Civilization: The West and the Rest
Page 40
Retreat from the mountains of the Hindu Kush or the plains of Mesopotamia has long been a harbinger of decline and fall. It is significant that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in the annus mirabilis of 1989 and ceased to exist in 1991. What happened then, like the events of the distant fifth century, is a reminder that civilizations do not in fact appear, rise, reign, decline and fall according to some recurrent and predictable life cycle. It is historians who retrospectively portray the process of dissolution as slow-acting, with multiple over-determining causes. Rather, civilizations behave like all complex adaptive systems. They function in apparent equilibrium for some unknowable period. And then, quite abruptly, they collapse. To return to the terminology of Thomas Cole, the painter of The Course of Empire, the shift from consummation to destruction and then to desolation is not cyclical. It is sudden. A more appropriate visual representation of the way complex systems collapse may be the old poster, once so popular in thousands of college dorm rooms, of a runaway steam train that has crashed through the wall of a Victorian railway terminus and hit the street below nose first. A defective brake or a sleeping driver can be all it takes to go over the edge of chaos.
Can anything be done to save Western civilization from such a calamity? First, we should not be too fatalistic. True, the things that once set the West apart from the Rest are no longer monopolized by us. The Chinese have got capitalism. The Iranians have got science. The Russians have got democracy. The Africans are (slowly) getting modern medicine. And the Turks have got the consumer society. But what this means is that Western modes of operation are not in decline but are flourishing nearly everywhere, with only a few remaining pockets of resistance. A growing number of Resterners are sleeping, showering, dressing, working, playing, eating, drinking and travelling like Westerners.61 Moreover, as we have seen, Western civilization is more than just one thing; it is a package. It is about political pluralism (multiple states and multiple authorities) as well as capitalism; it is about the freedom of thought as well as the scientific method; it is about the rule of law and property rights as well as democracy. Even today, the West still has more of these institutional advantages than the Rest. The Chinese do not have political competition. The Iranians do not have freedom of conscience. They get to vote in Russia, but the rule of law there is a sham. In none of these countries is there a free press. These differences may explain why, for example, all three countries lag behind Western countries in qualitative indices that measure ‘national innovative development’ and ‘national innovation capacity’.62
Of course Western civilization is far from flawless. It has perpetrated its share of historical misdeeds, from the brutalities of imperialism to the banality of the consumer society. Its intense materialism has had all kinds of dubious consequences, not least the discontents Freud encouraged us to indulge in. And it has certainly lost that thrifty asceticism that Weber found so admirable in the Protestant ethic.
Yet this Western package still seems to offer human societies the best available set of economic, social and political institutions – the ones most likely to unleash the individual human creativity capable of solving the problems the twenty-first century world faces. Over the past half-millennium, no civilization has done a better job of finding and educating the geniuses that lurk in the far right-hand tail of the distribution of talent in any human society. The big question is whether or not we are still able to recognize the superiority of that package. What makes a civilization real to its inhabitants, in the end, is not just the splendid edifices at its centre, nor even the smooth functioning of the institutions they house. At its core, a civilization is the texts that are taught in its schools, learned by its students and recollected in times of tribulation. The civilization of China was once built on the teachings of Confucius. The civilization of Islam – of the cult of submission – is still built on the Koran. But what are the foundational texts of Western civilization, that can bolster our belief in the almost boundless power of the free individual human being?* And how good are we at teaching them, given our educational theorists’ aversion to formal knowledge and rote-learning? Maybe the real threat is posed not by the rise of China, Islam or CO2 emissions, but by our own loss of faith in the civilization we inherited from our ancestors.
Our civilization is more than just (as P. G. Wodehouse joked) the opposite of amateur theatricals (see the epigraph above). Churchill captured a crucial point when he defined the ‘central principle of [Western] Civilization’ as ‘the subordination of the ruling class to the settled customs of the people and to their will as expressed in the Constitution’:
Why [Churchill asked] should not nations link themselves together in a larger system and establish a rule of law for the benefit of all? That surely is the supreme hope by which we should be inspired …
But it is vain to imagine that the mere … declaration of right principles … will be of any value unless they are supported by those qualities of civic virtue and manly courage – aye, and by those instruments and agencies of force and science [–] which in the last resort must be the defence of right and reason.
Civilization will not last, freedom will not survive, peace will not be kept, unless a very large majority of mankind unite together to defend them and show themselves possessed of a constabulary power before which barbaric and atavistic forces will stand in awe.63
In 1938 those barbaric and atavistic forces were abroad, above all in Germany. Yet, as we have seen, they were as much products of Western civilization as the values of freedom and lawful government that Churchill held dear. Today, as then, the biggest threat to Western civilization is posed not by other civilizations, but by our own pusillanimity – and by the historical ignorance that feeds it.
Notes
INTRODUCTION: RASSELAS’S QUESTION
1. Clark, Civilisation.
2. Braudel, History of Civilizations.
3. See also Bagby, Culture and History; Mumford, City in History.
4. On manners see Elias, Civilizing Process.
5. See Coulborn, Origins of Civilized Societies and, more recently, Fernández-Armesto, Civilizations.
6. Quigley, Evolution of Civilizations.
7. Bozeman, Politics and Culture.
8. Melko, Nature of Civilizations.
9. Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizations.
10. McNeill, Rise of the West.
11. Braudel, History of Civilizations, pp. 34f.
12. See Fernández-Armesto, Millennium; Goody, Capitalism and Modernity and Eurasian Miracle; Wong, China Transformed.
13. McNeill, Rise of the West. See also Darwin, After Tamerlane.
14. Based on data in Maddison, World Economy. The historic figures for global output (gross domestic product) must be treated with even more caution than those for population because of the heroic assumptions Maddison had to make to construct his estimates, and also because he elected to calculate GDP in terms of purchasing-power parity to allow for the much lower prices of non-traded goods in relatively poor countries.
15. Details in Fogel, Escape from Hunger, tables 1.2, 1.4.
16. Figures from Chandler, Urban Growth.
17. Calculated in terms of current dollars, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online database.
18. For an illuminating discussion, see Scruton, The West and the Rest.
19. See e.g. Laue, ‘World Revolution of Westernization’.
20. Acemoglu et al., ‘Reversal of Fortune’; Putterman and Weil, ‘Post-1500 Population Flows’.
21. Pomeranz, Great Divergence.
22. Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past.
23. Clark, Farewell to Alms.
24. Johnson, Rasselas, pp. 56f.
25. Murray, Human Accomplishment.
26. Landes, Wealth and Poverty.
27. Hibbs and Olsson, ‘Geography’; Bockstette et al., ‘States and Markets’.
28. Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel.
29. Diamond, ‘How to Get R
ich’.
30. See e.g. Roberts, Triumph of the West.
31. See North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change; North et al., Violence and Social Orders.
32. Clark, Farewell to Alms, pp. 337–42.
33. Rajan and Zingales, ‘Persistence of Underdevelopment’; Chaudhary et al., ‘Big BRICs, Weak Foundations’.
34. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
35. Wallerstein, Modern World-System.
36. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.
37. See e.g. Kagan, Paradise and Power and, more recently, Schuker, ‘Sea Change’.
38. See most recently Osborne, Civilization.
39. Morris, Why the West Rules.
40. Brownworth, Lost to the West.
41. Cahill, How the Irish Saved Civilization. At the time of writing, it remains to be seen if the compliment will be returned.
42. Dawson, Making of Europe; Woods, How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization.
43. Matthews, ‘Strange Death’; Guyver, ‘England’.
44. Amanda Kelly, ‘What Did Hitler Do in the War, Miss?’, Times Educational Supplement, 19 January 2001.
45. MacGregor, History of the World.
CHAPTER 1: COMPETITION
1. Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, chs. 8, 11, Book IV, ch. 9.
2. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Book VIII, ch. 21. See also Book VII, ch. 7, Book XIX, chs. 17–20.
3. See in general Bishop, China’s Imperial Way.
4. Tsai, Perpetual Happiness, p. 123.
5. Brook, Confusions of Pleasure.
6. Pinker, Better Angels.
7. Castor, Blood and Roses.
8. Fogel, Escape from Hunger, tables 1.2, 1.4.
9. Clark, Farewell to Alms.
10. Dardess, ‘Ming Landscape’, pp. 323f.
11. Needham (ed.), Science and Civilization, vol. V, pp. 52, 313.
12. Ibid., vol. VI, pp. 558, 571, 581. Cf. Hobson, Eastern Origins, p. 201.
13. Mokyr, Lever of Riches, pp. 209ff.
14. Needham (ed.), Science and Civilization, vol. IV, p. 184.
15. Ibid., vol. V, pp. 61, 157, 354, 421. Cf. Hobson, Eastern Origins, pp. 207–12.
16. Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas.
17. Ray, ‘Analysis’, p. 82.
18. Ibid., pp. 82–4.
19. Duyvendak, ‘True Dates’.
20. Cotterell, Imperial Capitals, p. 222. See also Fernández-Armesto, Millennium, ch. 4; Pathfinders, ch. 4.
21. Landes, Wealth and Poverty, pp. 95f.
22. Keay, China: A History, p. 385.
23. According to Nicholas D. Kristof, ‘1492: The Prequel’, New York Times, 6 June 1999.
24. Finlay, ‘Portuguese and Chinese Maritime Imperialism’, pp. 240f.
25. Flynn and Giraldez, ‘Born with a “Silver Spoon” ’, p. 204.
26. Chirot, ‘Rise of the West’, pp. 181ff.
27. Cipolla, Guns and Sails, pp. 77–82.
28. Hoffman, ‘Why Was It that Europeans Conquered the World?’ On the deficiencies of the Ming tax system, see Huang, 1587, p. 64.
29. Jones, European Miracle, p. 67.
30. Ibid., p. 120.
31. Birch, Historical Charters, pp. 3f.
32. Ibid., pp. 19f.
33. Ibid., pp. 61f.
34. Details from Inwood, History of London.
35. Burrage and Corry, ‘At Sixes and Sevens’.
36. Landes, Revolution in Time, pp. 34–42.
37. Barmé, Forbidden City.
38. Cotterell, Imperial Capitals, p. 222.
39. Cotterell, China: A History, p. 178.
40. Catto, ‘Written English’.
41. Flynn and Giraldez, ‘Arbitrage, China, and World Trade’.
42. Ebrey, Cambridge Illustrated History of China, esp. p. 215.
43. For a good summary, see Goody, Capitalism and Modernity, pp. 103–17.
44. Guan and Li, ‘GDP and Economic Structure’.
45. See Mintz, Sweetness and Power, p. 191; Higman, ‘Sugar Revolution’.
46. Clark, Farewell to Alms, p. 57.
47. Pelzer and Pelzer, ‘Coffee Houses of Augustan London’.
48. For a revisionist view, which downplays the social damage done by exports of opium from British India, see Newman, ‘Opium Smoking in Late Imperial China’.
49. Barrow, Life of Macartney, vol. I, pp. 348f.
CHAPTER 2: SCIENCE
1. See in general Bakar, Tawhid and Science; Morgan, Lost History; Lyons, House of Wisdom.
2. Freely, Aladdin’s Lamp, p. 163.
3. Lyons, House of Wisdom, p. 5.
4. İhsanoglu, Science, Technology and Learning, pp. 16f.
5. Mansel, Constantinople, p. 62.
6. Hamdani, ‘Ottoman Response’.
7. Forster and Daniel (eds.), Life and Letters, p. 221.
8. Hess, ‘Ottoman Seaborne Empire’.
9. İnalcik and Quataert, Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, p. xviii.
10. Stoye, Siege of Vienna, p. 32.
11. Ibid., p. 119. Cf. Panaite, Ottoman Law.
12. Goodwin, Lords of the Horizons, p. 229.
13. Lewis, What Went Wrong?, pp. 18f.
14. Özmucur and Pamuk, ‘Real Wages’; Quataert, Ottoman Manufacturing. As in India, traditional textile manufacturing was hard hit by European competition in the early nineteenth century, but the Ottoman economy fared better in the period after 1850.
15. Rafeq, ‘Making a Living’; Pamuk, ‘Institutional Change’.
16. Grant, ‘Rethinking the Ottoman “Decline” ’.
17. Steinberg, Five Hundred Years, pp. 22–5.
18. Eisenstein, Printing Revolution, p. 168.
19. Luther, Concerning Christian Liberty (1520).
20. Crofts, ‘Printing, Reform and Catholic Reformation’, p. 376.
21. Holborn, ‘Printing and the Growth of a Protestant Movement’, pp. 134f.
22. Dittmar, ‘Ideas, Technology, and Economic Change’.
23. Walsham, ‘Unclasping the Book?’, p. 156.
24. Hall, ‘Intellectual Tendencies’, pp. 390f.
25. Bohnstedt, ‘Infidel Scourge of God’, p. 24.
26. Clark, ‘Publication of the Koran’, p. 9.
27. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic; Levack, Witch-Hunt.
28. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
29. Henry, Scientific Revolution, p. 74.
30. Shank, Newton Wars, p. 239.
31. Murray, Human Accomplishment, esp. pp. 257f., 297f. See also Basalla, ‘Spread of Western Science’.
32. Smith, ‘Science and Technology’. Cf. Clark, ‘Aristotle and Averroes’.
33. Deen, Science under Islam, pp. 122ff.; Huff, Rise of Early Modern Science, p. 92.
34. Huff, Rise of Early Modern Science, p. 75.
35. Deen, Science under Islam, pp. 4f.; Faroqhi, Subjects of the Sultan.
36. Mansel, Constantinople, p. 45.
37. Lewis, What Went Wrong?, p. 43.
38. Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 232f.; İhsanoglu, Science, Technology and Learning, p. 20. See also Mansel, Constantinople, p. 46; Vlahakis et al., Imperialism and Science, p. 79.
39. İhsanoglu, Science, Technology and Learning, p. 4.
40. Barkey, Empire of Difference, p. 233.
41. Sprat, History of the Royal Society, pp. 63f.
42. Fernández-Armesto, Pathfinders, p. 281.
43. Gribbin, Fellowship, pp. 253f.
44. Hall, Philosophers at War.
45. Stewart, Rise of Public Science, p. 258.
46. Allen, Steam Engine; Allen, 1715 and Other Newcomen Engines.
47. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, p. 367. Cf. Gerber, ‘Monetary System’; Pamuk, ‘Prices’.
48. Goffman, Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe, p. 119.