Reagan: The Life

by H. W. Brands

  The rescue proved unnecessary after the hijackers ordered the ship to Port Said, where they surrendered themselves to Egyptian authorities in exchange for a pledge of safe conduct to a friendly country. Reagan recounted the events in his diary: “Word came that the Italian liner had returned to Port Said—the hijackers were taken by the Egyptians who turned them over to the P.L.O. who took them out of Egypt. They were only four in number but then we learned they had killed an American—a 69-year-old man in a wheel chair. So we never had a chance to launch our rescue attack. The hostages minus one are on their way home.”

  The murder of the American, Leon Klinghoffer, infuriated Reagan, and he refused to be bound by the Egyptian government’s safe-conduct pledge. He ordered the navy into action. “The big news was that our Navy F-14s had intercepted the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers and forced them down on Sicily—the NATO base in Sigonella,” he wrote on October 11. “Americans as well as friends abroad are standing six inches taller. We’re flooded with wires and calls.” Reagan worked the levers of diplomacy to try to get his hands on the hijackers. “There were other kinds of calls half the night, such as my call to Prime Minister Craxi of Italy asking that we be allowed to fly the four to the U.S. for prosecution here. He explained that he didn’t have the authority—Italian magistrates are independent of the government. Well, the upshot is, Italy will prosecute but we are putting in an extradition request just in case.”

  Reagan was willing to endure criticism from the Arab world for his affront to international law in waylaying the Egyptian plane. “Mubarak is offended and called our act piracy,” he wrote. “I think he’s playing to his own audience. The Egyptian people are partial to the PLO.” If anything, Reagan relished the harsh words. “I called Mrs. Klinghoffer,” he wrote two days later. “She and some other passengers had a stop in Rome to identify the hijackers. She told me I’m really hated by them, that every few minutes during the ordeal on ship they were sounding off about me.”

  THE CONTINUED CAPTIVITY of most of the hostages in Lebanon following the initial delivery of arms to Iran inspired McFarlane and his staff to try again. This time the Iranians wanted HAWK antiaircraft missiles, and McFarlane endorsed the request. He judged that Reagan’s previous approval of the TOW missiles would extend to the HAWKs, and he simply informed the president that a shipment from Israel was going forward, rather than asking for fresh authorization.

  Reagan didn’t object. Following a November 22 meeting of the NSC, he wrote, “Subject was our hostages in Beirut. We have an undercover thing going by way of an Iranian which could get them sprung momentarily.” The next day he observed, “We’re still sweating out our undercover effort to get hostages out of Beirut.”

  The second arms delivery was even less successful than the first. This time no hostages came home. McFarlane grew discouraged and told Reagan he wanted to resign. Reagan didn’t try to dissuade him. McFarlane’s last NSC meeting was on December 5. “Subject was our undercover effort to free our five hostages held by terrorists in Lebanon,” Reagan wrote. “It is a complex undertaking with only a few of us in on it. I won’t even write in the diary what we’re up to.”

  What the administration was up to was more bartering of arms for hostages. By this time Oliver North, the NSC staffer who was taking the lead on implementing the policy, had reduced the initiative to a formula:

  H-hr: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT

  H+10hrs: 1 707 (same A/C) w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT

  H+16hrs: 1 747 w/50 HAWKs & 400 TOWs = 2 AMCITs

  H+20hrs: 1 707 w/300 TOWs = 1 AMCIT

  H+24hrs: 1 747 w/2000 TOWs = French hostage

  The 707 and 747 were the transporting planes; the AMCITs were American citizens.

  North, unlike McFarlane, refused to be discouraged by the meager results to date. The administration must press forward, he argued, lest the hostages be in greater danger. “We are now so far down the road that stopping what has been started could have even more serious repercussions,” he wrote to John Poindexter, currently McFarlane’s deputy. “If we do not make at least one more try at this point, we stand a good chance of condemning some or all to death.”

  Reagan responded to this argument much as he had to previous arguments for sending weapons to Iran. “The president was profoundly concerned for the hostages,” McFarlane recalled of a White House meeting at which the new danger to the hostages formed a central part of the discussion. John Poindexter remembered the president weighing the hazards of going ahead but concluding, “I don’t think I could forgive myself if we didn’t try.” Reagan added, “If it becomes public, I think I can defend it, but it will be like answering the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.”

  The initiative went forward. In January 1986, Reagan described the program in greater detail than he had previously confided to his diary. “This was a day spent on two issues,” he wrote on January 7. “One was Qaddafi (Libya), and the other our five hostages in Lebanon.” Reagan vented against Qaddafi before continuing: “The other issue is a highly secret convoluted process that sees Israel freeing some 20 Hezbollahs who aren’t really guilty of any blood letting. At the same time they sell Iran some ‘Tow’ anti-tank weapons. We in turn sell Israel replacements and the Hezbollah free our five hostages. Iran also pledges there will be no more kidnappings. We sit quietly by and never reveal how we got them back.”

  The process turned out to be too convoluted for the Israelis, who recommended streamlining. Prime Minister Shimon Peres feared that Iran was losing its war with Iraq, and he urged the Americans to sell weapons directly to Iran. This appealed to John Poindexter, who had succeeded McFarlane as national security adviser. On January 17, 1986, Poindexter sent Reagan a memo outlining the Israeli plan, along with a draft presidential finding authorizing the direct sales. “Some time ago Attorney General William French Smith determined that under an appropriate finding you could authorize the CIA to sell arms to countries outside the provisions of the laws and reporting requirements for foreign military sales,” Poindexter wrote in his memo. “The objectives of the Israeli plan could be met if the CIA, using an authorized agent as necessary, purchased arms from the Defense Department under the Economy Act and then transferred them to Iran directly after receiving appropriate payment from Iran. The Covert Action Finding attached at Tab A provides the latitude for the transactions indicated above to proceed.” The finding itself declared, “The USG”—United States government—“will act to facilitate efforts by third parties and third countries to establish contact with moderate elements within and outside the Government of Iran by providing these elements with arms, equipment and related materiel.” A previous finding had authorized aid to third countries; this version added the “third parties,” understood to be private intermediaries.

  Poindexter’s memo and the presidential finding nodded to the idea of a strategic opening to Iran, but Reagan read them in terms of the hostages and what it would take to release them. He wrote in his diary that night, “Only thing waiting was NSC wanting decisions on our effort to get our five hostages out of Lebanon. Involves selling TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran. I gave a go ahead.”

  One thousand TOW missiles were delivered to Iran in February under the terms of the new finding. But no hostages were released. The Iranians instead kept the Americans dangling. “This morning more word about the possibility of getting our hostages out of Lebanon,” Reagan wrote in his diary on February 28, a Friday. “This has been a long tragic time for the families. We are supposed to know by next Thursday.”

  Thursday came and went. March came and went, and April and most of May. “We still don’t know whether our hostages will be freed,” Reagan wrote on May 27. Robert McFarlane, though no longer national security adviser, continued to pursue the Iran initiative for the president. He had traveled to Tehran in an effort to untangle things and was now reporting in. “Bud’s call revealed that two of the Iranians who had involved us were on the phony side,” Reagan wrote. “Ho
wever through them Bud was put in touch with a rep. from the P.M.’s office. Outrageous demands were made by the Hezbollahs such as Israel must leave the Golan Heights and South Lebanon. Kuwait must free the convicted murderers they’ve tried and imprisoned etc. Bud said no dice so they got back to the original price—sale of some weaponry. Now we’ll know possibly in the next 48 hours.”

  Later that day, Reagan added to his diary entry. “Another call from Bud in Iran,” he wrote. “Again they tried to exact some outrageous terms—delivery of the weapons and spare parts before release of the hostages. Bud told them deal was off. They backed down and said we had a deal, but they’d have to get through to the Hezbollah in Beirut. Bud thinks Iran, conscious of the Soviet forces on their border and their own lack of competence, want a long term relationship with us and this could be what’s behind their negotiations. Now we wait some more.” McFarlane was still thinking strategically, but Reagan remained focused on the hostages and the price of their release. “The deal is the plane carrying the material takes off from Tel Aviv. If at the end of three hours we have not received the hostages, we signal the plane to turn back.”

  “And that’s just what we did,” Reagan wrote the next day. “Signal the plane to turn back after over one-half hour. It seems the rug merchants said the Hezbollah would only agree to two hostages. Bud told them to shove it, went to the airport and left for Tel Aviv. This was a heartbreaking disappointment for all of us.”

  But neither McFarlane nor Reagan could walk away from the bargaining table. The Iranians, perhaps sensing the president’s desperation, lowered their offer. In exchange for spare parts for HAWK missiles and additional TOWs, they would arrange the release of one hostage. McFar lane accepted the deal. Reagan was relieved and encouraged. “Saturday good word: one of our hostages—Father Jenco—was released in Lebanon and turned over to the Syrians,” he wrote in his diary for July 26. “The release of Jenco is a delayed step in a plan we’ve been working on for months. It gives us hope the rest of the plan will take place. We’d about given up on this.”

  Reagan’s relief turned to pleasure when he met Jenco and his family. “The high spot of the day: the arrival of Father Martin Jenco, just released by the Hezbollahs in Beirut after being a hostage 19 months,” the president wrote on August 1. “His family were all with him and it was an emotional experience.”

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  DURING THE SAME months when he was wrestling with Iran over the hostages, Reagan was battling Congress over the contras. The discovery of the CIA’s mining of Nicaraguan harbors had produced another Boland amendment, the most restrictive yet. “No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual,” the amendment declared, seemingly categorically.

  Yet Reagan refused to be deterred. He judged the Boland restrictions wrongheaded and dangerous to American security, and he mounted a counteroffensive. Regional negotiations begun on Contadora Island in Panama had yielded little so far, but the administration watched them closely. The president’s stated desire for peace in Central America required him to express support for the Contadora negotiations, if only to mollify skeptics in Congress. But he and his team had serious reservations as to what the negotiations might produce. The last thing Reagan wanted was a regional agreement that afforded the Sandinistas international legitimacy.

  During the spring of 1985, Reagan publicly embraced the Contadora process as part of a strategy to secure new funding for the contras. “In NSC we’re putting together an idea for trying to frame our spending request to Congress for the Contras in Nicaragua in connection with peace proposals,” Reagan wrote in his diary that April. “I don’t believe the Dem. House will vote us the money just on a straight up or down basis.” He expected a struggle. “Tip O’Neill and his cohorts are already bad-mouthing the idea,” Reagan continued. “Indeed Tip sounds irrational.” He thought the House speaker was waging a personal vendetta against him. “Tip has engineered a partisan campaign to hand me a defeat—never mind if it helps make another Cuba on the American mainland.” Reagan chafed at the restrictions the legislature was putting on his ability to conduct diplomacy. He offered another plea for aid to the contras, couching their cause in terms of American obligation. “The United States has a clear, undeniable moral imperative not to abandon those brave men and women in their fight to establish democracy and respect for human rights in Nicaragua,” he told the lawmakers. But O’Neill and the Democrats wouldn’t budge. “Met with Repub. Leadership—House and Senate,” he wrote in May. “I got a little ticked off and told them I was tired of foreign policy by a committee of 535.”

  Reagan’s frustration prompted him to look elsewhere for contra funding. “Over to EOB”—the Executive Office Building—“to address about 150 presidents of major Jewish organizations,” he wrote in his diary in March 1986. “Subject Nicaragua. Very well received.” A few days later he recounted, “Over to EOB for a pitch on Nicaragua to an overflow crowd of leaders of a number of supporting organizations.” At first Reagan asked simply for political help: paid advertisements and other forms of pressure on Congress to reopen the funding pipeline. But when the legislature continued to balk, he requested aid for the contras themselves. “Over to the Mayflower Hotel to the CSIS”—Center for Strategic and International Studies—“conference,” he wrote in June. “I made a strong pitch for aid to the Contras and was well received.” A week later: “Over to EOB to speak to 200 reps of various groups who are all gung ho for our effort to help the Contras in Nicaragua.”

  Meanwhile, the president solicited money for the contras from friendly foreign governments. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia visited Washington to discuss the Middle East; Reagan was happy to oblige, but he brought up another subject as well. “We talked of our Mideast peace plan,” the president recorded. “He is agreeable to backing King Hussein and I think he sees merit in our proposals. He’s also going to increase the funding he is secretly giving the Contras in Nicaragua.”

  The question of contra funding prompted a special meeting of the National Security Planning Group. Reagan expressed his concern about the Contadora negotiations and made clear he would oppose any settlement that left the Sandinista status quo in place. “We will not agree or settle for any agreement which does not provide for democracy in Nicaragua,” the president told the planning group. “The main point of any settlement has to be to go back to the day the revolution against Somoza ended and enable the Nicaraguan people to decide what kind of government they want.”

  John Poindexter observed that the administration trod a narrow line on the Contadora negotiations. “We have a dilemma,” he explained. “For there to be any chance of getting money for the contras, we need a negotiating track. But there is no guarantee we won’t get an agreement which we don’t want.”

  Caspar Weinberger preferred to have nothing to do with any Contadora agreement, which would remove what little leverage the administration had with Congress. “We just have to make sure that the negotiations do not get out of our control,” Weinberger said. “We need to prevent them”—the Contadora negotiators—“signing an agreement or we will never get anything out of Congress.”

  George Shultz remarked that the administration wasn’t getting anything from Congress as matters stood. The contras were at grave risk. “If we don’t get money for the freedom fighters, they will be out of business,” Shultz said. Some members of the administration were advocating efforts to persuade the relevant committees in Congress to redirect to the contras funds appropriated for other purposes. Shultz dismissed this idea as inane. “It’s breathtaking in improbability,” he said. “It would be better to go to other countries.”

  Weinberger agreed that the administration should solicit
funds from other countries, but he wasn’t ready to give up on Congress. “Try everything,” the defense secretary said. “We should try every country we can find, the committees and the people of the United States. If the contras are out of business in July, we will have to fight there ourselves some day.”

  Oliver North attended this meeting as an aide to Poindexter and seconded Shultz’s suggestion. “The fiscal year 1986 intelligence authorization bill permits the State Department to approach other countries for non-military aid,” North said.

  “Haven’t we approached other countries?” William Casey asked.

  “We have, but not with much success,” Shultz replied.

  “But until now we have not involved the president,” Casey answered. “The Saudis, Israelis, South Koreans, Taiwanese all have some interest,” he said.

  The meeting ended with nothing decided and nothing said about the support the Saudis had already provided to the contras.

  Neither did North share that he had devised a separate method for funding the contras. After the February delivery of TOW missiles to Iran, North had taken between $3 million and $4 million from the proceeds and placed it in an account from which the contras could draw. Two months later he sought authorization to continue the diversion. He drafted a memo for Poindexter describing the Iran enterprise and explaining how the profits from the sale of weapons might be disbursed. “$12 million will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance Forces,” North wrote. At the end of the memo North included a recommendation: “That the President approve the structure depicted above.”

  Poindexter later testified that he couldn’t recall receiving this memo. He said he had directed North not to put anything in writing about the diversion of funds to the contras. North denied receiving this direction. Poindexter nonetheless admitted knowing about the scheme, if only in outline. “I had a feeling that something bad was going on, but I didn’t investigate it and I didn’t do a thing about it,” he told Donald Regan after the story broke, according to Regan’s recollection. “I really didn’t want to know. I was so damned mad at Tip O’Neill for the way he was dragging the contras around I didn’t want to know what, if anything, was going on. I should have, but I didn’t.” Poindexter told Ed Meese much the same thing. “He said that he did know about it,” Meese recounted. “Ollie North had given him enough hints that he knew what was going on, but he didn’t want to look further into it. But that he in fact did generally know that money had gone to the contras as a result of the Iran shipment.”