local topography where they were situated, Conwell provides a chronological narra-
tive of the walls’ construction and purpose during four phases. He concludes with a
strategic analysis of the Long Walls in Athenian history from their initial construction
to the end of the fourth century.
30 Thucydides 1.107,108.2. Conwel conjectures that the construction was begun as
early as 462–4611 and completed in 458–457. His argument ( Connecting a City to the Sea,
39–54), which attempts to confirm the involvement of Cimon in the project and thereby
substantiate a remark in Plutarch ( Cimon 13.5–7)—that is, in contradiction to Thucydides’
admittedly imprecise chronology (1.107)—and also thereby propose an early date for the
start of construction, fails to address adequately the democratic thrust of this initiative.
The Athenians’ commitment to build the Long Wal s reinforced the polis’s reliance on
the masses of citizens who serviced the fleet. For Cimon to favor this segment of the
Athenian citizen body seems inconsistent with his political views. Cimon, who had re-
cently suffered dishonor stemming from his pro-Spartan policies, was not in a position
of sufficient trust with his fel ow citizens to suggest a project involving so much of the
city’s resources. His involvement in building the wal s, which involved dumping “vast
quantities of rubble and heavy stones into the swamps” at his own expense, may rep-
resent little more, as Conwel himself writes, than the desperate attempt of a politician
“seeking to stave off political extinction” (49). He was ostracized from Athens in 461 BC.
31 Plato Gorgas 455d–e. Our written sources only permit us to date this wall to the
years 452–431. Conwell (64–78) conjectures that their construction took place around
443–442.
32 Conwell, Connecting a City to the Sea, writes (60):
Given their purpose, the Long Walls (Ia) were at once both conventional and
radical. On the one hand, however impressive their dimensions, the structures
simply secured the maritime orientation typical of cities in classical Greece. On
the other hand, while many fortifications were simply passive barriers defending
an urban zone against invasion, the Long Walls had a more ambitious role. Built
to defend the connection between Athens and its ships, they were land-oriented
structures with a decidedly maritime purpose.
84 Berkey
33 Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking, 2003), 51. See also chap-
ter two in this book, in which he delineates the objectives of Athenian foreign policy.
The walls of Athens facilitated the pursuit of a naval strategy designed to achieve these
objectives.
34 Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 52–54. Kagan writes (52):
This plan was much better suited to Athens than the traditional one of con-
frontation between phalanxes of infantry, but it did contain serious flaws, and
reliance on it helped cause the failure of Pericles’ diplomatic strategy of deter-
rence. . . . The Athenians would, for example, have to tolerate the insults and
accusations of cowardice the enemy would hurl at them from beneath their
walls. That would represent a violation of the entire Greek cultural experience,
the heroic tradition that placed bravery in warfare at the peak of Greek virtues.
Most of the Athenians, moreover, lived in the country, and they would have
to watch passively from the protection of the city’s walls while the enemy de-
stroyed their crops, damaged their trees and vines, and looted and burned their
homes. No Greeks who had ever any chance of resisting had been willing to do
that, and little more than a decade earlier the Athenians had come out to fight
rather than allow such devastation.
35 Long walls had also been constructed before the war, most importantly at Megara
and oligarchic Corinth.
36 Thucydides 5.82.1–2.
37 See Xenophon 2.1.17–32; Diodorus 13.104.8–106.8. At the Battle of Aegospotami, the
victorious Spartans, under the leadership of Lysander and Eteonikos, had destroyed or
captured 170 of the 180 Athenian triremes and executed perhaps as many as 3,500 Athe-
nian prisoners. See Barry S. Strauss, “Aegospotami Reexamined,” AJP 104 (1983): 24–35,
esp. 32–34. Donald Kagan describes the plight of the Athenians ( The Fal of the Athenian
Empire [Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 1987], 393): “The Athenians’ resources were
exhausted; they could not again build a fleet to replace the one lost at Aegospotami.
Athens had lost the war; the only questions that remained were how long it would hold
out before surrendering and what terms the Athenians could obtain.”
38 Xenophon 2.2.3, 10. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Xenophon are from
the Hellenica. The translation used throughout is that of Rex Warner, A History of My
Times (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1966).
39 Xenophon 2.2.11.
40 Xenophon (2.2.15) mentions that an earlier Spartan proposal, the origin and date
of which are unclear, brought back by the Athenian ambassador Archestratus, which
required the Athenians to tear down the Long Walls, had been angrily refused in the
Ecclesia. The Ecclesia imprisoned Archestratus and passed a law that forbid further
mention of such a term.
41 Xenophon 2.2.19–20. See also Diodorus 13.107.4, 14.3.2; Plutarch Lysander 14.4; An-
docides 3.11–12, 39; Lysias 13.14. Against the testimony of Xenophon, the writer of the
Athenaion Politeia states (34.3):
The peace terms specified that the Athenians should be governed by their ances-
tral constitution ( patrios politeia); on this basis the democrats tried to preserve
Why Fortifications Endure 85
the democracy, while the nobles who belonged to the political clubs and the
exiles who had returned after the peace wanted an oligarchy. . . . Lysander sided
with the oligarchs, overawed the people, and forced them to vote an oligarchy
into power on the proposal of Dracontides of Aphidna.
The translation is that of J. M. Moore, Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975). In accord with Athe-
naion Politeia: Diodorus 14.3.2–3 and Justine 5.8.5. The Athenians disputed the definition
of “the ancestral constitution,” and the interpretation of the term pitted those favor-
ing democracy against those favoring oligarchy. Lysander, whom the Spartans recalled
from the eastern Aegean to Athens, was instrumental in settling the dispute for the
time being by appointing Theramenes and the Thirty. For an excellent study of Ly-
sander’s policy, see Charles D. Hamilton, “Spartan Politics and Policy, 405–401 BC,” AJP
91 (1970): 294–314.
42 Xenophon 2.2.23.
43 J. K. Davies ( Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd ed. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993], 129) argues against viewing the end of the Peloponnesian War
as a pivotal moment in the stability of Greek interstate politics: “The first two phases
(i.e. 431–421, 421–413) belong together, but there is a very real break in the years 413–411,
when Athenian superiority had been broken, Persia entered the war, and Sparta be-
came a sea-power. Thereafter the new configuration of in
ternational politics remained
stable for a generation till the 370s, and the actual ends of wars in 404 and 386 were
comparatively unimportant.” See also 147: “Greek politics after 413 kept the same con-
figuration for a generation.” In my opinion, Davies’ interpretation fails to acknowledge
that the period extending from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the King’s Peace
(and the treaties that concluded those conflicts) constitutes a transition of the structure
of the interstate system from bipolarity to multipolarity. Furthermore, I find it difficult
to deny the significance of the treaty that ended the war in 404, which brought a formal
end to the Athenian Empire, or the treaty of 387–386 that ushered in the height of the
Spartan hegemony. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 416:
In spite of its apparently decisive outcome, the war did not establish a stable
balance of power to replace the uneasy one that had evolved after the end of
the Persian War. The great Peloponnesian War was not the type of war that, for
all its costs, creates a new order that permits general peace for a generation or
more. The peace treaty of 404 reflected a temporary growth of Spartan influ-
ence far beyond its normal strength.
44 The remains of the fortifications along the border of Attica date mainly to the first
half of the fourth century BC; however, it is likely that some defensive structures had
been established earlier in the preceding century.
45 See my 2001 Yale University dissertation, “The Struggle for Hegemony: Greek
Interstate Politics and Foreign Policy, 404–371 BC,” and Arthur Eckstein, Mediterranean
Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 2007), chap. 2.
46 The traditional assumption has been that Athens was utterly devastated after the
war (e.g., H. Bengston, Griechische Geschichte [Munich: Beck, 1960], 259, Claude Mossé,
86 Berkey
Athens in Decline: 404–86 b.c. , trans. Jean Stewart [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1973], 12–17). More recent scholarship supports the view that Athens’s recovery, both
economic and political, occurred more rapidly than previously believed (e.g., G.E.M.
de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Con-
quests [London: Duckworth, 1981], 291–92). Barry S. Strauss ( Athens After the Pelopon-
nesian War: Class, Faction and Policy, 404–386 b.c. [London: Croon Helm, 1986], passim)
provides a detailed analysis of social and economic conditions after the Peloponnesian
War. In 395, however, Athens was in a much more compromised position than during
the period of its fifth-century empire.
47 For the collected testimonia of Conon’s activities (397–396 to 394–393), see Harding
12, 22–26. In the second half of the fourth century, Athenians viewed Conon’s military
victories against Sparta as victories for Greece, even though he was an Athenian in the
service of Persia. See, e.g., Dinarchus, 1.14 [dated 323], trans. Ian Worthington, A His-
torical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 87:
Athenians, you did not take into account the actions of Timotheus, who sailed
around the Peloponnese and defeated the Spartans in a naval battle off Corcyra.
He was the son of Conon who freed the Greeks, and he took Samos, Methone,
Pydna, Potidaea, and twenty other cities as well. You did not take these deeds
into account either at his trial or for the oaths that affirmed the votes you cast,
but you fined him one hundred talents because Aristophon said he took money
from Chios and Rhodes.
See also 3.17.
48 Xenophon 4.8.7–11; Diodorus 14.84.4ff.
49 Xenophon 4.8.9–10.
50 Isocrates 4.154, 5.63–64, 7.12, 65, 9.52f; Demosthenes 20.68; Dinarchus 1.14, 75, 3.17;
Diodorus 14.39.3; Nepos Conon 2.1, 5.1f; Justin 6.3.4. An excellent treatment of the issue
of Athenian imperialism during the Corinthian War is Robin Seager’s “Thrasybulus,
Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396–386 b.c. ,” JHS 87 (1967): 95–115. In summarizing
the results of his research, Seager writes (115):
Thus it appears that the constant determining factor of Athenian policy be-
tween the restoration of the democracy and the Peace of Antalcidas is the re-
fusal of the mass of Athenians to accept the fact that the empire had been lost
and their desire to attempt to recreate it in fact as soon as or even before the time
was ripe. . . . It was this longing for empire on the part of the people which de-
termined the actions of Athens throughout the period, not the divergent views
of individual statesmen or political groups, who attempted no more than to
restrain or encourage the people in accordance with the dictates of patriotism
or personal advantage.
Seager is right to minimize the effects that politicians in Athens exerted in the debate
about Athenian foreign policy. The issue of empire was of general concern to all Athe-
nians during these years, and the ability to restore Athens to a prominent position was
largely in the hands of outside actors in the interstate arena.
Why Fortifications Endure 87
51 The Athenians, however, remained wary of war with Sparta. The Oxyrhynchus
Historian, in the description of the Damainetos affair of 396, remarks that the fear
of Sparta united the factions of Athenian society that were customarily divided with
regard to foreign policy matters (John Wickersham and Gerald Verbrugghe, Greek
Historical Documents: The Fourth Century b.c.: Hellenic Oxyrhynchia [Toronto: Hakkert,
1973], §6):
Launching a ship, he [Demainetos] sailed away from the docks and headed for
Conon. An uproar followed, and the prominent upper-class politicians were en-
raged. They accused the Council of throwing the city into a war with Sparta;
the Councilors were frightened and called an assembly. . . . The respectable
and wealthy Athenians were not inclined to upset matters anyway, but even
the masses and demagogues were on this occasion so frightened as to follow
the advice. They sent to Milon, the harmost in Aigina, telling him to punish
Demainetos, since he was acting without authority. Previously the masses and
demagogues had spent all their time stirring up trouble and crossing the Spar-
tans in many ways.
52 IG II2 1656–64. In addition, see the commentary on selected inscriptions from Pi-
raeus dated to this period by Franz Georg Maier, Griechische Mauerbauinschriften, vol. 1
(Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer, 1959), 15–36. Xenophon 4.8.10. Conwell ( Connecting a
City to the Sea, 109–22, 130–31) dates this phase of construction to the years 395–390.
53 For a definition and explanation of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox
of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), and idem, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New
York: Perseus, 2005).
54 Andocides, 3.37, trans. Douglas M. MacDowell, Antiphon and Andocides (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1998), 157: “There was once a time, Athenians, when we
had no walls or ships, but i
t was when we acquired them that our successes began.
So if you want success again now, those are what you must have. With this founda-
tion our fathers built up greater power for Athens than any city has ever had.” See
also R. Seager, “Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism 396–386 B.C.,” JHS 87
(1967): 95–115.
55 Prior to the ratification of the King’s Peace, Athens had honored the Klazomeni-
ans for their good will toward them: IG II2 28 (Tod 114; Harding 26, 40–41).
56 R. J. Seager and C. J. Tuplin (“The Freedom of the Greeks in Asia: On the Origins
of a Concept and the Creation of a Slogan,” JHS 100 [1980]: 145f.), maintain that this
provision of the King’s Peace is vital to the establishment of the concept of the Greeks
of Asia Minor as a single community, with subsequent value as a propagandistic slogan.
57 Alfonso Moreno, Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and
Fourth Centuries bc (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
58 Simon Hornblower, OCD 3, s.v. “autonomy” (224):
In internal affairs it means the state of affairs where a community is respon-
sible for its own laws; in this sense it is opposed to tyranny (Hdt. 1.96.1) and
means self-determination, whereas freedom ( eleutheria) means absence of exter-
nal constraint. But autonomia is also regularly used in the context of interstate
88 Berkey
relations, where it indicates a limited independence permitted by a stronger
power to a weaker.
59 The precise terms of the King’s Peace are unknown. For an admittedly specula-
tive reconstruction, see G. L. Cawkwell, “The King’s Peace,” CQ 31 (1981): 69–83. See
also Robert K. Sinclair, “The King’s Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval
Forces 387–378,” Chiron 8 (1978): 29–37. In summary, he writes (37):
While the King’s Peace might be criticized for vagueness and
formulation, these may have been due in part to the novelty of a koine eirene,
but are particularly to be related to the objectives of the Persians and Spartans
who could more effectively exploit a settlement that was not too precisely de-
fined. The other Greek states recognised the realities of the situation and in
particular the dominant position of Sparta, and their reactions in the next de-
Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome Page 14
