The League of Wives

by Heath Hardage Lee

  Phyllis’s friend Judi Clifford recalled later that although Phyllis had a real rapport and connection with Riffaud, she could not help but be a bit jealous. After all, Riffaud had seen Paul more recently than she had. That fact rankled Phyllis.21 Even so, she felt that meeting with Riffaud was “the most rewarding part of the trip for me. I feel we bridged a huge gap in our three and one-half-hour visit.”22

  Even prior to the trip, Phyllis had decided that being less dogmatic in her views and listening to others, even those with views that were opposite her own, was crucial. The personal contacts were what she felt were moving things toward reconciliation.23

  * * *

  March 26 through April 1 marked the National Week of Concern for Americans Who Are Prisoners of War or Missing in Action. The week was fully supported by the government, and the Department of Defense highlighted the week with a program at 10 a.m. on March 29 at the Pentagon. The Marine Corps band played, the chief chaplain for the U.S. Army gave the invocation. All the heavy hitters were present: Admiral Thomas Moorer of the U.S. Navy, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Melvin Laird, the secretary of defense; and Air Force brigadier general Daniel “Chappie” James, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and the POW/MIA families’ point man.

  The U.S. Navy and Air Force pilots jetted overhead in the “missing man formation” flyover. The event displayed every bit of pomp and circumstance the government could muster. The current administration was wooing the women in no uncertain terms. Finally, the government was telling the women they loved them, that they understood their pain. In exchange for this show of devotion, the administration wanted their political support.24

  Would the women accept Nixon’s proposal or would they turn away? Pat Nixon had turned her future husband down many times before she accepted his marriage proposal, but his persistent pursuit finally paid off. Would this scenario repeat itself between the Nixon administration and the POW/MIA wives? The women had yet to make their final decision.

  * * *

  In May, the National League held a special meeting for members to discuss the organization’s political position on the war (if any) and the presidential candidates for the 1972 election. Jane and Sybil were bowled over when they were invited to stay at the home of the chief of naval operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, and his wife. This was a huge honor, accorded to them as the wives of two of the highest-ranking naval prisoners of war.25

  By now, the government knew that the League was a force to be reckoned with. Back in March, Kissinger had asked the ladies to lend the administration their support.26 MIA wife Sallie Stratton was also present at the Kissinger meeting and was heartened by his conversation with them: “I found Dr. Kissinger to be a charming, soft-spoken, very confident man. He assured us any agreement reached with the Vietnamese would be a package deal, including the men from Laos and Cambodia … I was duly impressed by his demeanor and trusted his promises.”27

  But some of the women were beginning to waver in their enthusiasm for the current administration. “Even Jane was torn between Nixon and McGovern at that point.”28 Jane had been particularly incensed by an April 1972 Nixon reelection campaign solicitation letter stating that the president deserved a second term because “he has brought us out of a devastating war and set us on the path to peace.”29

  What?! Jane must have thought. Did I miss something here?

  The war was not over, the country was not yet on a path to peace. These misstatements (though rapidly corrected by the Nixon campaign office) reinforced an earlier decision Jane had made that surely would have shocked her ultraconservative husband. In an interview with the local newspaper, Jane stated that the letter “reinforced my earlier decision to attempt to become a member of the Virginia delegation to the Democratic National Convention in Miami,”30 which would take place July 10–13, 1972. Jane ultimately would not become a delegate in Miami, but she had made her point and criticized the Nixon administration publicly.

  For this reason, Jane must have avidly observed what transpired at the League’s special May meeting. Representatives for both Nixon and McGovern were invited to speak at the League meeting. Neither was very impressive. “Mr. Dolf Droge, Nixon’s rep, was an expert on the history and culture of Vietnam, but he was clearly lacking in terms of his explanations of U.S. military and diplomatic policy in Vietnam.” Sybil recalled, “His representation of the President was a disaster.”31

  Sallie Stratton had a different reaction to the young hippie historian, who communicated much of the presentation through songs. She felt his analysis of Vietnamese culture was critical to understanding their foe. Droge explained how “all discussions have been from either a hawk or dove position, both of which are totally irrelevant, he told us. What is needed is the owl position, one based on an understanding of the Vietnamese people and their long history.” Still, Sallie admitted that she was one of the few who enjoyed his talk. The League membership in general was not impressed.32

  Jane and Sybil told Admiral Zumwalt at breakfast the next day about what they deemed the Droge fiasco. Zumwalt stormed into the League’s press conference later that day and grabbed the mike. He had concluded that he must “go down and try to speak to the families to give them my own view that the President had remained steadfast in his intention not to ease the pressure on North Vietnam until the prisoners were released and the missing accounted for.” Zumwalt was glad he had done so, later observing that the audience’s questions “were good, hard and tough, and demonstrated that Sybil and Jane had not been amiss in their estimate that these long-suffering families needed some personal attention from the White House.”

  Energized by the positive reaction he received, Zumwalt decided to visit the White House and relay their reaction to Kissinger. “It was the only time I had ever dropped in on Henry unannounced. He came into the reception room, obviously perturbed at my arrival. I let him have it in no uncertain terms that I thought the White House had let down these families. Henry was infuriated and an acrimonious exchange took place.”33

  The admiral’s appearance saved the day for those in the Nixon camp. Sybil wrote later that “I believe it was his appearance and being willing to lay his job on the line to represent the President and our political persuasions as individuals rather than a group” that allayed the fears of League members about the current administration’s stance.34

  The next day, May 8, the U.S. government announced the blockade and mining of Haiphong harbor, in North Vietnam. Known as Operation Linebacker I, the campaign began with the bombing of the harbor from the air, in addition to a honeycomb of mines detonated in the harbor itself. This decisive military action won over many POW/MIA wives, giving them hope that the current administration would do what it took to finally end the war. Many felt that the presence of the mines would give the U.S. military leverage over the North Vietnamese and perhaps force their hand regarding the American POWs and MIAs.35

  Louise Mulligan, for one, was thrilled. She felt the offensive was long overdue. “I remember very well that morning. I put in a call to the White House and requested to speak to General [Brent] Scowcroft (who had replaced General Hughes as Nixon’s military aide). I waited some time and the General came on the line. I asked him, ‘Who ordered the bombing?’ There was a pause and he said, ‘Mrs. Mulligan, are you asking me who made the policy?’ I said, ‘I know exactly what I am asking you.’ He said, ‘I can’t tell you that.’ So I said to him, ‘Are you going to continue the bombing?’ He said, ‘Yes, until they sue for peace!’ and I replied, ‘That’s all I want to know!’”36

  Roger E. Shields, then the thirty-two-year-old civilian in the Office of the Assistant secretary of defense for International Security affairs spearheaded the DoD task force for POW repatriation was convinced this action is what would ultimately bring the Communists to heel. “We knew we had an agreement, and that the men were going to come home.”37

  At the end of that week, Sybil and Phyllis both stayed at the Army and Na
vy Club, just off Connecticut Avenue and only a few blocks from the White House. The League office, in the American Legion building, was just around the corner. Phyllis and Sybil must have spent some time together plotting strategy. Phyllis’s was surely humming her favorite song at the time, “I Am Woman,” by Australian singer Helen Reddy, released that same month. Phyllis was no feminist, but she loved the song’s line “I am invincible.” She later wrote, “That’s how I felt. I loved confrontation on the” POW/MIA issue. She “knew we couldn’t be licked.” This feeling of confidence and mastery of the issue led her to be more politically active within the parameters of the League. Phyllis was now acting as the Virginia committee chair for the League’s Non-Partisan Political Action Committee and would attend the state and national conventions for both the Republican and Democratic Parties in 1972.38

  With the November election rapidly approaching, the Nixon administration knew that if it lost Middle America, as LBJ had after the Tet Offensive, it was sunk. The ladies reflected this constituency. The government’s next move had to reflect support for the POW/MIA issue or the ladies might throw their support to McGovern. Some, like Valerie Kushner, already had. Jane was totally on the fence and upset with the Nixon fundraising letter.

  When Sybil, Phyllis, and Maureen Dunn—wife of Navy pilot Lieutenant Joseph P. Dunn, who went missing in 1968—requested a meeting with the president, they got it. The three women had been elected at the League’s May 7 meeting specifically “to meet with President Nixon to reaffirm our extreme distress and our expectations that an immediate policy be adopted that would insure an accounting of our missing men and the release of our POWs, not just the withdrawal of combat troops. We wanted the Paris Peace Talks reconvened simultaneously with inspection of POW camps in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam.”39

  On May 15, a press conference was held, with Sybil, Phyllis, and Maureen representing the National League. Sybil served as the spokeswoman for the group. The meeting illustrated the range of different viewpoints within the League membership and debunked the idea that the League was a puppet of the Nixon administration.

  Dressed in a red, white, and blue outfit,40 Sybil began by pointing out how critical she and the League had been of Senator J. William Fulbright, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had not held hearings on the POW/MIA issue during the entire eight years that Americans had been held in captivity. Sybil stated, “We consider the committee derelict in its responsibilities, and we said so. The point is, we don’t play favorites, and we are considering what is best for our husbands and sons, their health, and in many cases, no doubt, their lives are at stake.”41

  Phyllis was clear that she had been “very very critical of the Administration in recent months, and I wanted to be convinced with all my heart that everything possible was being done. This mining [of the harbor] has given me that assurance, and this meeting has given me that assurance. I hope that the other families in our organization will be heartened by this also.”42 Maureen told the reporters gathered at the White House after the meeting with Nixon that “I am the only MIA wife here. Please be reassured that the President is encompassing all aspects of Southeast Asia. This includes Laos, South Vietnam, and Cambodia.”43

  Maureen, Phyllis, and Sybil felt comfortable enough with President Nixon to speak their minds with him and not hold back. Sybil even ventured to give her own tactical advice to the president during their meeting. “I told the President I would land the U.S. Marines in North Vietnam and claim it as U.S. territory.” Her plan once the country was occupied? To keep it until the prisoners were released and accounted for. Nixon apparently laughed at the idea during the meeting. Though Sybil didn’t tell the press this, she had noticed that Kissinger jotted a note down with her suggestion.44

  Nixon assured the three ladies that the mining of Haiphong harbor meant the North Vietnamese would be out of oil in four months. He felt strongly that, after that, they would be forced to negotiate.45 When Maureen still had questions toward the end of their time with the president, he invited the ladies to “stay here and ask me all the questions you have. You ladies come first.”46

  Maureen wanted assurance from Nixon that the MIAs would not be forgotten at the end of the war. He readily gave it, assuring her that they were on his radar as well.

  * * *

  Over the summer of 1972, movie actress turned political firebrand Jane Fonda would make her infamous visit to North Vietnam, where she was photographed sitting on a North Vietnamese antiaircraft gun. She had a full schedule while visiting North Vietnam, set up by her Communist hosts. It included tours, live and taped broadcasts to GIs through Radio Hanoi, and meetings with American POWs, sometimes against their will. When she returned to Los Angeles on July 31, she announced that she would be “abandoning her career” until after the November election, “in order to campaign against the Vietnam War.” Over the years, she would receive the derogatory nickname “Hanoi Jane.”

  The POWs would never forgive Fonda for supporting the Communists and denying their mistreatment at the hands of the enemy,47 despite the actress’s repeated apologies many years later.

  The POW and MIA wives, though, barely gave Jane Fonda a second thought. The women regarded COLIAFAM and Cora Weiss as far more dangerous. But ultimately, most POW/MIA wives believed that Fonda and others like her were simply Communist-leaning pawns in the larger chess game of Vietnam. The League leadership were determined to checkmate their opponents, and they would do so through their own anti-propaganda awareness campaigns.

  * * *

  During the third weekend in September, the League leadership had their regularly scheduled bimonthly meeting with Kissinger. Sybil recalled that “this was the first meeting when he told the group that he hoped that soon he would have an announcement to make which would bring our waiting to an end.”48 Instead of feeling elated, Sybil felt let down and depressed. “Still nothing definite,” she wrote.

  But on October 12, just before the League’s 1972 convention, Kissinger returned from Paris extremely hopeful. Sustained U.S. military action had finally brought Le Duc Tho, the former Viet Minh leader negotiating on behalf of the North Vietnamese, back to the table. The two diplomats had “worked out a ceasefire to be followed within sixty days of a withdrawal of all U.S. forces and the release of all American POWs.”49 Though the war was not over yet, it seemed that progress was finally being made.

  Just two days later, the League hosted its third annual convention at the Statler Hilton, in Washington. League membership continued to grow: the organization now numbered 2,983, in addition to a “Concerned Citizen” group of more than five hundred non–family members. Both presidential candidates were invited to speak at the gathering. Only Nixon showed up, and he was received warmly by the crowd. Recently released Navy POW Lieutenant Mark Gartley also attended and spoke about the strict censorship of mail and packages to the prisoners. He noted that prisoner treatment had been much improved in the past several years. The publicity generated for the POWs by the League surely had not hurt.50

  The excitement over a potential peace agreement was pulsating through the air at the Statler Hilton. Consequently, perhaps the most important agenda item was the discussion of Kissinger’s explanation of the agreements he had worked out with the North Vietnamese regarding the prisoners and the missing. League membership was parsing his every word on the matter carefully:

  “There will be a return of all American prisoners, military or civilian, within 60 days after the agreement comes into force. North Vietnam has made itself responsible for an accounting of our prisoners and missing in action throughout Indochina, and for the repatriation of American prisoners throughout Indochina.”51 This clarification was especially important for the MIA families, who lived in constant fear that their loved ones (or their loved ones’ remains) would be left behind when the war ended.

  On October 15, Phyllis was nominated for the position of board chair and then elected by secret ballot. Louise
Mulligan, who had never run for a League office before and had backed off from League efforts for months, ran for a board seat in a last-ditch effort to set a fire under the League. She did not win, but she was glad she had put her name forth.52 After an interview with the League leadership in D.C., Helene was nominated for national coordinator and elected unanimously.53 Though Evie Grubb would have liked to have stayed on as League coordinator, League leadership wanted new direction and fresh ideas. Helene’s fundraising ability had already been noticed, and she had become friends with board chair Carole Hanson when Carole visited Colorado Springs to receive the $30,000 check generated by the Silent Nights Christmas seals campaign.54

  Now the vivacious Colorado Springs MIA wife and the once shy but now fearless Phyllis joined forces. They would make a formidable team. Helene and her children, Cindy and Robbie, moved to D.C. for her one-year term. Phyllis would travel back and forth from her home base in Richmond and be in constant phone contact with Helene and the other League officers and board members. Though the two women were both seasoned Leaguers, they had inherited a frequently fractious group. Together, they deftly steered the League through sometimes treacherous political and emotional tides.

  On October 26, not even two weeks after the League convention, Kissinger held a press conference, proclaiming, in his guttural German accent, “We have now heard from both Vietnams, and it is obvious that the war that has been raging for ten years is drawing to a conclusion, and that this is a traumatic experience for all of the participants … We believe that peace is at hand. We believe an agreement is in sight.”55