PMeth 1.4 Fourth Corollary of Ockham's Razor. Adopt the theory that jointly minimizes the following classes: (i) facts about the existence of fundamental things, (ii) facts about the holding of fundamental (natural) properties of and relations between fundamental things, and (iii) facts about brute metaphysical necessity. If more than one theory minimizes these classes (if some trade-off between them is inevitable), adopt that theory which makes the best trade-offs. (7.2.4, 9.2, 11.1, 15.2.1.1, 17.2.2, 22.4.1, 24.2.2.2, 27.1) PMeth 1.4.1 Addendum to Ockham's Razor: Prioritizing Qualitative Economy. When trading off quantitative economy (minimizing the number of fundamental things) and qualitative economy (minimizing the number of fundamental (natural) properties of and relations between fundamental things), always prefer the latter. (7.2.4, 11.1, 18.1.1)
PMeth 1.5 Fifth Corollary of Ockham's Razor. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that attributes the fewest ambiguities to natural language. (12.1.2, 17.4)
PMeth 1.6 Sixth Corollary of Ockham's Razor: Minimizing Possibilities. Other things being equal, prefer the theory that posits the smallest class of metaphysical possibilities. (15.1.1, 17.3)
PMeth 2 Scientific Realism. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that implies that our best scientific theories are straightforwardly true, as standardly represented. (5.2.1, 18.3.1, 20.5.6) PMeth 2.1 Scientific Realism: Objectivity. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that implies that our best scientific theories are objectively true: true independently of our scientific preferences and practices. (5.2.1)
PMeth 2.2 Scientific Realism: Reliability. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that implies that we are reasonably reliable in finding scientific truth. (5.2.1)
PMeth 3 Structuralism. Other things being equal, adopt the theory that explains metaphysical impossibilities in terms of the essential structure of things—e.g., in the case of extended things, in terms of the essential structure of space or time. (15.1.1, 18.3.1)
PMeth 4 Redundancy for Composite Entities. Reject any theory that posits any kind of composite entity without both emergent active powers and essentially unitary passive or immanent powers. (22.3, 22.4.1, 22.4.2, 22.5.1)
II. Principles of Epistemology
PEpist 1 Imagination as Guide to Possibility. If a scenario is imaginable in great detail without evident absurdity, then we have good reason to think that it represents a metaphysical possibility. (5.2.2, 6.3, 9.3.2.1, 16.2, 18.3, 19.1.1, 19.1.2, 20.5.6, 22.4.2, 26.1.1, 5.2.2, 9.3.2.1, 16.2, 19.1.1, 20.5.6, 26.1.1, 26.2.3) PEpist 1.1 Limit of Possibles Itself Possible. If a series of scenarios is such that each represents a metaphysical possibility, and the series converges at the limit on a further scenario, then we have good reason to think that the latter scenario represents a metaphysical possibility. (9.3.2.1)
PEpist 2 Reidian Common Sense. It is prima facie plausible to presume the truth of every article of common sense. (13.6.1, 20.5.3, 21.2.1) PEpist 2.1 Ethical Practices Presumption. It is prima facie plausible to suppose that all of the presuppositions of our fundamental ethical beliefs and practices are true. (11.1, 13.6.1, 22.6.1)
PEpist 2.2 Rational Practices Presumption. It is prima facie plausible to suppose that all of the presuppositions of rational practices (such as deliberation about the future or induction) are true. (13.6.1, 14.1) PEpist 2.2.1 Presumption of Philosophical Discourse. It is prima facie plausible to presume the truth of all of the pragmatic presuppositions of philosophical discourse. (20)
PEpist 3 Appearance of Bodies and Minds. Perception and memory present us with what are apparently distinct physical things, including some embodying apparently distinct minds. (11.2, 13.3)
PEpist 4 Reliable Perception Presumption. It is prima facie plausible to suppose that human perception and memory are reliable. (11.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.6.1, 17.4, 19.1.1, 20, 21.3) PEpist 4.1 Sensory Error Minimization. Other things being equal, prefer a theory that posits the fewest and least severe sensory errors to human subjects. (13.3.1)
PEpist 5 Conceptual Acquaintance. It is possible to know the truth of a proposition that involves the use of a concept C only if either (i) one knows a definition of C in terms of other concepts, or (ii) one knows a non-empty class of instances of C. (13.4, 13.6.4)
III. Principles of Truth
PTruth 1 One Truthmaker per Fundamental Property. If p is the true predication of a fundamental property P to x1 through xn, and q is the true predication of a different fundamental property Q to the same things x1 through xn, then p and q have distinct truthmakers. (2.5.2, 3.4.3, 8.1.3, 9.3.2.1, 18.4.1)
PTruth 2 Tarski's Schema. For any sentence s, if S is a name for s, then we should affirm the sentence of the form: S is true if and only if s. (2.3, 12.2.2)
IV. Principles of Metaphysics
PMeta 1 The Necessary and Sufficient Condition Test for Necessary Grounding. If the truth of a proposition p is necessarily wholly grounded in the truth of proposition q, then the truth of q is a metaphysically necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of p. (4.4) PMeta 1.1 The Necessary Condition Test for Necessary Grounding. If the truth of a proposition p is necessarily wholly grounded in the truth of proposition q, then the truth of q is a metaphysically necessary condition for the truth of p. (4.4)
PMeta 2 Intrinsicality of Powers. Having a power is an intrinsic property. (5.2.2, 19.1.2, 20.5.6, 26.2.1)
PMeta 3 Membership the Only Fundamental Set Relation. If S is a set, then the only fundamental relation involving S is the membership relation between S's members and itself. (8.1.2, 10.2.1, 18.1.1, 18.4.1)
PMeta 4 General Principle of Constituent Identity. If x and y both have proper parts, and they have exactly the same proper parts, then they must be identical.
(23.3) PMeta 4.1 PCI for Substances. If A and B are substances, and every constituent of A is a constituent of B and vice versa, then A is identical to B. (9.3.2)
PMeta 4.2 Weak PCI. If x and y are necessarily composite and necessarily have the same proper parts, then x = y. (9.3.2)
PMeta 4.3 PCI for Bundles. If x and y are bundles of properties, and x and y have the same proper parts, then x = y. (9.3.2)
PMeta 5.1 Finite spatiotemporal patchwork. If an event or process of (intrinsic) type A is possible, as is an event or process of intrinsic type B, and if there is enough room in the history of the world to locate in it instances of both events (or processes) without overlap in time and space, then it is possible for events (or processes) of both types to occur together. (6.3, 16.2.3, 20.5.6, 24.1, 26.2.1)
PMeta 5.2 Infinite patchwork. If T is a class of types of events or processes, and for each member of T, it is possible for an event or process of type T to occur, and there is enough room in history of the world to locate within it instances of each of the types in T without overlap in space and time between the instances, then it is possible for all the types in T to be realized together. (16.2.3, 18.3.1, 19.1.2, 24.1, 26.2.1)
V. Principles of Natural Philosophy
PNatPhil 1 Possibility of Ubiquitous Atomless Gunk. It is possible for nothing to exist but atomless gunk (things with parts but no atomic parts). (11.2.4, 22.4.2)
PNatPhil 2 Independence of Motion and Substantial Change. Neither the movement of two extended things nor the division of an extended thing into two parts can necessitate the creation or annihilation of material parts (not even point-masses). (18.3.3, 22.4.2)
PNatPhil 3 Continuity of Motion. It is impossible for any material thing to move discontinuously through spacetime. (19.1.2, 22.4.2, 24.2.1)
VI. Principles of Mereology
Axioms of Classical Mereology (23.1, 23.3)
(MA1) Reflexivity. Everything is a part of itself.
(MA2) Anti-Symmetry. If x is a part of y, and y is a part of x, then x = y.
(MA3) Transitivity. If x is a part of y, and y is a part of z, then x is a part of z.
(MA4) Weak Supplementation. If x is a proper part of y, then y has some part z that does not overlap x.
(MA5) Strong Supplementation. If x is not a part
of y, then x has some part z that does not overlap y.
(MA6) Arbitrary Sums If S is a non-empty set, then there exists at least one sum of S.
(MA6′) Arbitrary Parts. If there is a sum of the members of set S, and S′ is a subset of S, then there is a sum of the members of S′.
(MC1) Extensionality for Wholes. If x and y have the same proper parts, then x = y. (Follows from Anti-Symmetry and Strong Supplementation)
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