19.5T Beginning of Time. Time necessarily has a beginning. 19.5T.1 Existence of a First Temporal Part. Time necessarily has a single part that is earliest.
19.5T.2 Finitude of the Past. The past is necessarily finite in extent.
20. Time's Passage
20.1T Temporalism. There are moments of time. 20.1T.1T Temporal Pluralism. There are, have been, and will be more moments of time than one.
20.1T.1A Solipsism of the Present Moment. There are, have been and will be only one moment of time (the present).
20.1A Atemporalism. There are no moments of time.
20.2T Tensism (A-Theory). Some tensed truths are metaphysically fundamental. 20.2T.1 Simple Tensism (Moving Spotlight Theory). There is a simple, primitive property of presentness that is uniquely and temporarily possessed by a moment of time.
20.2T.2 Falling Branches (Changing Possibility) Tensism. The present moment is the earliest moment such that all later times involve at least one contingent fact.
20.2T.3 Aristotelian (Changing Actuality) Tensism. The present moment is uniquely actual.
20.2T.4 Presentism (Existential Tensism). The present moment is the unique moment such that everything exists then. 20.2T.4.1 Possibilistic Presentism. The present moment is the unique moment at which everything that actually exists actually exists then.
20.2T.5 Serious Tensism. Only tensed truths are metaphysically fundamental.
20.2A Anti-Tensism (B-Theory). There are no metaphysically fundamental tensed truths. 21.2A.1T Eliminative Anti-Tensism. There are no tensed truths.
21.2A.1A Reductive Anti-Tensism. There are tensed truths, but all tensed truths are wholly grounded in tensed truths.
20.2A.2T Eternalism. Everything that exists in the past, present, or future exists simpliciter.
20.3T Indeterminacy of Future Contingents. Some future contingent B-propositions lack any truth-value.
20.3A Determinacy of Future Contingents. All future contingent B-propositions are either true or false.
22. Material Composition: The Special Question
22.1T Universal Compositional Priority. Whenever some parts compose a whole, either the parts are wholly grounded in the whole, or the whole is wholly grounded in the parts. 22.1T.1T Universal Bottom-Up Priority. Whenever some parts compose a whole, the whole is wholly grounded in the parts.
22.1A No Universal Compositional Priority. There are cases of composition in which neither the whole is wholly grounded in the parts, nor are the parts wholly grounded in the whole. 22.1A.1T No Compositional Priority. In cases of composition, the whole is never wholly grounded in its parts, nor are the parts wholly grounded in the whole. 22.1A.1T.1 Compositional Equivalence. In cases of composition, truths about the whole and truths about the parts are metaphysically equivalent. 22.1A.1T.1.1 Nihilistically Grounded Composition. All truths about wholes and their parts are wholly grounded in a class of nihilistic truths (truths that do not entail the existence of anything).
22.1A.1T.1.2 Atomistically Grounded Composition. All truths about wholes and their parts are wholly grounded in a class of truths about atomic things that never compose anything.
22.2T Fundamental Heapism. Some heaps exist fundamentally.
22.2A Anti-Heapism. No heaps exist fundamentally.
22.3T Priority of Spatial Point-Parts. If x is a composite thing, then the location of x is wholly grounded in the point-locations of point-sized parts of x. 22.3T.1 Priority of Spatial Point-Parts for Heaps. If x is a heap, then the location of x is wholly grounded in the locations of some proper parts of x.
22.3T.2 Priority of Spatial Point-Parts for Thorough Heaps. If x is a thorough heap, then the location of x is wholly grounded in the locations of its point-sized parts.
22.3A Non-Priority of Spatial Point-Parts. If x is a composite thing, then the location of x is not wholly grounded in the location of x's point-sized parts.
22.4T Universal Atomism. Everything has an atomic part.
22.4A Existence of Mereological Gunk. Some things have no atomic part. 22.4A.1 Existence of Spatial Gunk. Something is spatially gunky.
22.5T Fundamental Artifactualism. Some material mere artifacts exist fundamentally.
22.5A Anti-Artifactualism. No material mere artifacts exist fundamentally.
22.6T Organicism. Some living organisms exist and are both fundamental things and composite material things. 22.6T.1 Composite Persons. Living organisms that are persons capable of free will exist and are fundamental composite, material things.
22.6A Anti-Organicism. Living organisms do not exist or are not fundamental composite, material things.
22.7T Priority Atomism. There are no fundamental composite material things. All fundamental material things are atoms.
22.8T Intelligible Composition. There is a finitely representable, non-trivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions C, such that for any set of simples S, the members of S compose something if and only if they jointly satisfy C. 22.8T.1T Mereological Nihilism. No non-empty set of things ever composes anything (whether fundamental or not).
22.8T.1A Mereological Aliquidism. Some non-empty sets of things do compose something: there is some other principle of composition besides Mereological Nihilism. 22.8T.1A.1 Extreme Organicism. A set of entities composes something if and only if the members of that set participate in a single life.
22.8T.1A.2 Mereological Universalism. For every non-empty set S, the members of that set compose something. (Equivalent to (M6) Arbitrary Sums)
22.8T.1A.3 Fastenation. The x's compose something if and only if they are fastened to each other.
22.8T.1A.4 Locomotive Unification. The x's compose something if and only if they are locomotively unified.
22.8T.1A.5 Cohesion. The x's compose something if and only if they cohere together.
22.8T.1A.6 Fusion. The x's compose something if and only if they are fused together.
22.8T.1A.7 Democritean Fastenation. The x's compose something if and only if they are all atoms and the x's are maximally fastened.
22.8T.1A.8 Serial Bonding. The x's compose something if and only if the x's are atoms bonded in ways R1 or R1' (or R1'', etc.), or the x's are things composed of atoms bonded in way R2 or R2' or…, or the x's are things composed of things composed of atoms bonded in way R3, or…
22.8T.1A.9 Homogeneous Continua. The x's compose something if and only if they form a homogeneous material continuum (a material thing with no sharp internal boundaries).
22.8T.1A.10 Homogeneous Continua Plus Organisms. The x's compose something if and only if they form an organism or a homogeneous material continuum.
22.8T.1A.11 Composition of Artifacts (1). Some material things compose a mere material artifact if and only if they have been altered or arranged by some intelligent agent (or group of agents) for a single purpose or interdependent set of purposes, and they do not compose a living thing.
22.8T.1A.12 Composition of Artifacts (2). Some material things compose a mere material artifact if and only if they are used and maintained by some intelligent agent (or group of agents) for a single purpose or interdependent set of purposes, and they do not compose a living thing.
22.8A Brutal Composition. There is no such finite set of conditions.
22.9T Extreme Anti-Heapism. No heaps exist.
22.10T Extreme Anti-Artifactualism. No composite material artifacts exist.
23. Material Composition: The General Question
23.1T Compositional Realism. The parthood relation, or some closely related relation, like joint-composition, is either fundamental or corresponds to a relational universal. 23.1T.1 Fundamental Parthood. The parthood relation, or some closely related relation, like joint-composition, is fundamental. 23.1T.1.1 Composition as Identity (CAI). Every whole is identical to its parts: to be a proper part is to be one of the things that are (collectively) identical to the whole.
23.1T.2 Natural Parthood. The parthood relation, or some closely related relation, like joint-composition, corresponds to a relationa
l universal or a natural resemblance class.
23.1A Compositional Anti-Realism. The parthood relation is neither fundamental nor natural. (=22.8T.1T Mereological Nihilism) 23.1A.1T Moderate (or Reductive) Compositional Anti-Realism. There are truths about proper parthood, but all truths about proper parthood are grounded in more fundamental, non-mereological truths. 23.1A.1T.1T Arbitrary Compositional Reductionism. All truths about proper parthood are grounded in more fundamental, non-mereological truths in such a way that Arbitrary Sums is true.
23.1A.1T.1A Non-Arbitrary Compositional Reductionism. All truths about proper parthood are grounded in more fundamental, non-mereological truths in such a way that Arbitrary Sums is false. 23.1A.1T.1A.1 Aristotelian Compositional Reductionism. Some things, the x's, compose y at time t if and only if the x's are more than one, and there is some process P involving exactly the x's as participants such that (i) the existence of y at time t is causally explained by the continuation of P during some I that is terminated by t, (ii) all of the power-conferring properties of each of the x's are at t wholly grounded in the power-conferring properties of y at t, and (iii) every property of y that confers an active or passive power on y at t ontologically depends on one or more of the x's.
23.1A.1A Compositional Nihilism. Nothing is a proper part of anything else.
24. Change and Persistence
24.1T Something changes. 24.1T.T Strict Kineticism. Some things change intrinsically. 24.1T.1T.1T Enduring Substratism. Fundamental things can undergo qualitative change, existing before, during, and after the change. 24.1T.1T.1T.1T Classical Endurantism. Fundamental things can undergo qualitative change, existing before, during, and after the change, but they do not have any temporal parts.
24.1T.1T.1T.1A Time-Slice Substratism. Fundamental things can undergo qualitative change, existing before, during and after the change, and they have instantaneous temporal parts corresponding to each instant during which they exist.
24.1T.1T.1A Replacementism. It is possible for something fundamental to undergo substantial change but not qualitative change. 24.1T.1T.1A.1T Classical Perdurantism. The only fundamental things exist only for an instant, and the only fundamental relations between such time-slices are spatiotemporal relations.
24.1T.1T.1A.1A Classical Genidentity Theory. The only fundamental things exist only for an instant, and there is one fundamental relation (primitive genidentity) that is not spatiotemporal.
24.1T.1A Moderate Staticism. Some things undergo mere Cambridge change, but nothing changes intrinsically.
24.1A Nothing changes.
24.2T Persistence. Something persists (has existed or will exist at more than one instant).
24.3T Universal Instantaneous Temporal Parts (UITP). All persisting things have instantaneous temporal parts (time-slices), one corresponding to each instant during which they exist, and these time-slices are fundamental and not mere logical constructions. 24.3T.1 Temporal Plenitude. For every set S of instantaneous temporal parts of things, containing exactly instantaneous object for each instant in some finite interval T, there is a persisting thing that persists throughout T with exactly the members of S as its instantaneous temporal parts.
24.3T.2 Continuous Arbitrary Worms. For every spacetime worm S over interval T, if the spatial locations of the members of S form a continuous trajectory through spacetime, there is a persisting thing that persists throughout T with exactly the members of S as its instantaneous temporal parts.
24.3T.3 Ramsey-Lewis-Sider Perdurantism. A spacetime worm S over interval T corresponds to the existence of a derived thing persisting through T if and only if the simplest and most powerful scientific theory of the actual world assigns a persisting entity to S. (=25.3T)
24.3A Absence of Temporal Parts. Some persisting things x and some instants of time t are such that x exists at t but has no instantaneous part at t that is fundamental and not a mere logical construction.
24.4T No Temporal Coincidence. Necessarily, no instantaneous thing is a time-slice of more than one persisting thing.
24.4A Temporal Coincidence. It is possible for an instantaneous thing to be a time-slice of two distinct persisting things.
24.5T Intrinsic Motion. Motion is something intrinsic to the moving thing at each moment of its motion.
24.5A Extrinsic Motion. Motion is not intrinsic to each instantaneous time-slice of the moving thing. 24.5A.1T The At/At Theory of Motion. The fundamental truths about locomotion are truths about instantaneous location events.
24.5A.1A Motion Intervalism. The fundamental truths about locomotion are truths not about location events but about extended processes of motion.
25. The Persistence of Composite Things
25.1T Mereological Constancy. Necessarily, everything that persists has exactly the same parts at all times at which it exists.
25.1A Mereological Inconstancy. It is possible for a persisting thing to gain or lose parts over time.
25.2T Possibility of Temporary Mereological Coincidence. It is possible for there to be two coincident entities.
25.2A Impossibility of Temporary Mereological Coincidence. It is impossible for there to be two coincident entities.
25.3T Ramsey-Lewis-Sider Perdurantism. A spacetime worm S over interval T corresponds to the existence of a derived thing persisting through T if and only if the simplest and most powerful scientific theory of the actual world assigns a persisting entity to S. (=24.3T.3) 25.3T.1 Worm Theory. Ramsey-Lewis-Sider Perdurantism is true, and persisting objects are identical to spacetime worms.
25.3T.2 Stage Theory. Ramsey-Lewis-Sider Perdurantism is true, and objects that can rightly be said to ‘persist’ are identical to temporal parts of spacetime worms.
26. The Existence and Scope of Causation
26.1T Causal Realism. Something is caused. 26.1T.1T Universal Causation. Everything is caused.
26.1T.1A Special Causation. Some things are caused, and some are not. 26.1T.1A.1T Existence of Uncaused Causes. Some uncaused things cause other things.
26.1T.1A.2T Principled Causation. The set of things having causes is finitely definable.
26.1T.1A.2A Unprincipled Causation. The set of things having causes is not finitely definable.
26.1A Causal Anti-Realism. Nothing is caused.
27. Causation: A Relation between Things or Truths?
27.1T Causal Connectionism. Causation is fundamentally a relation (causal connection) between things (and not between truths).
27.1A Causal Explanationism. Causation is fundamentally a relation (causal explanation) between truths. 27.1A.1 Nomological-Deductive Theory of Causal Explanation. The fact that truth p causally explains truth q consists in the fact that q can be deduced from p, together with truths about the laws of nature and relevant background conditions.
27.1A.2 Counterfactual Theory of Causal Explanation. If p and q are truths of the appropriate kind, and p causally explains q, then this fact consists in the fact that q would be not have been true if p had not been true (i.e., that (∼p []-> ∼q)).
27.1A.3 Probability-Raising Theory of Causal Explanation. The fact that truth p causally explains truth q consists in the fact that there is an appropriate body of background truths K(p) such that the probability of q conditional on the conjunction of p and K(p) is greater than the conditional probability of q on K(p) alone.
28. Discrete and Continuous Causation
28.1T Mark Transmission Theory. A set of events P constitutes a process if and only if (i) the spatiotemporal locations of the events in P form a continuum C, (ii) some conserved quantity Q is associated with the events in P at a constant value throughout C, and (iii) there is some action M (the ‘marking’ action) which did not in fact occur during C, but which is such that, if M had occurred at some spacetime location within C, then every subsequent event in P (but none of the earlier events) would have been replaced by a different event associated with a different value of Q.
Appendix B
Table of Principles
This
appendix collects together the principles of methodology, epistemology, truth, metaphysics, and mereology to which we have appealed throughout the book. We have listed, after each principle, the sections in which explicit appeal was made to that principle.
I. Principles of Methodology
PMeth 1 Ockham's Razor. Other things being equal, adopt the simplest theory. (2.3, 3.9, 5.1, 8.1.3, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1.4, 13.3.2, 17.3, 18.4, 20.5.1, 22.4.1, 22.5.1, 22.7.2, 24.2, 25.1.3.3) PMeth 1.0 The Zeroth Corollary of Ockham's Razor. Other things being equal, prefer the theory that posits the smallest number of fundamental entities. (3.0, 22.2)
PMeth 1.1 First Corollary of Ockham's Razor: Minimizing Rational Postulates. Other things being equal, prefer the theory that posits the fewest primitive, underivable postulates of reason. (2.3, 5.1, 5.2.3, 20.5.1)
PMeth 1.2 Second Corollary of Ockham's Razor. Other things being equal, adopt the theory with the fewest brute, inexplicable impossibilities and necessities. (2.4.2, 8.1.3, 17.2.2, 18.3.1, 18.4, 18.4.1, 19.1, 21.2.3, 21.6, 22.4.1, 24.2.2, 27.2.2.2)
PMeth 1.3 Third Corollary of Ockham's Razor. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that posits the fewest unexplained and uncaused non-internal relations between things. (5.1)
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