The Shah

by Abbas Milani

  52. Stig Hornshøj-Møller, “On the Nazi Propaganda Film ‘Der ewige Jude,’ ” Paper presented at the Imperial War Museum, London, 1997.

  53. “Taube nagt am Kohlstrunk,” p. 15.

  54. Körner, “Erst in Goebbels’, dann in Adenauers Diensten.”

  55. General Alavi-Kia, interview with author, San Diego, November 15, 2003.

  56. PRO, Conversation of Russel to Shah, May 6, 1958, FO 371/133019.

  13 The Dark Side of Camelot

  1. Immediately after the party Conference, the CIA heard about the existence of the report, recognized its importance, and marshaled all of its forces to get its hand on a copy. Two months later, Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency got hold of a copy and made a gift of it to the U.S. government. After some discussion in the White House and the CIA about what to do with the document, it was eventually “leaked” to the New York Times through the State Department. The United States then made every effort to broadcast the content of the report to citizens living in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The Soviet government denied the authenticity of the report, and it was only after the end of Communism that Russian citizens were finally allowed to read the full document. For an account of the CIA’s role in the discovery and dissemination of the Secret Report, see Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: A History of the CIA (New York, 2007), pp. 123–127.

  2. JFK, “Contingency Planning for Possible Soviet Move or Demonstration against the Shah, September 13, 1961.”

  3. For his biographical sketch, see my Eminent Persians: The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran (Syracuse, N.Y., 2008).

  4. Parviz Sabeti, the head of SAVAK’s Third Division, told me of the Shah’s constant worrying and nagging about Ashraf and his freedom. Sabeti, phone interview with author, September 4, 2005.

  5. Shah, Answer to History, p. 97.

  6. “Memorandum from the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant, August, 20, 1957,” FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XII, pp. 937–939.

  7. Shah, Answer to History, p. 97.

  8. JFK, RW Kromer, “Comments on First Iran Task Force Draft. 8 May 1961.”

  9. JFK, Oscar Cox to WW Rostow, “Memorandum on the National Front, 9 May 1961.”

  10. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 533.

  11. FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XII, p. 963.

  12. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 534.

  13. Ibid., p. 550.

  14. Ibid., p. 585.

  15. Ibid., p. 675.

  16. FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XII, p. 962.

  17. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 588.

  18. Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), p. 96.

  19. NSA, 390, “An Assessment of the Internal Political Situation, May 3, 1960,” p. 11.

  20. Dr. Amir Pishdad, interview with author, Paris, August 22, 2002.

  21. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, August 7, 1958, FO371/133027.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Majid A’lam, interview with author, San Diego, September 3, 2002,

  24. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, August 7, 1958, FO371/133027.

  25. Ibid.

  26. FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XII, p. 870.

  27. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, August 7, 1958, FO371/133027.

  28. Ibid.

  29. Mehdi Samii, interview with the author, Los Angeles, March 18, 2002.

  30. Shah, Collected Works, p. 2673.

  31. Mehdi Samii, interview with the author, Los Angeles, March 18, 2002.

  32. Pahlaviha be Ravayate Asnad [The Pahlavis According to Documents], 2 vols. (Tehran, 1378/1999), vol. 2, pp. 78–220.

  33. Hamid Ghadimi, interview with author, London, April 2002.

  34. Ibid. I asked him about a document published by the Islamic Republic, giving the figure of the total owed to his company by Shams. He confirmed the figure, “down to the penny,” in his words.

  35. Alam, Daily Journals, vol. 5, p. 377.

  36. Ibid., p. 378.

  37. Wright, “Memoirs.” The story of the contract appears on page 283. He had willed the memoirs to Oxford University, where it should be available to scholars.

  38. Ibid., p. 283.

  39. PRO, Foreign Office to Russels, September 30, 1957, FO 371/127147.

  40. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 621.

  41. Shah, Collected Works, p. 1020.

  42. FRUS, Vol. XII, 1955–1957, p. 879. There is also a panegyric but informed account of this resistance from a member of one of the families that organized it. Though written in the guise of a work of scholarship, it is in fact an ideological treatise, keen on defending the rights and prerogatives of the landlords. See Mohammad Gholi Majd, Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and the Ulama in Iran (Gainesville, Fla., 2000).

  43. Seyyed Mohammad Hussein Manzural Ajdad, ed., Marjai’yat dar Arseye Ejtema va Siyasat [Ayatollahs in the Social and Political Arena] (Tehran, 1379/1990), p. 422.

  44. For a detailed account of Iran and Israel’s intelligence relations, see Abdolrahman Ahmadi, SAVAK va Dastgah Etela’ti Israel [SAVAK and Intelligence Service of Israel] (Tehran, 1381/2001).

  45. For an elaborate account of these matters, see the memoirs of Israel’s ambassador to Iran, Moir Ezry, Yadnameh [Memoirs], 2 vols. (Jerusalem, 2001).

  46. FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XII, p. 867.

  47. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, 12 November 1966, FO 371/186665.

  48. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 676.

  49. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, September 6, 1960, FO 371/164228.

  50. Ibid.

  51. PRO, “Political Situation in Iran,” March 6, 1960, FO 371/147956.

  52. Wright, “Memoirs,” vol. 2, p. 413.

  53. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Embassy, July 23, 1957, FO 371/127075.

  54. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, September 6, 1960, FO 371/164228.

  55. For Aramesh’s version of events, see Khaterat-e Siyasiye Ahmad Aramesh [Political Memoirs of Ahmad Aramesh], edited by Golam Hussein Mirza-Saleh (Tehran, 1369/1990). Aramesh was also a critic of the Shah and sometime after the end of his tenure at the Plan Organization, he was shot by security forces on suspicion of involvement with terrorist groups.

  56. FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. XII, p. 712.

  57. NSA, no. 390, “Assessment of Internal Political Situation, May 3, 1960.”

  58. Amir Taheri, The Unknown Life of the Shah (London, 1991), p. 136; Fereydoon Hoveyda, Iran’s representative to the UN, claimed to have witnessed dollar-stuffed briefcases sent to the United States in the diplomatic pouch and given to the Nixon campaigns in 1968 and 1972. Ardeshir Zahedi, on the other hand, categorically denies all such claims. During the Watergate investigation, a few American journalists tried to verify the claim that illegal contributions had been made by the Shah but no one could find anything other than circumstantial evidence. There is no doubt about the Shah’s close relations with Nixon.

  59. NPL, Nixon to the Shah, January 27, 1955, PPS, 320.45.

  60. JFK, NSF, Doc. 119, “Shah’s Letter to President Kennedy, January 26, 1961.”

  61. Ibid.

  62. Ibid.

  63. Ibid.

  64. JFK. “Dean Rusk to President Kennedy, February 28, 1961.”

  65. JFK, “March 1, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Lieutenant General Bakhtiyar.”

  66. James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, Conn., 1988), p. 138.

  67. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (Oxford, 1980), pp. 108–109; Mark Gasiorowski, in his U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State In Iran (Ithaca, N.Y.,1991), p. 181, also reports the meeting and Roosevelt’s subsequent action.

  68. Jafar Sharif-Emami, Memoirs of Jafar Sharif-Emami, edited by Habib Ladjevardi, Iranian Oral History Project (Boston, 1999), pp. 223–238.

  69. JFK, “Tehran to White House, May 5, 1961.”

  70. JFK, “Memorandum for
President, RW Kromer, August 4, 1961.”

  71. Ibid.

  72. Sharif-Emami, Memoirs, pp. 231–236.

  73. JFK, “Basic Facts in the Iranian Situation,” n.d.

  74. Sharif-Emami, Memoirs, pp. 231–236.

  75. General Alavi-Kia, deputy director of SAVAK, was standing outside the door and overheard the heated discussion. General Alavi-Kia, interview with author, San Diego, April 22, 2003.

  76. JFK, “Basic Facts in the Iranian Situation,” n.d.

  14 Garrulous Premier

  1. Jahanguir Amuzegar, a respected economist who was Amini’s minister of finance is convinced that by every economic measure, the Iranian economy was indeed bankrupt.

  2. Ardeshir Zahedi, interview with author, Montreux, April 14, 2009.

  3. Ibid.

  4. JFK, “John Wiley to President, February 21, 1961.”

  5. Khalil Maleki, Do Nameh [Two Letters] (Tehran, 1357/1958). Both letters are addressed to Dr. Mossadeq; in them, Maleki describes the situation and offers biting criticism of the National Front leadership.

  6. Shah, Collected Works, p. 2402.

  7. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, May 13, 1961.”

  8. Ibid.

  9. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, August 27, 1961.”

  10. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, June 28, 1961.”

  11. Ibid.

  12. Moir Ezry, Yadnameh [Memoirs], 2 vols (Jerusalem, 2001), vol. 1, p. 106.

  13. Khodadad Farmanfarmaian, interview with author, London, December 11, 2002.

  14. Azar Ebtehaj, interview with author, London, June 20, 2003.

  15. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, September 18, 1955, FO 248/1557.

  16. In several interviews, Mehdi Samii provided me with details of these actions. Ahmad Tehrani, a lawyer working for Iran’s Foreign Ministry and a trusted aide to Ardeshir Zahedi, also provided some details of the case, as he was dispatched by the Iranian government to challenge Khaybar Khan’s allegations.

  17. Abolhassan Ebtehaj, Khaterate Abolhassan Ebtehaj [Memoirs], 2 vols. (Tehran, 1375/1986), vol. 2, p. 808.

  18. Khodadad Farmanfarmaian talked of Ebtehaj’s vehemence in arguing against excessive military expenditures for Iran while talking to American generals.

  19. Alam, Daily Journals, vol. 4, p. 63.

  20. Ebtehaj, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 853–857.

  21. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, May 14, 1961.”

  22. JFK, “NSC, Record of Action, May 24, 1961.”

  23. Ibid.

  24. JFK, “Telegram, Tehran to State Department, June 22, 1961.”

  25. Amongst the industrialists who supported his efforts was Mahmoud Rezai. His brother Ali Rezai was informed about these developments and had been a silent observer of some of these discussions. Ali Rezai, interview with author, San José, Costa Rica, August 21, 2002.

  26. I was told about some of these meetings by Ali Rezai, whose brother was a close ally of Bakhtiyar and who had participated in some of these meetings, including the one with Amuzegar.

  27. JFK, “25 May 1961 Memo for Philip Talbot,” FRUS, vol. XVIII, Microfilm Supplements.

  28. Ibid.

  29. JFK, “State Department to Tehran, June 28, 1961.”

  30. For a discussion of this group’s work, see George Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore, 1967).

  31. JFK, “Ball to Attorney General, January 26, 1961.”

  32. JFK, “Some First Thoughts on the Shah, March 30, 1962.”

  33. There are now two histories of the Confederation, one in two volumes in Persian and a shorter, one-volume account in English. See Hamid Shokat, Jonbesh Daneshjouyee Conferation Jahani [The Internation Student Movement of the Confederation], 2 vols. (Koln, 1985); for a brief English version, initially written as a doctoral dissertation, see Afshin Matin-Asghari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah (Costa Mesa, Calif., 2002).

  34. JFK. “Memorandum for the Files, John Bowling, February 20, 1961.”

  35. JFK, “Amini’s Relations with the Shah, July 29, 1961.”

  36. JFK. “State to Embassy in Tehran, October 31, 1961.”

  37. Ibid.

  38. Masud Behnoud, Az Seyyed Zia to Bakhtiyar [From Seyyed Zia till Bakhtiyar] (Tehran, 1369/1990), p. 463.

  39. Ali Amini be Ravayate Asnade SAVAK [Amini According to SAVAK Documents] (Tehran, 1379/1990), p. 39.

  40. PRO, “Report on ‘Silent Opposition’ in Iranian Politics,” February 21, 1958, FO 371/133009.

  41. NA, “State Department to Embassy in Tehran, March 3, 1961.”

  42. Ali Amini be Ravayate Asnade SAVAK, pp. 36–37.

  43. Empress Farah, My Thousand and One Days, p. 51.

  44. Farah Pahlavi, An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah, translated by Patricia Clancy (New York, 2004), p. 107.

  45. Empress Farah, My Thousand and One Days, p. 52.

  46. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, November 10, 1960, FO 371/149832.

  47. Empress Farah, My Thousand and One Days, p. 52.

  48. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, March 27, 1961, FO 371/15658.

  49. PRO, “Rumors about the Crown Prince,” November 10, 1960, FO 371/149832.

  50. In her two memoirs, An Enduring Love and My Thousand and One Days, the Queen chronicles some of these vicious rumors.

  51. PRO, Tehran to Foreign Office, March 27, 1962, FO 371/164227.

  52. PRO, Oslo Embassy to Foreign Office, June 3, 1961, FO 371/157657.

  53. Ibid.

  54. PRO, “Annual Report for 1963,” British Embassy, FO 371/17551.

  55. Shah, Collected Works, p. 2681.

  56. Farah Pahlavi, An Enduring Love, p. 93.

  57. Ibid., p. 117.

  58. PRO, Tehran, to Foreign Office, March 27, 1962.

  15 The Bright Side of Camelot

  1. Mehdi Samii, interview with the author, Los Angeles, March 15, 2003.

  2. Dr. Ghani kept a daily journal that included everything from the mundane to matters of state. His son, Cyrus, published the entire thirteen volumes, and then organized an English translation of a selection from the larger volumes. See Ghasem Ghani, A Man of Many Worlds: The Diaries and Memoirs of Dr. Ghasem Ghani (Washington, DC, 2007).

  3. For a discussion of the group and their genealogy, see my Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (Washington, DC, 2001).

  4. JFK, “State to Tehran Embassy, March 21, 1962.”

  5. In 2003, when I was interviewing Ardeshir Zahedi in New York, he kindly arranged with the management of the hotel for me to visit the famous suite 35A.

  6. JFK, the description appears in the catalogue of gifts to the President and First Lady.

  7. JFK, NSF, Box 119, “Memorandum of Conversation, April 13, 1962.”

  8. JFK, NSF, Box 117, “Background Paper, April 3, 1962.”

  9. JFK, NSF, Box 117, “Visit of the Shah of Iran, Background Paper, April 2, 1962.”

  10. Shah, Collected Works, p. 2795.

  11. Ibid., p. 2790.

  12. Ibid., p. 2793.

  13. PRO, British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, April 16, 62, FO 371/164227.

  14. JFK, NSC, Box 116, “Robert W Komer to Bundy, April 23, 1962.”

  15. Etela’at, Farvardin 26, 1341/April 15, 1962.

  16. PRO, Visit by the Shah, April 17, 1962, FO 371/164227.

  17. PRO, British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, April 25, 1962.

  18. PRO, British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, April 21, 1962.

  19. JFK, NSC, Box 116, “American Embassy to State Department, May 26, 1962.”

  20. Ibid.

  21. JFK, “Telegraph from State Department, Embassy in Tehran, June 16, 1962.”

  22. JFK, “Personal Message from President to the Shah, June 20, 1962.”

  23. JFK, “Kromer to Bundy, May 16, 1963.”

  24. PRO, “Iran’s Review for 1962,” FO 371/170372.

  25. Etela’at, 27 Ordibehesht 1340.

&nb
sp; 26. Etela’at, 21 Bahman 1340.

  27. PRO, “The New Iran Party,” February 12, 1964, FO 371/175712.

  28. NA, “The New Iranian Government, 23 July 1962.”

  29. Ibid.

  30. PRO, Wright Dispatch, September 21, 1955, FO 371/114811.

  31. Considering that in 2006, when a newly elected member of the U.S. Congress asked to take the oath of office using not a Bible, but the Qu’ran—he was an African-American Muslim—there was a nasty commotion, the law proposed by the Shah and his Prime Minister in 1962 was indeed a major step forward and far ahead of its time.

  32. Tarikh-e Giyame Panzdah-e Khordad be Ravayat Asnad [The June 5th Uprising According to Documents], edited by Javad Mansuri (Tehran, 1377/1998), pp. 252–253.

  33. Ibid., p. 252.

  34. PRO, “The Iranian Domestic Situation, 1962,” FO 371/170372.

  35. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, January 3, 1963.”

  36. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, February 9, 1963.”

  37. JFK, “Komer to Bundy, January 15, 1963.”

  38. Ibid.

  39. For a discussion of this history, see my “Pious Populist: Understanding the Role of Iran’s President,” Boston Review 32:6 (November/December 2007), 7–14, 4.

  40. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, January 23, 1963.”

  41. JFK, “CIA, Telegram, January 23, 1963.”

  42. For example, see Akbar Ganji, The Road to Democracy In Iran, edited by Joshua Cohen and Abbas Milani (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), pp. 43–89.

  43. JFK, “Tehran to State Department, January 26, 1963.”

  44. JFK, “Kromer to Bundy, January 29, 1963.”

  45. JFK, “Talbot to Holmes, February 28, 1963.”

  46. Shah, Answer to History, p. 104.

  47. Shah, Collected Works, p. 3308.

  48. Ibid., p. 3204.

  49. Ibid., p. 3208.

  50. Many sources have talked of this alliance. Ayatollah Montazeri, a onetime close ally of Khomeini and chosen by him as a successor, has, in his memoirs, given a glimpse into Navvab’s early days in the seminaries of Qom and Khomeini’s defiant support of him. Ayatollah Motazeri’s Khaterat was made available on the Internet.

  51. In those days, I was about thirteen years old and lived in Tehran. I remember accompanying my mother to the bazaar in Tehran, where she was given a copy of one of Khomeini’s tapes, which she later played for one of my uncles, Fakhraddin Shadman. He had been once a minister in the Shah’s government but by then was sidelined, facing the wrath of the King. The fact that my mother and uncle would engage in such dangerous acts speaks much about the nature of the times. For an account of Shadman’s life, see my Lost Wisdom: Iran’s Encounter with Modernity (Washington, DC, 2008).