The Shah

by Abbas Milani

Concurrent with his offer to Mossadeq to leave the country, the Shah also began to think about a possible replacement for Mossadeq, should he indeed carry out his threat and resign. For some time, his favorite candidate had been Alahyar Saleh, an eminent leader of the National Front. In May 1951, the Shah in fact had had a long talk with Saleh and had been “more favorably impressed than ever.” Saleh, at least according to the Shah, had been “quite critical” of Mossadeq and “had expressed complete devotion to Shah.”108 Ultimately, the Shah’s efforts to create a fissure between leaders of the National Front—particularly between Mossadeq and Saleh—failed. He had more success when it came to increasing the rifts within the nationalization movement in general. Within twenty hours of the meeting between Mossadeq and his emissary, the Shah was searching for a “means of getting message” to Saleh, while at the same time reemphasizing his opposition to General Fazlollah Zahedi.109 Aside from Saleh’s own attitude, the other obstacle to such an appointment was that the American State Department had “pronounced themselves as totally unfavorable to any idea that Alahyar Saleh should be successor to Mossadeq.”110 A showdown between Mossadeq and the Shah now seemed inevitable.

  On the morning of February 24, Mossadeq went to the Court and met with the Shah. Less then twelve hours earlier, “shortly before midnight,” Ala had met with Henderson at the American ambassador’s residence and indicated that Mossadeq had “promised not to press his grievances against the Shah at least for the time being.” The Shah had met with a delegation of deputies allied with Mossadeq and promised them that he would “make it clear once and for all that officers [in the] armed forces must look to Mossadeq not Shah for instructions.” He also agreed not to meet with “persons known to be critical of Mossadeq.” On the issue of land distribution, he refused to agree to Mossadeq’s demand.111 What made the Shah’s position more complicated was that, later in the same day, he received a message from some leading members of the Majlis, including some erstwhile supporters of Mossadeq, asking him “not to seek reconciliation with Mossadeq.” They assured the Shah that should Mossadeq attack him, the “majority of Majlis and country would be outraged and support Shah.”112

  In those days, a group of eight Majlis deputies, divided more or less equally between supporters of the Shah and supporters of Mossadeq, had been busy meeting with the two sides, hoping to heal the rift between the two men and to find a modus operandi wherein realities of the time and mandates of the constitution were both considered and implemented. Ultimately, the group of eight’s efforts came to naught. Not only did Mossadeq and the Shah have starkly different understandings of the constitution, but there was also a powerful external actor, namely Great Britain, who did not favor an amicable resolution to the stand-off. Moreover, by the time the group had arrived at a preliminary resolution, Mozzafar Baghai, one of the leaders responsible for creating the group, indicated that he was opposed to its implementation, as it would afford Mossadeq too much power.

  On the night of February 27, a distraught Ala told Loy Henderson that the Shah was planning to leave the country and had insisted on keeping his travel plans a secret, lest there be attempts to “prevent his departure.” Ala talked of the Shah’s “almost hysterical state,” adding that he “feared complete nervous breakdown and irrational action.”113 Ala also detailed the Shah’s plans to leave in a car the next day around five o’clock in the afternoon, accompanied by the Queen, two servants, and some guards. He had asked Mossadeq for $40,000 for two months’ living expenses, an additional $10,000 for the initial costs of travel, and his help in securing “an official invitation” for the royal couple from some foreign government.114 He meant to go first to Iraq, and from there, travel to Spain or Switzerland. Mossadeq had, according to Ala, given “his word of honor” to the Shah that during his absence, he would do nothing to undermine the Shah, and “the Shah [believed] Mossadeq.” Ala was sure this was just a ruse by Mossadeq and that there would be no return should the Shah leave the country. He wanted the United States to use all of its influence to deter the Shah from such a trip.115 But, as Ala repeated more than once, the Shah himself was anxious to leave.

  It was in this labyrinthine context that the February 24 meeting between Mossadeq and the Shah took place. Not surprisingly, it was anything but conciliatory. Mossadeq had apparently changed his mind about the wisdom of the Shah’s continued stay in the country. He was now convinced that “it might be good idea after all for Shah to leave country as soon as possible and to remain abroad until situation of the country [became] more stable.”116 The Shah knew, all too well, that precisely such a “temporary trip abroad” had ended the reign of not just Ahmad Shah but of the Qajar dynasty. The Shah’s suspicion about Mossadeq’s motives and plans was only increased when, in earlier discussions about the composition of the regency council (which would nominally head the government during the King’s absence), Mossadeq had insisted on “passing over” the Shah’s only full brother, Ali Reza, in favor of another half-brother, Gholam Reza. By law, the latter was forbidden from ascending the throne after the Shah, and thus Mossadeq was clearly forcing out of the regency the only brother who could succeed the Shah in case his foreign sojourn turned into permanent exile.117

  On the morning of February 28, according to the U.S. Embassy, whispers of the Shah’s imminent departure swept the city. There is much evidence to indicate that not only the Court, through Ala, but Qavam, Ayatollah Behbahani, an influential cleric in Tehran, and Ayatollah Kashani had all become active in mustering forces that would converge on the Court and try to pressure the Shah to reconsider. It was rumored that Mossadeq had threatened the Shah and that unless he left of his own volition, Mossadeq would have no choice but to ask the “people to choose between the Shah and himself.”118

  The night before the Shah’s rumored departure, at a dinner hosted by an American Embassy official, the guests included a number of bazaar merchants and a few political personalities; “all guests, with the exception of Khosrow Khan Ghashghai,” believed the Shah’s departure “would be detrimental to the interests of the country.”119 By the morning of the twenty-eighth, the embassy, along with a whole litany of de facto allies including Kashani were openly trying to “effect the cancellation or least postponement of the Shah’s plans to leave.”120

  The most serious obstacle to the success of this coalition’s effort came from the Shah himself. When the American Ambassador tried to engage the Shah in a conversation about the wisdom of his staying in the country, he “received an evasive answer.” The Shah, in Henderson’s view, was “now a nervous wreck,” “had jumped at the chance of escaping,” and thus “could not be dissuaded from leaving.”121 But events of that day surprised the Shah.

  At eleven o’clock on the morning of February 28, not long before Mossadeq’s arrival for what they both thought would be a farewell lunch, Ala met with the Shah to try for the last time to persuade him not to leave. But the Shah was not deterred. If I don’t go, he said, Mossadeq “would issue a proclamation attacking [me] and members of [my] family.” He did not, he said, want to engage in a squabble with Mossadeq. In the course of the meeting, news reached Ala and the Shah that Ayatollah Kashani was convening an emergency meeting of the Majlis—“with fifty-seven members present”—to discuss ways to convince the Shah not to leave the country. When the Shah received this news “he had become excited,” not because it was a sign of popular support for him or because it indicated a crucial breach between Mossadeq and his key ally, Kashani, but because such developments might stop his departure. He insisted on leaving at once, “before lunch.”122 In fact, the day before, a car carrying some of the royal couple’s personal belongings had already left the capital. Heavy snow impeded the car’s progress.

  Before long, another messenger arrived from the Majlis, reporting that a secret session of the parliament had passed a resolution indicating that the Shah’s departure “at this time would not be advisable.” Moreover, General Baharmast, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was s
aid to be “en route to the Court to inform the Shah that whole general staff had decided to resign in case Shah should leave the country.”123 Even that was not enough to deter the Shah. Only when a large crowd of “people demonstrated for the Shah” near the Court during the Shah’s meeting with Mossadeq did he change his mind about leaving the country.

  In that crowd, standing nervously atop the high wall that separated the Court compound from the outside world, was an agitated young man named Ardeshir Zahedi. “I hate heights,” he said, “but somehow I found myself on the wall, leading the crowds in their chants and slogans.”124

  The meeting between Mossadeq and the Shah was tense to begin with. But when the gathered crowd began to chant increasingly violent slogans, including the demand for Mossadeq’s death, the meeting came to an abrupt end. Soraya claims that she tried to calm a clearly agitated, perspiring, and “deathly pale” Mossadeq, and showed him how to leave the Court through the back door, thus avoiding the belligerent crowd. But at home too, an angry crowd awaited Mossadeq; when, according to the American Embassy, he appeared on the balcony in his famous pajamas in an “effort to quiet the throng,” he was booed down. Throughout the day, “loudspeakers were calling on people if they are for Shah now is time to demonstrate the fact.”125

  After the show of popular support, a buoyed Shah was once again resolved to stay and fight on. The American Embassy assessed that “the institution of the Crown may have more popular backing than expected.”126 They also noted that Kashani “has shown more power than expected both in influencing the Majlis and in quickly marshalling for mob action his fanatical followers.”127

  The British, on the other hand, saw the Shah as “a pawn” in the power struggle between Kashani and Mossadeq. That was why British officials did not take much comfort in the show of support for the Shah that day, as it was, in their view, “certainly organized by Kashani and was not a spontaneous expression of loyalty deep-seated or significant enough to stiffen the Shah.”128

  Nevertheless, at nine o’clock on the night of February 28, the Shah broadcast a message over the radio that embodied his new spirit. He said, “As I informed [the] public by communiqué issued by Court, on advice [of] my physician, it [was] necessary for me to go abroad for [a] pilgrimage and medical treatment for [a] short time. As all day today and in fact at this very moment, while I am speaking to you, I have witnessed [the] sincere feelings of [the] people, I gave up the idea of going on this trip and I expect [the] patriotic and valiant people of Iran in all parts of the country to maintain order so that by [the] help of [the] Almighty, Iran may continue along [the] path of honor.”129 Lest there be any doubt about who had managed to bring the crowds out into the streets, Ayatollah Kashani also issued a statement, “appealing to all to collaborate” with the clergy to “prevent” the Shah from going on a trip that would have “led to agitation in [the] country.”

  Mossadeq was particularly unhappy about the role he believed the United States had played in stopping the Shah from leaving the country. Shortly after his ill-fated meeting with the Shah, Mossadeq met with Henderson. He was in a bad mood, “apparently suffering from severe headache.” Henderson tried to convince Mossadeq to cease his attempts to get rid of the Shah, but Mossadeq contemptuously referred to those at the Court demonstrating against him, and those in the parliament passing a resolution in favor of the Shah as “British agents.” On other occasions, he called the demonstrators hoodlums, criminals, agitators, and foreign agents. To Henderson, he confirmed that he had gone to the Court to bid “the Shah farewell.” He was convinced that he could not “constitute necessary reform and obtain resolution of oil problem so long as Court served as basis of operation of British agents.”130

  On March 2, Mossadeq met Henderson again and asked him to “order all American citizens to keep off the streets.” When Henderson retorted that the safety of American citizens was the responsibility of the government, Mossadeq responded by accusing the United States of interfering in Iran’s domestic affairs and suggested that the Americans had played a key role in dissuading the Shah from leaving the country.131 The Shah, on the other hand, remained calm and resolute in his decision to stay in Iran. He met a delegation of Majlis deputies and told them “he had done nothing reprehensible” and that the people had already spoken in his favor.132 At the same time, a few days later, Mossadeq and a couple of his supporters confronted the Shah about the events of February 28, accusing him of laying a trap for Mossadeq. They claimed that the Shah had supposedly suggested he wanted to leave the country but organized demonstrations in his own support and against Mossadeq. The Shah, at least according to Mossadeq’s supporters, responded rather meekly, “We do not want to do anything above and beyond the constitution, and we do not wish to interfere in matters that are not within the purview of the King, and if some people have used [the occasion of my trip] to unsavory ends, the government must prosecute them fully.”133

  For Mossadeq, events of that February were a fiasco; for the Shah, they were a watershed event. Clearly the balance of forces, hitherto in favor of Mossadeq, was beginning to change in the Shah’s favor. Mossadeq had not only made his move against the Shah and failed, but, more crucially, his failure emboldened his foes, augmented the Shah’s power, revived the King’s sagging resolve, and increased tensions between Mossadeq and the American government. The once-despondent Shah, who had been tormented by an increasingly somber and defeatist attitude, was now in a much better, more self-assured, fighting spirit.

  Though he was an astute politician, Mossadeq still failed to realize the importance of his failed February move. On March 3, representatives of the Prime Minister and the Shah were both summoned to Qom by Ayatollah Boroujerdi, where they were given identical letters. The epistle ended with what must have been for Mossadeq an ominous hint and for the Shah a promising sign. The Ayatollah, until then a clear supporter of Mossadeq, this time asked him and the Shah to “preserve your unity and collaboration as before and thus prevent disorder and insecurity in the country.”134 In the tumultuous meeting in the Majlis in the days after the February 28 meeting, royalists criticized Mossadeq in sharp terms for not telling the parliament about “the Shah’s projected trip.” Mossadeq refused to accept any blame, instead referring to “certain provocative activities” against the government “emanating from Shah’s entourage”; he complained that “people broke into my house and I [was] compelled [to] climb [a] ladder in my pajamas and run away to [the American assistance organization] Point Four Office.”135

  Mossadeq ended his evasive retort by divulging his plans to hold a referendum. Almost a week before this public announcement, Mossadeq had told Henderson, the American ambassador, that he “might have a plebiscite throughout the country, Mossadeq supporters congregating in one mosque and his opponents in another.”136 During the same conversation, Mossadeq also articulated his theory of power—wherein lay the roots of his defiance toward the Shah, and toward the Majlis—a theory that came into direct conflict with the fundamentals of representative democracy. He was not, he told Henderson, the “Prime Minister of the Shah, or the Prime Minister of the Majlis, but the Prime Minister of the people.”137 He repeated much the same idea when he spoke to a jubilant crowd of supporters outside the Majlis. My real Majlis, he said, is here with you. Supporters have often praised these pronouncements as a laudable sign of Mossadeq’s democratic beliefs. In fact, they are the naked pronouncements of a populist, exhibiting a clear disregard for the checks and balances that define representative democracy and differentiate it from the rule of the mob.

  The idea of a referendum turned out to be surprisingly controversial. Abol Hassan Haerizadeh, once a key ally of the National Front, accused Mossadeq of “being [a] worse dictator than Reza Shah” and lambasted the idea of a referendum as the work of a “rebel government.”138 Other critics used the media to attack the idea of the referendum. By then a propaganda war against Mossadeq, some of it funded by the CIA’s BEDAMN operation, was in full force.1
39 A dubious idea like the referendum and an even more dubious exercise of forcing government opponents to cast their ballots in separate voting stations became perfect ammunition for this campaign. Another favorite weapon was Mossadeq’s continued insistence that he must be given special powers to govern—he demanded, and received from a pliant Majlis, the power to legislate. Even some of his allies began to see these powers as excessive and despotic.

  By early March, Tehran was preparing to hold the referendum, and the city was awash with rumors about a new clash between the Shah and his increasingly embittered yet still ambitious Prime Minister. The ultimate goal of the referendum was also not clear. The apparent purpose was to decide whether the parliament should be dissolved. In 1949 the Constituent Assembly had given this power to the Shah. He had refused to use it against Mossadeq—particularly when the British pressured him to dissolve the Majlis, dismiss the Prime Minister, and nullify the Nationalization of Oil Act. Now Mossadeq was keen on using a referendum to dissolve a parliament elected during his own government’s tenure.

  The Shah and the American Embassy saw the referendum as yet another sign of Mossadeq’s steady move “in [an] authoritarian direction” and in using the “technique of mobocracy.”140 The Shah and some of his supporters, as well as nearly all of Mossadeq’s more radical allies and supporters, also saw it as the first necessary step in ending monarchy in Iran. The referendum further split the ranks of the movement to nationalize oil. Ayatollah Kashani was openly and belligerently against the idea of a referendum and of Mossadeq himself. Other critics and foes of Mossadeq—from Mozzafar Baghai and General Fazlollah Zahedi to Ayatollah Boroujerdi and Ayatollah Behbahani—were now openly working to topple the government. The more isolated Mossadeq became, the more he had to rely on the Tudeh Party and the most radical members of the National Front; the more radical his camp became, the more united his foes became, and the more they came to enjoy the support of the British and American governments. As he admitted in later years, Ayatollah Khomeini had told his mentor, Kashani, in 1953 that Mossadeq was an infidel and did not deserve the support of the clergy or of the Muslim nation of Iran.