The Shah

by Abbas Milani

  In a meeting with embassy officials not long after his dismissal, Perron himself offered a reason for the break, calling it “necessary for the full development of the Shah’s personality.” In the words of the embassy, Perron now envisaged “himself as a sort of father image with whom his majesty had to break in order to assert his own influence.”11 Though Perron was no Falstaff and the Shah no Henry, the embassy report, in the words of the writer and filmmaker Ebrahim Golestan, certainly conjures memories of this bitter break.12

  The 1957 profile of the Shah noted another crucial change in him. While in 1951 the embassy had stressed the Shah’s “lack of confidence” and his incessant need “to seek advice at every turn,” he now felt less and less in need of any advice. This newfound self-confidence had both domestic and international roots. It was partially the result of his belief that his return to Iran after 1953 was a reaffirmation of his monarchy. It was also founded in his budding belief that he was not just a national but an international leader. At least in the eyes of some foreign diplomats, his sense of global mission began in November 1956, in response to the Suez Crisis. At that time, the Shah chaired a four-power Muslim heads-of-state meeting in Tehran. The meeting brought together leaders from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan and “provided Iran with an active role in an international crisis which [had] no parallel in modern times.”13 By the early 1970s, this sense of international import was in full bloom.

  But even in 1957, when this confidence and the undemocratic elements incumbent in his authoritarian modernization were only in their earliest formative stages, some observers saw potential trouble on the horizon. Some surmised that, given his innate tendency to be “indecisive,” he did not have “all the firmness necessary for a man” who wanted to rule, not reign.14

  The 1957 profile also hinted at what soon enough became one of the biggest challenges the American and British governments faced in their dealings with the Shah. Though the report emphasized the Shah’s “fear of communism,” it went on to say that he had been “reportedly impressed by economic advances he observed in the Soviet Union.”15 Moreover, after much trepidation about the wisdom of accepting the Soviet government’s invitation to visit the country in 1956, and after some consultation with British and American officials, he decided to go. The Soviets had by then already begun something of a charm offensive. They informed him that they had decided to lodge him at the Kremlin itself—at “Ivan Veliky tower . . . somewhere near [where] Stalin used to sleep.” It was the first time a reigning monarch “was ever accommodated in the Kremlin itself . . . except Napoleon who hardly counted as a guest.”16

  After returning from Moscow, the Shah took some pride in telling British and American diplomats about the uncompromising positions he had taken while in the Soviet Union. He said the Soviet leaders had “frankly admitted past mistakes (attributed to Stalin) in their policy towards Iran. They appeared genuinely anxious to turn over a new leaf.” The Shah said he even criticized his hosts for their continued support of the “subversive activities” of the Tudeh Party. British sources confirmed the story that the Shah had “stood up” to Soviet leaders, but they also reported that in private conversations, Soviet leaders “expressed considerable admiration for the Shah’s abilities and personality.”17 Aside from these small diplomatic gains, little of substance was changed in Iran’s relation with the USSR. The Shah’s “natural inclination” was to mistrust “everybody, and when in doubt the Russians most of all.”18 Was this about to change?

  As early as 1957 the Shah had grown increasingly weary of rumors that the United States was “playing with” the Iranian opposition and “working with urban middle class leaders” against him. He consistently complained that Turkey and Pakistan were receiving more aid from America than Iran did. America’s continued resistance against a bigger military for Iran continued to frustrate him. He finally recognized that he and his regime were increasingly seen as wards of the United States. Flirting with the Soviets, the American Embassy believed, would become appealing to the Shah because it “[would] frighten the US into more aid” and divert public criticism away from the regime. It was, however, the common wisdom in the West that regardless of his frustrations, the Shah was sufficiently pro-Western in his core values that he would never make anything more than “surface gestures towards Soviets.”19 By January 1959, this common wisdom was suddenly challenged.

  There were a number of added reasons why the Shah was tempted to flirt with the Soviets. His repeated attempts to have the United States and Britain join the Baghdad Pact (later known as the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO) as full members had failed. He found the Eisenhower Doctrine—the promise to help any country that chose to challenge and defy Soviet subversion—less than satisfactory. In his mind, it did not go far enough to guarantee Iran’s security in case of an attack by the Soviets. A sufficiently strong Iranian military that could hold the Soviets behind “the Alborz mountain line” long enough for U.S. forces to come to the rescue, a clear and categorical mutual defense pact between Iran and America, or America’s full membership in the Baghdad Pact would be, in his mind, the only sufficient guarantee against the possibility of Soviet aggression.

  The United States gave a variety of reasons for its refusal to join the Pact, including the claim that such a security arrangement with Iran must then be “accompanied by a security arrangement with Israel.” The Eisenhower administration made it clear that it was, at that time, unwilling to make such an arrangement with Israel.20 It was a measure of U.S.–Israeli relations in 1957, particularly after the United States had sided with Egypt and against Israel in the Suez Canal Crisis, that the United States told Turkey that if it could “get [the] Israeli government to agree not to press for a security arrangement with the US . . . then [the Eisenhower administration]”21 would make a new assessment of the Pact and the wisdom of the United States joining it as full members.

  The combination of all these factors contributed to the commencement of one of the strangest, and still enigmatic, episodes in the Shah’s thirty-seven-year reign. The Shah’s frustrations “came to a head in early 1959 when [he], without any word to his allies, embarked on secret negotiations with the USSR for [a] non-aggression pact.”22 So profound was the impact of this gambit that, at least according to Sir Denis Wright, who played a key role in the whole affair and in the Shah’s subsequent political life, “after this episode, [Britain] never trusted him again. Never.”23

  In the first week of January 1959, Iranian Prime Minister Manouchehr Egbal met with Denis Wright in London. They met in a friend’s home, away from the glare of the media and had a “mid-night session.” Egbal “spoke in convoluted terms about the serious situation in Tehran.” The next day, General Arfa—at the time Iran’s ambassador to Turkey—“also spoke anxiously” to Wright “much along the lines taken by Egbal.”24 Both men “expressed concern about the Shah’s reluctance” to sign a bilateral treaty the United States had offered in lieu of full membership in the Baghdad Pact. Neither man spoke about any other plans the Shah might be entertaining.

  Back in October 1958, the Soviet Union learned of a proposed bilateral security pact between Iran and the United States. They immediately sent a strong threatening note to Iran, claiming that the new agreement was in conflict with Iran’s past obligations to the Soviets and “grants the US military forces broad opportunities to subordinate Iran even further.” In the Soviet view, the new pact would give the United States the right to establish a new military base on Iranian soil, and such an agreement would be against the letter of the 1921 agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union. The formal threat was followed by another, even more brazen, note declaring that the “might and capability” of the Soviet Union is far superior to Iran and that if the Soviets are made to “feel uneasiness about elements of Soviet-Iran relations” then they will use their superior might to make Iran feel equal “inconvenience.”25

  The Shah’s response to this threat and to his continued tension w
ith the United States was a surprise to everyone. According to the official Soviet history of the episode, “after a number of prominent Iranian generals” came out against the bilateral pact with the United States, the Shah “proposed to the Soviet government that the two countries sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression.” On January 19, 1959, according to the Soviet narrative, “the text, a draft of the treaty was handed to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran. Moreover, Iran demanded that the Soviet government reply to the Iranian proposal as early as possible.”26 The Soviets, eager to make the deal, immediately sent a high-ranking diplomatic delegation to Tehran. “They met with the Shah, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.”27

  While the Soviet team was in Tehran on its highly secret mission, Denis Wright arrived in Iran, apparently for a vacation. He met with his “old friend Hussein Ala . . . the Court Minister.” Ala talked at length and anxiously “hinted that the Shah was flirting with the Russians.” Wright, who had earlier heard vague warnings about these moves from Egbal in London, was no longer surprised by what Ala apparently thought were shocking new revelations. Wright had already heard “from an unimpeachable secret source that a high-powered Russian delegation had arrived that very day in Tehran in the greatest secrecy to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Shah.”28 When asked about this “unimpeachable secret source” Wright clearly implied it might have been “monitored conversations” at the Court, and in the Shah’s office.

  Later that same day, at a luncheon, Ala informed British diplomats in Tehran what they already knew: that a high-level Soviet delegation was in Tehran, had met with the Shah, and was about to sign a non-aggression treaty with Iran. Denis Wright calls Ala’s action “a courageous thing to do.” What is not clear is whether Ala was acting at the behest of the Shah. Was he leaking highly sensitive state secrets to a foreign power about what he perceived was a wrong policy by the Shah? Or was the Shah engaged in a game of brinkmanship in which Ala was simply playing his assigned role when he “anxiously” informed the British about the Shah’s supposed Russian “flirtation”? Did the Shah really intend to secretly sign the deal or was he, all along, hoping to “frighten the West” and engage them in a game of brinkmanship? The British Foreign Office, by then fully informed of these developments, instructed Denis Wright “to do all [he] could to stop the Shah; he was also instructed in exactly what arguments he was to use to dissuade the Shah from his perilous path.”29 Ala, too, had beseeched Wright to “speak ‘very frankly’ ” with the Shah, informing the British diplomat that he “himself had been unable to make much impression on the Shah.”30

  For Denis Wright, the mystery was at least partially solved when, on January 29, 1959, at ten o’clock in the morning, he was “ushered into the Shah’s study.” The Shah began by complaining about the Baghdad Pact and the fact that he had not received enough aid. “You treat me more like a kept woman than a wife,” he reportedly complained. According to Denis Wright’s memoirs, he answered “that kept women sometimes earned fur coats if they behaved themselves.”31 The Shah then surprised his visitor by volunteering “that he had started negotiating with the Russians.” Wright “begged the Shah not to sign with the Russians,” and with tears rolling down his cheeks, he “prophesied that if he did so, he would eventually lose his throne.”32

  Much to Wright’s surprise, when the Shah learned of the extent of the British government’s displeasure, he feigned astonishment and sought “a scapegoat.” According to the Shah, it was Seyyed Zia who was responsible for the policy.33 Denis Wright does not mince words, concluding, “I thought then, as I do now, that the Shah was entirely to blame.”34 In meetings with Seyyed Zia, Wright confirmed his own hunch that the decision to engage in the negotiation was made by the Shah. The only other person who favored these negotiations and could have advised the Shah was the foreign minister, Aliasghar Hekmat.35 A couple of days after Wright’s visit, Britain’s defense minister and the British Ambassador to Tehran also had lunch with the Shah, and they too “were able to bring home to His Majesty the full implication of his proposed action.”36

  A couple of days after the British first found out about the Shah’s Russian gambit, the American government too had heard about the Soviet Union’s “secret negotiating team” and wanted to have its own “very frank” discussion with the Shah. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, assured a meeting of the National Security Council that in the CIA’s view, the Shah was just trying to blackmail the West. The Eisenhower administration, Dulles declared, was bent on “holding the line” against this tactic, and a policy of carrot and stick was clearly their chosen strategy. Part of the stick came in the form of the threat of troubles amongst nomadic tribes of Iran. American officials at the meeting were informed that two of the Qashgai brothers, living in the United States at the time, had “informed [the United States] that they are proposing to go back to Iran . . . to weaken the Shah.”37

  Aware of the Shah’s special rapport and almost filial relationship with Eisenhower, it was decided that the ultimate carrot and stick would be a letter from the President to the Shah. The day after his meeting with Denis Wright, the Shah received a surprisingly tart letter from Eisenhower. It began by reaffirming that “the direct contacts” the President and the Shah have “maintained over the past years . . . have always been a source of gratification to me.” He then immediately referred to reports the United States had received “to the effect that your government is considering the conclusion of a new treaty with the Soviet Union.” Eisenhower declared categorically and candidly that “it is my profound conviction that the principal objective of the Soviet Union in Iran remains unchanged and that that objective is inconstant with Iran’s independence and integrity and with the security and stability of Your Majesty’s regime.” Eisenhower once again referred to their “many past contacts” adding that, “I know you are aware that a Soviet objective is to separate Iran from its friends and allies.” He admitted that the United States did not know the details of the new “proposed treaty” but added menacingly that, “regardless of the actual terms of any new treaty with the Soviet Union, the impact on your friends would be unhappy.”38 He affirmed past differences “over our respective estimates of the size of the military program that should be maintained and supported” in Iran, but offered reassurances that the United States would never abandon its support of Iran’s “independence and integrity.”39

  The last paragraph of the letter included a surprisingly unveiled threat. “I am confident,” Eisenhower wrote, “that you would not knowingly take a step that would imperil your country’s security and possibly weaken Iran’s relations with its proven friends.”40 Within days after the receipt of the letter, and the meeting with British officials, the Shah decided to back out of the non-aggression pact, which, according to Soviet sources, he had proposed himself. Iran found an easy way to bring the negotiations to a dead end by demanding that articles in the 1921 and the 1927 agreements, often used by the Soviets as a pretext to threaten Iran, should be abrogated. On February 14, 1959, the Shah sent Eisenhower a letter “explaining his reasons” for initiating the negotiations for the pact with the Russians and more importantly stating “that the discussions had failed.”41

  No sooner had the negotiations ended in failure than the Soviet propaganda machine began a prolonged campaign against the Shah and his “reactionary policies.” Foreign diplomats in Tehran concluded that it was “unlikely that Khrushchev will ever forgive the Shah,” and that from then on, “a primary objective of Soviet policy toward this country can only be the overthrow of the Shah’s regime.”42 If the KGB chief in Tehran is to be believed, Khrushchev was so angry at the Shah that he ordered him assassinated. The only reason the attempt failed, according to the KGB station chief, was the utter incompetence of the man the Russians hired to carry out the assassination. A bomb was to go off in a small Volkswagen when the Shah was on his way to a session of the Majlis. But the trigger failed to work, and the Shah was spared. Nevertheless,
diplomatic relations between Iran and its northern neighbor were tense and fraught with danger. The American Embassy reported rumors—later declared “baseless”—that the Soviet Ambassador “was passing a story around Tehran” that the Soviet Union was planning to take over Azerbaijan.43 Within months of the collapsed negotiations, the Shah was invited to visit Britain. In London, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s goal was to place “emphasis on Anglo-American solidarity” with Iran and point out the “relative dangers of Soviet Communism.”44

  In Washington, the United States tried to use its own power of persuasion as well as the good offices of the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to “bring about a cessation of Soviet propaganda broadcast.”45 Iran even considered filing a complaint with the UN. In a letter to the Shah in August 1959, Eisenhower reassured the King that the United States “would use any opportunity” to pressure Khrushchev to cease the “vicious campaign” against the Shah.

  But the Shah was not sufficiently comforted by these promises. It is reasonable to assume that his sudden decision on July 24, 1959, to declare that Iran had “extended Israel de facto recognition,” as well as his decision to approve granting the Rothschild Group a contract to build an oil pipeline connecting Iran’s oil fields to Eilat in Israel, were all part of his effort to consolidate his ties to his Western allies in the face of this surprisingly harsh onslaught. In early 1955, Israel’s supply of “cheaper oil from Kuwait [had been] cut off on the advice” of the British government. Britain was worried that should these sales become a matter of public knowledge, its allies in Kuwait wouldn’t be able to sustain the political fallout amongst other Arab states. To the British, “the obvious solution was to supply” Israel’s oil needs from Iran. It was further suggested that, as in the case of Kuwait, “shipments should . . . be made to ‘Cape Tours’ and not directly to Haifa.”46 By the end of the fifties, the Shah was resolved to increase Iran’s economic ties with Israel. Not long after the July 24 announcement, Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion emphatically asked American officials to redouble the effort to support the Shah and build up his military.47