The Arab_Israeli Conflict

by Jonathan Rynhold

  The Mainline Discourse on Israel and the Conflict since 2000

  The Christian Century

  Between 2000 and 2008, approximately a hundred articles appeared in the Christian Century focused on Israel or the Arab-Israeli conflict. The thrust of the discourse was anti-Israel with a heavy dose of anti-Zionism, especially in the articles by the main contributor on the issue, James Wall,43 a senior contributing editor to the magazine. Some articles presented a more balanced picture, including perspectives from the Zionist left, but these were in a clear minority.44 The magazine reviewed nine books on Israel and the conflict. Of these, six were by anti-Zionist authors that received positive reviews, as did a book that claimed that U.S. policy is “controlled” by “the Israel lobby.”45

  The magazine overwhelmingly placed the blame for the conflict on Israel.46 One article on the 2005 Disengagement even laid the ultimate blame on Israel for the destruction of synagogues in Gaza by the Palestinian Authority.47 Israeli military actions were generally presented as a form of cruel punishment rather than a function of security, and moral equivalence was expressed regarding the actions of Israel and those of Hamas and Hezbollah.48 Wall even denied the latter were terrorist groups.49 He argued that the massive campaign of Palestinian suicide attacks that targeted Israeli civilians mainly within pre-1967 Israel was “resistance to occupation, not terrorism.”50 No articles focused on the extremist ideologies of Israel’s enemies and the threat they pose to Israel.

  The Mainline, Israel, and Human Rights

  The mainline discourse tends to single out Israel for disproportionate criticism and opprobrium. According to a study of mainline human rights advocacy from 2000 to 2003, 37 percent of mainline statements issuing criticism of human rights were focused on Israel; 32 percent were focused on the United States, and the remaining 31 percent were spread across twenty nations. Eighty percent of NCC resolutions targeting foreign nations for human rights abuses were aimed at Israel. Meanwhile, of the fifteen worst human rights offenders in the world, only five were criticized.51 Not a single human rights criticism was made by any mainline body of the Palestinian Authority or of any of the countries bordering Israel. This despite the fact that Freedom House rated Israel as “free” while its neighbors were rated as “not free” or, in the case of Jordan, “partly free.” Other Middle Eastern states with particularly bad human rights records like Saudi Arabia, which was both a U.S. ally and one of the fifteen worst human rights offenders in the world, according to Freedom House, also received no criticism.

  Official Mainline Statements and Resolutions

  Between 2000 and 2006 official statements and resolutions by mainline bodies were characterized by strongly anti-Israel positions. First, Israel was indicted as primarily responsible for the violence. For example, an NCC statement asserted at the start of the violence in October 2000 declared, “The fundamental source of the present violent confrontation lies in the continued failure to make real the national rights of the Palestinian people.”52 Other official statements went further by blaming Israeli “apartheid” for the outbreak of violence.53

  Second, much greater detail and much more emotive language were used to describe Palestinian suffering and losses than Israeli suffering and losses. The practical demands made of Israel tended to be specific and detailed, while only a vague demand was made of the Palestinians to halt violence. For example, the 2004 Presbyterian resolution on Israel’s security barrier conjured up images of the Holocaust and the dispossession of Native Americans by declaring that “the current wall ghettoizes the Palestinians and forces them onto what can only be called reservations.”54 Nothing in that resolution or any other mainline resolution on the issue mentioned the fact that the barrier was a response to terrorism and that it dramatically reduced Israeli civilian casualties.

  Third, mainline statements usually referred to a “cycle of violence” while emphasizing “disproportionate” use of force by Israel.55 For example, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006,56 the General Secretary of International Affairs and Peace at the NCC declared: “While we … certainly condemn the attacks of Hezbollah into Israel, we see that the response of Israel is so damaging to the people and to the infrastructure in Lebanon that we see it as more destabilizing.”57 Two years earlier, Ronald Stone, a Church elder who had served on the Advisory Committee on Social Witness Policy and as a professor at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, along with other American Presbyterians, met with Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon. In that meeting Stone stated: “We treasure the precious words of Hezbollah and your expression of goodwill towards the American people … As an elder of our church, I’d like to say that … relations and conversations with Islamic leaders are a lot easier than dealings and dialogue with Jewish leaders.”58 This was not the only meeting between American Presbyterians and Hezbollah.59 Meanwhile, in contrast to their criticism of Israel, mainline churches were virtually silent over the occupation of Lebanon by Syria, which had been going on in one form or another since the late 1970s. Finally, a Presbyterian resolution in 2003 implied Israel was a foreign entity within its pre-1967 borders by referring to “over fifty years of Israeli rule in Palestine.”60

  The Politics of Delegitimization and Divestment

  These resolutions and statements were not spontaneous or confined to rhetoric; rather, they were part of an orchestrated international campaign of boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) led by the Palestinian Solidarity Movement. Within the mainline, the centerpiece of this campaign has been the push for divestment from Israel. The campaign was led by a relatively small group that typically operates in “Peace and Justice” departments and church committees responsible for dealing with world conflicts.61 Also central to the divestment campaign have been Palestinian clergy, especially those associated with the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center. Their strategic aim is to broaden support for their anti-Zionist position among the soft liberal center-left of the mainline. As we noted earlier, most of the mainline clergy are liberal and dovish, but their main focus is on tackling local poverty. They have no particular animosity to Israel. While they know little about the conflict, they generally favor the peace process and mutual reconciliation. The goal of the BDS activists is to shift the mainline discourse away from a general discussion about the rights and wrongs on both sides, and in the region more generally, toward a conversation focused on the degree of Israeli iniquity. They seek to achieve this objective by presenting issues of general concern, such as settlements, as an expression of Israel’s innate moral corruption. They are assisted in these efforts by the mainline clergy’s hostility towards conservative evangelical theology, which is associated with strong support for Israel.62

  The BDS campaign made a significant breakthrough in 2004 when the Presbyterian General Assembly voted to initiate a process that could lead to divestment. The resolution termed the occupation the root of evil acts committed by both sides. At the same time two other resolutions were passed, one calling for the removal of Israel’s security barrier and the other denouncing Christian Zionism. The Presbyterian decision catalyzed the divestment campaign in other denominations. Two local regions of the United Methodist Church passed divestment resolutions. Subsequently, the Episcopal Church, the United Church of Christs’ General Synod, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America’s churchwide assembly all seriously considered divestment.

  The Foundations of Contemporary Mainline Hostility to Israel

  Israeli Policy?

  It could be posited that it was Israel that changed rather than the mainline. From this perspective, mainline hostility is related to the fact that before 1967 Israel was the underdog, surrounded by Arab states implacably opposed to its existence. Whereas after 1967, Israel became a regional power, occupying the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and Sinai, and building settlements there. At the same time, Israel refused to recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian nationalism and was staunchly opposed to the idea of establishing a Palestinian state until th
e 1990s. The first intifada further cemented the image of Israel as the powerful side and the Palestinians as the underdog. Meanwhile, the Arab states grudgingly began to move toward coming to terms with Israel by accepting UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which implied at least a formal recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Egypt then made peace with Israel in 1979. In 1988 the PLO formally recognized Israel’s right to exist and promised to stop terrorism. Indeed, once Israel recognized the PLO and opened negotiations in 1993, the intensity of mainline opposition subsided. Even Israel’s most prominent mainline supporter, Reinhold Niebuhr, had supported the creation of Israel in terms of relative justice, and this had led him to support partition as a means of reconciling Jewish and Arab claims. He was categorically opposed to the type of messianic theology that inspired unequivocal support for Zionism among evangelicals. So when, after 1967, Israeli policy under the Likud was directed at preventing partition in alliance with the messianic religious Right in Israel, it is not surprising that the mainline became more critical of Israeli policies.

  The limitations of this thesis become apparent when one tries to apply it to the period after 2000, in the wake of the collapse of the peace process. In that year a left-wing Israeli government made an unprecedented offer to fully withdraw from the Golan Heights, subject to some minor and mutual border rectifications. Syria rejected the offer. Israel then unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon in any case. Meanwhile, that same government accepted the Clinton Parameters, which would have given the Palestinians a state in 100 percent of Gaza and 97 percent of the West Bank, with free passage between the areas, and with its capital in East Jerusalem including Palestinian sovereignty over the surface of the Temple Mount. Arafat rejected the offer, while the Palestinians initiated a campaign of suicide bombing directed against Israeli civilians. If the mainline discourse was primarily exercised by a benevolent neutral concern for both sides, one would expect both their opposition to Israel and their support for the Palestinians to at least be reduced in the aftermath. But the opposite is the case; their hostility towards Israel increased dramatically to an all-time high. Moreover, much of the mainline discourse was not simply characterized by criticism of Israeli policies, but by a rejection of Jewish sovereignty per se. Clearly then, the direction of Israeli policy is of limited utility in explaining the thrust of the mainline discourse and the divestment campaign.

  Historic Mainline Ties with the Middle East

  Historic ties between American mainline denominations and the Middle East forged in the nineteenth century continue to influence mainline approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those denominations with historic and contemporary ties to the Middle East have been most active politically on the conflict, including the UCC, the Episcopalians, the Quakers, the Mennonites, and most of all the Presbyterians.63 The Quakers established educational institutions in the Middle East in the nineteenth century, notably in Ramallah. They were also active in assisting Palestinian refugees after 1948.64 Although few, they exercise a moral influence beyond numbers. This is particularly true with the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), which has won wide international recognition, including the Nobel Peace Prize. A fact sheet about the conflict available on a Quaker website65 denies that the historic connection of Jews to the Land of Israel is any more meaningful than the connection between ancient extinct biblical peoples like the Canaanites and the Holy Land. It designates Israel as an “apartheid” state and refers to Hamas’s position as being characterized by good faith and a “willingness to negotiate with Israel on equal terms.” The pamphlet calls for economic sanctions against Israel.66 The Presbyterians were most active in setting up educational institutions in the Arab world in the nineteenth century. They have also been the most supportive of the Palestinians. According to a 1988 survey of mainline and evangelical denominations, the Presbyterian clergy were the most likely to support Palestinian statehood.67 In the twenty-first century, Presbyterian missionaries with strong ties to the Palestinians were at the forefront of the divestment campaign.68

  Most influential of all has been the development of a close relationship between the mainline churches and the Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem. Sabeel is run by Rev. Naim Ateek, a Palestinian Anglican priest. While Ateek publicly accepts the two-state solution for pragmatic reasons, he emphasizes rejection of Israel’s right to exist. Statements by Ateek and many other speakers at Sabeel conferences indicate that their support for a two-state solution is provisional.69 Sabeel’s ideal is the replacement of Israel by single state for all Palestinians and Jews,70 in which the Jews will become a minority. Delegations from mainline churches regularly visit the Sabeel Center and they routinely send missionaries to work in Sabeel’s office in Jerusalem. Sabeel is an official partner of the Presbyterian Church (USA) and the ecumenical Churches for Mideast Peace, which lists among its members major mainline denominations like the Episcopal Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America, and the United Methodist Church. Various mainline congregations have sponsored Sabeel conferences,71 and in 2006, Ateek was awarded the Episcopal Peace Fellowship Award. Sabeel has been one of the moving forces behind the divestment campaign in the U.S.72

  Liberation Theology

  Sabeel’s influence is not simply a function of the historic ties between the mainline and Arab nationalism. Sabeel promotes a narrative of the conflict grounded on liberation theology; as already noted, liberation theology has had significant influence within the mainline since the 1970s and a significant influence on the mainline discourse on Israel, especially since the first intifada.73 In this vein, liberation theologist Rosemary Ruether referred to “the Zionist concept of a Jewish state” as “a remnant of a racist concept of nationalism.”74 She defined the State of Israel as, in its very essence, a colonialist power dependent on American imperialism, even within the pre-1967 boundaries.75 Ruether also asserts (incorrectly) that the aim of Zionism per se was to expel the Palestinians, and that as such it is at one with the displacement of indigenous peoples carried out by European colonists against Native American peoples.76

  This approach is echoed by various mainline pro-Palestinian activists such as David Wildman, who has served as executive secretary for Human Rights and Racial Justice in Mission Contexts and Relationships at the United Methodist General Board of Global Ministries, a $150 million church agency that used to support Marxist liberation movements in Latin America. At a Sabeel conference in 2005, Wildman exclaimed: “The U.S. represents a country where the settlers won and all but exterminated the indigenous population after seizing most of the land by force. Israel is one of the last places where a colonial settler project is actively seizing land from the indigenous population.”77 Wildman has been a strong advocate for anti-Israel divestment. The American Friends Service Committee has also been strongly influenced by liberation theology,78 as has Rev. Jeremiah Wright, Obama’s longtime pastor.79 Wright and the AFSC have consistently adopted a virulently anti-Israel line.80

  While liberation theology provides the broad theological framework for mainline hostility to Israel, it does not explain the peculiar focus on Israel. After all, perhaps the leading Protestant American liberation theologist, Robert McAfee Brown, took a far more balanced position on the conflict. Liberation theology dictates that its followers should side with the poor and oppressed. While Brown recognized the Palestinians as being in this category, he argued that the Israelis were also in this category because they are threatened militarily by the Arabs; he therefore argued that both sides required liberation. He supported Palestinian national aspirations, but argued that this could not happen until Israelis were liberated from the threat to their security, because there is always the danger that when an oppressed people gains liberation they will deny it to others. He argued that it was legitimate to criticize Israel from a theological perspective; but that Israel should be held to the same standards as all others. Only Israelis had the right to hold themselves to a higher standard, and Brown argued that Isr
ael’s vigorous internal debate over the first intifada was a model of how to go about this.81

  Consequently, taken alone, liberation theology is an insufficient basis for explaining the intense antipathy to Israel in the mainline discourse. Rather to understand the particular intensity of hostility to Israel, it is necessary to examine the ways in which it interacts with the residue of traditional anti-Jewish Christian theology.

  Liberation Theology and the Legacy of Traditional Anti-Jewish Theology

  In post–World War II America, the legitimacy of both anti-Semitism and replacement theology declined very significantly, and this was reflected in the attitudes and official positions of the mainline church. Nonetheless, Prof. Dennis Hale, a lay minister in the Episcopalian Church, and Holocaust theologian Richard Rubenstein have argued that the extraordinary amount of attention and depth of hostility focused on Israel within the mainline reflects a double standard born of the residual effects of old anti-Jewish theological themes.82 They argue that the Jewish people remain a special case in the contemporary Christian imagination, albeit sometimes unconsciously. The idea of the Jews as an archetype rather than a normal people continues to exist because of the “witness-people” mentality according to which the Jews, and by extension the State of Israel, retain symbolic meaning for Christians.83