The Atlas of Reality

by Robert C. Koons,Timothy Pickavance

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  Jackson, F. (1987), Conditionals (Oxford: Blackwell).

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  Johnston, M. (1987), Is There a Problem About Persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supp) 61: 107–135.

  Johnston, M. (1992), How to Speak of the Colors, Philosophical Studies 68: 221–263.

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  Kim, J. (1973), Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of an Event, Journal of Philosophy 70: 317–336.

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  Kim, J. (1992), Downward Causation, in A. Beckerman, H. Flohr, and J. Kim eds., Emergentism and Reduction (New York and Berlin: De Gruyter).

  Kim, J. (1993), ‘Strong’ and ‘Global’ Supervenience Revisited, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 79–91.

  Kim, J. (1994), Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence, Philosophical Issues 5: 51–69.

  Kim, J. (1998), Mind in a Physical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  Kim, J. (2001), Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body Problems for the Physicalist, in C. Gillett and B. Loewer eds., Physicalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

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  Koons, R.C. (1992), Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

  Koons, R.C. (1997), A New Look at the Cosmological Argument, American Philosophical Quarterly 34: 171–192.

  Koons, R.C. (2000), Realism Regained: An Exact Theory of Causation, Teleology and the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

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  Koons, R.C. (2014a), A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper, Noûs 48: 256–267.

  Koons, R.C. (2014b), Staunch vs. Faint-hearted Hylomorphism: Toward an Aristotelian Account of Composition, Res Philosophica 91: 1–27.

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  Kripke, S.A. (1980), Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

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  Lewis, D.K. (1970a), How to Define Theoretical Terms, Journal of Philosophy 67: 427–446.

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