The Shah

by Abbas Milani

  The stalemate was finally broken on December 12, when Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s chief of staff, flew to Texas and gave the Shah the good news that Panama had agreed to offer the Shah its “hospitality.” Though physicians had concluded that the Shah needed another operation, he decided to leave the United States as soon as possible and “do the operation later, in Panama.”64 More than once, he told his American interlocutors that he would abide by any decision they made about his time of departure and that he would do anything he could to expedite the release of the American hostages. He invariably added that he believed that no concessions would bring about a release of the hostages. The regime in Iran consisted, in his mind, of nothing but criminals and Communists and was not amenable to the normal logic of diplomacy.

  When the American Ambassador tried to inform the Panamanians that their controversial guest was on his way, he eventually found General Omar Torrijos—the strongman who actually ran the country—drunk in bed in one of his dozens of houses. It was decided that the Shah would stay in the house of a successful businessman named Gabriel Lewis Galindo, who had made his fortune providing banana boxes for the United Fruit Company—once one of the most notorious of the Rockefeller family companies. Now he was asked to rent his house on the island of Contadora to the Shah and his entourage. The island, located at the northern end of the Pearl Archipelago, was a vacation spot of the Panamanian rich. Long after the Shah’s departure, the spot gained fame by housing the popular show Survivor for three seasons. In 1980, the survivors were the Shah and his shrinking entourage.

  In what can only be construed as a cruel joke by Torrijos, he had designated as the Shah’s local host a “professor of Marxist philosophy at Panama University, a poet, a playwright, a sergeant in General Torrijos security guard.”65 He was nicknamed Chuchu and he had been a friend to Graham Greene and had hosted him every time he came to the island. On the fifteen-minute helicopter ride that took the Shah from Panama City to Contadora, the Shah looked gaunt and glum. He imagined himself sharing the fate of Napoleon and said “something about Elba” to one of his aides.66

  From the first moment of their arrival in Panama, there was no chemistry “between the shy, arrogant monarch and the exuberant populist dictator.” The General found the Shah the “saddest man [he had] ever met,” yet he understood the source of his melancholy. It must be hard, he said, to fall “off the Peacock Throne onto Contadora.”67 He called the Shah a chupon, an orange bereft of juice and the flesh. “This is what happens to a man squeezed by the great nations,” he said. “After all the juice is gone, they throw him away.”68 Even in Morocco, one of the members of the royal family who spent time with the Shah described him as “truly bereft. There was nothing left there,” he said. Yet in spite of his appearance and of the increasingly grim reports from Iran, at times the Shah regained his sense of grandeur. In talking with Aristides Royo, the president of Panama, he referred to himself as “a descendent of Darius” and rejected any comparison with Napoleon, saying that when Napoleon arrived in St. Helena, he knew “his empire [was] finished. Mine is intact . . . my dynasty will prevail. . . . I won’t go back but my son will.”69

  Security for the island was easy to control. About 200 National Guards were assigned to protect the royal family. The Shah worried about an attack from the sea, and “so gunmen were stationed on the beach, and frogmen in the water . . . and even more drastically, sonar devices were planted on the sea bed to detect either boats or divers.”70 One problem on the island was unreliable phone service to the United States and other overseas countries. Shortly after the Shah’s arrival, a U.S. Army communications system was put in place, allowing “the Shah and the Empress [to place] calls to the US and Europe.”71

  The other problem, of course, was the Shah’s cancer and the quality of the medical treatment he was receiving. It had become clear that he needed another operation, this time to remove his spleen. Panamanian doctors insisted on doing the operation; the Shah was “fearful . . . about being assassinated on the operating table.”72 In reality, the Shah had relegated the decision about who should do the surgery to Dr. Kean, who ultimately and strangely decided on Dr. Michael DeBakey—known mostly for his experience as a heart surgeon.

  And finally there was the question of possible Panamanian complicity in a plan to hand over the Shah to the Islamic regime. At times the Shah and the Queen even doubted the resolve of the Carter administration to stand up to the regime and Tehran and thus feared that the United States might be tempted to exchange the Shah with the hostages. But according to Carter, the United States never seriously considered that option. At the same time, he confirms that his emissaries met in Paris with representatives of Sadeq Gotbzadeh to discuss the release of the hostages.

  Even before arriving in Panama, rumors about the conditions of the Shah’s stay there swirled in the media. In a press conference with President Royo of Panama, reporters wanted to know whether there were any conditions for the Shah’s visit, and specifically, whether he had promised to invest large sums in the country. Would there be limits on his movements? Who would pay the cost of using the country’s National Guard to protect the Shah? There were no preconditions, Royo announced, adding that the Shah would “naturally cover the expenses for his stay.” The answer was only partially correct. The Shah paid for the food of the soldiers assigned to protect him. They ate at the hotel near the rented house where the Shah lived, and the monthly bill for the food came to $21,000.73 Moreover, according to the same reports, the Shah met with a number of businessmen not long after arriving in the country—but making investments was not a precondition for his stay in the country. Before long, there were rumors that the Shah had offered to buy the island of Contadora, where he was staying, for $425 million. President Royo denied knowing anything about the offer, adding that the island was “worth a lot more.”74

  On January 15, 1980, the State Department received a message from the British Embassy in Tehran that included the text of an official extradition request from the Islamic Republic to the government of Panama. It was a letter from Iran’s foreign minister, Sadeq Gotbzadeh, and was addressed to Panama’s President Royo. The letter praised “the long anti-imperialistic struggle of the people and government of Panama” and “applaud[ed] the large contribution of Panama to the overthrow of the dictatorship of Somuza.” It went on to declare that the Iranian regime did not doubt that “despite the pressures exercised by American imperialism,” the people and government of Panama “will not tolerate any longer the presence on their soil of the deposed Shah of Iran, a tyrant and criminal.” The letter also included what it called a “Warrant for the Arrest of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi,” requesting the Shah’s arrest and the “seizure of all the documents and effects at his disposal.”75 In what in retrospect seems like a well-orchestrated psychological war on the Shah, Iranian officials soon let the world know that an agreement had been made with Panama and that the Shah had already been put under arrest, would “be held there for sixty days,” and then brought back to Iran for a trial. Another official declared that a contract with the famously efficient terrorist “Carlos the Jackal” had been put on the Shah’s head. The Islamic regime had declared earlier that “whoever assassinated the deposed Shah and members of his immediate family would be carrying out the order of the Islamic Revolutionary Council.”76 This was only the first of many instances in which the regime put out contracts on the lives of its opponents or those whose art or writings it found distasteful. It has been estimated that the regime assassinated more than 200 of its opponents in Europe.77

  A week after receiving the extradition letter, President Royo wrote a note to the “Islamic Council of the Revolution” outlining “the requirement[s] for an extradition demand” and stating that in the meantime, the Shah is “under the care of Panama’s Security Authorities.” He ended his letter by noting that, in considering the extradition request, Panama would make every effort to abide by international law and hoped that, in return, the gover
nment of Iran would follow Panama’s “example and release the hostages.”78

  The United States was rightly worried that this kind of statement by Panamanian officials would be construed in Iran as an indication that the extradition of the Shah was a serious possibility and would thus prolong negotiations for the release of American hostages. The U.S. Ambassador in Panama was “instructed to meet with Aristides Roya [sic] and ask [him] to retract his statement regarding the extradition of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.”79

  The United States was put in something of a double bind. Clearly, the release of the hostages was predicated on the arrest and extradition of the Shah. But such a step was not only opposed by many powerful Americans—David Rockefeller, Henry Kissinger, and Richard Nixon amongst them—it also would have led to a serious distrust of America by its allies. On January 30, 1980, a meeting in Secretary of State Vance’s office brought together all the key decision makers to discuss the extradition request. It was resolved to send an official to Panama to meet with a Panamanian lawyer who had been a “former law partner of President Royo” to “obtain as much information as possible” about extradition laws in Panama. This official was then to travel to Contadora and meet with the Shah. It was made clear that this official’s “mandate was strictly fact-finding” and nothing more. Clearly cognizant of tensions already arising between the Shah and his Panamanian hosts, the official was directed, at all costs, to avoid appearing as though he was “attempting to negotiate differences between the two sides. Rather the Panamanians must perceive his visit sympathetically.”80

  The brewing tensions with Panama and the Shah’s increasing mistrust of his unpredictable host finally broke into the open when, around March 20, the Shah received word from Kissinger that he should leave Panama immediately. At the same time, the Carter administration was making every effort to keep the Shah in Panama. It is not clear what their motive was in this effort. Hamilton Jordan and Lloyd Cutler were dispatched from the White House for precisely this reason.81 But their efforts failed. A private jet was chartered from a company suspected of having ties with the CIA. It was finally time for the Shah to accept Sadat’s open invitation and return to Egypt.

  The flight from Panama to Egypt was not bereft of excitement. It left Panama on March 23, 1980. Halfway to their destination, the plane landed in the Azores Islands, ostensibly to refuel. When the stopover lasted almost eight hours, the Shah and his entourage grew concerned that the Carter administration might have decided to exchange the Shah for the hostages after all. But after the painfully long delay, the charter flight was allowed to resume and took a tired, despondent Shah to his final destination. He arrived in Cairo on March 24, 1980. As he landed and saw Sadat and a full military guard awaiting him at the airport, tears welled up in his eyes. On his way to the military hospital, he told Sadat, “I’ve done nothing for you, yet you are the only one to accept me with dignity.”82

  There were a variety of reasons for Sadat’s bold decision to offer the Shah asylum in Egypt. Aside from his own obvious sterling humanity and compassion for the once-powerful Shah, Sadat in those days was involved in a process of challenging and marginalizing the rising Islamist forces within Egypt. As the American Embassy in Cairo observed, “offering asylum to the Shah” was part of Sadat’s “thinly veiled attacks on [the] Islamic right in Egypt.”83

  As news of the Shah’s deteriorating health spread around the world, the torch the Shah and Soraya had carried for each other for more than three decades flared up again. Through “secure” channels, Soraya let the Shah know that she desired to meet him again. A few years after their acrimonious divorce, the two had discreetly reconnected. Many a time when the Shah traveled to Europe, he found a way to quietly slip away and meet with Soraya. Some have claimed that the meetings usually took place in Gstaad, an “elegant Swiss ski resort.”84 Moreover, in the course of these years, every time she was in financial need, the Shah was more than happy to help. In one instance, in the mid-1960s, she asked for and received $10 million. Now she knew he was on his deathbed, and they both wanted one more chance to meet. At the same time, the Shah by then felt increasingly dependent and indebted to his third wife. The meeting with Soraya must, he said, be arranged in a way that would not hurt the Queen.

  Ardeshir Zahedi was the conduit of the initial Soraya letter. President Sadat had to be brought in, as his security forces were needed to ensure Soraya’s discreet arrival in and departure from Egypt. But the Shah and Soraya were truly “star-crossed lovers,” and before any last farewell meeting could be arranged, the Shah’s health took a turn for the worse. The meeting had to be delayed to a later date, and that later date never came. A few lonely years later, Soraya died in Paris.

  Shortly after arriving in Egypt, a team of physicians led by Dr. DeBakey removed the Shah’s spleen—a spleen that was “full of nodules indicating localization of cell lymphoma.” In other words, the cancer had spread far and wide, and the Shah’s end was not far away.

  After the operation, the Shah was moved to the Kubbah Palace, where he recuperated with the rest of his family around him. He occasionally received visitors or worked with two American editors—Tom Weir and Christine Godek—on the final edition of his sadly deficient memoir, Answer to History. Tapes of these discussions show a bitter, angry Shah, willing to lay the blame for the revolution on anyone or anything but himself. He tells the editors that “cutting my wings, cutting me to size, was surely” the wrong-headed Western policy that eventually begot the revolution. He complains of how during the crisis, “Vance never contacted me directly.” And when the confused editors asked why he needed direct contact from U.S. officials about what was clearly a domestic problem, an angry Shah retorted, “I was incredule to believe in alliance.”85

  In the midst of these engagements, the Shah was attending to his wealth. His was a complicated network of companies, foundations, accounts and banks, landholdings on the Costa del Sol of Spain, and properties around the world. On May 28, 1979, less than six months after the Shah left Iran, his attorney, Jean Patry, informed him that, following his orders, they had withdrawn “from the Union de Banques Suisse all the assets deposited under the name of the Foundation Lutecia, and the Established Daletze after having cashed the bonds which could be cashed. . . . We established in Liechtenstein the Foundations Niversa, Zarima and Rukan. These Foundations . . . agreed to open each from accounts with respectively Union De Banques Swisse, Geneva Bank, Credit Swiss, Geneva Bank, Chase Manhattan Bank (Swisse), S.A. and Banque GutzwillerKurzzBingener, SA.”86

  A few months later, on October 17, 1979, the “Trust Company of Willeustand NY,” was set up under the laws of the Netherlands Antilles; it was set up to follow the Shah’s orders and, in his absence, to “take instructions from Empress Farah Diba.” The assets of the foundation were to be distributed, according to the Shah’s dispositions, by giving “20% to your wife; 20% to your elder son; 15% to your Farahnaz; 15% to your daughter, Leila; 20% to your younger son; 8% to your daughter Shahnaz, and 2% to your granddaughter, Mahnaz Zahedi.”87 The heirs designate “could only receive half of their share when they are twenty one,” and “they may dispose freely of the 50% remaining share only at the age of 30.” What these percentages are worth is a matter of wild conjecture, ranging from some $30 billion (according to the Islamic regime) to $120 million (according to some of the royal family’s allies). Those most likely to know estimate the Shah’s fortune to be close to a billion dollars, including the sale of the St. Moritz house (of which Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi eventually became an owner!) and its exquisite antiques and rugs. Many controversies, including the sale of the Queen Mother’s jewels and the lawsuits against Ahmad Ansari—a relative of the Queen who invested some twenty million dollars of her and her oldest son’s assets and was sued by the two when he declared that those investments had lost their value88—continued to cloud the issue of the distribution and actual size of his fortune.

  The question of the Shah’s wealth lingered
long after his death. In a petition filed in the New York County Supreme Court (Index no, 22013/79), lawyers for the Islamic Republic claimed that the Shah, as “supreme authority” in the country, held a special “position of trust” and that he failed in his “fiduciary obligation . . . to the citizens of Iran . . . abused his position of trust and confidence to enrich himself . . . by diverting government funds and property to his own use . . . and accepting payments, bribes, interest in business ventures.” The Empress is “alleged to have cooperated with the Shah in the furtherance of these acts.” Based on these allegations, the Islamic regime sought a judgment for the court to put a freeze on all the assets of the royal couple and force them to pay “compensatory damages in the total amount of twenty-five billion dollars . . . and punitive damages . . . totaling one billion, five hundred million dollars, and for a judgment of thirty billion dollars for conversion by the defendants of money and property in 1979.”89 On September 14, 1981, the court dismissed all claims. A similar lawsuit was filed in the Supreme Court of New York against the Shah’s twin sister, seeking “equitable relief, damages of 3.1 billion dollars and punitive damages in unspecified amount.”90 The Iranian regime claimed that in 1978 alone, more than $15 billion had left Iran, “much of it winding up in Swiss bank accounts.” This claim, too, was rejected by the court.