The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany

by William L. Shirer

  But Doenitz, who must have suspected the truth all along, for otherwise he would not have been at the dock to greet the returning U-30, did have a part in altering the submarine’s log and his own diary so as to erase any telltale evidence of the truth. In fact, as he admitted at Nuremberg, he himself ordered any mention of the Athenia stricken from the U-30’s log and deleted it from his own diary. He swore the vessel’s crew to absolute secrecy.†

  The military high commands of all nations no doubt have skeletons in their closets during the course of war, and it was understandable if not laudable that Hitler, as Admiral Raeder testified at Nuremberg, insisted that the Athenia affair be kept secret, especially since the Naval Command had acted in good faith in at first denying German responsibility and would have been greatly embarrassed to have to admit it later. But Hitler did not stop there. On the evening of Sunday, October 22, Propaganda Minister Goebbels personally took to the air—this writer well remembers the broadcast—and accused Churchill of having sunk the Athenia. The next day the official Nazi newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter, ran a frontpage story under the headline CHURCHILL SANK THE “ATHENIA” and stating that the First Lord of the Admiralty had planted a time bomb in the ship’s hold. At Nuremberg it was established that the Fuehrer had personally ordered the broadcast and the article—and also that though Raeder, Doenitz and Weizsaecker were highly displeased at such a brazen lie, they dared not do anything about it.13

  This spinelessness on the part of the admirals and the self-styled anti-Nazi leader in the Foreign Office, which was fully shared by the generals, whenever the demonic Nazi warlord cracked down, was to lead to one of the darkest pages in German history.

  HITLER PROPOSES PEACE

  “Tonight the press talks openly of peace,” I noted in my diary September 20. “All the Germans I’ve talked to today are dead sure we shall have peace within a month. They are in high spirits.”

  The afternoon before at the ornate Guild Hall in Danzig I had heard Hitler make his first speech since his Reichstag address of September 1 started off the war. Though he was in a rage because he had been balked from making this speech at Warsaw, whose garrison still gallantly held out, and dripped venom every time he mentioned Great Britain, he made a slight gesture toward peace. “I have no war aims against Britain and France,” he said. “My sympathies are with the French poilu. What he is fighting for he does not know.” And he called upon the Almighty, “who now has blessed our arms, to give other peoples comprehension of how useless this war will be … and to cause reflection on the blessings of peace.”

  On September 26, the day before Warsaw fell, the German press and radio launched a big peace offensive. The line, I recorded in my diary, was: “Why do France and Britain want to fight now? Nothing to fight about. Germany wants nothing in the West.”

  A couple of days later, Russia, fast devouring its share of Poland, joined in the peace offensive. Along with the signing of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, with its secret clauses dividing up Eastern Europe, Molotov and Ribbentrop concocted and signed at Moscow on September 28 a ringing declaration for peace.

  The governments of Germany and Russia, it said, after having

  definitely settled the problems arising from the disintegration of the Polish state and created a firm foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interests of all peoples to put an end to the state of war between Germany and England and France. Both governments will therefore direct their common efforts … toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.

  Should, however, the efforts of the two governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war …

  Did Hitler want peace, or did he want to continue the war and, with Soviet help, push the responsibility for its continuance on the Western Allies? Perhaps he did not quite know himself, although he was pretty certain.

  On September 26 he had a long talk with Dahlerus, who had by no means given up the quest for peace. Two days before, the indefatigable Swede had seen his old friend Ogilvie Forbes at Oslo, where the former counselor of the Berlin embassy was now serving in a similar capacity in the British Legation in the Norwegian capital. Dahlerus reported to Hitler, according to a confidential memorandum of Dr. Schmidt,14 that Forbes had told him the British government was looking for peace. The only question was: How could the British save face?

  “If the British actually want peace,” Hitler replied, “they can have it in two weeks—without losing face.”

  They would have to reconcile themselves, said the Fuehrer, to the fact “that Poland cannot rise again.” Beyond that he was prepared, he declared, to guarantee the status quo “of the rest of Europe,” including guarantees of the “security” of Britain, France and the Low Countries. There followed a discussion of how to launch the peace talks. Hitler suggested that Mussolini do it. Dahlerus thought the Queen of the Netherlands might be more “neutral.” Goering, who was also present, suggested that representatives of Britain and Germany first meet secretly in Holland and then, if they made progress, the Queen could invite both countries to armistice talks. Hitler, who several times professed himself as skeptical regarding “the British will to peace,” finally agreed to the Swede’s proposal that he “go to England the very next day in order to send out feelers in the direction indicated.”

  “The British can have peace if they want it,” Hitler told Dahlerus as he left, “but they will have to hurry.”

  That was one trend in the Fuehrer’s thinking. He expressed another to his generals. The day before, on September 25, an entry in Halder’s diary mentions receipt of “word on Fuehrer’s plan to attack in the West.” On September 27, the day after he had assured Dahlerus that he was ready to make peace with Britain, Hitler convoked the commanders in chief of the Wehrmacht to the Chancellery and informed them of his decision to “attack in the West as soon as possible, since the Franco–British army is not yet prepared.” According to Brauchitsch he even set a date for the attack: November 12.15 No doubt Hitler was fired that day by the news that Warsaw had finally capitulated. He probably thought that France, at least, could be brought to her knees as easily as Poland, though two days later Halder made a diary note to “explain” to the Fuehrer that “technique of Polish campaign no recipe for the West. No good against a well-knit army.”

  Perhaps Ciano penetrated Hitler’s mind best when he had a long talk with the Chancellor in Berlin on October 1. The young Italian Foreign Minister, who by now thoroughly detested the Germans but had to keep up appearances, found the Fuehrer in a confident mood. As he outlined his plans, his eyes “flashed in a sinister fashion whenever he talked about his ways and means of fighting,” Ciano observed. Summing up his impressions, the Italian visitor wrote:

  … Today to offer his people a solid peace after a great victory is perhaps an aim which still tempts Hitler. But if in order to reach it he had to sacrifice, even to the smallest degree, what seems to him the legitimate fruits of his victory, he would then a thousand times prefer battle.*16

  To me as I sat in the Reichstag beginning at noon on October 6 and listened to Hitler utter his appeal for peace, it seemed like an old gramophone record being replayed for the fifth or sixth time. How often before I had heard him from this same rostrum, after his latest conquest, and in the same apparent tone of earnestness and sincerity, propose what sounded—if you overlooked his latest victim—like a decent and reasonable peace. He did so again this crisp, sunny autumn day, with his usual eloquence and hypocrisy. It was a long speech—one of the most lengthy public utterances he ever made—but toward the end, after more than an hour of typical distortions of history and a boastful account of the feat of German arms in Poland (“this ridiculous state”) he came to his proposals for peace and the reasons therefore.

  My chief endeavor has been to rid our relations with France of all trace of ill will and rende
r them tolerable for both nations … Germany has no further claims against France … I have refused even to mention the problem of Alsace-Lorraine … I have always expressed to France my desire to bury forever our ancient enmity and bring together these two nations, both of which have such glorious pasts …

  And Britain?

  I have devoted no less effort to the achievement of Anglo–German understanding, nay, more than that, of an Anglo–German friendship. At no time and in no place have I ever acted contrary to British interests … I believe even today that there can only be real peace in Europe and throughout the world if Germany and England come to an understanding.

  And peace?

  Why should this war in the West be fought? For restoration of Poland? Poland of the Versailles Treaty will never rise again … The question of re-establishment of the Polish State is a problem which will not be solved by war in the West but exclusively by Russia and Germany … It would be senseless to annihilate millions of men and to destroy property worth millions in order to reconstruct a State which at its very birth was termed an abortion by all those not of Polish extraction.

  What other reason exists? …

  If this war is really to be waged only in order to give Germany a new regime … then millions of human lives will be sacrificed in vain … No, this war in the West cannot settle any problems …

  There were problems to be solved. Hitler trotted out a whole list of them: “formation of a Polish State” (which he had already agreed with the Russians should not exist); “solution and settlement of the Jewish problem”; colonies for Germany; revival of international trade; “an unconditionally guaranteed peace”; reduction of armaments; “regulation of air warfare, poison gas, submarines, etc.”; and settlement of minority problems in Europe.

  To “achieve these great ends” he proposed a conference of the leading European nations “after the most thorough preparation.”

  It is impossible [he continued] that such a conference, which is to determine the fate of this continent for many years to come, could carry on its deliberations while cannon are thundering or mobilized armies are bringing pressure to bear upon it.

  If, however, these problems must be solved sooner or later, then it would be more sensible to tackle the solution before millions of men are first uselessly sent to death and billions of riches destroyed. Continuation of the present state of affairs in the West is unthinkable. Each day will soon demand increasing sacrifices … The national wealth of Europe will be scattered in the form of shells and the vigor of every nation will be sapped on the battlefields …

  One thing is certain. In the course of world history there have never been two victors, but very often only losers. May those peoples and their leaders who are of the same opinion now make their reply. And let those who consider war to be the better solution reject my outstretched hand.

  He was thinking of Churchill.

  If, however, the opinions of Messrs. Churchill and followers should prevail, this statement will have been my last. Then we shall fight … There will never be another November, 1918, in German history.

  It seemed to me highly doubtful, as I wrote in my diary on my return from the Reichstag, that the British and French would listen to these vague proposals “for five minutes.” But the Germans were optimistic. On my way to broadcast that evening I picked up an early edition of Hitler’s own paper, the Voelkischer Beobachter. The flamboyant headlines said:

  GERMANY’S WILL FOR PEACE—NO WAR AIMS AGAINST FRANCE AND ENGLAND—NO MORE REVISION CLAIMS EXCEPT COLONIES—REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS—CO-OPERATION WITH ALL NATIONS OF EUROPE—PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE

  The Wilhelmstrasse, it is now known from the secret German documents, was encouraged to believe by the reports it was getting from Paris through the Spanish and Italian ambassadors there that the French had no stomach for continuing the war. As early as September 8, the Spanish ambassador was tipping the Germans off that Bonnet, “in view of the great unpopularity of the war in France, is endeavoring to bring about an understanding as soon as the operations in Poland are concluded. There are certain indications that he is in contact with Mussolini to that end.”17

  On October 2, Attolico handed Weizsaecker the text of the latest message from the Italian ambassador in Paris, stating that the majority of the French cabinet were in favor of a peace conference and it was now mainly a question of “enabling France and England to save face.” Apparently, though, Premier Daladier did not belong to the majority.*18

  This was good intelligence. On October 7, Daladier answered Hitler. He declared that France would not lay down her arms until guarantees for a “real peace and general security” were obtained. But Hitler was more interested in hearing from Chamberlain than from the French Premier. On October 10, on the occasion of a brief address at the Sportpalast inaugurating Winterhilfe, Winter Relief, he again stressed his “readiness for peace.” Germany, he added, “has no cause for war against the Western Powers.”

  Chamberlain’s reply came on October 12. It was a cold douche to the German people, if not to Hitler.† Addressing the House of Commons, the Prime Minister termed Hitler’s proposals “vague and uncertain” and noted that “they contain no suggestions for righting the wrongs done to Czechoslovakia and Poland.” No reliance, he said, could be put on the promises “of the present German Government.” If it wanted peace, “acts—not words alone—must be forthcoming.” He called for “convincing proof” from Hitler that he really wanted peace.

  The man of Munich could no longer be fooled by Hitler’s promises. The next day, October 13, an official German statement declared that Chamberlain, by turning down Hitler’s offer of peace, had deliberately chosen war. Now the Nazi dictator had his excuse.

  Actually, as we now know from the captured German documents, Hitler had not waited for the Prime Minister’s reply before ordering preparations for an immediate assault in the West. On October 10 he called in his military chiefs, read them a long memorandum on the state of the war and the world and threw at them Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War.20

  The Fuehrer’s insistence toward the end of September that an attack be mounted in the West as soon as possible had thrown the Army High Command into a fit. Brauchitsch and Halder, aided by several other generals, had consorted to prove to the Leader that an immediate offensive was out of the question. It would take several months, they said, to refit the tanks used in Poland. General Thomas furnished figures to show that Germany had a monthly steel deficit of 600,000 tons. General von Stuelpnagel, the Quartermaster General, reported there was ammunition on hand only “for about one third of our divisions for fourteen combat days”—certainly not long enough to win a battle against the French. But the Fuehrer would not listen to his Army Commander in Chief and his Chief of the General Staff when they presented a formal report to him on Army deficiencies on October 7. General Jodl, the leading yes man on OKW, next to Keitel, warned Halder “that a very severe crisis is in the making” because of the Army’s opposition to an offensive in the West and that the Fuehrer was “bitter because the soldiers do not obey him.”

  It was against this background that Hitler convoked the generals at 11 A.M. on October 10. They were not asked for their advice. Directive No. 6, dated the day before, told them what to do:

  TOP SECRET

  If it should become apparent in the near future that England, and under England’s leadership, also France, are not willing to make an end of the war, I am determined to act vigorously and aggressively without great delay …

  Therefore I give the following orders:

  a. Preparations are to be made for an attacking operation … through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out … at as early a date as possible.

  b. The purpose will be to defeat as strong a part of the French operational army as possible, as well as allies fighting by its side, and at the same time to gain as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium and northern France as a base fo
r conducting a promising air and sea war against England …

  I request the Commanders in Chief to give me, as soon as possible, detailed reports of their plans on the basis of this directive and to keep me currently informed …

  The secret memorandum, also dated October 9, which Hitler read out to his military chiefs before presenting them the directive is one of the most impressive papers the former Austrian corporal ever wrote. It showed not only a grasp of history, from the German viewpoint, and of military strategy and tactics which is remarkable but, as a little later would be proved, a prophetic sense of how the war in the West would develop and with what results. The struggle between Germany and the Western Powers, which, he said, had been going on since the dissolution of the First German Reich by the Treaty of Muenster (Westphalia) in 1648 “would have to be fought out one way or the other.” However, after the great victory in Poland, “there would be no objection to ending the war immediately” providing the gains in Poland were not “jeopardized.”

  It is not the object of this memorandum to study the possibilities in this direction or even to take them into consideration. I shall confine myself exclusively to the other case: the necessity to continue the fight … The German war aim is the final military dispatch of the West, that is, the destruction of the power and ability of the Western Powers ever again to be able to oppose the state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe.