Reagan: The Life

by H. W. Brands

  DON REGAN DIDN’T think the problem was so easily resolved. He recognized that the arms-to-Iran story hadn’t emerged out of thin air, and he guessed that it couldn’t be waved away. He urged the president to get ahead of the story by telling everything he knew about it.

  The problem was that Regan didn’t know how much Reagan knew. He could only guess at the extent of the president’s knowledge of the alleged arms-for-hostages deal. As chief of staff, Regan theoretically controlled the flow of information to and from the Oval Office. Theory and practice meshed closely in domestic affairs, but foreign policy often frustrated his efforts to keep on top of things. The national security adviser reported directly to the president; Robert McFarlane and then John Poindexter briefed Regan only intermittently on what they told Reagan and what he told them.

  Regan nonetheless believed the president had to face the press. Before Reagan left for Camp David, Regan repeated his advice about telling all.

  Reagan again resisted. “Don, you heard what Jacobsen said,” he explained. “I can’t talk.”

  “Mr. President, I don’t care,” Regan replied. “We’re between the devil and the deep and it’s not going to help things to maintain silence. If these hostages don’t materialize soon, you’re going to have to speak up. You’re going to be ripped apart on the weekend talk shows. The Monday morning papers will pick it up. The American people are going to start demanding to know what’s going on here.”

  Reagan still refused. But he said he would reconsider on Monday after he returned from Camp David. He flew to the presidential retreat, where he persisted in blaming the media. “The Saturday night and Sunday morning talk shows continued to hammer on the hostage and Iran arms story giving credence to every rumor and supposed leak,” he wrote. “They can do great harm with their irresponsible drum beating.”

  Don Regan hoped to enlist Nancy Reagan to help in persuading the president to go public. But she declined. “He’s not going to talk to the press,” she said. She added, according to Regan’s recounting, “My Friend says it’s, you know, it’s just wrong for him to talk right now.”

  Regan had bitten his tongue at the influence of Nancy’s astrologer in determining the president’s schedule, but this crossed the line into policy. Over the phone he exploded in frustration. “My God, Nancy,” he said. “He’s going to go down in flames if he doesn’t speak up.”

  On Monday, Reagan met with his national security team. “Subject: the press storm charging that we are negotiating with terrorist kidnappers for the release of hostages using sale of arms as ransom,” he recorded. “Also that we are violating our own law about arms sales to Iran. They”—the press—“quoted as gospel every unnamed source plus such authorities as a Danish sailor who claims to have served on a ship carrying arms from Israel to Iran, etc. etc. etc. I ordered a statement to effect we were not dealing in ransom, etc., but that we would not respond to charges or Q’s that could endanger hostage lives or lives of people we were using to make contact with the terrorists.”

  Reagan only reluctantly agreed to speak to the leaders of Congress in a private session. He told the lawmakers that the administration had indeed sent arms to Iran but merely in small amounts and not in exchange for hostages. Don Regan watched the visitors as the president spoke. “Some of those men were skeptical,” he recalled. “You could see it in their faces. But they had no choice but to accept what the president told them. Ronald Reagan had never lied to them (or in my experience, to anyone). And there is no question in my mind that he thought he was telling the truth.”

  Reagan sensed the skepticism as well. He wasn’t used to having his integrity impugned. He decided that the only way to resolve the matter was to take his case to the American people. “This whole irresponsible press bilge about hostages and Iran has gotten totally out of hand,” he wrote to himself. “The media looks like it’s trying to create another Watergate. I laid down the law in the morning meetings—I want to go public and tell the people the truth.”

  TEN DAYS AFTER the story surfaced, the president addressed the American people from the Oval Office. He dispensed with the typical opening joke, though he allowed himself a jab at the media. “I know you’ve been reading, seeing, and hearing a lot of stories the past several days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers at Italian ports and Spanish harbors, and especially unnamed government officials of my administration. Well, now you’re going to hear the facts from a White House source, and you know my name.”

  His television audience had never seen him more serious. “I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy,” he said. “For eighteen months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages.” Iran’s cooperation was crucial to achieving these goals.

  He went straight to the most damning allegation. “The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists.” He let the charge hang in the air for a moment, and then, looking straight in the camera, he said, “Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not.”

  Yet some things needed to be explained. “During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran,” Reagan said. “My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship.” But the shipments were no more than a gesture. “These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the six-year war between Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries.”

  As for the hostages: “At the same time we undertook this initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there.”

  The initiative had borne fruit. “Some progress has already been made,” Reagan said. “Since U.S. government contact began with Iran, there’s been no evidence of Iranian government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking.”

  Reagan emphasized Iran’s strategic significance. “It lies between the Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean,” he said. “Iran’s geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with oil flows from the Arab States that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran’s oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy.” For these reasons, the United States had to establish a dialogue with Iran. He likened Iran to China in the early 1970s, and his secret policy to that of Richard Nixon. “In 1971 then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensitivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage.”

  Reagan offered greater detail about his Iranian initiative. “Our discussions continued into the spring of this year,” he said. “Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to rais
e the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialogue, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements. The four days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion, and American personnel were not mistreated.” The dialogue had continued since then, and progress continued to be made. The release of David Jacobsen was the latest sign.

  Reagan reiterated that Jacobsen’s release had nothing to do with the arms shipments. “We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we.” The Iran initiative did not signal an easing of American policy toward terrorism. “Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Qaddafi. We have not, nor will we, capitulate to terrorists.” And the ini tiative violated no laws. “The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with federal law.”

  Reagan appealed to Americans’ good sense. “As president, I’ve always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now. I cannot guarantee the outcome. But as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism.”

  GEORGE SHULTZ WATCHED Reagan’s address with mounting dismay. “The president’s speech convinced me that Ronald Reagan still truly did not believe that what had happened had, in fact, happened,” Shultz recalled. The secretary of state had gradually realized that his and Caspar Weinberger’s strong opposition had not spiked the Iran initiative. John Poindexter had kept the details from him, but Shultz divined enough to conclude that it was a disastrously conceived arms-for-hostages deal.

  Yet Poindexter had managed to persuade the president otherwise, Shultz observed. “What had been going on here was a staff con job on the president, playing on his very human desire to get the hostages released. They told the president what they wanted him to know and what they saw he wanted to hear, and they dressed it up in ‘geostrategic’ costume.” The con job worked all too well. “So what Reagan said to the American public was true to him, although it was not the reality.”

  Shultz was hardly alone in finding Reagan’s explanation incredible. A Los Angeles Times poll revealed that a scant 14 percent of respondents thought the president was telling the truth about the Iran initiative. By a margin of three to one they rejected his claim that the administration did not negotiate with terrorists. Only one in five respondents believed Reagan’s claim that his administration had not violated federal laws in sending weapons to Iran.

  Shultz was sorely tempted to resign. By office he was the president’s right arm for foreign affairs, but Reagan had rejected his advice in favor of that of Poindexter. He wanted to be a good soldier and support the president’s policies, but he was convinced Reagan didn’t know what policies Poindexter was making in his name. And Shultz refused to cover for Poindexter.

  He agreed to appear on Face the Nation but soon wished he hadn’t. Host Lesley Stahl asked an obvious question: “Will there be any more arms shipments to Iran, either directly by our government or through any third parties?”

  “It’s certainly against our policy,” Shultz responded.

  “That’s not an answer,” Stahl observed. “Why don’t you answer the question directly? I’ll ask it again. Will there be any more arms shipments to Iran, either directly by the United States or through any third parties?”

  “Under the circumstances of Iran’s war with Iraq, its pursuit of terrorism, its association with those holding our hostages, I would certainly say, as far as I’m concerned, no,” Shultz replied.

  “Do you have the authority to speak for the entire administration?” Stahl pressed.

  “No,” Shultz said, reddening with anger and embarrassment.

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  REAGAN, PRESUMABLY, SPOKE for the administration. The president observed the mounting skepticism and realized he had to answer the questions himself. He called a news conference. “Eighteen months ago, as I said last Thursday, this administration began a secret initiative to the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an opening statement. “Our purposes were fourfold: to replace a relationship of total hostility with something better, to bring a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war, to bring an end to terrorism and to effect the release of our hostages.” Reagan said he had recognized that the initiative entailed great risks for both the American hostages and the administration’s Iranian interlocutors. “That’s why the information was restricted to appropriate cabinet officers and those officials with an absolute need to know.” For the first time the president acknowledged the dissent among his advisers. “This undertaking was a matter of considerable debate within administration circles,” he said. “The principal issue in contention was whether we should make isolated and limited exceptions to our arms embargo as a signal of our serious intent.” Reagan didn’t identify the disputants by name, but all the reporters and many of those watching the news conference on television understood that the prime objector was George Shultz. “Several top advisers opposed the sale of even a modest shipment of defensive weapons and spare parts to Iran. Others felt no progress could be made without this sale. I weighed their views. I considered the risks of failure and the rewards of success, and I decided to proceed. And the responsibility for the decision and the operation is mine and mine alone.” Reagan quoted Abraham Lincoln on controversial decisions: “If it turns out right, the criticism will not matter. If it turns out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right will make no difference.”

  Reagan refused to apologize for the course he had chosen. “I understand this decision is deeply controversial and that some profoundly disagree with what was done. Even some who support our secret initiative believe it was a mistake to send any weapons to Iran. I understand and I respect those views, but I deeply believe in the correctness of my decision. I was convinced then and I am convinced now that while the risks were great, so, too, was the potential reward. Bringing Iran back into the community of responsible nations, ending its participation in political terror, bringing an end to that terrible war, and bringing our hostages home—these are the causes that justify taking risks.”

  Reagan said he would continue to take risks to enhance American security. But his past policy toward Iran had become counterproductive on account of the heavy and often inaccurate media attention. And so it was being changed. “To eliminate the widespread but mistaken perception that we have been exchanging arms for hostages, I have directed that no further sales of arms of any kind be sent to Iran. I have further directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. There may be some questions which for reasons of national security or to protect the safety of the hostages I will be unable to answer publicly. But again, all information will be provided to the appropriate members of Congress.”

  He opened the floor to questions. Helen Thomas asked if he thought the credibility of his administration had suffered as a result of the recent revelations, coming soon after the swapping with the Soviets of Zakharov for Daniloff.

  Reagan denied, as he had before, that there was any trade of Zakharov for Daniloff. The premise of Thomas’s question was simply wrong. As for the Iran enterprise: “There was no deception intended by us. There was the knowledge that we were embarking on something that could be of great risk to the people we were talking to, great risk to our hostages. And therefore we had to have it limited to only the barest number of people that had to know.” In language that inadvertently conjured memories of Richard Nixon and Watergate, Reagan continued, “I was not breaking any law in doing that.” He explained, “I have the right under the law to defer reporting to Congress, to the proper congressional committees, on an action, and defer it until such time as I believe it can safely be done with no risk to o
thers.” He said the relevant congressional committees would receive briefings shortly. He added, as an afterthought to his Nixonesque denial of legal culpability, “We were not negotiating government to government. We were negotiating with certain individuals within that country.”

  Thomas followed up. “Are you prepared now to disavow the finding which let you make end runs around the Iranian arms embargo?” she asked. “Are you going to tear it up?”

  “No, as I say, we are going to observe that embargo,” he replied, somewhat confusingly. “And it’s part of the same reason that, as I’ve said, we were doing this in the first place: And that is to see, among the other issues involved, if we can help bring about peace between those two countries, a peace without victory to either one or defeat and that will recognize the territorial integrity of both. And this is something that all of our allies are seeking also. But I think the people understand that sometimes you have to keep a secret in order to save human lives and to succeed in the mission, just as we went into Grenada without prior notice, because then we would have put to risk all of those men who were going to hit the beach.”

  Another reporter asked about Shultz. Had the president and the secretary of state ever spoken about the latter’s resignation?

  “There’s been no talk of resignation,” Reagan said.

  Chris Wallace of NBC News wanted Reagan to resolve a seeming contradiction. “Mr. President, you have stated flatly, and you stated flatly again tonight, that you did not trade weapons for hostages. And yet the record shows that every time an American hostage was released—last September, this July, and again just this very month—there had been a major shipment of arms just before that. Are we all to believe that was just a coincidence?”

  Reagan sidestepped. “Chris, the only thing I know about major shipments of arms—as I’ve said, everything that we sold them could be put in one cargo plane, and there would be plenty of room left over. Now, if there were major shipments—and we know this has been going on—there have been other countries that have been dealing in arms with Iran. There have been also private merchants of such things that have been doing the same thing. Now, I’ve seen the stories about a Danish tramp steamer and Danish sailors’ union officials talking about their ships taking various supplies to Iran. I didn’t know anything about that until I saw the press on it, because we certainly never had any contact with anything of the kind. And so, it’s just that we did something for a particular mission. There was a risk entailed. And Iran held no hostages. Iran did not kidnap anyone, to our knowledge. And the fact that part of the operation was that we knew, however, that the kidnappers of our hostages did have some kind of relationship in which Iran could at times influence them—not always—but could influence them. And so three of our hostages came home.”