The Atlas of Reality
Page 103
9.2T Primitive Identity. All pairs of substances are self-individuating.
9.2A Non-primitive Identity. Some pairs of substances are not self-individuating. 9.2A.1 Fundamental Relations of Distinctness. For any distinct substances x and y, the truthmaker for x's distinctness from y is a fundamental distinctness nexus between x and y.
9.2A.2 Scotism. Substances have haecceities, and haecceities are natural properties.
10. Relations, Structures, and Quantities
10.1T Monadism. There are no fundamental relational truths.
10.1A Anti-Monadism. There are some fundamental relational truths. 10.1A.1T Connectionism. Some non-symmetric relational universals or non-symmetric relational tropes are fundamental entities. 10.1A.1T.1T Classical Connectionism. There are relational universals that are fundamental. 10.1A.1T.1T.1T Relational (Nexus) Connectionism. When some particulars (in a certain order) instantiate some relational universal, the truthmaker for the corresponding proposition is a relational nexus that ties those things (in that order) to the universal. The nexus does not contain either the relation or the relata as parts.
10.1A.1T.1T.1T.1A Constituent (State of Affairs) Connectionism. When some particulars (in a certain order) instantiate some relational universal, the truthmaker for the corresponding proposition is a state of affairs that contains those things and that universal as proper parts.
10.1A.1T.1A Trope Connectionism. There are relational tropes that are fundamental, but no fundamental relational universals.
10.1A.1A Separatism. There are no fundamental non-symmetric relational universals or relational tropes. 10.1A.1A.1T Ostrich Separatism. Separatism is true, and there is no general explanation of why some things taken in a certain order resemble other things taken in a certain order.
10.1A.1A.1A Reductive Separatism. Separatism is true, and there is some general explanation of why some things taken in a certain order resemble other things taken in a certain order.
10.2T Real numbers are universals. 10.2T.1 Determinate Universal Theory. Real numbers are relational universals, each instantiated by ordered pairs of determinate quantities.
10.2T.2 Simple Intensity Theory (Nexus version). Positive real numbers are relations between intensities, and intensities are universals that are jointly connected to particulars and determinable universals.
10.2T.3 Composite Intensity Theory. Positive real numbers are intensities. Each positive real number contains all smaller positive real numbers as proper parts, and the having of a determinate property consists in the joint instantiation of a determinable universal and an intensity.
10.2A Real numbers are not universals. 10.2A.1T Real numbers are tropes. 10.2A.1T.1 Determinate Trope Theory. Real numbers correspond to natural resemblance classes of relational modifying tropes, each of which modifies an ordered pair of quantities.
10.2A.1T.2 Simple Intensity Theory (Trope-nexus version). Positive real numbers are binary relations between intensity-tropes, and each intensity-trope is jointly attached to both a substrate and a trope of some determinable.
11. Nihilism and Monism
11.1T Aliquidism. Something exists.
11.1A Nihilism. Nothing exists.
11.2T Pluralism. More than one thing exists. 11.2T.1 Fundamental Atomism. Necessarily, every fundamental entity is atomic (lacking parts).
11.2A Monism. No more than one thing exists.
12. The Non-Existent and the Vaguely Existent
12.1T Actualism. Everything (actually) exists.
12.1A Anti-Actualism. Some things don't (actually) exist. 12.1A.1T Possibilism. Everything could exist, and some things could exist that don't actually exist.
12.1A.1A Meinongianism. Some things couldn't exist.
12.2T Epistemicism. Every boundary is determinate. Hence, any vagueness is merely epistemic.
12.2A Anti-Epistemicism. Some boundaries are indeterminate, resulting in failures of the law of bivalence. 12.2A.1T Ambiguity Theory of Vagueness. Some boundaries are indeterminate, but all such indeterminacy is merely a matter of ambiguous reference to fully determinate entities.
12.2A.1A Real Ontological Vagueness. Some entities lack determinate boundaries, independently of our knowledge or how we refer to them.
13. Solipsism, Idealism and the Problem of Perception
13.1T Idealism. Every fundamental particular is wholly mental. 13.1T.1 Solipsism. Every fundamental particular is wholly mental and part (or attribute or event intrinsic to the life of) of a single subject or mind.
13.1A Anti-idealism. Not every fundamental particular is wholly mental. 13.1A.1 Inferred Anti-Idealism. Non-mental things exist but cannot be perceived (either directly or indirectly).
13.2T Phenomenalism. Everything we are familiar with or that we have knowledge of, including apparently physical objects, is in reality wholly composed of and wholly grounded in wholly mental things. 13.2T.1 Phenomenalism (Solipsistic Version). For each subject of experience, the world as that subject knows it consists only in that very subject and its wholly mental parts and properties.
13.3T Veil of Perception. Wholly mental things are the only possible objects of sense perception. 13.3T.1 Veil of Perception (Solipsistic Version). The only possible objects of sense perception for each subject are the wholly mental and properties parts of that very subject.
13.3A Perceptual Realism. It is possible to perceive something other than wholly mental things. 13.3A.1T Indirect Realism. It is possible to perceive something other than wholly mental things, but only indirectly, by virtue of perceiving wholly mental things.
13.3A.1A Direct Realism. It is possible to directly perceive things other than wholly mental things (i.e., not by virtue of perceiving wholly mental things). 13.3A.1A.1T Perceptual Dualism. It is possible to directly perceive non-mental (physical) objects, as in veridical perception. It is also possible to be in states (hallucinatory states) in which one directly perceives a wholly mental object but perceives no physical object, and some hallucinatory states are introspectively indistinguishable from some veridical perceptions.
13.3A.1A.1A Unitary Direct Realism. Cases in which existing physical things are directly perceived are introspectively indistinguishable from cases in which no existing thing is directly perceived. 13.3A.1A.1A.1 Meinongian Direct Realism. It is possible to directly perceive both existing and non-existing physical objects, and some cases of the former are introspectively indistinguishable from the latter.
13.3A.1A.1A.2 Intentionalism. It is possible to directly perceive existing physical objects, and there are possible states introspectively indistinguishable from these in which one perceives nothing whatsoever (whether mental or physical, existing or non-existing).
14. Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity
14.1T Possible Worlds. There are possible worlds. 14.1T.1T Concretism. Possible worlds are maximal concrete objects.
14.1T.1A Abstractionism. Possible worlds are maximal possible abstract objects. (=15.1T)
14.1A No Possible Worlds. There are no possible worlds.
14.2T Modal Indexicalism. All attributions of actuality are indexical in character.
14.2A Modal Anti-Indexicalism. Some attributions of actuality are not indexical. (=15.2T)
15. Abstractionism: Worlds as Representations
15.1T Abstractionism. Possible worlds are maximal possible abstract objects. (=14.1T.1A) 15.1T.1T Magical Abstractionism. A world w represents that p if and only if it is necessarily true that if w were actual, then p, and there is no substantive account to give about why possible worlds represent what they do.
15.1T.1A Structural Abstractionism. Possible worlds represent what they do in virtue of their internal structure. 15.1T.1A.1 Linguistic Abstractionism. Structural Abstractionism is true, and worlds represent in the way linguistic things do, namely, by having components which represent things and which are arranged in according to a kind of “grammar”.
15.1T.1A.2 Pictorial Abstractionism. Structural Abstractionism is true, and worlds represent in the way pictures do, na
mely, by having components that literally share features with what they represent.
15.2T Modal Anti-Indexicalism. Some attributions of actuality are not indexical. (=14.2A) 15.2T.1 Simple Anti-Indexicalism. Actuality is a simple, fundamental property of possible worlds.
15.2T.2 Actual-Truth-Defined Anti-Indexicalism. A possible world is actual if and only if it corresponds to the class of (actually) true propositions.
15.2T.3 Truth-Defined Anti-Indexicalism. A possible world is actual if and only if it corresponds to the class of true (simpliciter) propositions.
15.2T.4 Existence-Defined Anti-Indexicalism. The actual world is that unique possible world that is reality-bounded and not quantificationally deficient.
15.2T.5 Existence-Simpliciter-Defined Anti-Indexicalism. The actual world as that unique world w such that, for every x, x exists according to w iff x exists simpliciter.
15.2T.6 Fundamental-Truth-Defined Anti-Indexicalism. The actual world is that unique world w such that every fundamental truth is true in w.
15.2T.7 Aristotelian Modality. It (tenselessly) is possible for p to be the case if and only if there is, was or will be a time at which it is, was or will be possible for p to be the case;
it is now simply possible for something to exist or to fail to exist iff something now has the power to cause or to prevent its coming into existence;
it is now simply possible for some things to stand in some natural relation iff something now has the power to make those things to stand in that relation;
it is now possible for p to be the case iff either it is now simply possible for p to be the case, or it is simply possible for it to be simply possible for p to be the case, or it is simply possible that it is simply possible that it is simply possible that p, etc.
15.3T Combinatorialism. Every Tractarian world corresponds to a possible world.
15.3A Anti-Combinatorialism. Some Tractarian worlds correspond to no possible world.
16. De Re Modality and Modal Knowledge
16.1T Transworld Identity. Some things really exist (exist in a fundamental way) in more than one possible world. 16.1T.1 Overlapping Concrete Worlds. It is possible for something to fail to exist if and only if there is an concrete universe in which it (and not just a counterpart of it) does not exist.
16.1T.2 Strong Transworld Identity. There is an object x and distinct worlds w1 and w2 such that both w1 and w2 represent x in part because each is ontologically dependent on x.
16.1A Worldbound Individuals. Each possible individual exists, as a matter of necessity, in one and only one possible world. 16.1A.1 Ludovician Counterpart Theory. It is possible for something to fail to exist if and only if there is an isolated universe in which it has no counterpart, it is possible for something to have a property if and only if there is an isolated universe it which a counterpart of it has that property, and it is possible for some things to stand in some natural relation if and only if they have some counterparts that do stand in that relation in some isolated universe.
16.2T Conceivability Entails Possibility. Every conceivable scenario is true in some possible world.
16.2T.1 Lack of A Priori Falsity Entails Possibility. Every negative-epistemic conceivable scenario is true in some possible world.
16.3T Necessity Entails A Priori Knowability. If p is necessarily true, then we can know a priori that p is true in fact.
16.4T A Priori Knowability Entails Necessity. If it is knowable a priori that p is false, then p is true in no possible world.
17. Is Space Merely Relational?
17.1T Spatial Substantivalism. Places exist and are G-fundamental. 17.1T.1T Theory of Spatial Qualities. Places are fundamental properties or qualities, and location is predication: a place is predicated of the things located there.
17.1T.1A Spatial Particularism. Places are ordinary particulars (not properties or qualities), and location is an external relation between fundamental particulars (between locations and the occupiers of those locations). 17.1T.1A.1T Body-Space Dualism. Both bodies and places are fundamental particulars of different kinds, with location being an external relation between bodies and places.
17.1T.1A.1A Spatial Monism. The only concrete particulars are places (parts of space). A body is simply a special kind of place—one that is characterized by a quality of being massive, body-ish, or en-mattered.
17.1T.2T Spatial Externalism. Spatial distance and contiguity are external relations between places.
17.1T.2A Spatial Internalism. Spatial distance and contiguity are internal relations between places.
17.1A Spatial Relationism. Places are not G-fundamental. 17.1A.1T Modern Relationism. Spatial Relationism is true, and shapes and volumes are properties of material bodies that consist entirely in the holding of certain distances between point-sized parts of those bodies.
17.1A.1A Aristotelian Relationism. Spatial Relationism is true, and shapes, volumes and contiguity (or contact) are metaphysically fundamental properties of material bodies.
17.2T Fundamentality of Distance. The fundamental spatial property is distance between points.
17.2A Fundamentality of Shape and Contiguity. The fundamental spatial properties are shape, volume, and contiguity between extended things.
17.3T There are real absences.
17.3A There are no real absences.
18. The Structure of Space: Points vs. Regions
18.1T Spatial Pointillism (Extreme Indivisibilism). Indivisible, dimensionless parts of space (points) are more fundamental than extended regions; extended regions can be wholly grounded in points.
18.1A Spatial Anti-Pointillism. Finite regions or volumes are at least as G-fundamental as points. 18.1A.1T Fundamentally Gunky Space. All G-fundamental volumes of space have proper parts.
18.1A.1A Discrete Space. There are simple volumes.
18.1A.2T Voluminism. Entities of fewer than three dimensions (like boundaries that are points, curves, and surfaces) are only logical constructions from regions and extended entities.
18.1A.2A Volume-Boundary Dualism. Entities of fewer than three dimensions (like boundaries that are points, curves, and surfaces) exist and are not mere logical constructions, but they are not more fundamental than extended things. 18.1A.2A.1 Coincident Boundaries. There are spatially coincident points (curves, surfaces).
18.2T Fundamental Entity Space-Matter Correspondence. The fundamental spatial entities are points (as opposed to volumes) if and only if the fundamental occupiers of space are point-sized bodies (as opposed to voluminous bodies).
18.2A No Correspondence between Space-Matter Fundamentality. 18.2A.1 Extended Material Atoms in a Pointillist Space. There could be extended material atoms that occupy fundamental spatial points without point-sized parts occupying those points.
18.2A.2 Material Simples without Proper Location. There could be an extended body composed of infinitely many indivisible, zero-dimensional, volume-less material bodies, each without a unique and unshared fundamental location. That is, each indivisible body occupies infinitely many spatial regions, each of which is also occupied by infinitely many other bodies.
18.3T Material Pointillism. The only fundamental bodies are point-sized (dimensionless). Truths about extended bodies are wholly grounded conceptually in truths about point-sized bodies.
18.3A Material Anti-Pointillism. Necessarily, if there are any extended bodies (bodies with finite volume), then there are fundamental bodies with finite volume.
18.4T Finitism. There are (with the possible exception of sets and numbers) only finitely many actually existing things.
18.4A Infinitism. There are infinitely many actually existing things, other than sets and numbers.
18.5T Spatial Aristotelianism. Every region of space is Aristotelian.
18.5A Continuous Variation. Some quality or quantity varies continuously throughout some region of space.
19. The Structure of Time
19.1T Instantism. Temporal intervals are not G-fundamental entities: temporal in
tervals are wholly grounded in durationless instants.
19.1A Intervalism. There are extended temporal intervals that are G-fundamental. 19.1A.1T Strong Intervalism. Instants either don't exist at all or are derived entities—mere logical constructions from finite intervals.
19.1A.1A Interval-Instant Dualism (Moderate Intervalism). Both instants and intervals are fundamental entities. 19.1A.1A.1 Instants as Dependent Entities. Instants exist only when they are the actual boundaries of extended processes or events.
19.2T Procedural Instantism. No temporally extended process is fundamental: only their indivisible, dimensionless parts (time-slices) are fundamental.
19.2A Procedural Intervalism. Some extended processes are metaphysically funda-mental.
19.3T Temporal Finitism. It is impossible for any temporal interval to have infinitely many actual temporal parts.
19.3A Temporal Infinitism. It is possible for temporal intervals to have infinitely many actual temporal parts.
19.4T Temporal Anti-Discretism (Unlimited Divisibility). All extended occupiers of time have proper parts that are temporally extended.
19.4A Temporal Discretism. There are extended occupiers of time without proper parts that are temporally extended.