The Shah

by Abbas Milani

  Zahedi decided to send the telegram to the Shah shortly after delivering his victory speech on the radio around four in the afternoon of August 19. Some of his advisors and aides suggested that he should wait a day or two before sending the telegram. Let him sweat, they said, and he will be more manageable when he returns.76 But the General vetoed them all. As future events showed, his loyalty to the Shah was not fully requited.

  To expedite the Shah’s return home, a plane was chartered from KLM at the cost of $12,000. The Shah decided to leave Soraya in Rome for a few more days, arguing that Tehran still might not be safe enough for her. Aside from the Shah and his closest aides, aboard were “twenty newspaper men whom the Shah insisted on taking with him without the preliminary diplomatic red-tape concerning entry and travel visas.”77 When the airline hesitated to allow the journalists to board without proper papers and visas, the Shah, according to some journalists, “threatened to end the airline’s concession to fly over Iran unless the newsmen were authorized to board.”78 This was the first obvious hint of a newly self-assertive Shah who increasingly saw the law as a malleable tool of his modernizing authoritarian designs for Iran.

  The Shah seemed to have sensed how much the country had changed under Mossadeq. As the American Embassy in Tehran already understood, a “revolution. . .with deep-rooted origins in the wave of nationalism” had swept Iran. The old patterns of power had been “irrevocably shattered” and anyone who wanted to succeed in the new Iran, the embassy believed, “must shape his program on the basis of nationalist operations.”79 Maybe that was why, before leaving Rome, the Shah had sent the British government a message through the U.S. embassy, saying that in Tehran, “he may have to say some harsh things against the British, but that he will not reflect his true feelings.”80

  On his way back, the Shah stopped in Baghdad to thank the Iraqi King for his hospitality. In conversations with the journalists, he called Mossadeq “an evil man” who must be tried. He also refused to meet with the Iranian ambassador, Mozaffar A’lam. Eventually the Shah did forgive A’lam and allowed him to return to government work; but that day, his anger was too raw to agree to a meeting.

  He arrived back in Tehran in the early afternoon of August 22 under tight security conditions. The new cabinet, some members of the royal family, and the diplomatic corps were all at the airport, waiting to give the Shah an official welcome. No sooner had the plane landed than General Zahedi climbed rapidly up the stairs of the plane, and a few minutes later, emerged with the Shah. It was whispered that he did not wish to kiss the Shah’s hand, and that his fast move to board the plane before the Shah left it was in order to obviate a potentially embarrassing scene for the Shah.81

  As the Shah passed the line of eagerly waiting military commanders, he noticed that Colonel Nasiri was now a general. The Shah was not happy, and he immediately let it be known that he considered military promotions his sole monopoly power. This was the beginning of tensions between the Shah and the General who had saved his throne.

  A few hours after his arrival, at nine in the evening of August 22, the Shah delivered a short radio message to the “God-loving, patriotic and honorable people of Iran.” He thanked them for their “sincere sentiments” and reassured them that their action had, “from [a] thousand miles way,” removed all his fatigue and anxiety. With no sense of irony, he said, “As you know, on numerous occasions, I was ready to sacrifice my life for you, and in future too, I will not refuse if the occasion arises.”82 He talked of his own “unforgettable support for the national movement” and promised that “as in the past” he would work to move Iran “toward a democratic life, one fortunately mandated in Islam’s esteemed teachings.” As with all he said and wrote in those years, there was a heavy dose of religiosity in his words—part of his strategy of alliance with the clergy against Mossadeq and the Left. And then, in a thinly disguised reference to Mossadeq, the Shah said that the full weight of the law would be laid upon “those who violated the constitution, in spite of the oath they took, and who dissolved the Majlis, dissolved the army.”83 By the time the Shah made this announcement, Mossadeq had already decided to turn himself in. He was taken to the Officers’ Club where General Zahedi had set up his headquarters. He met Mossadeq upon his arrival. After polite words of greeting, Mossadeq was taken to a room that would henceforth serve as his prison.

  The Shah’s real mood and lingering anxieties, as well as his newfound confidence, were all evident in his first meeting with Loy Henderson, the American ambassador. The meeting took place at six o’clock in the early evening of August 23, and, at the Shah’s request, it was a private affair. Henderson began the meeting by conveying an oral message from President Eisenhower, congratulating the Shah on his return. Earlier that day, the Iranian Chief of Protocol had let foreign embassies know that “it would be appropriate for heads of state to send public congratulatory messages to the Shah of Iran.”84

  Henderson in fact took some liberties with the text of the message, adding an introductory paragraph to the message that the President had approved. He began by praising the Shah’s “great moral courage.” The Shah, according to Henderson, “wept as [he] read this message,” and then asked the Ambassador to tell the President how grateful he was for the “interest the US had shown in Iran.” He called what had happened in Iran in those crucial August days “a miracle,” and said he believed it was “wrought. . .due to [the] friendship of the West, to [the] patriotism of the Iranian people and to [the] intermediation [sic] of God.”85 He added that in his mind, if he had failed, Iran would have had no “alternative but communism.” He emphasized that it was “his intention to completely root out subversive press. . .and completely wreck Tudeh organization.” At the same time, he wanted to know “how soon can [U.S. aid] come in and in what quantities and form?”86 He and Zahedi both knew that their political success, even their survival, might well depend on the quick resolution of the oil issue and a fast revival of the troubled economy. Millions of dollars were almost immediately given to the Zahedi government. Even the Russians, who had prevaricated and procrastinated in giving the Mossadeq government the gold and currency they owed Iran at the end of World War II, were now willing to pay their debt expeditiously.

  The Shah surprised Henderson when he offered his own analysis of why the plans for the night of August 15 failed. Someone, the Shah said, “must have betrayed them,” and then ventured to ask, “Could it have been British agents?” Henderson’s answer was categorical, delivered in a tone of stern admonishment. He “expressed surprise” at the Shah’s proposition, saying he “knew for [a] fact that [the] British were dealing honestly with him and he should get out of his head once and for all [the] idea they [were] engaging in double-dealing.” And then, in a surprisingly stern tone, he told the Shah he “hoped he would never again make, either to British or Americans, remarks which might tend” to undermine the mutual confidence that existed between the United States and Britain.87

  The Shah also talked at some length about why he was not happy with the Zahedi cabinet. He was, he said, happy with Zahedi himself and had “complete confidence in him.” Nor did he believe the General had “ambitions other than [to] serve Iran and its Shah.” Members of his cabinet, however, were a different story. They are, the Shah said, the “same old faces which had been rotating in office for years. He had hoped for [a] Cabinet which would stimulate the country particularly youth.” He was more than ever convinced of the urgent need for rapid economic change—from land reform to new laws facilitating and encouraging foreign investment. He was also convinced “that Mossadeq’s popularity was partially founded on his reputation for honesty,” persuading the Shah that he should pick up the banner of fighting corruption.88

  The Shah also told Henderson that he had been informed that “Americans [had] insisted Amini be included as Minister of Finance and that Cabinet be selected before his arrival and presented [to] him as fait accompli.” The Ambassador denied the allegation, but every indica
tion is that the Shah did not accept Henderson’s denial and never came to trust Amini. Within weeks of this conversation, the Shah also changed his attitude about Zahedi. He had resolved upon his return to concentrate in his own hands much of the power that had been invested in the prime minister’s office, by law and post–World War II practice. But as the American Embassy noted, General Zahedi’s “past experience,” his “resistance to British and Soviet policies. . .his close identification with the National Front from 1949–1952,” made it unlikely that he would easily give in to the Shah’s effort to weaken the role of the prime minister.89 The Shah thus knew that the first necessary step for achieving his goal was the removal of Zahedi as prime minister. The task proved harder than he had imagined.

  The United States was not the only big power to send the Shah a letter of congratulation. Winston Churchill also sent a brief oral message saluting and congratulating the Shah. As diplomatic ties between Iran and Britain had been cut by Mossadeq, Churchill’s message had to be conveyed through the American Embassy. Churchill congratulated the Shah, “on [his] safe return. . .,” and added, “May I express the sincere hope that success will now attend your efforts to guide Persia toward those better things which you have always so ardently desired for her.”90 The Shah responded by saying that he “deeply appreciated” Britain’s good wishes, which, he said, “fortified him in meeting the difficult tasks ahead.” The Shah also “asked that this exchange of messages be held completely secret.”91 In drafting the message to the Shah, Churchill had decided against mentioning the question of oil. At the same time, he kept in mind the Shah’s “almost pathological distrust of the British”—a distrust that was again confirmed when Loy Henderson delivered Eisenhower’s message of congratulation.

  Late at night on August 23, the Shah also met with Kermit Roosevelt. No sooner had Roosevelt entered the room than a “frock-coated attendant appeared with tiny glasses of vodka and caviar canapés.” If Roosevelt is to be believed, the Shah’s first words were, “I owe my throne to God, my people, my army—and to you!” The Shah also talked of his plans to put Mossadeq on trial and give him “three years of house arrest in his village,” and then allow him to be “free,” but confined to “move about in but not outside” his village. The Shah also indicated, according to Roosevelt, that when Fatemi was arrested—“and he will be” found and arrested, he said—“he will be executed.” In those days, Fatemi had taken refuge with the Tudeh Party, who were hiding him in their safe houses. By way of a gift, the Shah gave Roosevelt a “large, flat, golden cigarette case.”92

  As the Shah tried to concentrate more and more power in his own hands, and as he now faced Zahedi’s resistance in this effort, both men knew the country was in desperate need of money; there was also considerable pressure on the two to resolve the oil issue rapidly. The question of when to resume the severed diplomatic ties with Britain also needed a resolution. Messages from political figures like Kashani warning against the resumption of diplomatic ties confirmed the depth of anti-British resentment in the country. The British government, on the other hand, was eager to regain its foothold in Iran and its control of at least part of the country’s oil industry; they were thus exerting pressure for a speedy resumption of diplomatic ties.

  The issue of relations with Britain and the resolution of the oil crisis were, of course, inseparable. By December 1953, it was decided that the time to resume diplomatic ties with Britain had arrived. The Shah and Zahedi both had some reservations about the early resumption of ties, but Loy Henderson and Alfred Escher, the Swiss ambassador to Iran who also represented the British government’s interests during their embassy’s closure, worked hard behind the scenes to convince them to allow the resumption of full diplomatic ties. When in December of 1953, Iran finally agreed to resume ties, Britain announced that it had named Denis Wright as its chargé d’affaires in Tehran.

  Wright was surprised at the appointment as he knew nothing about Iran—he was a man more experienced in the world of oil politics. But oil was Britain’s biggest concern and thus sending an “oil man” as the first diplomat made sense. Wright eventually learned that Iran had also predicated the resumption of ties with Britain on the condition that no one who had served in Iran during the tumultuous days of Mossadeq would return to the embassy—hence Wright’s appointment.93

  At the Foreign Ministry, Wright was given his marching orders: he was to strive to resume full diplomatic ties, and if possible, “bring back AIOC alone”—that is, as the sole oil monopoly in Iran. Failing that, Wright was to strive for the best achievable form of shared control of Iran’s oil with primarily American companies. Finally, he was to insist on receiving “fair compensation. . .for the loss of enterprise in Iran.”94 For the British, as future negotiations showed, the question of compensation was as much an issue of pride and revenge as a financial matter—forcing the insolent natives to submit to the will of imperial Britain.

  As Wright soon realized after arriving in Tehran, he had been given a tall order. He had been in Tehran only two weeks when he wrote in his singular, wry fashion, “with the single exception of the Pakistani chargé d’affaires, who is not particularly bright,” no one in Tehran believes it remotely possible to bring AIOC back. Even then, the British failed to understand the depth of nationalist sentiments against them in Iran.95

  Ironically, Denis Wright arrived in Tehran on the last day of Mossadeq’s military tribunal; just as the Shah had told Roosevelt a few months earlier, Mossadeq was sentenced to three years in prison, and the coincidence of the British envoy’s arrival on the day the sentence was handed down “did not pass unnoticed in the Tehran Press.”96 As he was driving from the airport to the expansive British Embassy compound, Wright was told that a dinner appointment had already been made for him for the next night. He was to meet with special emissaries of the Shah—Ernest Perron and Bahram Shahrokh, who had made his name for being the booming voice of strident Nazi broadcasts to Iran.

  The next evening, as planned, Wright met with Perron and Shahrokh. The two men reiterated the claim that they were representing the Shah and probed Wright about the terms of the oil settlement he envisioned. They then went on to “criticize General Zahedi. . .and inquired whether the British government would object if the Shah dismissed Hussein Ala as Court Minister.” Wright told them “in London General Zahedi was held in high regard, while what the Shah did with Hussein Ala was his affair and no concern of the British government.”97 Wright also refused to engage the two men in any substantive discussion of oil. Moreover, the next day, Wright informed a Zahedi confidante about his unusual meeting with the two royal emissaries.

  Two days later, during a small Christmas party at the embassy, the two men came back unannounced to meet with Wright. They produced a paper that they claimed contained the verbatim views of the Shah as he had articulated them just that morning. The note said that “all matters of high policy, i.e., matters above or outside the diplomatic routine should be presented to His Majesty” through either Perron or Shahrokh. It also specified that “once you have received suggestions on the oil matter. . .you inform His Majesty through” the same channel “in advance, and [that] before you present them to the Minister of Foreign Affairs you await His Majesty’s approval or counter-proposal.” The note further indicated that “His Majesty accepts the principles” proposed by Britain on how to resolve the oil issue, but also said that the agreement “must be face-saving for the Persian government.”98

  Wright found the note and its mode of delivery unacceptable. He told the emissaries that he disliked the idea of dealing with the Shah without the knowledge of the cabinet; in fact, after seeking the permission of the Foreign Office, Wright informed a member of the Zahedi government of the “full story.” When Zahedi learned of the incident, he was reportedly so angry that he took a plane to Ramsar, where the Shah was vacationing, and confronted—in Wright’s words “berated”—the Shah about his attempt to bypass the Prime Minister and the members of the
cabinet on sensitive foreign policy and oil issues.99 The Shah was not happy about Wright’s maneuvers. He was also not willing to take the blame for Perron and Shahrokh’s clumsy handling of the matter, telling Zahedi and the British that the two had acted on their own.

  This was hardly a favorable beginning for the Shah’s relationship with Denis Wright. At the same time, the inauspicious beginning marked the Shah’s first step in his eventually successful effort to concentrate in his own hands all sensitive oil negotiations and issues of foreign policy. More than a decade later, when Wright returned to Iran as an ambassador, what had been in 1954 the Shah’s unacceptable mode of handling sensitive state matters became in 1964 precisely how Wright and other important ambassadors conducted their business. The only difference was that the contact person was no longer Perron but the Court Minister. By then, Perron had died in a hospital, alone and bereft.

  In spite of this initial tense encounter with Wright in 1953, the Shah did not relent in his effort to find a way to dismiss Zahedi. But the Shah’s “feelers” were still met with stiff resistance by the American and British Embassies. In May 1954, when the Shah dropped hints about Zahedi’s imminent dismissal, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles instructed the American Embassy in Tehran that it was “essential Shah have no doubt regarding firmness of United States support for Zahedi and our deep concern at indications Shah may be considering change of government.”100 The reason for this categorical support was clear: both Britain and the United States believed that Zahedi had the gravitas and power to resolve the oil issue.