The House of Islam

by Ed Husain

  The House of Islam is on fire – and the arsonist still lives there. Neighbours can bring water to put out the fire, but Muslims must also expel the fire bombers in their midst. It is no longer enough simply to condemn terrorism. Muslims deserve no applause or special recognition merely for condemning murderers. That is the least we can do, not the most. The measure of civilisation is not that low. From the earliest days of Islam, the Kharijites were so called because they were exactly that: outsiders, people who had ‘gone out’, beyond the pale. The greatest of Muslim scholars declared them to be non-Muslims. And the earliest violent Salafi-jihadis were banned from Mecca by the qadi and the Ottoman rulers because they were considered to be infidels.

  As long as the House of Islam provides shelter for Salafi-jihadis, the rest of the world will attack Islam and Muslims. A poll carried out in the Netherlands in 2013 disclosed that 73 per cent of respondents said that ‘a relationship exists’ between Islam and terror attacks.11 In France in the same year, 74 per cent of people polled said that they considered Islam as intolerant, and 73 per cent viewed Islam negatively.12 In Germany in 2012, 64 per cent of Germans associated Islam with violence and 70 per cent connected Islam with fanaticism and radicalism.13

  As long as Muslims tolerate their presence, we will give licence even to the ideologues in both the East and West to conflate Islam with Salafi-jihadism. More Muslims will turn to jihadism, and another generation will be lost. We need to cleanse our mosques, publishing houses, schools, websites, satellite TV stations, madrasas and ministries of Salafi-jihadi influences. Unless we do, Islamophobia will continue to rise and we cannot complain when the West repeatedly suggests that Muslims are suspect. Unless we do, no matter how much Muslims protest, they will continue to share the opprobrium heaped on those who claim to represent us. Unless we do, we cannot credibly claim that ‘they have nothing to do with us’. Sadly, they do come from within us.

  Islamists and Salafists seek to suppress thoughts of coexistence not only with Israel but also with other Muslims, particularly Shi‘a believers. If mainstream Sunni Islam does not expel the killers of Shi‘a, it will continue to allow Salafi-jihadis to claim that they are acting in the name of Sunni Islam, and further fuel the inferno of Sunni–Shi‘a clashes in the Middle East. Entire countries are already in the grip of this sectarian crisis, and it has probably not yet peaked in Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran and elsewhere. Once these people have been ejected and identified as the chief foes of Islam, both Sunni and Shi‘a can then turn their attention to isolating and eradicating the Salafi-jihadis, the Kharijites of our time. This is not happening at present, so they exploit the privilege and enjoy the protection of being within the House of Islam and can claim that their ijtihad, or sharia-based reasoning, is as valid as that of mainstream Muslims.

  To deny their claim to Islam, to oust them from the faith, offers three immediate advantages: first, their yaqeen, or certainty, comes into question, for the majority of the world’s Muslims cannot be wrong. Second, although those who are already jihadis or Kharijites may not repent and return to the fold of mainstream Islam, the vast majority of young Muslims, potential recruits in the decades ahead, are forced to reconsider. You cannot be fighting for Islam if the majority of Muslims do not even consider you Muslim. Currently, no such fork in the road exists, and both options – jihadism and mainstream Islam – are presented, at least in the early stages of radicalisation, as equally Muslim. Third, declaring the Kharijites’ apostasy from Islam is a solidly theological and scriptural argument, and therefore defeats them on the very ground that they seek to claim as their prerogative.

  As matters stand, Islam and ordinary Muslims are not responsible for terrorism, but have something to do with Salafi violence. Just as Pakistan was held in deep distrust for harbouring Osama bin Laden, the role of its madrasas and for assisting North Korea with nuclear technology, today the Islamic world is considered suspect for including murderers, beheaders, rapists, slave owners and terrorists. There needs to be a global declaration by all fifty-plus Muslim governments and their Islamic leaders, disowning these theological brigands as disbelievers. This should start with a summit in Mecca and then amplified in multiple Muslim capitals over a sustained period of time.

  In Islam, if a Muslim drinks alcohol, consumes pork or steals, he or she is still considered a Muslim, albeit a sinful believer who is expected to have to face God to account for these acts in the next life. If, however, that same person then attempts to justify those sins, then she or he becomes a disbeliever, a kafir, because they have committed an open act of disbelief (known as kufr bawah) by denying and defying the basic precepts of Islam. Actions and faith are detached. Sinful actions do not nullify a Muslim’s belief. But the opposite is true for Salafi-jihadis or the Kharijites. They believe and vehemently insist that Muslims not praying, or drinking alcohol, are not sinful, but in fact are disbelievers. On these grounds they make Takfir, or excommunicate Muslims.

  By their own definition, what then of someone, nay an entire movement, committed to the worst acts of inhumanity – killing innocents, enslaving women, murdering Muslim believers and destroying historical sites? If consuming and defending the consumption of a bacon sandwich puts a Muslim outside the faith, then why not murder, rape, enslavement and the demolition of antiquities?

  By their own measure, Salafi-jihadis are disbelievers and behave and belong outside the fold of Islam. When will more Muslim governments and leaders again have the courage to say so?14

  Just like the Kharijites, Salafi-jihadis claim to be the truest of true Muslims, and they cite chapter and verse in support of their claim. They inject yaqeen, total certainty, into the minds of their adherents, so that they would be prepared to kill millions if they could. It is not lack of intent, or compassion for God’s creation, that prevents them, merely the inability thus far to do so. For as long as Salafi-jihadis or Kharijites are allowed to wear the mantle of Islam, they will continue to win more and more of the Muslim masses over to their side. ‘True Muslim brothers are being killed’ and ‘War is being waged on Islam’ will continue to be their rallying cries.

  Killing them will not solve the problem on its own. This is only dealing with the visible symptom of a disease. Keeping them within the fold of Islam for over thirty years since the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 has transformed the Kharijite threat from an Egyptian problem into a global security threat. This failed policy needs to end, or else, within a century, Kharijite extremism will claim millions more adherents within the Muslim world and beyond. In an age of pressurised attention spans, sound bites and tweets, the nuance, context and caveats of mainstream Muslim scholarship cannot compete with the simplistic clarity of extremists speaking the language of the engineers, scientists and doctors who dominate the elite of Arab societies. An organised minority is now in control of the discourse of the disorganised majority of Muslims. We cannot, in the name of pluralism and tolerating different views within Islam, tolerate intolerance.

  For how much longer will we blame the West and take comfort in conspiracy theories? Expelling extremists is fully within Muslim control. When the Wahhabi sect first came into being in the eighteenth century, Suleiman Abd al-Wahhab, the qadi of Mecca who was the brother of the founder of the sect, kept Salafi-jihadis out of the city. In India, Muslim scholars have issued a fatwa against the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS, ruling that they are ‘not Islamic organisations’. And leading Pakistani scholar Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri has issued an extensive edict calling them disbelievers of the Kharijite strain within Islam. In Egypt, the grand imam of Al-Azhar has called for them to be punished.

  Takfiris only understand this language of Takfir. Only this may force them to reconsider their Islamic credentials, repent and return to the fold of Islam by denouncing their un-Islamic acts of killing, raping, enslaving, and destroying Islam from within. Historically, some of the greatest of Muslim scholars, including Imams Bukhari, Ibn Taymiyya, Subki, Ibn Hajar and others,
have said that these are not people from within Islam. So what stops today’s Muslims from expelling the jihadis from within our ranks, denying them the platform that they seek to hijack?

  Jordan, Britain, Turkey, Egypt and America have made the point, identifying the extremists as Kharijites and apostates, but more Muslim governments and scholars in positions of leadership still need to organise, mobilise, speak, and then take active measures to deny all putative Islamic, scriptural, justifications of Salafi-jihadism. For how much longer will they first remain silent, and then complain that the West and others are falsely blaming Muslims?

  The House of Islam is on fire. Anger and hate are fanning the flames from room to room. We must act before it suffocates us. We all need to bring buckets of water to douse the flames, and then support the task of renovating after the fire we helped to set. Unlike climate change or natural disasters, we can make a real difference in our lifetimes, and create peaceable alliances in the Muslim world. And to do that, we must turn our urgent attention to the battle of ideas raging across the Middle East.

  Appendix: Middle Eastern Thinkers’ Calls for a Regional Union

  The calls for Arab unity or regionalism discussed below represent a range of ideologies – some pan-Arab and others pan-Islamic, some secular and others religious – but all call for a regional architecture that transcends the nation-state. Some authors were Christian, some Muslim. Remember that this is not an exhaustive list; rather, I chose to highlight those who were most representative of the major political trends.

  AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

  Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan, Turkey (1954–)

  In September 2011, Erdoǧan departed on his ‘Arab Spring tour’ to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, during which he emphasised Turkish–Arab unity and positioned Turkey as a model for these countries’ futures.

  In April 2016, as Turkish president, Erdoǧan called on Muslim-majority states to unite in fighting terrorism and overcoming sectarian divisions in an opening speech at the annual summit meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Istanbul.

  ‘I believe the greatest challenge we need to surmount is sectarianism. My religion is not that of Sunnis, of Shi‘as. My religion is Islam,’ he said in his opening speech.

  ‘Why are we waiting for help from outside to solve our problems and put a stop to terror?’ he asked.

  ‘Sectarianism is the biggest source of danger facing the Muslim world. We must unite to solve these problems ourselves,’ he said.

  Abdullah Gul, Turkey (1950–)

  Abdullah Gul was president of Turkey from 2007 to 2014. He stated in November 2011, addressing the British Foreign Office’s Wilton Park think tank, that the Middle East lacked ‘an efficient regional economic cooperation and integration mechanism’. President Gul noted the role of the European Union in Europe’s development after the fall of the Berlin Wall to indicate the potential for such a union after the Arab Spring.1

  I invited President Gul to address a Westminster audience in 2017, when he reiterated his calls for deeper regional integration through a political and economic union that addressed the challenges of the Middle East.

  GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)

  King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, Saudi Arabia (1924–2015)

  King Abdullah, reigning King of Saudi Arabia, called in 2011 for the transition of the Gulf Cooperation Council from a cooperative agreement towards a single entity.

  Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah al-Saud, Saudi Arabia (1952–)

  In 2013, the Saudi King Abdullah promoted his son, Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, to head the Saudi national guard; almost immediately following, Prince Mutaib announced that the GCC would create a 100,000-strong defence force over the next few years.2

  Prince Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, Bahrain (1935–)

  Prince Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, the current prime minister of Bahrain, has made many statements in support of both Gulf and Arab unity projects. In April 2013 at the Gulf Press Association Conference, he stated: ‘unity will protect our future and make us a strong entity in the international arena’.3 In January 2014, he echoed the same sentiments and added that a Gulf union could be ‘the core of the Arab unity’ and would be a means to protect against ‘the schemes being plotted against us’, referencing the unrest in Bahrain that could be a ‘gateway through which terror could be spread into the entire region’.4

  Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, United Arab Emirates (1918–2004)

  Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, former ruler of Abu Dhabi and president of the UAE, said in a February 2000 meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah: ‘Without building solidarity and closing their ranks, the Arabs will have no weight and strength in the world. They will lose nothing if they pursue the path of solidarity, unity, and joint action.’5 Sheikh Zayed’s political vision of unity among Arabs led to the creation in 1973 of the United Arab Emirates, a confederation of seven Arab political entities.

  Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, United Arab Emirates (1949–)

  Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, current ruler of Dubai and vice president and prime minister of the UAE, in August 1987 as defence minister met with PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to discuss Arab unity and Palestinian political aims. Sheikh Mohammed stated that: ‘Arab unity is essential,’ and that the UAE would always support any joint Arab action aimed at promoting Arab interests.6 In November 2000, he stated in a broadcast Internet chat with other UAE rulers that progress had been made in the ‘much sought-after unity among Arab states’.7

  ANTI-COLONIALIST

  Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/9–97)

  Jamal al-Din al-Afghani is considered a founder of Arab nationalism. He campaigned for pan-Arab/pan-Islamic unity starting in the 1860s to challenge European encroachments into the Middle East and beyond. Though he was born in either Iran or Afghanistan – scholars disagree despite the nisba ‘al-Afghani’ – he spent his life travelling, living for a time in India, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Europe, Persia and Russia. Afghani aspired to create a strong state to protect Muslims from European ambitions. However, the concern with Muslim, rather than Arab unity does not indicate an interest in religious doctrine or spirituality in Afghani’s project; he considered Islam to be a civilisation, rather than a religion.8

  Muhammad ‘Abduh, Egypt (1849–1905)

  Muhammad ‘Abduh, a student of Afghani, was more focused on the religious nature of Islam than on his teacher’s political activism. ‘Abduh served as Mufti of Egypt and is considered a founder of Islamic Modernism. He believed that Islam could only be revitalised through cultural activity, not politics, and he preached brotherhood and unity between all schools of Islamic thought. He was a supporter of the rebellion against the British in Egypt, and he made popular a more hopeful attitude toward unitarian politics that led faithful Egyptians to engage in politics.9

  Muhammad Rashid Rida, Syria (1865–1935)

  Muhammad Rashid Rida, a student of Muhammad ‘Abduh, built upon his teacher’s philosophy in the religious direction, toward the establishment of the caliphate. Rashid Rida’s writings influenced the modern political philosophy for an ‘Islamic State’.10

  Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Syria (1849–1902)

  Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi was also a student of Muhammad ‘Abduh, though his ideology focused on Arab nationalism, rather than pan-Islamism. To Kawakibi, Arabs were the only legitimate representatives of Islam,11 and he championed Arabs against the Turks. He argued for a spiritual caliphate, whose ruler would exercise no political authority.12

  PRO-OTTOMAN

  Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, Ottoman Empire (1842–1918)

  The Ottoman ruler Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II adopted Afghani’s call for pan-Islamism in an attempt to draw Arab peoples and territory under Ottoman influence. Afghani rejected the Sultan’s confluence of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism.13

  ANTI-OTTOMAN

  Negib Azoury, Syria (1870–1916)

  Negib Azoury, an Ottoman Christian, built upon
Kawakibi’s theology and called for both a spiritual caliphate and a secular Arab empire from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers to the Suez Canal. Azoury intended this Arab empire to separate from the Ottoman Empire. His book Le réveil de la nation arabe was published in 1905.

  Shukri al-’Asali, Syria (1868–1916)

  Shukri al-’Asali, a supporter of the 1908 Young Turk revolt, was elected to the restored Ottoman Parliament in 1911. As a Member of Parliament, he called for the reform of the Syrian socioeconomic and education systems and was a strong opponent of Zionism. Unlike Azoury and other Arab nationalists of his time, ’Asali supported a combined Arab and Turkish project under the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to rebuild the Ottoman Empire, with improved status and quality of life for Arabs. However, he eventually rejected CUP, because Arabs’ condition had not improved; in April 1911, he spoke in Parliament, describing the lack of Arab representation in senior ministry positions. Despite these grievances, ’Asali maintained that he was loyal to the Ottoman project, yet some historians argue that his views had changed by the time of his death.14

  Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, Syria (1855–1916)

  Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, like ’Asali, began his political career supporting the Young Turks, then becoming a member of the reinstated Ottoman Parliament. He condemned the CUP as too tyrannical and not supportive of Arab rights. Though he was a member of the Ottoman Parliament, he was motivated by pan-Islamic impulses and supported ‘a strong Ottoman entity in which Arabs would prosper’. Al-Zahrawi was president of the First Arab Congress, held in Paris in 1913, and eventually adopted the goal of Arab independence.15

  Aziz Ali al-Misri, Egypt (1879–1965)

  Aziz Ali al-Misri served in the Ottoman military and originally supported unity within the Ottoman Empire; however, he later left the CUP due to their radicalism and instead became a supporter of the Arab nationalist cause. Misri was an important force in turning Egyptians away from purely Egyptian nationalism toward pan-Arab nationalism.