The Pentagon's New Map

by Thomas P. M. Barnett

  America has spent the last half century trying to extend that internal-security rule set around the planet. Throughout this process we have consistently displayed the willingness to act preemptively. During the Cold War, all those preemptive actions were cloaked within the larger anti-Communist strategy of “hold that line!” So we tended to lose sight of the underlying reality whereby we put an amazing amount of faith in our military establishment not to go overboard and end up destroying the planet. Of course, we maintained the polite fiction that the president was the man with his finger on the “button,” but in reality, our hair-trigger standoff with the Soviets was so preprogrammed in all its complexity that he was no more in complete control of the nuclear standoff than the man in the moon. What controlled that standoff was both sides understanding that no one controlled the standoff, therefore the nuclear option was not a line to be crossed. But we should never kid ourselves about the true nature of that bargain: we were always set to preemptively wage war—that was the primary rule set. It worked so well over the Cold War because both sides had—believe it or not—incredibly professional military leaders and suitably careful political leaders who constantly validated that rule set.

  And you know what? Our political and military leaders still understand the validity of that particular rule set—as it applies across the Core. Of course, the Pentagon is still populated by far too many strategists who want to tinker with that rule set regarding China, and these people need to be pushed off the historical stage as quickly as possible. But I am completely confident—based not just on my regular exposure to senior personnel (both political appointees and career bureaucrats) in the U.S. government, but more so in terms of my continual interactions with the next generation of military leaders (the commanders and lieutenant colonels of today)—that this distinction between where deterrence still works and where preemption becomes necessary is not only completely understood, it is already largely internalized by most security decision makers.

  Where we fail as a defense community is in making this distinction clear and understandable to both the American public and the world. What holds us back are those outdated strategic concepts that we simply have a hard time giving up, like the need to focus on the Big One instead of the strategic environment as a whole. So when we employ this preemptive option against a Saddam, for example, more than a few critics—not to mention the seriously overpsyched advocates—think the correct follow-on question is “Who’s next?” Naturally, when we preemptively strike a Saddam, we hope to create a certain demonstration effect, meaning we extend the desired rule set. But the rule set we seek to extend is not some half-baked notion of “You’d better watch it, world, ’cause you never know what might set America off!” Rather, at a moment like this, we need to explain very carefully the sum of the rule-set violations that triggered our preemptive response. Like a cop explaining to a review board why he drew his pistol and shot the suspect dead, we need to make our case very calmly and completely and truthfully.

  I believe the Bush Administration has made that case against Saddam, and nothing we have found in Iraq since—such as the dozens of mass graves and killing fields—convinces me that we did not do the right thing. But instead of debating the larger meaning of what America has just done, not just to the Middle East but frankly to the world as a whole, we waste a lot of strategic debate going back over, ad nauseam, the decision to go to war.

  I know, I know. This is America, and in America there are no time limits on debates as important as those involving war. But in my mind, what really needs to be debated now is how we as a nation define the size of the task ahead. Was the problem just Saddam? Is it just al Qaeda? Is it Israel and Palestine too? Do we finish it off when there are no members left in the Axis of Evil? Is it all about the “arc of instability”? Or do we include the rest of Africa? Or most of Southeast Asia? How about Colombia? Where does this “present danger” end?

  With regard to this strategy of preemption, I think four things need to be spelled out clearly to both our citizens and the rest of the Core: (1) that arms control as we have known it for decades is now dead and buried; (2) that is it not a question of “when” unilateralism makes sense, but “where”; (3) that while it is okay for America to—in most instances—get the ball rolling on specific security threats inside the Gap, eventually all jobs there are multilateral efforts; and (4) since there is no exiting the Gap militarily, there is no such thing as an exit strategy. Let me deal with each of these points in turn.

  One of the ways I came around to this strategic vision, which I believe is less a theory than an objective reality that has been staring all of us in the face for more than a decade, was in understanding how the Core-Gap division effectively kills arms control as a useful tool of American foreign policy.

  We do not need any arms control whatsoever inside the Core. Everyone who really needs nukes already has them, but if the Japanese ever decide they truly want them, I don’t think even that development triggers the need for any arms control. Since Mutually Assured Destruction and deterrence still hold throughout the Core, all the advanced states there readily understand the “crystal ball effect” of nukes—as in, we all know where we end up collectively if anybody decides to use them, so nobody is going to use them. Now, don’t get me wrong, I have nothing against doing whatever is possible in terms of military-to-military ties between, say, the United States and China to increase awareness on both sides regarding strategic postures, especially as we develop limited missile defense capabilities. But that is not arms control. That is simply maintaining good intra-Core security transparency.

  If we do not need any arms control within the Core because it is superfluous, we also do not need it between the Core and Gap, because it is completely futile. Here I am talking about most of the efforts to limit technology transfer, which usually involve America throwing sanctions at the problem and, in the process, pissing off the rest of the Core while stopping nothing in the process. In almost every instance of initial technology transfer, we are talking about private firms from fellow Core powers seeking to make a buck by selling the same sort of military-related technology that we routinely share among ourselves in the Core, and which America often sells to its own particular allies within the Gap. We will never stop this technology transfer, we will simply drive it underground. Having it out in the open beats guessing about who is smuggling what. Moreover, I always think it is bad when America is put in the position of wagging its finger at the Gap for wanting to get its hands on the same technology we develop at will and employ with regularity. I want lots of technology transfer from the Core to the Gap as a rule, because I think giving them access to such technology is an important part of shrinking the Gap.

  You might counter with “But all we really want to stop being transferred is the technology associated with weapons of mass destruction.” Here I am in agreement, but since I don’t think sanctions or treaties are really going to stop that transfer from Core to Gap, I shift my response on that point to why I believe arms control inside the Gap is likewise a complete waste of time. Assume the transfer is going to occur despite our best efforts. Now, we have people inside the Gap we simply do not trust with weapons of mass destruction. They do not adhere to our security rule sets and, frankly, would like to see them torn down. So why do we think there is any utility in pursuing arms control or sanctions of any form?

  At this point, if you have a bad actor, whether he is a superempowered terrorist like Osama bin Laden or a rogue leader like Kim Jong Il, who has checked a long list of boxes that says he is not to be trusted and the world would be a better place without him, then I say you move on to preemption. There is no negotiation at this point in the process, because you have given them plenty of warnings and requests to cease and desist. In the case of a regime, you simply keep ratcheting up your demands for compliance, and when the regime cannot comply and cannot be provoked into a precipitating action by your constantly growing military pressure, you preempt.
In the case of a terrorist group, you skip even those preliminaries and preempt the moment you have any of them in your crosshairs.

  Now, that may sound pretty harsh, but again, in many ways this is simply America taking the same sort of security rule sets that keep us safe within our borders and working to extend them to that Gap that lies in the great beyond. You may ask, What gives America the right to make such decisions? The simplest answer is that “might makes right” when we are talking about America playing Gap Leviathan. On some level, if other Core powers want a greater say in how we exercise that power, they simply need to dedicate enough defense spending to develop similar capabilities. Absent that, America earns a certain right for unilateralism in the Gap. If, over time, the rest of the Core disapproves of the “service” America is providing on their behalf, they have ways of making their displeasure known to us (a subject I intend to cover later).

  What we have to make clear to both Americans and the rest of the world is that it is not a matter of the U.S. Government acting unilaterally whenever it pleases, just wherever it needs to inside the Gap. It’s a lot like talking to cops in Los Angeles about how they behave during their workday. You ask, “Do you act the same way in Brentwood as you do in South Central?” And they say, “No.” You ask, “Why?” And they reply simply, “Because I like to make it home for dinner every night in one piece.” Simply put, the same security rule sets that define upper-class Brentwood do not extend to the harsh, inner-city reality that is South Central. Denying that reality is unfair to the personnel whose lives are put at risk in extending the security rule sets we all take for granted in our neighborhood.

  In many ways, that is the essential beef the United States has had with the International Criminal Court, going all the way back to the Clinton Administration.◈ It’s not that America wants one rule set for itself and another for the rest of the world, just that America needs special consideration for the security roles it undertakes inside the Gap. In effect, we don’t want fellow Core members applying their Kantian rule sets to our behavior inside the Hobbesian Gap. So what has the Bush Administration done to deal with this bifurcated world? America is pressuring nations around the world to sign a special bilateral agreement in which they pledge not to take us to court over any military interventions we may undertake within their borders. It’s sort of a “pre-nup” in this global war on terrorism. Over seventy countries have already signed these treaties, and virtually all of them are Gap states.◈ But who is lodging the biggest protests about these accords? The Europeans, naturally.

  America will need to act unilaterally inside the Gap on a regular basis not just because we need a free hand whenever American lives are put at risk, but also because—quite frankly—no other military power on the planet comes even close to matching our capabilities. In effect, our unilateralism inside the Gap is functionally defined. So yes, we may get the UN. Security Council to “bless” us with a resolution and “dress” us with coalition partners that, to be blunt, we simply do not need in the initial warfighting phase of any intervention, but in the end we’ll be kicking down the door largely on our own whenever the scenario is significant in size—as in Iraq. Yes, there will always be a few key allies we can count on, all of whom are likewise distinguished by some lesser ability to project their own military force around the planet (and all of whom resemble our melting-pot profiles—being either the Brits or any one of a number of their former colonies, such as Australia, Canada, India . . .). But have no delusions: the United States owns the only “fist” in the business.

  Of course, it’s one thing for America to act unilaterally in “kicking down the door” and toppling some bad guy, and quite another thing to actually follow through on the peace that also needs to be won. In this follow-on effort, we not only need friends, we need a lot of friends. But it is not a bad thing for America to, in effect, write checks with its military strategy of preemption that it cannot possibly cash using the defense budget alone. By that I mean, sometimes somebody needs to take that nasty first step in dispatching the bad guy—you know, the Clint Eastwood character who rallies the settlers into defending the homestead. In the end, if the high plains drifter tries to do it all alone, he’s gonna get nailed, but if he waits for the crowd to muster its courage, then everyone’s more likely to take some bullets. Sometimes leaders gotta lead.

  In my mind, the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism in this situation is very subtle. America is being multilateralist when it says, “Hey, Core, everybody follow me in!” And then the rest of the Core follows us in. America is being unilateralist when it says, “Hey, Core, everybody follow me in!” And then nobody except the Brits and Aussies tag along. But either way, American soldiers will end up being the tip of the spear. Getting everyone else along for the follow-through effort simply brings us back to the point about America needing to be more explicit with its allies about the better world we seek to create whenever we undertake these necessarily difficult tasks.

  What if our allies do not like our definition of that “better world”? Obviously, it cannot be a matter of America declaring, “Follow me or get out of the way!” So the discussion of security rule sets is a never-ending process, just as it is inside our country, where the Supreme Court is constantly revising definitions of our most basic legal principles. But that discussion is not a substitute for action, so let’s not confuse the United Nations with the executive branch of some hoped-for future world government. The UN is closer to a congress, or a combination debating society and rule-setting body. For the foreseeable future, America comes closest to the Core’s executive branch function, primarily because we own the world’s preeminent military force. But that structural reality only highlights the great importance of how America explains itself whenever it employs its military might around the planet. So far, we have explained the need for war, but not the promise of peace.

  The Bush Administration has not yet pitched that larger vision of a future worth creating. Instead, with no “happy ending” attached to this pretty scary tale we seem to be spinning out, most people around the world are more than nervous about our intentions. That’s not just bad, it’s tragic, because we are wasting a precious moment in history here—a moment when the world is looking to us quite naturally to spell out the new rule sets. But what do we give them instead? Just preemption, nothing more. Or worse, instead of the Bush Administration offering more, we leave it to the political pundits to toss out phrases like “empire,” “World War IV,” and “crusade.”

  All those foolishly hyperbolic descriptions prevent us from having the debates we as a nation truly need to work our way through if we are ever going to come to grips with the long-term security challenge of shrinking the Gap. And here’s where I get to my final point about this Administration—and every one that follows—getting level with the American public: we are never leaving the Gap and we are never “bringing our boys home.” There is no exiting the Gap, only shrinking the Gap, and if there is no exiting the Gap, then we’d better stop kidding ourselves about “exit strategies.” No exit means no exit strategy.

  Why I Hate The “Arc Of Instability”

  In the summer of 2002 I gave a speech at a Washington, D.C., conference of defense contractors that got me quickly called on the carpet in the policy shop of the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). I had always worried about this happening with one of my talks, because when you speak bluntly about the future, what you say can often collide with the polite truths of the present. My sin was this: I said that America’s new military bases in Central Asia would become a permanent feature of the landscape there. The exact quote was, “I believe fifty years from now, they will be as familiar to us as Ramstein Air Force Base.” Ramstein is a huge, permanent hub for American military operations located in Germany. By comparing our new bases in the former Soviet republics of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with Ramstein, I was suggesting that our recent moves into Central Asia signaled the sort of long-term export of security
that we ended up pursuing in Europe following the Second World War. I believe America will end up exporting security on that scale not just to Central Asia, but also to the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean Rim, and—yes—even Southeast Asia, a place we swore we’d never return to after losing Vietnam. The bases we create throughout the Gap will, by and large, never reach the scope of Ramstein, because we will want lots of small, Spartan-style facilities dotting the Gap, not the sort of giant, Mall of America bases we built in Europe and Northeast Asia for World War III. But yes, over the decades, these bases will become, in aggregate, as familiar to U.S. servicemen and -women, and the American public as Ramstein became to the generations who lived through the Cold War. That’s how big our security commitment to the Gap will end up being. That’s how long the road ahead truly is.

  Now, the reporter who wrote up my “startling prediction” pulled the usual trick and counterposed my quote with one from Secretary Rumsfeld himself, in which he proclaimed, “We don’t have any particular plans for permanent bases.”◈ When I read the article, I joked to a colleague that it was like I had predicted Rumsfeld would be dead in fifty years, only to have my “startling prediction” contradicted by an immediate statement from him that he “didn’t have any particular plans for the great beyond.” Simply put, we can both be right on this point.