Starving the Monkeys: Fight Back Smarter

by Tom Baugh

  In this triumph of the collective, we splattered a good portion of our most valuable resources, blood and treasure, over the fields of Europe and the bottom of the North Atlantic. Demons alone weren't enough to sell the sacrifice of these two resources. The blood, unwillingly provided by the lower classes, was demanded by a national draft imposed by the ethnic-cleansing veterans on their own grandchildren. Meanwhile, the treasure was eagerly sold for destruction by the proto-Muffy and proto-Biff, safely away from the hazards of war. Prosperity in that war was determined by how fast the largest could churn out the most unreliable war material. And in its destruction at the hands of the ill-trained conscripts, create a rising demand for more. Perhaps there were even academy grads hired for the purpose of extolling the virtues of the latest useless truck or gun.

  At that war's end, as the blood and treasure became exhausted, the collective devised a means to ensure that the all-valuable irritations could never heal. An armistice, neither victory nor defeat for either side, ensured that friends would continue to hate, but never reconcile. An armistice is an entirely different vehicle than an instrument of surrender.

  The West decided to stop fighting because it was just too darn expensive to keep pushing farmers armed with substandard Muffy-brand weapons against Germans armed with super-reliable machine guns and chemicals. Adding to the inequity in machines was the fact that the Germans were under the command of small-unit leaders such as Lieutenant Erwin Rommel. And led by men such as Heinz Guderian watching the action thoughtfully as a signals officer from a command post. Watching and learning and thinking.

  A one-sided war was exactly what was required by the collective to paint the German mind as demonic and sacrifice as valiant. Inferior material and inferior ideas fit exactly with the collective ethic of the noble self-sacrifice, so long as the sacrifice was made by someone else.

  The leadership in that war didn't have to be so one-sided, but was a direct result of the triumph of collective mores over the individual. The Americans had deliberately disenfranchised the tactically superior Southern generalship and erased them, and by extension their Revolutionary War roots, from the American warrior ethic. These small unit leadership methods, applied on the scale of armies by Washington and Stonewall Jackson, served well the rebels in the late-1700s and the rebels in the mid-1800s.

  But these same effective methods were forbidden to the ill-trained and involuntary conscripts of the early-1900s, and led directly to their slaughter, a triumph of the collective over the mind. At the same time, the collective compounded this error by cheapening the industrial base which had more or less single-handedly won the war for the North. Into the meat grinder the North had thrown steel until the grinder clogged on it. The lesson? More steel, less thought. A lesson which fell apart when it met a foe who had both.

  The Germans had studied any victory regardless of its heritage, and chose to make the best weapons possible despite the potential profit margin of cheap. And so, despite the innate heroism of the individual American, he was hopelessly outgunned and outled in his overwhelming number. And his generals prodded him into human wave tactics which would make a modern Chinese general proud.

  The armistice sleight-of-hand which followed encouraged the Germans to agree to abandon their superior weapons as a show of good faith, an early example of the perils of unilateral disarmament. After this voluntary disarmament, the western allies decided to immediately impose non-existent terms of surrender on a nation which had never officially surrendered. And, given their prowess on the battlefield against a numerically superior enemy, probably wouldn't have needed to.

  But a fraudulent victory was not enough. Immediately after the end of that war, the collective seized most of the German chemical patents in American courts at the behest of the monkey elite. These stolen patents included those of the lucrative pharmaceutical and dye industries, and denied their rightful owners the fruit of these ideas. For the Germans, a nation which lacked agricultural or other significant natural resources of any kind, their ideas and their innovations were their national export. In other times, this piracy would have been sufficient to incite a war as the monkeys seized these goods of the mind infinitely more valuable than any mere shipboard cargo. But, the Germans held their tongue, helpless in their voluntary disarmament. But this festering resentment would ensure that the commercial forces of Germany would later move in lockstep with the Nazis in World War II.

  The treachery of the monkey collective in that armistice would not be limited to the field of commerce. In their youth, the German Lieutenants and Captains had been oppressed by the terms of a fake surrender. But in their maturity, these Generals would march with the Nazis alongside their commercial brethren. And in their march the Privates and Corporals would become Sergeants and Fuehrers. All of these formidable forces were driven by their perception of the thieves and cowards of the west and the uncivilized barbarians of the east. And of traitors in their own midst who conspired with their oppressors. Thus came industrialized slaughter, and absolutely no credible opposition in this country to the draft, the due of a veteran generation payable by its own young.

  The Americans, in that war against defiance, would ride into suicidal human wave battle atop the monkey-tank of the day, named after the genocidal ethnic-cleansing general hero of the industrialized North. The Sherman, a high-riding mobile target reminiscent of a child's crayon-drawing, was no match for the German Panther or Tiger. Even the slightly more modern Pershing, named after the human-wave hero of the practice war, was no match one-on-one with the German models.

  Only in the hands of a Patton would the feeble American equipment make a decent showing. Patton became a political pariah who dared to study the works of both Rommel and Stonewall Jackson. The Pattons of that war enabled the individual American soldier to survive contact with the enemy beyond the point at which the Germans or the Japanese would simply have run out of ammunition. The Pattons of that war made Presidents of men who despised men like him, and who knew only how to help the enemy exhaust that ammunition.

  The Germans, of course, made a crucial strategic blunder which cost them the war, and more importantly for the modern entrepreneur, the post-war propaganda. Incensed by the onerous terms of the post-armistice, the Germans identified merchant Jews with their western enemies who had cheated their way into a false victory.

  These intellectual Jews, feeling the 1920's equivalent of white guilt, perhaps "Jew guilt", over their parents' and grandparents' mercantile success, affected strongly Marxist views to assuage this guilt. But to their German peers, this affectation placed them in the camp of the barbarian Communists to the east. The Jew in Germany soon found himself labeled as an Eastern Communist or a Western Capitalist with equal disdain and precision. Finding no safe corner of political opinion in which to hide, the smart ones tried to flee this encirclement while their less-clever brethren ignored the danger.

  In 1939 Guderian pointed the way through to victory in Belgium, having learned his lessons in the command post of the previous war watching the needless slaughter of static war. But behind him, the rot in the Fatherland was already taking hold. In the practice war, the Jews had been allies in their war against the West, serving in war industry and at the front alike. But now, rather than gainfully employing these millions the Germans were besot with the task of feeding them in inefficient labor camps. And later, burdened with wasting valuable ammunition, railway traffic and industrial produce in killing them rather than the enemy.

  Once the Germans began to face the human wave, agricultural, and industrial might of an entire continent, even their superior weapons and tactics were overwhelmed in their smaller number. The Germans were then left in a position in which the internment and labor camps were simply too expensive to feed. So the starving Germans, having their industry destroyed by relentless bombing and no labor to tend their meager fields, turned a deaf ear to rumors of atrocities out of raw animal survival. The triumph of the collective was almost complete as it
ground through the individual as all collectives must ultimately do.

  Had the Germans avoided the destruction of their Jewish resources, they might have well won the war and taken their vengeance from the duplicity of the armistice. Freed from the burden of killing Polish and Hungarian Jews, they could have solidified their industrial might atop the fields of Poland and the minds of Budapest. From that vantage they could have swiftly taken Ukraine, starving the Russians into defeat a few years later. But then, we wouldn't have had the opportunity to experience guilt imposed on Americans for over six decades, and the power of the collective which derives from this. Our world today is shaped indelibly by Hitler, who was arguably the product of an unbroken chain of the monkey collective stretching back to the Annapolis and Boston slave markets.

  Hitler can be seen as a symptom of practice war subterfuge rather than the cause of evil. Without other hands beside him, he would have amounted to nothing but a street-corner rant. But instead, he shaped our modern world. As proof, consider the Cold War, the dark fantasy of the war merchant and the political oppressor alike. Without nuclear weapons, the agrarian Soviet Union would have been little more than a footnote on the page of history.

  Each side in this war had their own stable of native nuclear physicists, such as the Americans Lawrence, Serber, Seaborg, and Oppenheimer. Likewise, the Soviets had Kurchatov and numerous names we will never know, who spent much of their energy studying stolen plans from the Manhattan Project. Alone, neither the Americans nor the Soviets had the political will to pursue nuclear weapons without Hitler as a threat to both. Their mutual salvation came as a result of Hitler's own racist policies.

  The practice-war Germans had enjoyed the services of men such Fritz Haber, the son of Lebanese Jews and the father of modern chemical warfare. Haber is also famous as the inventor of the Haber process, in which ammonia is created literally from thin air. Ammonia from any source can be used as a fertilizer directly. But, more typically Haber's ammonia is converted into and combined with nitric acid from the German Ostwald process to make ammonium nitrate, the most important agricultural fertilizer of the modern world. The chemists of the early 1900s begat the physicists of the mid-1900s. While Germany enjoyed the former in the practice war, it would deny itself the latter in the main event. From across Europe, brilliant Jews fled Hitler, the vast majority heading west to Britain and America. This flight is best documented by Richard Rhodes.

  Reading Assignment

  The Making of the Atomic Bomb by Richard Rhodes In this scholarly book, Rhodes details the history of the atomic bomb. Unwittingly, he also demonstrates the power of individual minds to starve an enemy of its produce. As researched by Rhodes, Hungary alone traded seven players to the Manhattan Project and related endeavors. Theodor von Karman became famous for his work with fluid dynamics. George de Hevesy invented new methods in radio-biochemistry. Michael Polanyi found correlations between knowledge, science, economics and the subconscious mind. Hmmm.

  Their fellow Hungarian Leo Szilard invented many concepts surrounding the use of fission for weapons and energy. Szilard's patents would later become absorbed by the government as they were too important to allow mere profit. Eugene Wigner developed important theories of nuclear reactions. John von Neumann contributed a mathematical insight to the propagation of shock waves both inside and outside of atomic bombs. To implement the required calculations for these theories, he is also credited with a great deal of the early work in computer science. The last of these seven Hungarians, Edward Teller, is widely known, along with Polish Jew Stanislaw Ulam, as the father of the thermonuclear bomb.

  Mussolini contributed Enrico Fermi, the scientist who would oversee construction of the first nuclear reactor at the University of Chicago, whose wife was a Jew. Germany would contribute Hans Bethe among many others too numerous to list here.

  Austria effectively discovered fission in absentia in Kungalv, Sweden, when Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Frisch, both Austrian Jews fleeing the Nazis, went for a Christmas walk in 1938. During this walk, Lise interpreted the experimental results of her former German chemist partner, Otto Hahn, who missed identifying fission by the barest of margins. Had he not been stripped of Lise's help, Otto Hahn would have given the Nazis the first key to the atomic bomb. Had Germany not been stripped of the best minds of Europe, the rest might have contributed to making a more peaceful Hitler-free Germany the world's first nuclear power.

  The most famous of all of Hitler's refugees was of course Albert Einstein. Despite his popularity in common understanding, his sole contribution to the atomic bomb was his famous letter to President Roosevelt. In that letter Einstein urged the President to fund a nuclear program before the Germans got there first. That letter, a copy of which is on display at the Museum of Science and Energy in Oak Ridge, would be contribution enough.

  The development of the atomic bomb in America was then a direct effect of the racist policies of the Nazis. This development is also the clearest historical example of how a small group of people denied their enemy the produce of their minds. Had Hitler successfully placated the Jews, he could have used their talents to conquer or pacify the world under a single government. As it turned out, for a time America was the sole nuclear superpower. This status had been handed to it in part by Hitler's refugees and in part by a steamer-trunk-full of nuclear secrets brought by British scientists sent to America to protect them from the Nazis. Had this hole card been played correctly, the Cold War would have never happened.

  Patton, and others, advised attacking the Soviets directly, and thus forcing them back into their own borders after the war. With the nuclear hole card, the threat of such an attack would have been sufficient. Limited to their own borders, the Soviets would have been forced to survive on their own meager resources rather than having the rich resources, intellectual and physical, of Eastern Europe to plunder. So weakened, the Soviets would have collapsed within a decade. Iin their collapse, they would have spawned a more peaceful and prosperous Russia to continue the progress started by Peter the Great before being interrupted by the cancer of Communism.

  However, the forces of nice need conflict to feed them. And so, this collective chose to allow the Soviets to occupy half of Europe, damning generations of innocent Europeans, and Soviet citizens themselves, to their rule. The Soviet collectives, after all, more closely resembled the progressives in power in America at that time and at all times since. Progressives who were, and remain, supported by the American electorate.

  More brutal than the Germans, the Soviets would eventually murder many times more people than the Nazis, most of them their own citizens. But at least Biff and Muffy would have a worthy adversary to frighten the Americans into compliance and service. To help the Soviets, and to prevent their premature collapse, the Americans would continue the wartime policy of shipping grain to the Soviet Union throughout most of the Cold War. And thus ensuring that their enemy wouldn't starve while enslaving their population to make all those bombs and missiles. And Hitler's Panther and Tiger became the models for the Soviet tanks of the Cold War and the American M1 Abrahms of today. And his V-1 became the Tomahawk, and his V-2 became the Apollo and the Trident and the Minuteman.

  By letting the Soviet sore fester, the collective fanned it to strength so that it might form a credible threat. For decades, as strategic experts warned of this threat and continued to warn of its growing menace, the collective stayed their hand. General Curtis LeMay, the Patton of strategic air forces, developed the means to win that war, and promoted the industrial base to fulfill his vision. Hyman Rickover, the driving force of the naval nuclear program, followed suit.

  But the collective would fight them each step of the way. Even so, as late as 1960 the Soviets were still far enough behind such that a first strike still seemed practical, as documented in the famous book by Herman Kahn.

  Reading Assignment

  On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn Kahn was a renowned military strategist and theorist employed
by the RAND Corporation think-tank. The first third of this scholarly book is available as a teaser on the web, and clearly describes the tradeoffs which were still available in the early 1960s. As late as then, it still was not too late to destroy the threat which faced us, although the cost would be high. But not so high as the cost we now face from radical terrorists as we implicitly arm them, having groomed them from birth for the task.

  Interestingly, Kahn placed his hopes for survival and recovery from nuclear war on the individual skill and spirit of the survivors. He drew a clear distinction between the collectivists of what he called A Country and the individualists of what he called the B Country. In Kahn's model, A Country consists of the urbanized areas, including the suburban areas which serve the cities. Meanwhile, B Country consists of the rural areas which remain. Today, we would refer to B Country as the "flyover."

  In Kahn's day, roughly half of the productive capacity, human and material, resided in each of these areas. Both of these halves of the nation cooperated to mutual benefit like gigantic renditions of Og and Pok. In this trade, the rural areas supplied raw materials, such as food and ore and transportation while the urban areas supplied designs and finished goods. A Country ate the food supplied by B Country and smelted steel from the ore. Conversely, B Country used the tractors and mining equipment provided by A Country. Both benefitted.

  Kahn also presented evidence of a doubling of the economic output of the nation roughly every ten years. He also ominously pointed out that, in a crisis, B Country could survive without A Country. But A Country could not survive without B Country. In other words, remove designs and the ideas and the newest models of tractor, and B Country can still limp along. Remove the food, and A Country dies. Unconditionally.