Stonewalled: My Fight for Truth Against the Forces of Obstruction, Intimidation, and Harassment in Obama's Washington

by Sharyl Attkisson

  “It is, I think, self-evident that what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist attack. Our embassy was attacked violently, and the result was four deaths of American officials. So, again, that’s self-evident,” said Carney.

  Except, perhaps, to Clinton, who says she was careening.

  Carney’s remark reminds me of a comment Morell made in April 2014 when he finally admitted to Congress that he removed the word Islamic from the phrase Islamic extremists. He did it not to obfuscate, he told Congress, but because, “what other kind of extremists are there in Libya?” Everyone knows that. We don’t have to say it.

  And on September 25, a full two weeks after the attacks, the president addressed the U.N. General Assembly and continued to refer to “killers” rather than “terrorists,” evoking the “crude and disgusting video” that “sparked outrage throughout the Muslim world.”

  Why was the conversation with the American public so starkly different than the one taking place behind the scenes—the accurate one—unless the narrative was being seriously manipulated?

  Clinton now freely embraces in her book what she and the White House so carefully avoided saying in those early days. In fact, she’s decided to own it, if one can glean anything from the first sentence in her Benghazi chapter: the American victims, she writes, “were killed in a terrorist attack.” It’s almost as if she wants to convince us that she said so all along. In what looks like a striking attempt to rewrite her post-Benghazi narrative and speeches, Clinton goes heavy in her book on recounting instances in which she used terms such as “heavily armed militants,” “violent attackers,” or “extremists,” but she conveniently omits how she repeatedly pointed to the YouTube video.

  For example, she writes in her book that on September 12, “I laid out the facts as we knew them” to the press corps, reporting that “heavily armed militants” had assaulted the compounds. She fails to mention that, for the second day in a row, she pointed to the video. Same with the statement she made on September 13 when she appeared with Morocco’s foreign minister. Same with the statement she made on September 14 when she met with the victims’ families at Andrews Air Force Base.

  Of that meeting, Clinton writes in her book, “All you can do is offer a human touch, a kind word, a gentle embrace.” She leaves out the part about her speech at that same event in which she stated, “We’ve seen rage and violence directed at American embassies over an awful Internet video that we had nothing to do with.” And she doesn’t address the reports from victims’ family members who said that Clinton privately promised them that she would hunt down the maker of the YouTube video—never mentioning that she intended to hunt down the terrorists who actually killed their loved ones.

  With the passage of time and the release of more facts and documents, Clinton appears to be evolving her position from “the attackers were motivated by an awful, disgusting YouTube video” to “the video played a role.”

  Clinton writes in her book, “I know there are some who don’t want to hear that an internet video played a role” in the September 11 upheaval in the Mideast, such as the attacks on the U.S. embassy in Cairo. She says it “would have been strange not to consider . . . that [the video] might have had the same effect [in Benghazi], too. That’s just common sense.”

  The problem with that defense is that, at the time, Clinton hadn’t set forth the video scenario as “commonsense” musings. She falsely portrayed it as a fact, as if exclusive to the scenario of preplanned terrorism. We now know that this was contrary to the facts she and other Obama officials had in hand and contrary to what her own representatives were privately telling Libyan officials.

  In her book, Clinton employs other techniques to deflect. She ridicules those pursuing unanswered questions as “fixated on chasing conspiracy theories.” It’s similar to the way in which Democrats reject allegations about the IRS’s targeting conservative groups and the conveniently missing emails as “conspiracy theories.” They seem to think that evoking the word conspiracy will lead some voters to dismiss the concerns. They controversialize the legitimate reporting of their self-generated controversies by using the language of propagandists.

  Throughout her Benghazi chapter, Clinton inadvertently highlights contradictory characterizations that the Obama administration has switched between, depending upon which was needed for expediency.

  For example, the administration advanced the narrative that it couldn’t have predicted the Benghazi attacks. (That was to explain why it denied security requests and had no military help accessible.) Yet Clinton also argues that they were vigilantly prepared. (That was so as not to appear to be out of touch with the well-documented dangers.)

  To be specific, Obama officials have stated that there was no reason to put the military on special alert on the 9/11 anniversary because there had never been a repeat attack on that date. But in her book, Clinton states that, prior to the Benghazi attacks, the 9/11 anniversary added a “potentially combustible element” that “like every year . . . prompted our intelligence and security officials to proceed with extra caution.”

  We’re left to wonder what extra caution was supposedly exercised, since examples are lacking. Stevens and his team weren’t granted the extra security that they said was necessary. Nobody dissuaded him from making the trip to Benghazi on September 11. The military says nobody was on a short leash for quick action the night of the assaults and that no assets were in place. And even when the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Cairo foreshadowed the Benghazi attacks, nobody seemed to “proceed with extra caution” to evacuate the Benghazi staff. Everything about the scenario seemed to telegraph a lack of extra caution.

  Two more opposing narratives involve the administration originally indicating that it believed the attacks were going to be short-lived (to explain why they decided not to deploy outside military rescue teams at the outset), while Clinton claims, in her book, that they expected the violence to continue and spread (to give the impression that they were on top of it).

  To be specific, Clinton writes that, during the Benghazi attacks, “I did not believe this crisis was over. We could expect more unrest to come.” She says she warned Libya’s president not to “assume the threat had passed . . . We also had to get ready for the possibility of other assaults elsewhere. We had to assume and plan for the worst—the possibility of further attacks against U.S. interests in the region.”

  If the administration anticipated an indefinite spate of attacks and violence, as Clinton states, then why did they conversely argue there was no point in spinning up military resources because they “couldn’t get there in time”?

  Further, Clinton seems to contradict her own assertion that they expected additional unrest when she writes that there was no point sending special operations forces standing by in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, because that they would take several hours to muster and were more than five thousand miles away. Why wouldn’t one go ahead and muster them if they were truly assuming and planning for the worst, and if the administration were doing everything possible (as the president says he had ordered)?

  Regarding the talking points used by Ambassador Rice— Clinton appears to attempt to revise the facts by stating something that simply isn’t the case:

  “The extensive public record now makes clear that Susan was using information that originated with and was approved by the CIA.”

  In my opinion, that’s just plain wrong.

  In fact, the “extensive public record” indicates that then-head of the CIA Petraeus expressed great disapproval of the talking points Rice used. Also, the “extensive public record” shows that White House officials and the State Department had significant input into editing the talking points into their final, scrubbed version.

  Perhaps the most glaring section of Clinton’s Benghazi chapter that deserves analysis is the analogy she applies to those investigating Benghazi.

  “If somebody bre
aks into your home and takes your family hostage,” she writes, “how much time are you going to spend focused on how the intruder spent his day as opposed to how best to rescue your loved ones and then prevent it from happening again?”

  It strikes me that she and other administration officials who went to a great deal of effort to steer the public toward a false narrative now are spending equal effort asking why the narrative matters at all.

  To expand on Clinton’s clumsy analogy, one might counter that:

  If somebody breaks into your home and takes your family hostage, are you going to decide, somehow in advance, that the hostage rescue team can’t get there in time so there’s no point in trying? And if there are policemen in the next neighborhood who want to help, are you going to order them to stay put to protect the neighbors instead of helping the family that’s in danger now?

  The fact is, the controversies over Benghazi don’t surround questions about how the terrorists “spent their day,” as Clinton implies. Those asking questions want to know why the landlord failed to secure the house when the family had asked for help in so many different ways, and when the landlord had been warned that a dangerous intrusion was imminent. They want to know the intruder’s motivation: did he act alone or is he part of a dangerous ring that could strike again? They want to know why the police were told to do everything they could to help, yet didn’t come to the rescue. They want to know why the police weren’t better placed to provide assistance. They want to know if the police attempted a cover-up after the fact. They want to make sure that the truth is fully aired and that those responsible for any missteps or cover-ups are held accountable to help avoid a repeat occurrence in the future.

  Throughout the chapter, Clinton laments “a regrettable amount of misinformation, speculation and flat-out deceit by some in politics and the media.” On that point, many would agree. They just might disagree on who’s responsible for perpetuating the deceit.

  | CBS HIRES BENGHAZI FIGURE

  In January 2014, Morell, the ex-CIA deputy director was hired as a consultant for CBS News. At the same time, the government was still very much embroiled in controversy over its monitoring of citizens and journalists, targeting of whistleblowers, and the handling of Benghazi. The hire drew immediate commentary from some of my sources.

  CBS is employing one of the most controversial figures in the Benghazi controversy. Are you comfortable with that? one asked.

  Once in the CIA, always in the CIA, said another. And now he’s in your newsroom.

  I felt that Morell was hired to spin rather than spy. But regardless, CBS was presenting him on the air to viewers as though he were a neutral observer, without disclosing his political and financial ties. This risked opening CBS to criticism that, in my view, we simply couldn’t afford. Network news operations are huge enterprises and it’s impossible to prevent every mistake. But it’s foolish not to prevent the obviously preventable ones.

  About a month before CBS announced Morell’s hiring, he’d also been hired at that PR firm dominated by Hillary Clinton loyalists: Beacon Global Strategies. I also got a tip that Morell was the target of new congressional allegations that he hid or gave false information about Benghazi. To protect CBS’s reputation and interests, I felt it was urgent that we disclose Morell’s financial and political ties when he made his on-air appearances.

  On February 18, 2014, I sent an email to the CBS ethics czar to express this concern. I said that for our own protection at CBS, we had a responsibility to disclose Morell’s relationships each time he appears. Putting it out front avoids criticism and gives the public the crucial information it needs to decide how much weight to give Morell’s opinions on various topics. Disclosure is our friend. It protects us.

  I instinctively knew that my email would further my reputation as a troublemaker rather than that of a loyal employee watching out for CBS interests. But I hit the SEND button.

  Before long, the ethics czar called me. He didn’t agree that we had an ethical duty to disclose Morell’s financial and political ties each time he appears. He did acknowledge we should reveal them if Morell were asked a question specifically about Hillary Clinton.

  “Well, the problem with that,” I countered, “is that people who initiate propaganda are pretty clever. They steer public opinion in less obvious ways than in answers to direct questions. He may not be asked about Hillary, but can still subtly steer opinion in a certain direction. If we disclose his connections each time, we don’t have to worry that somebody will later accuse us of hiding them.”

  I wondered if CBS even knew, prior to my pointing it out, that Morell worked for the company largely composed of ex-Clinton and Obama officials.

  “Did you even know he worked for Beacon before I told you?”

  “No,” admitted the ethics czar.

  The next morning, Morell appeared on CBS This Morning. There was no disclosure of his financial or political ties.

  | MORELL’S CONTRADICTIONS

  On May 3, 2014, I have left my job at CBS and am now fully free to write on my own website about yet another contradiction in the administration’s Benghazi narrative. Morell is at the center of it.

  The contradiction surfaces when Vietor, former spokesman for President Obama’s National Security Staff (NSS) gives an interview to FOX News anchor Bret Baier. In it, Vietor acknowledges that, while at the White House, he made at least one substantive change to the talking points. That change was to add a line that seemed to advance the notion that the attacks were born from spontaneous demonstrations.

  It’s a stark one-eighty from the story the administration has told to date.

  “According to the e-mails and the time line, the CIA circulates new talking points after they’ve removed the mention of al-Qaeda,” Baier says to Vietor, “and then at 6:21 the White House, you, add a line about the administration warning of September 10th of social media reports calling for demonstrations. True?”

  “Uh, I believe so,” answers Vietor.

  Both Morell and White House spokesman Carney had previously insisted that White House officials only made a single edit, changing “consulate” to “diplomatic post.”

  Carney said it at a White House press briefing on May 10, 2013: “[T]he only edit made by the White House or the State Department to those talking points generated by the CIA was a change from—referring to the facility that was attacked in Benghazi, from ‘consulate,’ because it was not a consulate, to ‘diplomatic post.’ . . . But the point being, it was a matter of non-substantive/factual correction.”

  On April 2, 2014, Morell repeated the claim under oath before Congress.

  “To be very clear the White House did not make any substantive changes to the talking points.”

  He was even more specific and adamant in the written testimony he submitted in connection with the hearing.

  “No one at the NSS [where Vietor worked at the time] suggested or requested a single substantive change. That is a simple fact, and calling it a myth doesn’t change the reality,” wrote Morell.

  With Vietor feeling chatty in the FOX News interview, Baier continues to press.

  “Did you also change ‘attacks’ to ‘demonstrations’ in the talking points?” Baier asks.

  “Uh maybe. I don’t really remember,” answers Vietor.

  “You don’t remember?”

  “Dude, this was like two years ago . . .”

  “The key part is ‘attacks’ to ‘demonstrations . . .’ ” continues Baier.

  “Yeah,” says Vietor.

  “Did you do that?”

  At this point, Vietor appears to rethink the wisdom of the conversation. Perhaps he recalls that Morell had provided a different account to Congress a month before.

  “No . . . what did we—what was the question?” says Vietor.

  “The CIA talking points,” Baier repeats. “It was edit
ed from ‘attacks’ to ‘demonstrations.’ ”

  “No,” says Vietor. “Michael Morell testified to what he changed and what was changed in those, in those emails, the whole process of that, Michael Morell testified that he took them back, didn’t like them and changed them.”

  Vietor’s new contradictions create a turning point.

  After more than a year of resistance, House Speaker John Boehner at last gets behind the idea of convening a special select committee to investigate Benghazi, replacing the piecemeal efforts of four separate committees.

  About this time, a member of Congress sends me an email titled, “You see this? First question I have is, was this speech really delivered Sept. 12?”

  The email links to a speech that CBS president Rhodes delivered to the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce the day after the Benghazi attacks. In it, Rhodes told the audience, “Our government thinks that, you know, there’s a really good chance this was not just a spontaneous mob reaction to what some thought was an offensive film but actually a coordinated effort timed to the 9/11 anniversary.”

  Why were the Rhodes brothers giving their respective audiences opposing accounts at the same time? The CBS Rhodes seems to know right away that the government suspects a 9/11 terrorist attack. Did he know this from his brother at the White House, who then ended up steering the talking points toward the YouTube video narrative?

  On May 8, 2014, my phone rings. It’s Senator Graham. He tells me he’s just had a conversation with the CBS Rhodes.

  “He’s really worried about that speech he made,” Graham says.

  “How do you know?” I ask.

  “The sound of his voice.”

  Senator Graham says he wanted to give Rhodes the benefit of the doubt. He told Rhodes that he assumed his information came from his own CBS reporters and “not your brother.”

  “That’s absolutely true,” Rhodes replied, according to Graham.