The Arab_Israeli Conflict

by Jonathan Rynhold

  The Israel Paradox and Wider Cultural Trends

  While each of the political, ideological, and religious groups analyzed in this book has its own nuances, an overarching pattern is clear. First, in each case the underlying orientation is sympathy for Israel over the Palestinians. Second, the differences within each group are mutually reinforcing. Thus, evangelical Christians and Orthodox Jews are likely to hold conservative political views, prefer a hawkish strategy, and support the Republicans. All these groups are also more likely to believe that the U.S. should side with Israel and that the Palestinians are mainly to blame for the failure to achieve peace, while being equivocal about the creation of a Palestinian state and the construction of settlements. In contrast, non-Orthodox Jews and many mainline Christians are likely to hold liberal political views, prefer a dovish grand strategy, and support the Democrats.5 These groups tend to oppose settlements and support the creation of a Palestinian state, as well as active American mediation, to achieve these ends. To be sure, the Left is more internally divided on policy to the conflict than the Right, but the basic division holds.

  This coalescence into a single divide is symptomatic of the fact that Americans have become more ideologically polarized. And this situation finds expression in an increasingly partisan political environment in which the Republican base has become more conservative and the Democratic base more liberal. Indeed, the values gap between Republicans and Democrats has become greater than the gender, age, race, or class divides between them.6 The fact that the partisan divide has grown across numerous issues strongly suggests that the growing divide over policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is part of this general process of partisan-ideological polarization in American politics.

  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact the several key patterns associated with the “Israel paradox” fit in with global patterns of political culture charted by Ronald Inglehart and the World Values Survey (WVS). According to Inglehart, socioeconomic processes of modernization and postmodernization generate a universal process of cultural shift. As countries become wealthier and modernize their societies, they develop postmaterial values. Postmaterialists are concerned with individual meaning, minority rights, and multiculturalism; they are also dovish and relatively unconcerned by national security, while tending to find organized religion and nationalism unattractive. This cultural shift does not occur because individuals change their values; rather, it takes place through generational replacement as the more liberal postmaterial values of younger generations replace the more traditional materialist values of older generations. These postmaterial values increasingly come to define Left/liberal parties, while material/traditional values define the Right side of the spectrum. It is clear from the WVS and other surveys that these liberal values are increasingly prevalent among younger generations in America,7 including among American Jews,8 and that the Democratic Party base is increasingly made up of young people with liberal, postmaterial values. Despite the universal nature of postmodernization, political cultures across the world are not converging, but rather developing in parallel. This is because the traditional political culture of each country remains influential. Thus, despite postmodernization, Inglehart’s cultural map shows that America remains distinct from Europe in that it retains more traditional values, as well as being more individualistic. America remains exceptional.

  These general patterns fit the Israel paradox in two ways. First, it fits the finding that Americans remain more sympathetic to Israel than Europeans because of the nature of their respective political cultures. Attitudes exist in parallel, in that on both continents conservatives are more supportive of Israel than liberals. However, the resilience of national culture is demonstrated by virtue of the fact that American liberals remain more pro-Israel than European conservatives. Second, the growing gaps and divides within American political culture over the Arab-Israeli conflict is part of a general process of postmodernization in which younger generations come to adopt more liberal, postmaterial values. Younger liberals, including American Jews, are less drawn to traditional security- and nationalism-based arguments for Israel and more drawn to promoting peace with the Palestinians as well as with issues concerning the quality of Israeli democracy, including the way Israel treats its non-Jewish minorities. This explains why older Democrats are more sensitive to security threats to Israel than their younger counterparts. Clearly, this has political implications going forward.

  Cultural Trends, Shifting Attitudes, and their Political Implications

  One of the central findings of this book is that the underlying sympathy for Israel in America is incredibly resilient; intertwined as it is with the very foundations of American identity. In political terms this undergirds the special relationship, generating a willingness to support Israel’s well-being, especially its security, on terms and in ways that the U.S. does not do for other countries. Even when crises in the relationship occur, the cultural foundations ensure that when the crisis subsides the relationship returns to the underlying norm of closeness.

  Various factors point in the direction of this pro-Israel orientation becoming stronger. September 11, 2001, greatly enhanced the perception of Israel as a vital ally, while the demographic and political importance of Israel’s strongest supporters, evangelicals, and Orthodox Jews has been growing. In contrast, the mainline church, the largest base of vociferous opposition to Israel, is declining in size and political significance. In parallel, the membership of AIPAC has increased, while the number of people attending AIPAC’s annual policy conference has risen from about 500 in the early 1970s to 13,000 in 2013, including around half of the members of the Congress.

  Yet there are several potential challenges to underlying sympathy for Israel. The first of these concerns American national identity itself. In his provocative book entitled, Who Are We?9 Samuel Huntington argues that the American creed is under serious threat from globalization, multiculturalism, and their adoption by American elites. Huntington worries that because of this process, the mass immigration of Hispanics and Asians will not be acculturated into the American creed and that this would signal its decline. Given that support for Israel is closely tied to the creed, if Huntington is correct, this could signal a decline in sympathy for Israel.10 One might even speculate that Hispanics may be relatively attracted to the postcolonialism, which has influence in Latin America in the form of dependency theory and the populist politics of leaders such as Hugo Chavez, who supported Iran while opposing Israel. Yet, while Hispanic sympathy for Israel is relatively low in America, the margin of sympathy over the Palestinians remains large, as they are among the groups least supportive of the Palestinians. Consequently, the growth of the Hispanic population will not pose a fundamental challenge to pro-Israel sympathy in the U.S.

  Another social change of relevance is the decline in religious affiliation. In 1990 8.2 percent of Americans did not identify with any organized religious group; by 2012 this figure had more than doubled to about a fifth. This was mainly a result of generational replacement. America is also becoming less Christian. Eighty-six percent of American adults identified as Christians in 1990, 73 percent in 2012. Perhaps even more significant, for the first time, in 2012 fewer than half of Americans identified as Protestants.11 This decline is of significance, because one of the main foundations of support for Israel is a widespread belief in the Bible. In contrast, the margin by which the religiously unaffiliated prefer Israel over the Palestinians is the narrowest of any ethnoreligious group in America. Yet even the unaffiliated prefer Israel over the Palestinians by more than a margin of 2–1. Given the contrast with secular Europeans who are generally more pro-Palestinian, this suggests that the pro-Israel orientation remains deeply embedded in American political culture. It may wane somewhat, but it will remain significant.

  A further potential challenge could be a shift in American strategic culture. Americans who prefer a robust internationalist grand strategy tend to have more positive attitudes abou
t Israel. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Americans are increasingly inclined to support a strategy of retrenchment.12 Yet Americans continue to view Israel as an ally in a struggle against common enemies like radical Islamic terrorism and Iran, which do not look as if they are going to disappear soon. Moreover, it is worth recalling that in the early 1970s the Nixon administration had a strategy of retrenchment that increased the strategic significance of strong, reliable allies like Israel.

  What about changes in the Arab world? Sympathy for Israel has been reinforced by negative perceptions of Muslim and Arab countries opposed to Israel and the United States. Will the Arab Spring, with its promise of democratization, change attitudes? This is unlikely, because the benefactors of the Arab Spring appear to be Islamists rather than secular democrats, and this only serves to reinforce the sense of otherness Americans feel towards Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East.

  Another possibility is that a change in Arab states’ policies and Palestinian policies towards the U.S. and Israel may shift attitudes. In 1974, when Egypt was still allied with the Soviet Union and was hostile to Israel, only 5 percent of Americans viewed it favorably, whereas after President Sadat switched sides in the Cold War and made peace with Israel, over 60 percent of Americans came to view Egypt favorably.13 Most Americans, including American Jews, consistently support the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza if the Palestinians demonstrate the will to live in peace with Israel. So if there is perceived to be a real Arab partner for peace and if the Israeli leadership is simultaneously viewed as not serious about peace, there will be public willingness to accept U.S. pressure on Israel.

  However, the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah does not suggest such a scenario is likely. More generally, Arab states and the Palestinians have been very reluctant to follow in Sadat’s footsteps. Even in the 1990s, Syria never made a serious public peace gesture toward Israel, and it continued to support terrorist groups opposed to the Oslo process. The Palestinians and Arab states promote the demonization of Israel in international forums including the United Nations, going beyond criticism of Israeli policies to questioning Israel’s right to exist, descending into anti-Semitism and into justifying terrorism as “resistance.”14 Virulent anti-Israeli rhetoric and support for terrorism are good for domestic legitimacy in the Arab world and elsewhere where postcolonialism has resonance. But for the majority of Americans, such an approach continues to reinforce the perception that the Arabs and Palestinians are not sincere about peace with Israel.

  Finally, changes within Israel might cause it to lose its status as the preferred party. On numerous occasions the level of support for Israel among the general public and American Jews has fallen in response to specific actions that were viewed as inconsistent with democratic values or a genuine commitment to peace. Examples include the dip in support for Israel following the Sabra and Shatilla massacre in 1982 and the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987. Yet, opinion bounced back quickly, so such events in the future would be unlikely to yield a sustained realignment among the general public. However, they may well have a far more significant impact on Democrats, liberals, and young non-Orthodox Jews.

  This raises the key political issue at the heart of the Israel paradox, namely whether higher levels of sympathy necessarily translate into higher levels of political support. Regarding Israeli security, the answer is yes. In the wake of 9/11, the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the growing threat of a nuclear Iran, Israel has come to be viewed as one of America’s closest allies. From this perspective, a victory for Israel against these enemies is a victory for the U.S., and a defeat for Israel would be a defeat for the U.S. This fusing of American and Israeli security in the public mind means that for the American public, presidential support for Israeli security serves as a kind of litmus test of presidential credibility on American security itself.15

  Yet at the same time, the fact that the overwhelming bulk of the growth in support for Israel has been on the Right side of the political spectrum is also very significant. This means that a Republican administration is more likely to lean toward Israel and less likely to heavily pressure Israel in the context of the peace process than a Democratic administration. Even an Israeli government that vigorously pursued a peace agreement with the Palestinians recognized this. Thus, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert explained that a key reason why he pushed so hard for an agreement in the autumn of 2008 before George W. Bush left office was that he felt had the necessary support from the president to propose bold concessions without the fear of being undercut.16

  This is all very well when the Republicans are in power, but, of course, this is not always the case. Democrats and liberals are very unlikely to follow their European counterparts and become pro-Palestinian, even as younger generations are less sympathetic toward Israel than older generations. However, those elements that are becoming increasingly central to the Democratic base – liberals, the religiously unaffiliated, and Hispanics – are among the least pro-Israel groups in America. Liberals in particular are increasingly critical of Israeli policies, and their support for Israel is increasingly influenced by Israel’s willingness to advance the peace process. In addition, the idea that the U.S. should adopt an evenhanded approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is becoming increasingly strong among liberals. This trend is reinforced by trends within the Jewish community. Major organizations within the community – such as J Street, or the Reform and Conservative movements – are now willing to openly adopt positions at odds with the Israeli government on issues like settlements. Given that American Jews are predominantly liberal and support the Democratic Party, the overall consequence of this will be that a Democratic administration inclined to take an evenhanded approach to the conflict, including pressure on Israel, will face a less potent opposition. It will be able to credibly claim that it is pro-Israel, as it will have the backing of major pro-Israel organizations.

  To sum up, identification with Israel remains deeply embedded in American political culture. Widespread sympathy for Israel, and the bipartisan norm of support for Israeli security that flows from this identification, have grown stronger. However, different interpretations of how to practically implement that norm as regards the peace process are coalescing along partisan and ideological lines. This has important political ramifications for Israel, because when the Democrats are in power, the Israeli government is likely to face an administration more inclined to be evenhanded while simultaneously being under greater pressure to demonstrate its willingness to make concessions. This was apparent during the first Obama administration. The political saliency of this will be affected by perceptions as to how serious Israel’s Arab partners are about peace and by the prominence of other strategic challenges to regional stability that are not directly connected to the Arab-Israeli arena. But it still represents an important underlying shift.

  The lesson for the State of Israel is that consensual support in America is more important than higher overall levels of support concentrated on one side of the political spectrum. In order to protect bipartisan support, Israel likely will be required to put forward policies that demonstrate its commitment to a two-state solution. That does not mean that Israel would have to give in to all Palestinian demands and dismantle all settlements tomorrow. There is more than sufficient bipartisan support that in any peace negotiations Israel’s security requirements and concerns about the other side’s commitment to peaceful coexistence would be understood very sympathetically, and it will continue to be possible to mobilize widespread support on these issues. This reality is reinforced by the inherent instability of the Middle East, which periodically deflects attention from the conflict, as the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria have done. It is also reinforced by the tendency of the American public as a whole to focus on domestic economic issues. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the liberal and Democratic consensus opposes settlements, in any case. Further expansion of settlements and ret
reat from maintaining the possibility of a two-state solution will deepen divisions among Israel’s friends and increase liberal and Democrat opposition to Israeli policies in ways that will have political consequences. It is an illusion for an Israeli government to think that over time it can retain bipartisan support in the U.S. and at the same time keep the settler movement happy.

  As for Democratic administrations, while they have increased leverage over settlements, there remains significant domestic constraints on pressuring Israel on other issues so long as the Palestinians’ and the Arab states’ credibility on the question of peace remains so weak. In any case, the underlying cultural foundations of pro-Israel sentiment in America are so robust that the special relationship between Israel and the United States will remain virtually unbreakable.

  Notes

  Introduction

  1 “Memorandum of Conversation, Palm Beach, Florida, December 27, 1962, 10 a.m.,” in Nina J. Noring, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume 18: Near East 1962–1963 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 280.

  2 On Realism see William Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy,” in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne, eds., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 32–47.