The Arab_Israeli Conflict

by Jonathan Rynhold

  Concerning U.S. policy, in 2002 at the height of the second intifada, nearly half of Republicans thought the Bush administration’s supportive policy toward Israel was appropriate, a further 12 percent thought it was too little support, while slightly more than a third thought it represented too much support.175 During the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War, more than half of Republicans preferred that the U.S. take Israel’s side, while about a third thought that the U.S. should say or do nothing.176 Finally, despite a general hostility to foreign aid, more than 60 percent of Republicans thought that Israel should receive aid; in contrast, three-quarters thought that aid to Arab countries should end.177

  Overall, opinion among the rank and file of Republicans and conservatives roughly reflected the balance within the elite discourse. Positions associated with the pro-Israel approach of the new conservative mainstream generally received the highest levels of support. On the issue of a Palestinian state, Republicans were more or less evenly divided. This reinforces the conclusion that Republican and conservative support for Israel is not primarily driven by the “whole land of Israel” ideology of the Israel Right, since support for Israel was much higher than opposition to Palestinian statehood.

  U.S. Policy under the Republicans

  At the level of policy, the struggle has been primarily between Realist approaches and the approach of the new conservative mainstream. There was no automatic correlation between orientations and policy, as many other factors also influenced American policy.178 Nonetheless, ideas did matter. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze the impact of conservative discourse and attitudes on policy in detail, a brief survey of this relationship is sketched out below.

  As the peace process took off in the early 1990s, the George H. W. Bush administration adopted a moderate version of the Realist approach, which combined aspects of pro-Israel and anti-Israel neutrality. It was willing to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf to expel Saddam from Kuwait, though not to drive him from power in Iraq itself. Following this it vigorously promoted the peace process, convening the Madrid conference, while pressuring the right-wing Israeli government to freeze settlements. Despite such pressure, the administration focused on facilitating the peace process, rather than attempting to impose a settlement.

  From the mid-1990s, the new conservative mainstream began to rise. Jesse Helms, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1995 to 2001, was a former Southern Democrat and a very conservative Republican. After visiting Israel in the 1980s he became an active supporter of Israel for a mixture of religious and strategic reasons. It was Helms who initiated the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, which monitored Palestinian compliance. The initiative was born of a deep-seated skepticism about the Palestinians’ willingness to make peace and an equal measure of skepticism concerning the Clinton administration’s willingness to call the Palestinians out on this.179

  Matters ratcheted up a notch when the leading Republican in Congress, Newt Gingrich, led a campaign to prevent the Clinton administration from applying pressure on the right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu. Nonetheless, it was not until the 107th Congress (2001–2003) that conservative and Republican support for Israel in the House outweighed that of liberals and Democrats. The motions of that Congress relating to Israel were mainly sponsored by Republicans, and they took Israel’s side in the conflict against the Palestinians. For example, a House resolution sponsored by Rep. Eric Cantor (R-VA) and Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO), contained a lengthy condemnation of Arafat and a call for a prohibition on providing aid to the Palestinian Authority.180 Subsequently, left-wing organizations, like Americans for Peace Now, felt a noticeable drop in support from Realist-oriented Republicans, as their numbers dwindled in Congress.181

  The surge in Republican support for Israel in the wake of 9/11 was also evident in the White House itself, although it took until March 2002 for this to become fully evident. Until 9/11 the administration was relatively disengaged from the peace process, focusing on conflict management. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the administration seemed to shift toward a more Realist position, when it became the first administration to officially endorse the creation of an independent Palestinian state. However, once the president became convinced that Arafat was behind the acts of terrorism directed against Israelis, and that he was receiving weapons from a member of the “axis of evil” – Iran – he switched to the approach of the new conservative mainstream championed by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and other people in the administration like Elliot Abrams and Doug Feith. The fact that Arafat lied to President Bush himself about his receiving arms from Iran and supporting terrorist groups had a major impact on the President, who took such matters of honor seriously.182

  Subsequently, President Bush swung behind the approach of the new conservative mainstream by more or less acquiescing in Israel’s military campaign to defeat Palestinian terrorism, known as Operation Defensive Shield. As he explained:

  I refused to accept the moral equivalence between Palestinian suicide attacks on innocent civilians and Israeli military actions intended to protect their people. My views came into sharper focus after 9/11. If the United States had the right to defend itself and prevent future attacks, other democracies had those rights, too.183

  Later, in June 2002, he conditioned the creation of a Palestinian state not only on an end to terrorism but also on the replacement of Yasir Arafat and the institution of political reforms in the Palestinian Authority. In a wider sense, the president also adopted an offensive grand strategy, as witnessed by the initiation of the Iraq War in 2003.

  Neoconservative influence was also evident when the administration came out in favor of the Sharon government’s plan to unilaterally disengage from Gaza. This plan was similar to ideas put forward in the conservative discourse in the preceding years. In return for this unilateral Israeli concession, the president sent an official letter to Israel in April 2004, which laid out his administration’s positions regarding final status issues. The letter was also influenced by neoconservative thinking. First, it reiterated that American support for Palestinian statehood was conditional on their fighting terrorism and internal reforms. Second, the letter referred to American support for changes to the 1967 cease-fire lines as well as support for Israel’s continued ability to defend itself by itself along “defensible borders,” which is usually understood as referring to an Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley. Still, Bush also declared that any settlement was dependent on an agreement resulting from negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians; in other words, the administration would not impose the letter on the Palestinians.

  In late 2006, the administration’s policy shifted toward Realism. As the situation in Iraq became more chaotic, representatives of the new conservative mainstream associated with the Iraq policy, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Doug Feith, resigned. Replacing Rumsfeld in 2006 was the Realist Robert Gates, who had served under George H. W. Bush as deputy national security advisor. Gates also served on the Baker-Hamilton Commission studying the Iraq War, which recommended placing a new emphasis on the peace process, in line with the preferred Realist strategy.

  Two other events served to cripple the credibility of the neoconservative approach. First, the election victory of Hamas in January 2006 demonstrated that democratic elections could increase the power of forces opposed to both peaceful relations with Israel and the US. Second, as a result of the Second Lebanon War, in which Israel failed to impose a major defeat on Hezbollah, that radical Islamist organization went on to achieve greater political power at the expense of the American-backed pro-democracy government of Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora. Subsequently, the Bush administration put a new emphasis on peace negotiations with the convening of the Annapolis summit. Still, rather than seeking to impose a settlement or focus on pressuring Israel, the administration confined its role primarily to facilitation.

  Conclusion

>   In the wake of the Six Day War, Republicans and conservatives began to be more supportive of Israel. After 9/11, support for Israel surged and the approach of the new conservative mainstream became dominant. For them, Islamic radicalism is the main cause of instability and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. In this struggle, Israel is viewed as a key frontline ally and as a strategic asset. Aside from this, their commitment to Israel has deep ideological and theological roots, and they advocate taking Israel’s side in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

  Could this overwhelming support for Israel recede, or even be reversed? Since the surge in support for Israel in the wake of 9/11 correlates with the surge in support for an offensive interventionist grand strategy, it is conceivable that the shift of the Republican base away from support for an interventionist grand strategy in the wake of the Iraq War and the economic crisis184 may lead to a parallel decline in support for Israel. One indication of a potential change came in the 2012 Republican primaries, when leading candidates endorsed the idea of starting the aid budget from zero, with every country, including Israel, having to make the case.185

  Although “distancing” is conceivable, it is also highly unlikely. Even if Republicans were to cut aid to Israel, such aid is no longer of critical economic importance to Israel. What is critical is American willingness to supply Israel with advanced weaponry and diplomatic support. There is no indication that Republicans and conservatives would reverse these policies even if they adopt a strategy of retrenchment, because they would continue to view Israel as an ally engaged in a struggle against common enemies. In this vein, it is worth remembering that in 1970 a Republican administration which sought to retrench actually increased aid to Israel tenfold, precisely because it took the view that having strong reliable allies like Israel had become of greater strategic significance.

  So Republicans and conservatives are likely to remain staunchly pro-Israel. On the surface, this would appear to reinforce America’s pro-Israel orientation. However, the strident nature of Republican and conservative support for Israel raises the prospect that supporting Israel may shift from being uncontroversial to become a partisan issue. In 2010, Republican supporters of Israel set up a partisan Israel lobby named the Emergency Committee for Israel,186 and in the 2012 presidential primaries, all the Republican candidates tried hard to make support for Israel a partisan issue by strongly attacking Obama’s policy toward the Jewish state. At the very least, such developments demonstrated that bipartisan sympathy for Israel masks significant partisan and ideological disagreements on U.S. policy toward Israel, the peace process, and the wider Middle East. The nature and extent of these differences are revealed in the next chapter.

  3 Democrats, Liberals, and the Left: Rising Criticism of Israel

  This explosion of violence would be totally understandable if the Palestinians had no alternative. But … it came in the context of a serious Israeli peace overture, which Mr. Arafat has chosen to spurn. That’s why this is Arafat’s war. That’s its real name.

  —Thomas Friedman, October 20011

  Israel’s continued control and colonization of Palestinian land have been the primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement in the Holy Land.

  —Jimmy Carter, 20062

  Introduction

  Since Vietnam, and especially since the 2003 Iraq War, American opinion over foreign policy has grown more polarized along partisan and ideological lines, with Democrats and liberals on one side, and Republicans and conservatives on the other.3 At the same time, Democrats have become increasingly divided among themselves over foreign policy.4 For a long time both of these divisions bypassed the Arab-Israeli conflict, however this is no longer the case.

  This chapter surveys and analyzes liberal, Democratic, and left-wing approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It begins with a look at levels of identification with liberalism among the general public and within the Democratic Party, followed by a brief survey of the development of liberal attitudes to Israel prior to 1990. It then focuses on three elite approaches to the conflict: robust liberal internationalism, which is the most supportive of Israel while also promoting a two-state solution; the approach of dovish Democrats who favor an evenhanded approach to the conflict; and the progressive-postcolonial approach that sympathizes primarily with the Palestinians. The chapter then goes on to survey liberal narratives of the rise and fall of the peace process from the early 1990s until the end of the first decade of the new millennium through the coverage of the main liberal magazines and columns of a number of leading liberal columnists. Attention then turns to the attitudes of rank-and-file Democrats and liberals. Following this, the chapter briefly demonstrates the impact of liberal approaches on U.S. policy towards the conflict in the Clinton and Obama administrations, as well as among Democrats in Congress. Finally, it is argued that there is a decline in support for Israel over the Palestinians, particularly among the younger generation of liberals.

  Liberalism and the Democratic Party

  Classical liberalism is central to the American creed. However, in contemporary political discourse, liberals are inclined to believe in government intervention to deal with socioeconomic problems, they support the right to abortion, separation of church and state, and minority rights. They also tend to be more dovish on foreign policy. Between 1992 and 2010 roughly half the number of Americans identified as liberals, compared to those who identified as conservatives.5 However, conservatives’ advantage is eroding as successive generations of Americans are increasingly liberal. Thus by 2014 within the “millennial” generation – those born between 1980 and 2000 – more voters identified themselves as liberals (31 percent) than as conservatives (26 percent). In every other age group, more voters identified as conservative.6 This is demonstrated in Figure 3.1. Overall, the percentage of self-identifying liberals rose from 17 to 23 percent in the period 1992–2013.7

  Figure 3.1. Self-Reported Ideology by Generation: 1997–2009 (From “Millennials in Adulthood: Millennials Less Conservative Than Older Generations.” Reprinted with permission from the Pew Research Center.)

  The trend toward increased liberalism is especially strong within the Democratic Party. Since the mid-1960s Democrats have become increasingly liberal, and this trend intensified between 2000 and 2013 as the share of liberals rose among Democrats from 29 to 43 percent; making liberals the largest ideological grouping in the Party (see Figure 3.2).8 The other part of the Party’s base is composed of disparate elements including ethnic minorities, two-thirds of whom are blacks and Hispanics. Aside from becoming more liberal, Democrats are also becoming more secular. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the percentage of Democrats with “no religion” rose from a quarter to more than a third, while the percentage of white evangelicals identifying as Democrats fell to an all-time low of 9 percent.9

  Figure 3.2. U.S. Political Ideology – Recent Trends among Democrats (From Jones, “Liberal Self-Identification Edges Up to New High.” Copyright © 2014 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. The content is used with permission; however, Gallup retains all rights of republication. This graph is an interpretation of data compiled by Gallup, Inc. However, Gallup, Inc. had no part in the creation of this graphic interpretation.)

  The American Left, Democrats, Liberals, and Israel 1917–1991

  In 1917 President Woodrow Wilson backed the Balfour Declaration in which the British government committed itself to the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” By the 1940s – in the wake of the rise of Nazism, the closing of America to mass Jewish immigration, violent Arab opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine, and finally the Holocaust – Democrats, liberals, and organized labor were overwhelmingly in favor of the creation of a Jewish state. Subsequently, they became very strong supporters of Israel. As was discussed in the first chapter, there were a variety of reasons for this: the universal principle of national self-determination, the provision of a refuge for victims of the Holocaust, and solidarity
with a fellow democracy run by social democrats under threat from its undemocratic neighbors. Democrats also had a domestic political incentive for supporting Israel, given the importance of the Jewish vote.

  Until 1967, the liberal consensus on Israel ran parallel with the liberal internationalist consensus on containment of the Soviet Union. In the wake of Vietnam and the Six Day War, things changed. At first, the change was confined to the fringes. The New Left emerged as a force in the antiwar movement. From their postcolonial perspective, the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat, was a hero. At the same time, there was a retreat from liberal internationalism and containment among Democrats represented by the rise of progressive, antiwar elements associated with George McGovern. McGovern was considered likely to weaken support for Israel; indeed, the Israeli ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, effectively endorsed Richard Nixon in the 1972 election campaign. Subsequently, hawkish pro-Israel elements like the neoconservatives and white Southerners left the Democratic Party, while organized labor shrank in size, becoming less important within the Party.

  While liberals and Democrats continued to sympathize with Israel by large margins, the liberal media became increasingly critical of right-wing Israeli government policy toward the Palestinians in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War and even more so in the wake of the first intifada, which began in December 1987. As the Palestinians and the Arab states began to take diplomatic steps toward peace with Israel, and as Israelis became deeply divided as to how to handle the peace process, so liberals began increasingly to support the Israeli center Left, while increasingly coming to view the Israeli Right as a major obstacle to peace.10 The section below examines the three main liberal approaches to Israel in more detail, with a focus on the post–Cold War era.