comeback.”60 On another occasion, he complained that Qavam had hired goons to physically assault him and the royal family. The British warned the Shah about “his failure to appear in public,” suggesting that people were beginning to think that “he may be afraid.” The Shah looked “unhappy, discouraged, and very frightened, even less sure of himself than usual.” He often repeated what was becoming a mantra. It was, he said, “impossible to be a constitutional ruler” in Iran. The answer he received was less than satisfactory. A dictatorship was also impossible, he was told by the British Ambassador. When reporting this conversation, the Ambassador went on to make a comment on the Shah’s character. The Shah, he said, was most inclined toward “running away morally, if not even physically”61 from any problem.

  Eventually, helped by his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, and encouraged by words and deeds of support from the American government, the Shah succeeded in helping Qavam overcome the Azerbaijan crisis and then ridding himself of the “meddlesome” Prime Minister. After Qavam’s trip to Moscow—a trip he hailed as a great success—he began to negotiate not only with the Russian Embassy in Tehran, but with a delegation from the Azerbaijan province led by Jafar Pishevari. A few weeks after Qavam’s return, Soviet troops began to leave Iran, easily a key development in the resolution of the crisis. By then, Pishevari had a full-fledged cabinet and increasingly acted as a head of state. His official title was prime minister, while other provinces in Iran had governors. His government was also acting more and more like an independent state. Units of the Iranian army had been disarmed and dismissed. Iranian postage stamps “were over-printed with the words ‘Azerbaijan National Government, 21 Azar 1234,” and before long “a new flag appeared over government buildings in Tabriz.” Finally, in a gesture that captured poetically and politically where the heart of the new Azerbaijan government was, it “adopted Moscow time, half an hour behind Tehran.”62

  The Shah began his plans for dismissing Qavam first by opposing Qavam’s attempt at appeasing the Soviets and reaching a rapprochement with Pishevari. But he waited for the Soviet army’s departure from Iran before making his move against Qavam. The fact that Qavam had chosen his vice-premier and propaganda and labor minister, Mozzafar Firuz, as his chief negotiator with Pishevari made it politically easier and more emotionally appealing for the Shah to fight the agreement. Firuz had long openly ridiculed and criticized the Shah, and in return the Shah developed a lifelong visceral hatred of the man. Even long after the end of the Azerbaijan crisis, when the Shah was at the height of his power and figures like Firuz were altogether marginalized, his obsessive hatred of Firuz did not dissipate.63 Moreover, in 1946, the Shah’s ability to oppose any agreement reached by Qavam was augmented by the fact that, by then, Firuz was considered “a spokesman of the pro-Soviet element in Iran, outdoing the Tudeh party itself.”64

  On June 13, 1946, with much fanfare, Qavam announced that Firuz had finally succeeded in resolving all outstanding issues between the central government and Pishevari. The claim was far from the truth. Many apparently intractable issues, including the nature and limits of the “autonomous region’s” power, were left unresolved. But by then, with the Soviet troops gone, Pishevari felt more vulnerable and had softened some of his views and his rhetoric. In his own words, Western pressure on the Soviet Union—what he called his “big friend”—had changed the landscape.65 In reality, while in Tehran, Pishevari received a long, surprisingly harsh letter from Stalin, reprimanding him for his overzealous revolutionary rhetoric. Iran and Azerbaijan are not in a revolutionary situation, Stalin said, adding that “we could no longer keep [Soviet troops] in Iran, mainly because the presence of Soviet troops in Iran undercut the foundations of our liberationist policies in Europe and Asia. The British and Americans said to us that if Soviet troops could stay in Iran, then why could not the British troops stay in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece and also the American troops in China . . . therefore we decided to withdraw troops from Iran and China, in order . . . to unleash the liberation movements in the colonies.”66

  In spite of the remaining intractable issues between the two sides, both Pishevari and Qavam had to pretend progress was being made in the negotiations: Pishevari because Stalin had ordered him to soften his position and Qavam for two different reasons. He had promised Stalin he would soon resolve differences with Pishevari and, moreover, some Western diplomats at the time believed that Qavam had calculated that his position as prime minister was guaranteed only so long as the negotiations continued. The Shah, he knew, was trying to get rid of him, and prolonging the negotiations with the Soviets and Pishevari while showing some progress was one way to stay in power and block the Shah’s moves.

  The Shah was equally resolved to derail the agreement and depose Qavam. Was it likely that the proposed agreement with Pishevari would, as Qavam and his supporters suggest, pave the way for a more democratic, federal Iranian government, or would it set the nation on the slippery slope that would end in secession? While it is impossible to answer this question with certainty, the fate of the People’s Republics of Eastern Europe makes it far more likely that Iranian Azerbaijan would have soon followed a similar fate and disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

  The Shah focused his opposition to the agreement by adamantly opposing the part stipulating that “the Azerbaijan army will be incorporated into the Iranian army.”67 As the Shah never tired of repeating in future years, he had told Qavam that he “would prefer to have [his] hand cut off than to sign such a decree.”68 For several reasons, the Shah’s opposition key amongst them, Qavam’s negotiations with the Pishevari government collapsed. By then, Qavam had seen the writing on the wall. His plans for some kind of oil concession to the Soviets and an autonomy agreement with the Pishevari government were no longer a possibility, and he declared himself fully in agreement with the proposed operation by the Iranian military to retake Azerbaijan. On December 11, 1946, the Iranian military, commanded by the Shah and General Hajj Ali Razmara, entered and reoccupied the province of Azerbaijan. Before Iranian forces began to move, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, the Tudeh Party, and Pishevari’s propaganda department—one threatening war, another promising “resistance to death,” and the Tudeh Party offering full support to the Pishevari government—tried to deter Qavam and
the Shah from going through with the planned military operation. But both men, albeit for different reasons, held firm. In spite of the revolutionary bombast of Pishevari and his comrades—“there is death, but no retreat,” they had famously announced—once Iran’s military began to move into Azerbaijan, there was little serious resistance. The radical zeal of some of Pishevari’s policies, the heavy-handed approach of the Soviet “advisors” and of the exiles who had returned home with the Red Army—the Muhajirs—combined to create “the terror that gripped Azerbaijan at the time.”69 This terror had by then sapped what early enthusiasm there was amongst the people and had made the ruling party weak and isolated. Before the military operation, more than once, the Shah had made “reconnaissance flights over enemy-held territory, often in old planes, sometimes in small, twin-engined Beechcraft, and always without a radio.”70

  With no Soviet army to prop them up and no people to support them, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan collapsed sooner than anyone had imagined. Less than twenty-four hours after the invasion, the Party conceded defeat. In the morning, the Democratic Party’s official organs had called on people to resist the attackers, and around eight o’clock in the evening, the same organs asked people not to fight the Iranian army. It has been estimated that during the first stage of the operation 500 people were killed on both sides. On the second day of the military operation, the Soviet Ambassador requested an emergency meeting with the Shah. He marched into the room and angrily demanded an immediate end to all hostilities. Unbeknownst to him, by then the Shah had already received reports that the Azerbaijan government had collapsed and surrendered. With glee in his eyes, the Shah showed the incredulous Ambassador copies of the reports from the region, indicating that the hostilities had ended.71 Reports from citizens of Tabriz at the time, written on the day the military operations began, indicate that from early morning, as soon as people heard the Iranian army was on its way, they began to attack, disarm, and at times execute members of the Azerbaijan government, particularly the much-despised Muhajirs who had invariably been the most brutal in suppressing the people.72 Even earlier, people had shown their disgruntlement with the more radical policies of Pishervari’s comrades by celebrating, with more than usual fanfare, the birth dates of Shiite Imams.

  In solving the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, the Shah was helped by a number of factors. On the one hand, he had come to believe that his decisions were “really inspired and decided by that mystical power” to which he felt he owed his career. Ironically, even Qavam is reported to have occasionally engaged in the religious ritual called estekhareh in which the devout use either the Qu’ran or their worry beads to consult God about the wisdom or the likelihood of an action. More secular Iranians use the Hafez Divan for the same purpose, opening it to a random page, reading the ghazal (sonnet) on that page, and finding from it a guide to Heaven’s designs. In Qavam’s case, when faced with a dire decision like Azerbaijan, he used the worry beads he invariably carried in his pocket to find out what God wanted him to do.73 It was, the Shah told one of his authorized biographers, “divine intelligence that” directed his actions and even determined their timing.74 His policies in the Azerbaijan crisis, no less than any other of his decisions, were, in his mind, “part of [his] mystical life . . . and the mission ordained for [him] by higher powers.”75

  In less spiritual moments, the Shah attributed Iran’s ability to get the Soviet Red Army out of the country—incidentally, the only time the Soviets were forced to give up a territory they had occupied—at least partially to Truman’s “frank” and “stiff” notes to Stalin, demanding Soviet evacuation of its forces from Iran. Years later, in a press conference on April 24, 1952, Truman himself claimed that he “had to send an ultimatum” to Stalin to get its forces out of Iran. Later the same day, a White House spokesman clarified Truman’s declaration by saying that “the President was using the term [ultimatum] ultimately in a non-technical sense.” Truman further claimed that the U.S. message sent to the Soviet Union “was the major factor in bringing about Soviet withdrawal from Iran.”76 Recent material from the Soviet archives seems to indicate that in deciding to take his troops out of Iran, Stalin took into consideration a large number of factors, and not just pressures from the United States or promises from Qavam.77 Without access to all the deliberations of the Soviet leadership in the days this decision was made, it is impossible to measure the relative value and power of each of these factors in shaping Soviet policy.78 If we believe Stalin’s letter to Pishevari, the major reason for his decision to withdraw Soviet forces was that Iran was not ready for a revolution.

  The Shah believed that American intervention brought about a new stage in U.S.–Soviet relations, writing in his Answer to History that “it is fair to say that the Cold War began in Iran.”79 Others, like the American Consul in Tabriz have gone even further, suggesting that the “Cold War began on March 4, 1946. On that day fifteen Soviet armored brigades began to pour into the Northern Provinces in Iran.”80 Not accidentally, on March 5, Churchill delivered his famous speech warning of the rise of a new “Iron Curtain” around parts of the world. Truman had seen a draft of the address before it was delivered and showed his support for its content when he accepted the job of “introducing Churchill to the Fulton, Missouri audience.”81

  Not long after the end of the Azerbaijan crisis, the Shah decided to finally rid himself of Jenab-e Ashraf (His Eminence), a title he himself had bestowed on Qavam in the heat of the Azerbaijan crisis, long after Reza Shah had banned the use of all such titles. The Shah knew he still lacked the independent power base to dismiss Qavam without the support, or at least the tacit approval, of the American, if not the British, Embassy. As early as March 27, 1947, he told the American Embassy about charges of corruption against Qavam that “were brought to him daily” and wondered whether he should dismiss the Prime Minister for this reason. The Shah’s claim about allegations of corruption was not baseless. Qavam’s greed and penchant for bribes and kickbacks was by then widely rumored in Iran, and on occasion reported by foreign governments.82 But in 1947, the Shah’s real goal was not fighting corruption but soliciting the American Embassy’s support for removing Qavam. The American ambassador, George Allen, clearly understood what the Shah meant, but the United States still did not want Qavam removed, and thus Allen responded that “the responsibility for removing or sustaining the government should be placed on the Majlis.”83

  The Shah too understood what the Ambassador’s response implied, but he was not deterred and continued his effort to dismiss Qavam. In this endeavor, the uprising of southern tribes against Qavam inadvertently helped the Shah. Tribal leaders objected to the membership of Communists in Qavam’s cabinet. Qavam had no choice but to comply with their wishes, but dismissing the Communist members of his government would dissipate any remaining support he had on the Left. With the Right already against him and solidly in the Shah’s camp, Qavam was now clearly vulnerable, and the Shah knew this. By mid-October, the American Embassy had also changed its mind on Qavam. The State Department instructed its embassy in Tehran to “give all appropriate” support to any government the Shah appointed to replace Qavam.84

  By October 16, there was a rumor in Tehran that the Shah had ordered the arrest of Qavam. The once all-powerful Prime Minister who had dismissed the Shah as a novice was now worried enough to visit some of the generals close to the Shah that day “to find out what the true situation was.” The generals were not very helpful, claiming ignorance of the Shah’s plans. Yet they added to Qavam’s anxieties by saying that what they did know was that “the Shah was disgusted with the cabinet’s pro-Soviet orientation.” Even before the encounter, Qavam had confided to some of his supporters that “he was primarily afraid of Iranian army.”85 The army, Qavam knew, was fully in the Shah’s camp.

  Anxious about his fate, a now-chastened Qavam asked to meet with the Shah on October 17. By then, the Shah had, in his own words, “spent three sleepless nights” trying to decide w
hether the time to fire Qavam had finally arrived.86 According to the Shah, Qavam was “trembling with fright” when he arrived at the Court. With anger in his voice and agitation in his movements, the Shah demanded that members of the Tudeh Party and Mozzafar Firuz “must be dismissed.” Left with few options, Qavam agreed to reshuffle the cabinet and rid it of Communist members, but on Firuz he offered a compromise. Instead of firing him, he would send him to Russia as Iran’s ambassador. The Shah agreed but later confided to a friend that he had accepted the idea of sending Firuz to Moscow only “because Iranian ambassadors were always treated like dogs by the Kremlin.”87

  By the end of the meeting, Qavam and the Shah “drew up a new cabinet list,” but the Shah had one last demand: he wanted Qavam to keep the decision to fire the Communist ministers a secret for twenty-four hours and announce it to the media as a fait accompli. This way, the Tudeh Party would have no chance to try and preempt the reshuffle by organizing demonstrations, and the Soviets would have no opportunity to make new threats. Qavam agreed to the Shah’s demand, but no sooner had he left the Court than he “promptly told Firuz who told Soviet ambassador.”

  As expected, Russia immediately reacted angrily to the plan, making new threats. Qavam tried to use the threat to frighten the Shah into accepting another delay in their planed reshuffle, “lest the Soviet troops might enter the country.”88 The Shah did not relent. Moreover, the American Embassy had by then already assured the Shah that, in the case of a Soviet attack, the United States would be there to help. More crucially, the Shah knew that getting rid of the Communists in the cabinet would both endear him to the Truman administration and become the necessary first step in getting rid of Qavam.