In the Mirror of the Past
Page 2
But this new history often tends to focus on war. It portrays the weak principally in their confrontations with those against whom they must defend themselves. It recounts stories of resistance and only by implication reports on the peace of the past. Conflict makes opponents comparable; it introduces simplicity into the past; it fosters the illusion that what has gone before can be related in twentieth-century uniquack. Thus war, which makes cultures alike, is all too often used by historians as the framework or skeleton of their narratives. Today there is a desperate need for the history of peace, a history infinitely more diverse than the story of war.
What is now designated as peace research very often lacks historical perspective. The subject of this research is ‘peace’ purged of its cultural and historical components. Paradoxically, peace was turned into an academic subject just when it had been reduced to a balance between sovereign, economic powers acting under the assumption of scarcity. Thus study is restricted to research on the least violent truce between competitors locked into a zero-sum game. Like searchlights, the concepts of this research focus on scarcity. But in the process of such research, the peaceful enjoyment of that which is not scarce, people’s peace, is left in a zone of deep shadow.
The assumption of scarcity is fundamental to economics, and formal economics is the study of values under this assumption. But scarcity, and therefore all that can be meaningfully analyzed by formal economics, has been of marginal importance in the lives of most people through most of history. The spread of scarcity into all aspects of life can be chronicled; it has occurred in European civilization since the Middle Ages. Under the expanding assumption of scarcity, peace acquired a new meaning, one without precedent anywhere but in Europe. Peace came to mean pax œconomica. Pax œconomica is a balance between formally ‘economic’ powers.
The history of this new reality deserves our attention. And the process through which pax œconomica monopolized the meaning of peace is especially important. This is the first meaning of peace to achieve worldwide acceptance. And such a monopoly ought to be deeply worrisome. Therefore, I want to contrast pax œconomica with its opposite and complement, popular peace.
Since the establishment of the United Nations, peace has been progressively linked with development. Previously this linkage had been unthinkable. The novelty of it can hardly be understood by people under forty. The curious situation is more easily intelligible for those who were, like myself, adults on January 10, 1949, the day President Harry Truman announced the Point Four Program. On that day most of us met the term ‘development’ for the first time in its present meaning. Until then we had used ‘development’ to refer to species, to real estate and to moves in chess. But since then it can refer to people, to countries and to economic strategies. And in less than a generation we were flooded with conflicting development theories. By now, however, most of them are merely curiosities for collectors. You may remember, with some embarrassment, how generous people were urged to make sacrifices for a succession of programs aimed at ‘raising per capita income,’ ‘catching up with the advanced countries,’ ‘overcoming dependencies.’ And you now wonder at the many things once deemed worthy of export: ‘achievement orientation,’ ‘atoms for peace,’ ‘jobs,’ ‘windmills’ and, currently, ‘alternative life styles’ and professionally supervised ‘self-help.’ Each of these theoretical incursions came in waves. One brought the self-styled pragmatists who emphasized enterprise, the other would-be politicians who relied on ‘conscientizing’ people into the foreign ideology. Both camps agreed on growth. Both advocated rising production and increased dependence on consumption. And each camp with its sect of experts, each assembly of saviors, always linked its own scheme for development to peace. Concrete peace, by thus being linked to development, became a partisan goal. And the pursuit of peace through development became the overarching unexaminable axiom. Anyone who opposed economic growth, not this kind or that, but economic growth as such, could be denounced as an enemy of peace. Even Gandhi was cast into the role of the fool, the romantic or the psychopath. And worse, his teachings were perverted into so-called non-violent strategies for development. His peace, too, was linked to growth. Khadi was redefined as a ‘commodity,’ and non-violence as an economic weapon. The assumption of the economist, that values are not worth protecting unless they are scarce, has turned pax œconomica into a threat to people’s peace.
The linkage of peace to development has made it difficult to challenge the latter. Let me suggest that such a challenge should now be the main task of peace research. And the fact that development means different things to different people is no obstacle. It means one thing to trans-national corporation executives, another to ministers of the Warsaw Pact, and something else again to the architects of the New International Economic Order. But the convergence of all parties on the need for development has given the notion a new status. This agreement has made development the condition for the pursuit of the nineteenth-century ideals of equality and democracy, with the proviso that these be restricted within the assumptions of scarcity. Under the disputes around the issue of ‘who gets what’ the unavoidable costs inherent in all development have been buried. But during the seventies one part of these costs has come to light. Some obvious ‘truths’ suddenly become controversial. Under the ecology label, the limits of resources, of tolerable poison and stress, become political issues. But the violent aggression against the environment’s utilization value has so far not been sufficiently disenterred. To expose the violence against subsistence which is implicit in all further growth, and which is veiled by pax œconomica, seems to me a prime task of radical peace research.
In both theory and practice all development means the transformation of subsistence-oriented cultures and their integration into an economic system. Development always entails the expansion of a formally economic sphere at the expense of subsistence-oriented activities. It means the progressive ‘disembedding’ of a sphere in which exchange takes place under the assumption of a zero-sum game. And this expansion proceeds at the cost of all other traditional forms of exchange.
Thus development always implies the propagation of scarcity-dependence on goods and services perceived as scarce. Development necessarily creates a milieu from which the conditions for subsistence activities have been eliminated in the process of making the milieu over into a resource for the production and circulation of commodities. Development thus inevitably means the imposition of pax œconomica at the cost of every form of popular peace.
To illustrate the opposition between people’s peace and pax œconomica, let me turn to the European Middle Ages. In so doing, I emphatically do not advocate a return to the past. I look at the past only to illustrate the dynamic opposition between two complementary forms of peace, both formally recognized. I explore the past rather than some social science theory in order to avoid utopian thinking and a planning mentality. The past is not, like plans and ideals, something which might possibly come about. It allows me to stand on fact when I look at the present. I turn toward the European Middle Ages because it was near their end that a violent pax œconomica assumed its shape. And the replacement of people’s peace by its engineered counterfeit, pax œconomica, is one of Europe’s exports.
In the twelfth century, pax did not mean the absence of war between lords. The pax that Church or Emperor wanted to guarantee was not primarily the absence of armed encounters between knights. Pax, for peace, meant to protect the poor and their means of subsistence from the violence of war. Peace protected the peasant and the monk. This was the meaning of Gottesfrieden, of Landfrieden. It protected specific times and places. No matter how bloody the conflict among lords, peace protected the oxen and the grain on the stem. It safeguarded the emergency granary, the seed and the time of harvest. Generally speaking, the ‘peace of the land’ shielded the utilization values of the common environment from violent interference. It ensured access to water and pasture, to woods and livestock, for those who had nothing else
from which to draw their subsistence. The ‘peace of the land’ was thus distinct from the truce between warring parties. This primarily subsistence-oriented significance of peace was lost with the Renaissance.
With the rise of the nation-state, an entirely new world began to emerge. This world ushered in a new kind of peace and a new kind of violence. Both its peace and its violence are equally distant from all the forms of peace and violence which had previously existed. Whereas peace had formerly meant the protection of that minimal subsistence on which the wars among lords had to be fed, henceforth subsistence itself became the victim of an aggression, supposedly peaceful. Subsistence became the prey of expanding markets in services and goods. This new kind of peace entailed the pursuit of a utopia. Popular peace had protected precarious but real communities from total extinction. But the new peace was built around an abstraction. The new peace is cut to the measure of homo œconomicus, universal man, made by nature to live on the consumption of commodities produced elsewhere by others. While the pax populi had protected vernacular autonomy, the environment in which this could thrive and the variety of patterns for its reproduction, the new pax œconomica protected production. It ensures aggression against popular culture, the commons and women.
First, pax œconomica cloaks the assumption that people have become incapable of providing for themselves. It empowers a new élite to make all people’s survival dependent on their access to education, health care, police protection, apartments and supermarkets. In ways previously unknown, it exalts the producer and degrades the consumer. Pax œconomica labels the subsistent as ‘unproductive,’ the autonomous as ‘asocial,’ the traditional as ‘underdeveloped.’ It spells violence against all local customs which do not fit a zero-sum game.
Secondly, pax œconomica promotes violence against the environment. The new peace guarantees impunity — the environment may be used as a resource to be mined for the production of commodities, and as a space reserved for their circulation. It does not just permit, but it encourages the destruction of the commons. People’s peace had protected the commons. It guarded the poor man’s access to pastures and woods; it safeguarded the use of the road and the river by people; it reserved for widows and beggars exceptional rights for utilizing the environment. Pax œconomica defines the environment as a scarce resource which it reserves for optimal use in the production of goods and the provision of professional care. Historically, this is what development has meant: starting from the enclosure of the lord’s sheep and reaching to the enclosure of streets for the use of cars and to the restriction of desirable jobs to those with more than twelve years of schooling. Development has always signified a violent exclusion of those who wanted to survive without dependence on consumption from the environment’s utilization values. Pax œconomica bespeaks war against the commons.
Thirdly, the new peace promotes a new kind of war between the sexes. The transition from the traditional battle for dominance to this new all-out war between men and women is probably the least analyzed of economic growth’s side effects. This war, too, is a necessary outcome of the so-called growth of productive forces, a process implying an increasingly complete monopoly of wage-labor over all other forms of work. And this, too, is aggression. The monopoly of wage-related work entails aggression against a feature common to all subsistence-oriented societies. Though these societies may be as different from each other as those of Japan, France and Fiji, one central characteristic is common to all of them: all tasks relevant to subsistence are assigned in a gender-specific way, to either men or women. The set of specific tasks which are necessary and culturally defined vary from society to society. But each society distributes the various possible tasks to either men or women, and does so according to its own unique pattern. In no two cultures is the distribution of tasks within a society the same. In each culture, ‘growing up’ means to grow into the activities characteristic there, and only there, of either man or woman. To be a man or a woman in pre-industrial societies is not a secondary trait added on to genderless humans. It is the most fundamental characteristic in every single action. To grow up does not mean to be ‘educated,’ but to grow into life by acting as a woman or as a man. Dynamic peace between men and women consists of precisely this division of concrete tasks. And this does not signify equality; it establishes limits to mutual oppression. Even in this intimate domain, people’s peace limits both war and the extent of domination. Wage-labor destroys this pattern.
Industrial work, productive work, is conceived as neutral and often experienced as such. It is defined as genderless work. And this is true whether it is paid or unpaid, whether its rhythm is determined by production or by consumption. But even though work is conceived as genderless, access to this activity is radically biased. Men have primary access to the paid tasks which are viewed as desirable, and women are assigned those left over. Originally, women were the ones forced into unpaid shadow work, although men are now increasingly given these tasks too. As a consequence of this neutralization of work, development inevitably promotes a new kind of war between the sexes, a competition between theoretical equals of whom half are handicapped by their sex. Now we see a competition for wage-labor, which has become scarce, and a struggle to avoid shadow work, which is neither paid nor capable of contributing to subsistence.
Pax œconomica protects a zero-sum game, and ensures its undisturbed progress. All are coerced to become players and to accept the rules of homo œconomicus. Those who refuse to fit the ruling model are either banished as enemies of the peace, or educated until they conform. By the rules of the zero-sum game, both the environment and human work are scarce stakes; as one gains the other loses. Peace is now reduced to two meanings: the myth that, at least in economics, two and two will one day make five, or a truce and deadlock. Development is the name given to the expansion of this game, to the incorporation of more players and of their resources. Therefore, the monopoly of pax œconomica must be deadly; and there must be some peace other than the one linked to development. One can concede that pax œconomica is not without some positive value — bicycles have been invented and their components must circulate in markets different from those in which pepper was formerly traded. And peace among economic powers is at least as important as peace between the warlords of ancient times. But the monopoly of this élite peace must be questioned. To formulate this challenge seems to me the most fundamental task of peace research today.
The Right to Dignified Silence
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Address to ‘People’s Forum: Hope’ Tokyo, 23rd April 1982
Last winter, visitors to a certain city in Germany witnessed a quite unusual scene. At selected times, and only for one hour, some people regularly gathered at busy intersections and remained silent. They stood mute in the cold, shifting their feet now and then, not saying a word, not responding to passersby. When the hour ended, they drifted away, still silent. These quiet people were careful not to disturb traffic nor to hinder pedestrians. They wore ordinary dress. Usually one or two carried a sign which gave the reason for their stance: ‘I am silent because I have nothing to say about nuclear destruction.’
I joined some of these silent groups. And I soon noticed that such quiet people can be very offensive to those who pass by — the silence of such a group speaks with irrepressible loudness. This stillness thunders, conveying inexpressible horror. Germans are well-informed about the effects of nuclear machines. The majority, however, brushes aside scientific evidence showing the unavoidable consequences of the deployment of nuclear devices. Some, honorable and religious, have reconciled themselves to the risks posed by stationing an increasing number of American Cruise and Pershing missiles on German soil. However, a sizeable and growing minority determinedly opposes further nuclear armament, and more than a few among them are committed to unconditional nuclear disarmament.
The silent people present a provocative challenge to both hawks and the entire spectrum of doves. Those who choose to participate in the street
corner ritual commit themselves to say nothing and to answer no questions. Once an irritated man kept at me for half an hour. I am sure that he supported unilateral disarmament as strongly as I, but in his view silence was not the proper way to stand up for my convictions. But I could not respond then and there.
Now, I can give four reasons for the belief, shared by many others, that it is imperative that some of us exercise nonviolent, defensive silence, even at the cost of disturbing or hurting some of our friends. I shall answer four questions: 1) Why is a response of silence to nuclear bombs so important, especially in Germany? 2) Why do I, as a philosopher, believe that argument alone is not sufficient to resist the production, stationing and maintenance of nuclear devices? 3) Why do I think that silence is often more compelling than words? 4) Why do I count silence among those human rights which deserve the protection of law?
First, I believe that young Germans have a special relationship to genocidal machines. But one must understand what a genocidal machine is; it is not a weapon. It is, as the atomic bomb, a fundamentally new type of phenomenon. Nuclear devices are objects with no similarity to anything built in the past. Genocide, however, is nothing new. Throughout history, conquerors often eradicated cities or whole populations. We read in the Bible, for example, that the Jews felt instructed by their God to kill every human being in certain cities they had conquered.