Reagan: The Life

by H. W. Brands

  Reagan repeated that El Salvador was the key. “We can’t afford a defeat,” he said. “El Salvador is the place for a victory.”

  CENTRAL AMERICA AND the Caribbean remained the focus in subsequent discussions of foreign policy. Al Haig brought home the American ambassador in Nicaragua to speak to the president and the NSC. Lawrence Pezzullo was unimpressed by the Sandinista leadership. “They are not men of great stature,” he said. “They fell into power after a general insurrection against Somoza was started with all sectors of Nicaraguan society participating.” The Sandinistas had no experience in government and were doing a dismal job directing the country. As for their Salvadoran connection: “The Sandinistas were grabbed by the romance of the revolutionary process as they saw it in Central America and were swept along into helping in El Salvador. They also saw a revolutionary El Salvador being a forward defense position for their own revolution, and were probably convinced by Castro to get involved.”

  Pezzullo identified essential questions for the Reagan administration: “Can we get the Sandinistas to back off in El Salvador? Can we impress on them the high cost of continuing their efforts? Can we drive a wedge between them and the Cubans?” Pezzullo didn’t deny that strong measures might become necessary, but he thought they hadn’t yet. The administration should move carefully. “Avoid any precipitous act,” he said. “Don’t cut off aid for the moment. The evidence is there for such an action, but a sudden action on our part would lead to a very negative reaction in Managua and have a cascading effect that would cool or terminate relations.”

  Haig suggested giving the Sandinistas thirty days. They should be told that if they didn’t lay off in El Salvador, the United States would suspend all assistance and perhaps take further steps.

  At this meeting Reagan pondered going to the regional source of the Central American troubles. “What can we do specifically about Cuba?” he asked the group.

  William Clark, Haig’s deputy at State, said the State Department was planning to show the leaders of Congress evidence of Cuban complicity in El Salvador’s troubles.

  Reagan wanted more. “What specific pressures can be placed on Cuba?” he demanded.

  Caspar Weinberger replied that clandestine operations were one possibility. Economic pressure was another. The United States was already embargoing trade with Cuba, but the administration could try to persuade America’s allies to join the embargo.

  Reagan asked for military options.

  Haig evidently responded forthrightly to the president’s question, but his remarks were excised when the minutes of this top secret meeting were declassified.

  Weinberger pointed out a problem with the military option, one not shared by clandestine operations. “The problem with military action is that as it escalates, congressional checks come into play,” the defense secretary said.

  Reagan didn’t respond to Weinberger’s objection. Instead, he returned to El Salvador. “If the junta falls in El Salvador, it will be seen as an American defeat,” he said. He endorsed the thirty-day warning to Nicaragua, but he was prepared to consider escalation. “We must not let Central America become another Cuba on the mainland. It cannot happen.”

  51

  REAGAN HAD NEVER been an impulsive person. His career steps had been deliberate: planned and executed with care. It took him years to make the leap from radio to films. He required a decade to shift from films to politics. He was slow even to conclude that Nancy was the love of his life.

  His decisions as president were, for the most part, equally deliberate. As determined as he was to prevent Central America from becoming another Cuba, he refused to rush into anything.

  Sometimes, though, he was tempted to move more swiftly. Poland had been restive under communist rule for decades. During the 1950s, Polish workers walked off their jobs to protest dismal and dangerous conditions in factories and corruption in government. In 1970 shipyard workers in Gdańsk marched and rioted against rising food prices; the government’s feckless response inspired workers in other cities and intellectuals to join the antigovernment demonstrations. The 1978 elevation of Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyła to the papacy, as Pope John Paul II, afforded the Polish protesters additional confidence; a papal visit the following year pulled hundreds of thousands of Poles into the streets in an unsubtle rebuke of the regime. During the summer of 1980 a hike in meat prices provoked the largest protests to date and the establishment at Gdańsk of Solidarity, led by the charismatic Lech Wałesa. Strikes spread across the country, paralyzing the economy and presenting the communist rulers with a stark choice: to order the army against the strikers or to grant some of their demands. The government chose the latter, which convinced Wałesa and the workers that events were moving their way and spurred them to demand still more.

  The Soviet government of Leonid Brezhnev observed developments in Poland with mounting concern, as the CIA noted. The Kremlin cared little about Polish meat prices, but it cared much about who governed the country. Since World War II the overriding objective of Soviet policy toward the countries to Russia’s immediate west had been to prevent their falling under hostile influence. What this meant was that any government in Warsaw had to suit Moscow. Thrice previously—in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968—the Kremlin had dispatched Soviet troops and armor to crush insurgencies that threatened pro-Soviet regimes. When the Kremlin in the autumn of 1980 spoke ominously about “antisocialist elements” in Poland and moved troops to the Polish frontier, it appeared to be setting the stage for another armed intervention.

  Reagan inherited the Polish problem along with the presidency. And he inherited an American policy that was stouter than he liked to give Jimmy Carter credit for. “The United States is watching with growing concern the unprecedented building of Soviet forces along the Polish border,” Carter had declared in December 1980. “The Polish people and authorities should be free to work out their internal difficulties without outside interference.” Carter offered economic assistance to Poland to ease the country’s debt and overall distress; at the same time he issued a sharply worded warning: “The attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland.”

  Reagan could do no less than Carter, having campaigned against the weakness he ascribed to the Democrats’ foreign policy. He echoed Carter’s admonitions. “The Polish people must be allowed to work out their own solutions to their problems,” he said shortly after inauguration. “Outside intervention there would affect profoundly and in the long term the entire range of East-West ties.”

  Whether the Soviets would intervene or not preoccupied American intelligence analysts during the first year of Reagan’s presidency. A crucial conduit of information was a Polish colonel, Ryszard Kukliński, who had been cooperating with the CIA for years. “We waited eagerly for each of his reports,” recalled the CIA’s Robert Gates. The administration prepared for two scenarios: “the worst case: a Soviet invasion, resistance, and significant bloodshed,” as Gates put it, and internal repression by the Polish regime, perhaps to forestall Soviet intervention. The menu of American responses included recalling the American ambassador in Poland, curtailing economic aid, and imposing stiffer credit conditions on loans to the Polish government. Significantly, nothing stronger was contemplated, even in the worst case. “For all the tough talk,” Gates recalled, speaking of the remarks by Reagan and other administration officials, “the conservative new team was wholly focused on stern warnings and possible economic sanctions in the event the Soviets acted in Poland. More dramatic measures weren’t even discussed.”

  The tension in Poland mounted as the months passed. Colonel Kukliński sent word that the Polish regime, headed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, was consulting with the Kremlin on imposing martial law in Poland. Whether this would serve as a prelude to Soviet intervention was impossible to say. But Gates and the CIA, assuming it might, prepared a
statement Reagan could issue in response. The plan was for the president to proclaim a “Polish Patriots Day” and ask Americans to “stand with our Polish brothers and sisters” by wearing ribbons of the Polish national colors, white and red.

  Yet the CIA thought Soviet intervention remained unlikely, at least in the near term. The Soviets were in a “desperate dilemma,” William Casey wrote to Reagan. “If they go, they will get economic chaos arising from the debt, a slowdown of the whole Polish work force and millions of Poles conducting a guerrilla war against them. If they don’t, they are open to the West and a political force which could unravel their entire system.” It was a decision the Soviet leadership didn’t want to have to make. “Before sending divisions in,” Casey predicted, “they will move heaven and earth to get the Poles to crack down themselves.”

  Reagan realized he faced a dilemma, too. “Now we must take on the problem of what to do or if to do something to help the Polish people,” he wrote in his diary. “Their economy is going bust. Here is the first major break in the Red dike—Poland’s disenchantment with Soviet Communism. Can we afford to let Poland collapse? But in the state of our present economy, can we afford to help in a meaningful way?”

  The strains in Poland eased slightly during the summer of 1981. Polish cardinal Stefan Wyszyński implored Wałesa and Solidarity not to carry out a threatened general strike, contending that massive violence would be the inevitable result. When Wałesa at first refused, the elderly and ailing cardinal knelt down before the Solidarity leader and said he would remain on his knees until death unless Wałesa canceled the strike. Wałesa gave in.

  BUT CONDITIONS AGAIN grew fraught during the autumn. The slow pace of reform prompted Solidarity once more to threaten a general strike. The Polish government warned against such action, and the Soviets sent advisers, including Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the military commander of the Warsaw Pact, to Warsaw to stiffen the government’s resolve.

  In December the Polish government imposed martial law. The government arrested Wałesa and other Solidarity leaders. The union itself was outlawed. Travel and communications were curtailed; universities were closed; Poland’s borders were sealed; a curfew was imposed. In the crackdown at least a dozen people, perhaps scores, were killed.

  The CIA had lost its chief asset in Poland when Colonel Kukliński concluded that his cover had been compromised and fled the country. Yet his warning about the possibility of martial law had prepared the administration for the moment Jaruzelski made the move. Reagan responded with a call to the pope. “Your Holiness, I want you to know how deeply we feel about the situation in your homeland,” he said, according to a transcript released to the media. “Our sympathies are with the people, not the government.” Reagan praised John Paul for making Poland’s struggle part of the struggle for freedom across the globe. “Our country was inspired when you visited Poland, and to see their commitment to religion and belief in God. It was an inspiration to the whole world to watch on television. All of us were very thrilled.”

  The president opened other avenues to the Vatican and, through the Vatican, to Poland. “Lunched with Cardinal Casaroli, Secretary of State to the Vatican,” he wrote in his diary for December 15. “Most of the talk was on Poland. This thing going on there was no sudden reaction as the Communist government would have us believe. The operation is so smooth it must have taken weeks for planning. Solidarity was going to demand a vote by the people as to whether they wanted to continue under Communism. That the Commies can never permit.”

  Reagan spoke to reporters about Poland. “All the information that we have confirms that the imposition of martial law in Poland has led to the arrest and confinement, in prisons and detention camps, of thousands of Polish trade union leaders and intellectuals,” he said in a prepared statement ahead of a news conference. “Factories are being seized by security forces and workers beaten.” For eighteen months Poland had been mov ing toward greater freedom and personal liberty; this progress had been abruptly and brutally reversed. “Coercion and violation of human rights on a massive scale have taken the place of negotiation and compromise.” The hand of the Kremlin was clear. “It would be naive to think this could happen without the full knowledge and the support of the Soviet Union. We’re not naive.”

  Confidentially the president considered his options. At a long and contentious meeting of the National Security Council on December 21, Reagan heard, made, and weighed arguments for and against strong action against the Soviets and their Polish protégés. Al Haig described the current situation in Poland, as American intelligence understood it. “There is widespread resentment among the people against the Polish government but no major, overt challenge to it,” Haig said. Church leaders, including Józef Glemp, archbishop of Warsaw, were taking a cautious line. “Archbishop Glemp has ‘walked the cat back,’ ” Haig said. “He has shifted from a position of strong condemnation of the military law that has been imposed to a plea for moderation and for no bloodshed.” The Polish military had warned parish priests against denouncing martial law, and most of the priests appeared to be complying.

  Haig said the State Department had received a detailed analysis of the Soviet position from the embassy in Moscow. “The theme of this message is that the Soviets are ‘cooling it,’ ” Haig said. “They are not preparing for intervention and, significantly, they are not preparing the Soviet people for intervention.” The embassy had concluded that the Kremlin didn’t have the stomach for intervention. “The Soviets are afraid to intervene because they know they can’t hack it,” Haig said. They would go to great lengths to keep the Jaruzelski government afloat. “The Soviets are preparing food for shipment to Poland and preparing for a massive bailout of the Polish economy.”

  Offering his own recommendation, Haig urged caution. “I am not one who espouses the devil theory that all is lost, that the Soviets are in charge, that Solidarity is dead, that all this is the case with or without Soviet intervention. I don’t think we should proceed on these assumptions.” Instead, the administration should watch carefully and respond accordingly. “We should husband our leverage and use it as the assessment changes.”

  Reagan sought a stronger response. “This is the first time in sixty years that we have had this kind of opportunity,” he said, referring to the cracks Solidarity had made in the wall of communist rule. “There may not be another in our lifetime. Can we afford not to go all out? I’m talking about a total quarantine on the Soviet Union. No détente! We know, and the world knows, that they are behind this. We have backed away so many times! After World War II we offered Poland the Marshall Plan. They accepted, but the Soviets said no.” Reagan talked of suspending licenses that allowed American companies to trade with Poland. He noted that Lane Kirkland and the AFL-CIO had taken a forceful position in support of Solidarity. “Kirkland said in a conversation that our unions might refuse to load ships,” Reagan told the NSC. “How will it look if we say yes”—let U.S. exports to the Soviet Union proceed—“while our unions, our own ‘Solidarity,’ won’t load the ships?” Reagan acknowledged that big companies doing business with Poland would suffer from an embargo. “I recognize that this is a great problem for International Harvester and for Caterpillar. It may mean thousands of layoffs.” But what was the alternative? “Can we allow a go-ahead?” He didn’t think so, though he suggested examining means for softening the blow to Americans. “Perhaps we can find a way to compensate the companies if we say no. Perhaps put the items in inventory and use them by some other means.” But the administration had to do something. “Can we do less now than tell our allies, ‘This is the big casino’? There may never be another chance!” Reagan likened Solidarity and the Polish dissidents to America’s founding fathers. “It is like the opening lines in our own Declaration of Independence: ‘When in the course of human events.’ This is exactly what they are doing now.”

  George Bush echoed Reagan’s remarks. “I have thought a lot about this problem over the weekend,” the vice
president said. “I agree with the president that we are at a real turning point.” Bush urged Reagan to sound the call for Poland. “The president should really identify, in a speech, with Walesa and the Polish ambassador. I really feel that—particularly at this Christmas time—the country is waiting for a more forward position. This is not a political matter but one of world leadership.”

  Caspar Weinberger endorsed Bush’s recommendation. “I suggest that you talk to the world,” the defense secretary told Reagan. “This is not a time for prudence or caution. The world needs to be told that it has a leader.” Weinberger wanted Reagan to fix the blame squarely on the Kremlin. “Let’s not be mistaken,” he said. “What Poland has now in Jaruzelski is a Russian general in Polish uniform. The Soviets are getting what they want.” Weinberger pressed for action. “This is a chance to seize the initiative. It is the time to do it.”

  Bill Casey chimed in. “We lose credibility if we fail to follow through now on this situation,” the CIA chief asserted. “We are seeing an unraveling of the communist economic system.” Casey warned that America’s European allies wouldn’t support an embargo, but he didn’t think their timidity should deter the president from doing what needed to be done. “We should go with across-the-board sanctions.”

  John Block, the secretary of agriculture, tried to slow things down. Block had to deal with farmers, who would suffer the brunt of an embargo, but he framed his case for caution more broadly. “The Soviet communist system is collapsing of its own weight,” he said. “I believe there should be a presidential message, but we must be careful. If we play our trump card—total economic sanctions—at this time, what else can we then do? We must wait for the time to play that card, not do it prematurely.”