The Shah
Page 22
Nevertheless, the British needed to appear willing to negotiate. Thus, beginning in 1948, and again in 1949, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, later renamed British Petroleum, or BP) sent a representative named Neville Gass to renegotiate the terms of the company’s agreement with Iran. By then AIOC was principally owned by the British government because the Admiralty bought 85 percent of its energy from the company at discount prices. Gass’s interlocutor in Iran was a career politician named Abbasgoli Golshai’yan, who never survived the taint of what came to be known as the Gass-Golshai’yan or Supplemental Oil Agreement.7
According to the Supplemental Oil Agreement, signed on July 27, 1949, Iran’s actual revenue for each barrel of oil would have gone from 22 cents per barrel to 33 cents per barrel. Britain heralded it as a new beginning for Iran—a fairer agreement than any oil-producing nation of the world had ever been offered before. This was hardly the case. By then Mexico had nationalized its oil, and the United States had offered Venezuela a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement and was about to do the same with Saudi Arabia.
Mossadeq, by then in charge of a key Majlis committee with oversight over all oil negotiations, took up the mantle of defeating the Supplemental Agreement, calling it a betrayal of Iran’s sovereign rights. The Shah’s position on the Supplemental Agreement was at best inconsistent. In fact there were clear discrepancies between his public pronouncements and what he told the British Embassy in private.
The British were pressuring the Shah to use his influence to help ratify the Agreement. The Shah was in those days planning his first visit to the United States and to Europe, and the British Embassy in Tehran tried to convince him to cancel his trip in order to attend to the task of getting the Agreement ratified. On more than one occasion, the Shah assured the British privately that he was in favor of the Supplemental Agreement and was doing everything in his power to help get it ratified. But he also warned that, given Mossadeq’s opposition and the national mood, its passage was unlikely.
As the pressure to cancel his trip increased, the Shah told British officials that he had asked Mohammad Saed, then the prime minister, to remain in office “until he had secured the ratification of the supplemental oil agreement.”8 But neither Saed nor anyone else could muster the votes in the Majlis for the passage of such an agreement. Few politicians, and certainly not the Shah, dared offer public support for it. When the Supplemental Oil Agreement was submitted to the Majlis on December 19, 1949, the oil commission, chaired by Mossadeq, unanimously rejected it. The British Embassy, angry at the outcome, complained bitterly of the Shah’s inability to deliver on his promise to help pass the bill: “It is generally felt he must be either a knave or a fool, or both.”9
The Shah was neither. He was a pragmatic politician, keen on retaining his power and keeping his options open. He knew public support for the Supplemental Agreement was the kiss of political death. He knew that Mossadeq was the man of the hour and that nationalization of oil was the most popular and dominant demand of the moment. More than once, he publicly declared his undivided support for the nationalization movement. Anyone who opposed the movement or its leader, the Shah knew, did so at great peril. He also knew what the British might do to him should he part policy with them, and he knew that Mossadeq was no friend of the Pahlavi dynasty.
The political horizon looked bleak for the Shah. He could seize absolute power, dissolve the Majlis, and arrive at some kind of agreement that paid lip service to nationalization, but in fact perpetuated British control of Iranian oil by agreeing to some disguised form of the Supplemental Agreement. He had neither the temperament nor the public support for such an aggressive move. He also knew the United States would be opposed to this idea.
During his November 1950 trip to the United States, the Shah met with President Truman and addressed a joint session of Congress. In the course of his negotiations with Truman administration officials, including the President, the Shah learned that the United States favored a more equitable deal for Iran in its negotiations with AIOC. By the end of his trip, he was convinced that the Truman administration had concluded that nationalization of Iran’s oil was a foregone conclusion and that Britain should learn to live with it. The American government had further concluded that “it was not in the interest of the West as a whole for the United States to be identified with any plan put forth by the British which did not recognize the principle of nationalization.”10 More than once during those months, the Truman administration nearly resolved to publicly break with Britain and side with the Iranian nationalists. But late in 1951 Churchill came back into power and made Truman understand in no uncertain terms that Britain’s continued support in the Korean War was predicated on America’s help in Iran.11
The Shah’s second alternative was to accept Mossadeq and nationalization and resign himself to a merely ceremonial role. As he had repeatedly said, he never took this option seriously as he was unwilling to accept the role of a ceremonial leader. He also knew cooperating with Mossadeq meant a direct confrontation with Britain. By the end of 1952, the Shah had learned that even the Truman administration had lost patience with Mossadeq, making this second option even less appealing.
His third alternative was to accept as prime minister a charismatic politician who could stand up to Mossadeq and solve the oil crisis. He disliked that option, knowing full well that it was precisely as a charismatic prime minister that his father had ascended the throne and overthrown the old Qajar dynasty.
As the British waited anxiously for the Shah to find a solution to the oil question, a number of Iranian politicians contacted the British Embassy or government and suggested that they were ready and able to solve the oil problem in a manner favorable to the British. On December 10, 1950, Seyyed Zia had met with officials of the British Embassy and complained about the interference of the royal family, “particularly princess Ashraf,” in public affairs. He went on to say that “activities of the Shah” had reached a stage where they threatened the dynasty. He even claimed that “there was now a good deal of talk about a republic” and that Qavam was soon going to announce his plans to create such a republic.12 On December 17, 1950, Zia had lunch with the British Ambassador again and this time told him that the Shah was an utter failure and had failed in “everything he had undertaken.” He also made it clear that he himself was “ready to take office whenever the moment was convenient and then went so far as to say that if [the British] government were interested in hearing details of a plan, he would be very glad to impart them.”13
Almost a year later, it was Qavam’s turn to contact the British and indicate that he, too, was “ready to take office” and to “dissolve the Majlis and arrange an election of a new one sympathetic to the British interests” and press for a “modified agreement with the Anglo-Iranian oil company.”14 In November 1951, he threw all caution to the wind, and met directly with the British Ambassador, saying that he hoped that, “sincerely assisted” by the British, he could come to power. Three months later, on February 7, 1952, in a meeting with Julian Amery, a high-ranking British official, he laid out his detailed plans. The meeting took place in Paris, where Qavam was visiting; and much to Amery’s surprise, Qavam had also invited Captain David Drummond—aka Prince Hamid Qajar, the man who in 1941 had been rejected as a candidate to replace the Shah only because he spoke no Persian. Qavam made no effort to hide his disdain for the Shah and the fact that he preferred Drummond/Qajar as a king.15 Qavam’s plans to come back to power faced two obstacles: the Shah was adamantly opposed to his appointment, and the British were still not ready to abandon the Shah in favor of a man they considered “the master of the double-cross.”
In a later meeting, Qavam informed the British Embassy that the time to act was now and that he was made “anxious by report . . . that there were frequent contacts between Mossadeq and the Russian embassy.”16 During these months, Qavam, according to a British Embassy report, was receiving financial aid and support from none other than the Shah’s
mother, who was also worried about what she considered her son’s weakness and indecision.17
Even the Shah’s siblings were not free of the temptation to enter the fray. As early as February 1950, Ali Reza, the Shah’s only full brother, met with British officials to register his approval of the Supplemental Agreement and his dismay at the Shah’s handling of the matter. A few months later, he became even more critical and ambitious. On December 13, 1951, Ali Reza called the British Ambassador to his palace, and bitterly complained that “he was allowed to take no part in the affairs of the state whatsoever by his brother.”18 The fact that he was the Shah’s only full brother, and the fact that the powerful Queen Mother “was very anxious for him to be made crown prince” made these comments even more significant.19 British officials were “struck by the bitterness, mixed with contempt, with which Ali Reza spoke of his brother.”20 A few months later, the Prince again asked to see the British Ambassador and he went even further in criticizing the Shah. He made it “quite clear that in his opinion the Shah did not have the necessary strength of character” to uproot the corrupt ruling class and bring about necessary “fundamental reforms.” Instead of deposing the Shah at the time—“to make a change at this critical moment” would be dangerous, Ali Reza said—he recommended that he be named commander in chief.21
About the same time, one of the Shah’s half-brothers, Abdul Reza, had met with the American Ambassador and suggested that he be put in charge of the country’s economic situation.22 Even Sardar Fakher Hekmat, for many years speaker of the Majlis, and an ally of the Shah, complained to the British Embassy in 1951 about the Shah’s inaction and indecision, and how Hekmat’s words of warning “seemed merely to bounce off the thick head of the king—as he himself put it.”23 Hekmat wanted the British government to make it clear to the Shah that “unless he behaves in a more manly and decisive manner,” there would be no chance to save his throne.
As the Shah contended with these forces, Britain and the United States preferred the appointment of a powerful prime minister to take on Mossadeq. For both countries, Iran was too important to allow the Shah’s private trepidations to become an insurmountable obstacle to that option. The Shah tried to buy himself some time by appointing loyal “caretaker” prime ministers. On each occasion he would assure the British Embassy that he had instructed the Prime Minister to get the Supplemental Agreement passed. It was no surprise that none of his chosen prime ministers succeeded in passing the Agreement, and thus, on June 26, 1950, the Shah had no choice but to agree to the appointment of General Hajj Ali Razmara as the new prime minister. By then Razmara was in his third term as chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Only weeks earlier, the Shah had declared that “he [would] never agree to General Razmara becoming Prime Minister.”24 He knew that the British had earlier had serious reservations about Razmara. In 1949, for example, they had described him as “probably the most feared and disliked man in Persia today.” They called him a corrupt, ambitious intriguer “who trims his sail to any wind.” They also reported on rumors of his “pro-Soviet inclination.”25
But by June 1950, Razmara realized his hour had arrived. In a series of meetings with British and American officials, he promised to bring about both political reforms in the country and the resolution of the oil crisis by helping pass “a revised agreement” that was within the existing formula. He demanded that both embassies pressure the Shah to come out publicly in support of him. He also wanted the British Embassy to tell Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani—a powerful Shiite cleric and a leader of the nationalization movement—that the cleric “would not have [British] support in opposing him.”26 Finally, the British were convinced that Razmara was the Jason who could deliver to them their golden fleece.
Razmara was easily one of the most erudite officers in the Iranian military. He had by 1950 published dozens of books on matters relating to geography, cartography, and military strategy. He was also an avid memoirist, leaving behind detailed accounts of his travels and encounters. He was a man of infinite political ambition—and considerable guile.
But it proved hard to convince the Shah to offer full support to the ambitious general. The Shah was not alone in worrying about Razmara’s ambitions. The British government, arguably his most ardent advocate, worried that he might “be tempted to act across constitutional processes” and move against the Shah. But the situation was “so serious that the risk,” according to the British, “was deemed well worth taking.”27
The Shah was certainly less sanguine about such risks as they threatened his throne. For a while, he had resisted the Razmara appointment by claiming “he had not been certain” about the British attitude toward such a move. When on June 19, 1950, the British reiterated their full support for the Razmara appointment, the Shah said disingenuously that “he was relieved to hear this.”28 Ultimately, he even had to accede to British and American demands that “he should go out of his way to demonstrate he was supporting Razmara.”29 Before taking the final leap, the Shah sent Ernest Perron to the British Embassy to tell them categorically that once Razmara was appointed prime minister, “he would not be allowed to have any say in military affairs.”30
While the Shah worried about Razmara’s ambition, the new prime minister had oil on his mind. He knew he had a formidable enemy in Mossadeq, and he also knew his survival depended on his ability to solve the oil crisis. He wanted to forge an agreement that was acceptable to Britain and palatable to the people of Iran, whose nationalist sentiments had been aroused by Mossadeq. Razmara tried to convince the nation that nationalization was not in Iran’s best interest. He hired an American advisor to argue that nationalization was not a wise decision for Iran. He even argued that Iran was simply incapable of managing its oil industry. “We can’t even build the handle of an ewer,” he infamously said in a speech before the parliament. He had envisioned a series of grandiose reforms—from decentralization of the government to dismissing corrupt government officials—and hoped to use them to win the hearts and minds of the people. He tried to pressure the Shah to decrease the military budget and allow the use of those sums for social reforms. He had also asked the U.S. and British governments for loans and aid for implementing these badly needed changes. More than once, Razmara told the British that, should they desire to provide Iran with any foreign assistance, they should make it clear that it could not be used for “unnecessary things such as airplanes.”31 Clearly, he and the Shah did not see eye to eye on budgetary matters.
As arguments between the two men ensued, the Shah complained to the British Embassy that “activity against the Shah was being carried out by Razmara or [at] any rate the people in his confidence.”32 The British dismissed these complaints and considered them the result of the Shah’s jealousy and mistrust. At the same time, they believed that “the Shah had begun to oppose Razmara through the Majlis a week after his ministry began.”33 The plot thickened considerably when, in the heat of Razmara’s battles with the Majlis, the Shah agreed to allow Ayatollah Kashani to return to Iran after a brief period of exile. Whisper had it that the Shah’s primary intention was to have the cantankerous Ayatollah weaken the ambitious General. If indeed that was his intent, the ploy worked. Almost immediately, Kashani became one of Razmara’s most forceful enemies. He declared it the duty of every Iranian to “oppose the government.” Mossadeq and his allies used even stronger language in their attacks on the General. Some went so far as to compare him with Hitler.34
The Shah’s relationship with his prime minister was further complicated by the fact that his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, was having an affair with the dashing officer. Both were married at the time, yet their letters, published in recent years, clearly indicate an intimate, intensely amorous relationship. He calls her “my kind beloved” (Aziz-e Mehrabanam) and addresses her using the informal singular “you” in Persian (to) while she calls him “my dear general” (General-e Azizam). When she complains of his fickle ways, saying that he had forgotten her during one of his trips
, he defends himself by saying that he had sent “everyday a telegram. Every day I have written you a note.” The letters also show Ashraf’s fervent attempt to keep her general in her brother’s camp. It might, she says, be “God’s will that my brother will have his commands and ideals materialized by you.”35
Razmara believed he had trumped all of the Shah’s machinations against him when he convinced the British government to agree to what was close to a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement. He told the Majlis that he wanted to deliver an important speech and intimated that the final resolution of the oil crisis was now at hand.
On March 7, 1951, however, as he tried to enter a mosque in the center of Tehran, an Islamist terrorist, a devotee of Kashani’s, met him with three bullets. Not long after he was taken to the hospital, he was declared dead. Rumors of the Shah’s hand in the assassination began to spread immediately. Razmara had been reluctant to go to the mosque that day, but Assadollah Alam, the Shah’s closest confidante, had repeatedly urged him to go. Alam was, in fact, questioned by the police after the assassination. All these facts added poignancy to the rumors. The assassin, as it turned out, was a member of the Feda’yan-e Islam. The General’s assassination paved the way for the passage of the Oil Nationalization Act and for Mossadeq’s rise to the pinnacle of power.
The Shah’s murky attitude toward nationalization was evident when he appointed Hussein Ala to replace Razmara. Soon after the appointment, Alam met with British officials, who told him to ask the Shah to “use all his influence to persuade deputies under his control [to stay] away from the Majlis,” and thus render a quorum impossible. This had become the last British weapon to abort the nationalization bill. Alam told them that “43 of the Majlis’s 131 deputies,” known to be allied with the Shah, “would stay away.”36 At the same time, Ala, the new prime minister, told British officials that “all Persians regard nationalization as a desirable principle.”37