The Arab_Israeli Conflict

by Jonathan Rynhold

  The Second Lebanon War also led them to identify an increase in the security threat posed to Israel by the risk that a Palestinian state would be taken over by religious zealots, who would rain down rockets on Israeli cities.124 This did not change their minds about the urgency of an Israeli civilian withdrawal from the West Bank, but it did lead them to argue that a military withdrawal would have to come later, after it was clear that there was a partner able and willing to counteract such threats effectively.125 In this regard, great hopes were raised by the state-building efforts of the Palestinian prime minister Fayyad, which they hoped would lay foundations for a decent Palestinian state that would coexist peacefully alongside Israel.126

  The return to power of a Likud-led government in Israel in 2009 led to an upsurge in criticisms of Israeli policies. Netanyahu was taken to task for not extending the settlement freeze and for not taking the diplomatic initiative. Israel’s foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, was castigated for using racist language and for contradicting the values that made Israel “worth supporting.”127 Yet at the same time, they thought that Abbas did not seem much interested in negotiating an agreement, either.128 Nor did they believe that removing Lieberman and the settlements was a panacea that would, by itself, unlock the door to peace between Israel and the Palestinians or regional stability,129 given the strength of extremist forces among the Palestinians and in the region in general.130

  The Progressive-Postcolonial Narrative

  The Nation placed the bulk of the blame for the collapse of the peace process in 2000 on Israel. Israeli concessions under Barak were portrayed as grossly insufficient. Some argued for abandoning the negotiations and creating a boycott movement, while others called for a return to negotiations.131 The Nation condemned suicide bombings while continuing to place the primary responsibly on Israeli policies.132 One article referred to suicide bombing against Israeli civilians as “counter-attacks,”133 and another implicitly accused Israel of attempting genocide, claiming, “The Israelis are trying … to do to Palestinians … what Ahmadinejad seems to suggest should be done to Israel.”134 Even the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza was dismissed as merely a means of strengthening Israel’s grip on the West Bank.135 Unsurprisingly, Israel was also deemed primarily responsible for the Second Lebanon War,136 and there was deemed to be no moral difference between Israeli and Hezbollah actions.137 A similar approach was taken to the Gaza War in 2008–2009, with the emphasis being on Palestinian suffering.138

  The Dovish-Liberal Narrative: Tilting Towards Progressive Postcolonialism

  In American Prospect, Salon, and the NYRB, both sides were blamed for the collapse of the peace process and the cycle of violence.139 The Israelis had to stop settlements; the Palestinians had to stop terrorism.140 By far the most influential of the articles in this genre was authored by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha in the NYRB, which argued that part of the reason for failure was that the U.S. was too supportive of Israel.141 Although it triggered an exchange of views, the net effect of this article was to erode the idea that the Palestinians were primarily responsible for the collapse of the peace process. The former U.S. negotiator Aaron Miller concurred, arguing that the U.S. had erred at Camp David by acting as “Israel’s lawyer.”142

  While the thrust of the discourse was to blame both sides, prior to 9/11 there was a tilt toward the Progressive pro-Palestinian narrative, especially in Salon, where some articles cast Israel as engaged in colonization, racism, and apartheid.143 One article gave a sympathetic portrayal of a Palestinian mother who felt not only anguish but also pride that her son had been killed in a suicide attack on Israeli civilians. The Israeli view that such pride constituted a culture of brutality that rendered peace impossible, was characterized as racist.144

  In contrast, in the wake of Palestinians cheering the 9/11 attack,145 the discourse tilted the other way, laying the blame primarily on Arafat146 while strongly rejecting attempts to delegitimize and boycott Israel.147 However, it was also emphasized that Sharon sought to create “Palestinian Bantustans” instead of a genuine Palestinian state.148 When the Sharon government launched Operation Defensive Shield, it was argued that such attempts to resolve matters by force would fail and that only addressing legitimate Palestinian grievances through negotiations would succeed. In this vein, they endorsed the 2002 Arab League peace plan and the 2003 draft Geneva peace agreement.149

  While on balance, the view of the Gaza disengagement was positive,150 the tilt toward Israel began to erode before then, with the onset of the Iraq War in 2003. The most significant article in this regard was Tony Judt’s “Israel: The Alternative” in the NYRB,151 in which he declared that the very idea of a Jewish state was anachronistic. He referred to Israel as a colonial state and to the then deputy prime minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, as a Fascist. This article caused a storm. However, it was not until the Second Lebanon War that the expression of anti-Israel positions grew substantially, when Israel was accused of “methodically smashing Lebanon into the dust,” of “pounding civilians,” and seeking to “ethnically cleanse” South Lebanon. The Israeli claim (later proven to be true) that Hezbollah was hiding among civilians was declared a myth.152 A few articles that were relatively neutral or sympathetic to Israel did appear, but they were in the clear minority. Much of the strong criticism of Israel was heavily linked to strong criticism of the Bush administration’s support for Israel in the war.153

  The same perspective was prevalent in relation to the conflict between Israel and Hamas. In the wake of Hamas’s seizure of power in Gaza in 2007, there was a groundswell of opinion in favor of the U.S. opening a dialogue with Hamas and the construction of a Hamas-Fatah coalition, without Hamas having to accept the three Middle East Quartet (U.S., EU, Russia, UN) conditions adopted by much of the international community: recognition of Israel, acceptance of past agreements, and the complete cessation of terrorism. They argued that its anti-Semitic ideology was not that important as, in their view, Hamas was a complex, pragmatic grassroots organization.154 As Gary Kamiya, the executive editor and cofounder of Salon, argued, “Hamas is not the problem; it is a symptom. The problem is … the dispossession of Palestinians and the ongoing Israeli occupation of their land.”155

  Given their assertion that U.S. pressure on Israel was a sine qua non for peace, it is not surprising that much ink was spilt arguing that the mainstream pro-Israel lobby, the Christian Right, and the neoconservatives156 were preventing the exertion of the necessary pressure. The most influential article on the subject was penned by a former editor at the the New Republic, Peter Beinart, who took the American Jewish leadership to task its refusal to adopt an openly dovish stand when that involved opposing the Israeli government.157 Liberal hostility toward the foreign policy of George W. Bush also spilled over into hostility toward Israeli policy under Sharon, which like the Bush doctrine emphasized unilateralism and the use of force. Opposed to the Iraq War for a variety of reasons, they also viewed it as a diversion from dealing with the key issue – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.158

  Having surveyed the elite approaches and discourse, the question remains as to how much support these approaches had among the mass of Democrats and liberals.

  Public Opinion among Democrats and Liberals

  Grand Strategy

  Democrats are divided over U.S. grand strategy. Though the trend is increasingly dovish, a large minority favor robust liberal internationalism. On the one hand, Democrats share a strong belief in the efficacy of diplomacy. Between 1997 and 2009, the percentage of Democrats who agreed that “good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace” increased from about two-thirds to three-quarters,159 reaching 90 percent among liberal Democrats.160 On the other hand, a large minority of Democrats continue to believe that “the best way to ensure peace is through military strength.”161 In parallel, Democrats have been divided about multilateralism. A majority favors multilateralism,162 yet a large minority of 45 percent believe the U.S. should “go its own way in internat
ional matters regardless of what other countries think.”163 Finally, Democrats are divided about the degree to which the U.S. should engage internationally, though the trend is toward a defensive or even an isolationist position. Thus, between 2002 and 2009 the number of Democrats agreeing that the U.S. should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” increased from 40 to 53 percent.164

  The Middle East and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

  Democrats’ attitudes toward the Middle East are also mixed. Between 2002 and 2011, an absolute majority of Democrats consistently disagreed with the idea that Islam encourages violence more than other religions. Liberal Democrats were the most opposed to this claim.165 Despite this, a majority of Democrats viewed Islamic extremist groups and Iran’s nuclear program as the greatest threat to the United States. Yet in March 2012, they were evenly divided between those who were concerned about the U.S. “acting too quickly” against the Iranian nuclear program and those who were concerned that the U.S. might wait too long.168 Among liberal Democrats, doves outnumbered hawks on Iran, by a margin of 2–1.169 However, a majority of Democrats would approve of using force if it were certain Iran had produced a nuclear weapon.170 As regards the peace process, despite major divisions within the liberal discourse, Democrats level of sympathy for Israel in opinion polls has remained stable since 1967, hovering at 45–50 percent, at least double the number for those who sympathized more with the Palestinians.171 In the 2000s the level of Democrats sympathy for Israel was slightly below the national average (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3).

  Table 3.2. Sympathy for Israel and the Palestinians, 2002 to March 2006 (%)

  * * *

  IsraelPalestiniansPro-Israel Margin

  All Americans 51 15 +36

  Democrats 47 20 +27

  Liberals 43 25 +18

  Republicans 72 07 +55

  * * *

  Data from Gallup166

  Table 3.3. Sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians August 2006 to January 2009 (%)

  * * *

  Aug. 2006 (2nd Lebanon War)Jan. 2009 (Gaza War)

  All Americans 52 49

  Democrats 45 42

  Liberals 42 33

  Republicans 68 69

  * * *

  Data from Pew Research Center167

  During times of heightened violence, the liberal preference for Israel over the Palestinians eroded considerably. Thus in 2002, at the peak of the second intifada, as well as during the Gaza War in 2008–2009, about a third of liberals sided with Israel, while about a quarter preferred the Palestinians, thereby constituting a slim pro-Israel margin of 8 percentage points among those taking sides.172 In these cases, the gap between Democrats and liberals was especially pronounced. In 2002 Democrats sympathized with Israel over the Palestinians by a margin of 27 points, more than three times the figure for liberals.173

  While most Democrats are more sympathetic to Israel than the Palestinians, they are also supportive of Israel ultimately making concessions for peace. In 2002 Democrats supported the creation of a Palestinian state by a margin of 44–28; by 2009 the margin had grown to 59–22.174 On Jerusalem, in the event of a two-state solution, nearly half of Democrats supported dividing the city, while only a third supported complete Israeli control.175 Also in 2009, when President Obama called on Israel to freeze settlements, more than two-thirds of Democrats agreed that the United States should get tough with Israel.176

  When it comes to attributing blame, the pro-Israel margin among Democrats is much narrower than it is on the sympathy index. Thus in June 2002, a majority of Democrats thought that neither Ariel Sharon nor Yasir Arafat wanted peace. The margin by which they were more skeptical of Arafat’s intensions was only 9 percentage points.177 In 2011, they believed that both sides were making a serious effort to reach peace. The margin by which they were more positive regarding Israel was 13 percentage points. By a similar margin Democrats favored Israel concerning the appropriate level of force used in the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2009 Gaza War.178 However, on some aspects of these wars, Democratic opinion ran against Israel. In 2006 a narrow plurality thought Israel was mainly responsible for civilian causalities.179 While in 2009, a larger plurality of Democrats disapproved of Israel’s military action.180 Such attitudes contrasted sharply with the unequivocally pro-Israel stance of Republicans (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5).

  Table 3.4. The Second Lebanon War, 2006: Pro-Israel Margin (%)

  * * *

  RepublicansDemocratsPartisan Gap

  Responsibility for the war +46 +18 +28

  Responsibility for civilian casualties +26 − 05 +31

  Too much Force (−) vs. (+) Too little/Just right +64 +16 +48

  * * *

  Data from Pew Research Center182

  Table 3.5. The Gaza War, 2009: Pro-Israel Margin (%)

  * * *

  RepublicansDemocratsPartisan Gap

  Dis/approve of Israel’s military action +35 −16 +51

  Too much Force vs. Too little/Just right +66 +15 +51

  * * *

  Data from Pew Research Center183

  On the issue of the U.S. taking sides in the conflict, the majority of Democrats favored the even-handed approach espoused by the dovish Democrats. In 2002, about a half of Democrats thought George W. Bush’s policy was too supportive of Israel; approximately a third thought it was about right.181 During the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War, around 40 percent of Democrats thought that the U.S. should say or do nothing: around a third thought the U.S. should support Israel, while about a tenth thought the U.S. should publicly criticize Israel.184 In 2007, a plurality of liberals thought the U.S. should apply more pressure on Israel rather than on the Palestinians.185

  Focus groups

  Focus groups in 2010–2011 with well-informed mainstream and liberal-leaning Democrat opinion formers in the Washington, DC, area revealed a similar picture to that portrayed by opinion polls.186 These Democrats were friendly towards Israel, they felt that the U.S. has a special commitment to Israel, and they were sensitive to its difficult security environment. At the same time they were critical of Israeli settlements and strongly supportive of Palestinian statehood in the context of a negotiated peace. While critical of many aspects of Palestinian behavior, they also sympathized with them as “oppressed” and “abandoned” victims. Their support for the peace process was very strong and central to their view of American interests in the Middle East. They felt both sides were responsible for the conflict and that the onus for peacemaking fell equally on both parties. They also argued that the U.S. should serve as an honest broker in the peace process and about half thought that Obama’s policy was too favorable to Israel. About half also agreed with the linkage theory, while the other half argued that even if the U.S. distanced itself from Israel, it would make little difference to America’s standing in the region.

  U.S. Policy under the Democrats

  The Clinton Administrations, 1993–2000

  U.S. policy to the peace process under Democratic administrations has been influenced, but not dictated, by the different approaches outlined above. During the Clinton presidency, the dominant approach was the centrist version of robust liberal internationalism. The administration tried to create a Pax Americana through two policies that were supposed to be mutually reinforcing.187 On the one hand, it pursued a tough policy of “dual containment” directed at the radical regimes of Iran and Iraq. On the other hand, it devoted great energy to the peace process.

  There was a high degree of coordination with Israel regarding the peace process. Thus, the administration accepted Rabin’s initial preference to focus on the Syrian track.188 Meanwhile, on the Palestinian track the U.S. initially played the role of a facilitator. Although Washington had not brokered the 1993 Oslo Accords, it was happy to adopt the agreement. Indeed, Dennis Ross argued that since dealing with the PLO was extremely controversial in Israel, it was a decision only the Israelis could make for themselves.189
Following the agreement, the administration once again coordinated its strategy toward the peace process with Israel. It blamed Hamas terrorists for Israel’s policy of closure, and it refused Arafat’s demands that the U.S. intervene directly in the talks when Israel opposed that intervention, in order not to give the Palestinians the impression that the U.S. would “deliver” Israel. Furthermore, to reassure Israel and to encourage it to continue with the peace process, every time an agreement was signed the administration upgraded the strategic relationship between the two countries.190 In the run-up to the 1996 Israeli election, the administration sought to help the Labor leader, Shimon Peres, against his right-wing rival, Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, by organizing an antiterrorism conference and granting Israel extra aid.

  The defeat of Peres led to a period of tension with the Netanyahu government. Indeed, between 1996 and 1999, Arafat visited the White House many more times than Netanyahu. Nonetheless, when Netanyahu eventually succumbed to U.S. pressure and agreed to withdraw from a further 13 percent of the West Bank in the 1998 Wye Agreement, he did get in return a package of strategic benefits, which included cooperation in the field of missile defense and a memorandum of strategic understanding which stated that the U.S. would “consult promptly with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance, it can lend to Israel” in the event that Israel was threatened by intermediate- or long-range ballistic missiles.191 The victory of Ehud Barak in the 1999 election re-inaugurated close coordination, which was in evidence at the Camp David summit. The summit was Barak’s initiative; he convinced Clinton to endorse it. The U.S. also acceded to Barak’s request that no formal written notes of the summit should be taken in order to protect Israel’s negotiating position. Indeed, when the administration finally presented its own parameters for a permanent status agreement in December 2000, they did so only in oral form.192