Reagan: The Life

by H. W. Brands

  Reagan didn’t consider SDI a joking matter. His smile was gone. “What the hell use will ABMs or anything else be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” he demanded.

  “Mr. President, you just made a historic statement: What the hell use will SDI be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” Gorbachev responded. “But it is exactly because we are moving toward a reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons that I favor strengthening the ABM Treaty. In these conditions it becomes even more important.”

  Reagan tried another tack. “I am the oldest man here,” he said. “And I understand that after the war the nations decided that they would renounce poison gas. But thank God that the gas mask continued to exist. Something similar can happen with nuclear weapons. And we will have a shield against them in any case.”

  “I am increasingly convinced of something I knew previously only second-hand,” Gorbachev said. “The president of the United States does not like to retreat. I see now that you do not want to meet us halfway on the issue of the ABM Treaty, which is absolutely essential in conditions where we are undertaking large reductions in nuclear arms.”

  He paused, wearily. “I see that the possibilities of agreement are exhausted,” he said. He had gone as far as he could. “I think we can conclude our meeting with this.” The two of them had not achieved the results he had hoped for, results the world had hoped for. “But we must take account of the realities. And the reality is that we are unable to work out agreed-upon proposals on these issues. You and I talked about the possibility of major reductions in nuclear weapons, but if the fate of the ABM Treaty is unclear, then the entire conception collapses and we return to the situation that existed before Reykjavik.”

  He reflected. “Perhaps you will report this to Congress,” he said. “We will report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. I do not think the world will stop. Events will unfold, and neither will our relations stop. But we will not succeed in taking advantage of the present opportunity.”

  Reagan hadn’t given in, but he wasn’t ready to give up. “Can we go away from here with nothing?” he asked.

  “Unfortunately, we can,” Gorbachev replied stolidly.

  The foreign ministers, Shultz and Shevardnadze, reminded their bosses that they had to issue a communiqué. They exchanged phrases, seeking language that wasn’t entirely negative.

  Gorbachev grew impatient. “Well, Mr. President,” he said, “ ‘X hour’ is approaching. What are you going to do?”

  Shultz jumped ahead of Reagan. He said he had some phrasing that might suit both sides. He started reading.

  Gorbachev cut him off after only a few words. “That is not acceptable to us,” he said. But he said he was willing to let Shultz try again, at greater length. “Maybe, if the president does not object, we will declare a break for one or two hours,” he said.

  Reagan nodded, and the two sides recessed.

  91

  NOT FOR YEARS had Reagan worked this intensely and long. He was nearly exhausted. He had been counting on being back at the White House for Sunday dinner with Nancy. But he realized he and Gorbachev stood at the brink of one of the great decisions in world history. If they could bridge the gap between them on SDI, they might put the planet on a path to a post-nuclear age. Future generations would thank and revere them. He couldn’t leave Iceland without one more try.

  The American offer at this point, as sharpened by Shultz with Reagan’s approval, was that the two countries would abide for five years by the ABM Treaty’s provisions for research, development, and testing. During this time they would reduce their strategic offensive arsenals by 50 percent. During the next five years they would continue to reduce their offensive ballistic arsenals, with the goal of total elimination by the ten-year mark. As long as the reductions proceeded, the two sides would adhere to the ABM Treaty. After the ten years, assuming all offensive ballistic missiles had been eliminated, both sides could deploy strategic defenses if they wished.

  Gorbachev opened the afternoon session with his counterproposal. He agreed to the two five-year reductions of offensive ballistic missiles. And he liked the ten-year adherence to the ABM Treaty, although he wanted it embraced at the outset, without the dual five-year formula proposed by the Americans. Yet he continued to insist that research and testing of strategic defense technologies be confined to laboratories. Testing in the field must wait until the end of the ten-year period.

  Reagan responded indirectly. “Our position offers a somewhat differ ent formulation,” he said. “I hope we can eliminate the difference in the course of our talks.” He repeated the proposal Shultz had crafted.

  Gorbachev answered that there were definitely differences between the two positions. “Your formula, as I see it, fails to meet our position halfway,” he said. “The main aspect of the Soviet Union’s approach is that in the period in which the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are carrying out deep reductions in nuclear weapons, we ought to reinforce instead of impairing or undermining the ABM Treaty.” The president’s attachment to SDI would have the latter effect. Gorbachev said he was asking no more than was entirely within the spirit of the ABM Treaty. “What we are talking about primarily is the renunciation of testing any space components of ABM defense in space—that is, refraining from any steps which would in effect pave the way to deployment of such systems. I want to emphasize once more that what is prohibited according to our formula does not affect laboratory testing and leaves open the possibility for the American side, like the Soviet side, to conduct any laboratory research relating to space, including SDI research. We are not undermining your idea of SDI; we are permitting that kind of activity, which is already being conducted by the United States and which is impossible to monitor anyway. We are only placing the system in the framework of laboratory research.” Gorbachev said he wasn’t asking any more than was reasonable. “I think the U.S. could go along with this, especially considering the major steps the Soviet Union has made.”

  Reagan shook his head. “That doesn’t remove the question of what we are to do after ten years if we should want to create a defense against ballistic missiles,” he said. He couldn’t fathom Gorbachev’s stubbornness on strategic defense. “I just don’t understand why you object so much to SDI,” he said. He added, “As for what the ABM Treaty prohibits and what it permits, the two sides have differences of interpretation here.”

  Gorbachev was mystified, too, but by Reagan’s attachment to SDI. Yet his proposal granted much of what the president sought. “As you see, we are offering a broad formula of what we can do after the ten years,” Gorbachev said. “If you should deem it essential to continue SDI, we can discuss that. And so why deal with the question in advance, right now? And why force us to sign SDI? Perhaps we might have other interests.”

  Reagan stood firm. “We want right now to provide for the possibility of defense in case, ten years from now, when we no longer have missiles, someone should decide to re-create nuclear missiles,” he said.

  Gorbachev asked Reagan to focus on what the two sides had agreed on and what it would allow them to do. “We will be able to accomplish the historic task of eliminating strategic offensive weapons,” he said. He continued, “Why complicate things with other problems which we are uncertain about, the consequences of which are unclear? It would only undermine one side’s confidence in whether it was acting correctly by reducing its nuclear forces under conditions where the other side is taking steps which could have aggravating consequences for the entire process.” Gorbachev reiterated that SDI was not being eliminated. “The scientific-technical aspect of SDI could still continue, your capability in that sphere. The decision would by no means sound the death knell for your SDI program.”

  Reagan defended America’s pro-SDI interpretation of the ABM Treaty. “We are only proposing such research, development and testing as are permitted by the ABM Treaty,” he said. He wondered aloud if there was more to the Soviet resistance than Gorbachev was admitting. “What objection can there be unless som
ething is being hidden?” He repeated yet again his willingness to share SDI technology. “We will make it available to the Soviet side if it wants it.” Reagan added that if either side had reason to worry about strategic defense, it was the United States. “If the Soviets feel that strongly about strengthening the ABM Treaty, why don’t they get rid of Krasnoyarsk”—where the Soviets had built a radar system the American government deemed in violation of the ABM Treaty—“and the whole defense structure they have built around their capital? They have a big defense structure and we have none. It is a peculiar fact that we do not have a single defense against a nuclear attack.”

  Gorbachev ignored the allegation. “I still wish you would carefully examine our proposal,” he said. “It encompasses elements of both your and our proposals. If it is acceptable I am ready to sign it.”

  George Shultz intervened. “Would you please give us this formula in printed form in English so that we can examine it carefully?” the secretary of state asked.

  Gorbachev nodded. Trying yet again to convince Reagan, he said, “You are proposing SDI. To us, that option is unacceptable. We want to keep the possibility of finding something different. Hence our formula makes it possible to take account of the situation in the future, after the ten years. Summing up our proposal, let me emphasize that the two sides will strictly comply with the ABM Treaty for ten years and will pledge not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty. Simultaneously they will continue laboratory research. After the ten-year period, under condi tions of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the two sides will get together and decide what to do next and come to an agreement.” Gorbachev paused. “I don’t understand what bothers you about that.”

  Reagan answered with a query of his own. “If we have eliminated all nuclear weapons, why should you be worried by the desire of one of the sides to make itself safe—just in case—from weapons which neither of us has anymore? Someone else could create missiles, and extra guarantees would be appropriate. Your side and our side are completely eliminating our weapons. I can imagine us both in ten years getting together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and American missiles under triumphant circumstances. By then I’ll be so old that you won’t even recognize me. And you will ask in surprise, ‘Hey Ron, is that really you? What are you doing here?’ And we’ll have a big celebration over it.”

  Gorbachev was beyond being amused. “I don’t know whether I’ll live till that time,” he said.

  “Well, I’m certain I will,” Reagan said.

  “Sure you will,” Gorbachev said. “You’ve passed the dangerous age for men, and now you have smooth sailing to be a hundred. But these dangers still lie ahead for me. For a man they come by the age of sixty, and besides, I still have to meet with President Reagan, who I can see really hates to give in. President Reagan wants to be the winner. But in this case, on these matters, there can be no winner—either we both win or we both lose. We’re in the same boat.”

  Reagan’s sense of humor was fraying too. “I know I won’t live to be a hundred if I have to live in fear of these damned missiles,” he said.

  “Well, let’s reduce and eliminate them,” Gorbachev said.

  “This is a rather strange situation,” Reagan said. “We have both put forth specific demands. You are in favor of a ten-year period. I have said that I will not give up SDI. But both of us, obviously, can say that the most important thing is to eliminate nuclear missiles.”

  “But you wouldn’t have to give up SDI,” Gorbachev objected, “because laboratory research and testing would not be prohibited. And so you could continue activities within the framework of the SDI program. Your opponents won’t even be able to open their mouths, especially under conditions where we have eliminated nuclear weapons. Anyway, I am categorically against any situation where our meeting results in one winner and one loser. Even if this did happen now, in the next stage, in the process of preparing the text of agreements, it would make itself felt and the loser would act in such a manner that everything would end up destroyed. Therefore equality is essential both at the present stage and in the next. After all, considerable time will pass between the achievement of agreements and the final ratification of the agreements. And only if the document accommodates the interests of the U.S. and the interests of the U.S.S.R. will it merit ratification and support.”

  Reagan tried a different approach. “Perhaps we can resolve the matter this way,” he said. “The question of what research, development and testing are permitted by the ABM Treaty should remain for discussion and negotiation at the meeting in the course of your visit”—to Washington. “We will come to an agreement regarding the ten-year period and breaking it down into two five-year periods, in the course of which nuclear weapons will be eliminated, while everything having to do with testing, laboratory research and the provisions of the ABM Treaty and so on are things we can discuss at the summit meeting.”

  “But without that there’s no package,” Gorbachev objected. “All of these issues are interconnected. If we come to an agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, we will have to have assurance, guarantees, that the ABM Treaty will not only be complied with but also strengthened in the course of this crucial period, this historic period when strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated. I repeat, this period is too crucial; it is dangerous to improvise.” He added, “I am convinced that preserving the ABM Treaty is also consistent with the interests of the U.S.”

  Reagan’s fatigue and frustration grew more obvious. “It looks like we’re not getting anywhere,” he said. He reiterated his inability to understand why Gorbachev was so worried about what would happen in ten years, when all strategic missiles would have been eliminated. “Perhaps we ought to take another look at what we disagree about.”

  George Shultz again intervened. “It seems to me there are two differences between us,” he said. “First, what to consider to be permissible research in the course of the ten-year period. Second, it seems to me the Soviet side has in mind an indefinitely long period during which we will not be able to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We have in mind ten years.”

  “No,” Gorbachev said. “We need absolute clarity here. We believe that in the stage in which we are undertaking actual reductions in nuclear weapons the ABM Treaty needs to be made stronger, not made weaker. Over the period of ten years the two sides will refrain from exercising the right to withdraw from the treaty. After those ten years, we will see. Perhaps we will continue to comply with the treaty. Perhaps some new elements will emerge. But for the period of ten years the treaty must be preserved, in fact made stronger.”

  “In other words,” Shultz said, “for ten years the two sides will not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty. After the ten years, this aspect will be gone. Then the sides can exercise that right.”

  Now Eduard Shevardnadze stepped in. “Let me remind you, moreover, that research will not be restricted, but it can only be conducted in the laboratory,” he said.

  Gorbachev urged Reagan to do what he himself had done in Geneva. “Mr. President,” he said, “I remember how things went in Geneva. You and I were sitting in a room drinking coffee, we were in a good mood and we thought we were going to succeed. Secretary of State Shultz came in and told us how things stood. He said that the Soviet delegation would not give its consent to an agreement with respect to certain questions. And then you said to me, ‘Pound the table and order your people to come to an agreement!’ I went out and in fifteen minutes the agreement had been reached. If we take a break now, and if you achieve agreement in ten minutes, you can consider it another victory for you.”

  Before Reagan could respond, Shultz asked for additional clarification. At times Gorbachev had spoken of the elimination of ballistic missiles, at times of strategic offensive weapons, at times of nuclear weapons generally. What precisely did the general secretary have in mind?

  “The weapons to be eliminated would include all components of the triad,” Gor
bachev said. “Missiles, including heavy missiles; submarine missiles; and bombers.”

  Shultz explained that the American proposal dealt with offensive ballistic missiles. “These missiles include not only strategic missiles”—long-range missiles—“but also, for example, intermediate-range missiles and others. What you are talking about are strategic offensive weapons. That is a different category of weapons.”

  Gorbachev’s impatience with details surfaced once more. “I thought that yesterday we had offered, and you had agreed to, an option which calls for a fifty-percent reduction of the entire triad of strategic weapons, including missiles like the SS-18 that you are so worried about,” he said. “That option did not come easy to us. But we went along with it in order not to get bogged down in a swamp of levels, sublevels and so on. So let’s agree that in this case, again, we’re talking not only about missiles but about all strategic offensive weapons.”

  Everyone was exhausted by now. The clock showed 4:30. Reagan wanted to board his plane and head back toward Washington and Nancy. But he could see that Gorbachev was tired too, and he knew from his union days that fatigue could be the deal maker’s friend.

  Perhaps Gorbachev was thinking something similar. Surely he could outlast the old man across the table.

  They agreed to another recess.

  92

  THE DISTANCE BETWEEN the two sides was heartbreakingly small. Gorbachev wanted testing on SDI to be confined to the laboratory for ten years; Reagan refused the constraint. What made the heartbreak the more excruciating was that the distance was almost wholly political. No one had shown Reagan evidence that SDI would be ready to emerge from the laboratory before Gorbachev’s ten years had expired. He was standing on principle, but the principle had little to do with the technology. He just couldn’t be seen as giving ground on SDI.