Third Reich Victorious

by Unknown

  Hitler continued to build support for his Nazi party. The economic downturn of 1930-31 provided an opportunity for the party to seize control of the government. On March 13, 1932, Hitler defeated Hindenburg (another general of the Great War) for the German presidency by claiming 53 percent of the vote to his opponent’s 36.8 percent. The Enabling Act of March 1933, passed on the strength of jingoism (“Many hands have failed Germany, let two hands lead us!”) and Blueshirt coercion, established the Nazis as the only German political party and Hitler as Der Führer (the Leader), absolute dictator of his nation.

  While Hitler achieved political prominence, Karl Dönitz wore several hats within the German Navy. Officially, he served within the Ship Design Bureau, as had Hitler. Unofficially, he was the junior member of a coterie of officers that closely circled Admiral Raeder—officers committed to building a new and powerful Kriegsmarine. In that group, he had two roles. Dönitz is best known for the top secret development of the new submarine force. By 1932 he had secretly constructed ten small U-boats, developed the plans for the next generation of long-range vessels, begun training the crews for those boats, and developed the theoretical tactics to use a U-boat fleet against Great Britain. The fruition of his efforts waited only on Hitler’s seizure of the German government and the public nullification of the hated Treaty of Versailles.

  Dönitz’s second role, however, has only recently been uncovered by historians. Between 1925 and 1934 he masterminded German naval intelligence. To his credit belong several major espionage efforts, including the acquisition of the plans for the Japanese “Long Lance” torpedo. Dönitz also managed to place moles in several American and British institutions of higher education, allowing him access to (often secret) research in those countries and schematics of the radar systems that would shortly be under development. Finally, to replace the overseas bases lost by Germany at the end of the Great War, Dönitz developed a supply system supported by sympathetic shipping magnates and industrialists in countries that could be expected to maintain their neutrality in the next round of war. In 1934 he received his richly deserved promotion to the rank of admiral from the hands of Hitler, who officially named him as Chief of Submarine Forces—an act accompanied by the public renunciation of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

  While Hitler received the adoring accolades of the public, and Dönitz submerged himself in the depths of international intrigue, Erich Raeder set the stage for the three men’s vision of a new world naval order. In truth, Raeder served as the rudder of the triumvirate, restraining the enthusiasm of Dönitz and smothering (at least visibly) the ardent Anglophobia of Hitler, while risking his own neck to siphon funds from the very public naval budget into “black operations” and political adventurism.12 In 1928, Raeder had become an admiral and Chief of Naval Command. At last he had the power, if not the budget, to modernize the German Navy. In 1932, Hitler also granted him the lion’s share of German military appropriations; and in 1934, the renunciation of Versailles removed the final yoke from Raeder’s neck.

  By 1928, Germany’s Great War vintage battleships required replacements (allowed by the Treaty of Versailles as long as the replacements displaced 10,000 tons or less). Raeder proposed building three “pocket battleships.” Mounting only six eleven-inch primary guns in two turrets, they traded a third turret for speed (28 knots) and operational range (9,000 to 10,000 nautical miles at 18 knots). At the same time, he requested the building of thirty destroyers and six light cruisers, all trading heavier armament for extended range capability. With the Nazi party already dominating the German Reichstag, his plan received rapid approval. Over the following five years, three battleships (Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee), three cruisers (Seydlitz, Nürnherg, Wiesbaden), and thirty modern destroyers were launched. All of the vessels violated treaty stipulations in one manner or another, but the victorious allies of the Great War, distracted by global economic disaster, lacked the energy for a vigorous (i.e., military) protest.

  That lack of protest, more than any other factor, allowed Hitler to disavow the Treaty of Versailles, in its entirety. From 1934 to 1939 all segments of the German military rearmed with great vigor. For Raeder, Hitler, and Dönitz, the time had arrived to put theory into practice. In a top secret missive to the key officers of the Kriegsmarine, Raeder (speaking not only for Hitler but outlining a plan that certainly bore his mark) discussed the future objectives of the navy.

  Our primary enemy is the Royal Navy of Great Britain. We must destroy it, then land forces to subdue the English people. No nation has achieved that goal since 1066. Every nation that has tried to achieve equality with England has failed—not because of a lack of will, not because of industrial inferiority, but only because they failed to destroy the Royal Navy and its power of blockade. We shall succeed. We shall avenge our comrades who died and our children who starved at the hands of the Royal Navy from 1914 to 1919 …

  Phase I of our effort nears completion. A nucleus of modern surface ships is complete or near complete. Today, I have ordered the conversion of the three light cruisers now under construction to aircraft carriers. Unknown to many of you, plans for light and heavy carriers have been under development since 1920, as have the plans for modern aircraft for those carriers. I have the highest assurances that the carriers will be completed by early 1936.

  Phase II begins immediately. Construction has been ordered on the following ships: two heavy carriers, two pocket battleships, two large battleships, three heavy cruisers, sixty destroyers, ten fast oilers, ten fast replenishment vessels. Due to limitations of the economy, completion of all ships is not expected until 1942. Additionally, orders for seagoing U-boats will be placed in the next month, with an estimated delivery of five boats per month by mid-1935. Finally, the Führer has approved the formation of thirty aircraft squadrons for naval service and of a corps of marines to train for amphibious assaults …

  The marine corps will consist of three divisions of light infantry plus supporting units, including a special operations battalion, an amphibious armored brigade, and a parachutist brigade. Shipping and air assets will be allocated to provide a 100 percent first wave lift capability to the corps. For security purposes, the corps will be designated Schutzstaffel [“Guard Detachment,” abbreviated SS], and will officially serve as security detachments aboard ships and at bases, and as a bodyguard for the Führer. Secretly, it will begin planning and training for the potential invasion of England …13

  We do not envision war before 1942, but we cannot ignore the fact that Great Britain or France could strike first, especially if either nation realizes that the Führer intends to restore Germany to its proper place in the world. To discourage premature conflict, every effort must be made to deceive our enemy as to our future intentions. There will, on pain of death, be neither public discussion of this missive nor overt criticism of the Royal Navy …14

  Grandiose plans indeed, but could Hitler accomplish them? Could he mold the entire German government to his will? The man that most Germans would soon call their Little Admiral quickly discovered that a government did not perform with naval efficiency. Ruthless, he sacked bureaucrats who did not come up to scratch and simply nationalized businesses that operated inefficiently. He put the German people to work building an infrastructure of roads and railways, even airlines, second to none—and the trains did run on time. He had little time for sycophants and no time for inefficiency or internal squabbling.15 By early 1936, Hitler had accomplished miracles both within and without Germany—and had rallied the German-speaking people of Europe to the Nazi banner.

  Backed by a strengthened military armed from the industry of the Rhineland (remilitarized in 1934), Hitler began the Anschluss, the annexation of all territory that had once belonged to Imperial Germany or that now held German-speaking populations. Province by province and nation by nation, he dismantled the artificial states created by the Treaty of Versailles. And his former enemies of the Great War, Britain and France, practiced
appeasement—refusing to commit troops and treasure to stop the expansion of Hitler’s Reich. They convinced themselves that his territorial ambitions had limits, and they were correct—to a point.

  Hitler also scored three diplomatic coups during the waning years of the 1930s. He cemented alliances with both Italy (the Rome-Berlin Axis) and Japan. Both countries possessed large navies, and could challenge the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific respectively. Finally, he achieved an understanding with Josef Stalin, the Russian dictator. Representatives of the two nations signed a trade treaty (with military undertones) in early August 1939. That alliance of convenience not only placed the threat of a two-front war in abeyance, it provided a much needed trading partner for Germany.

  By 1939 only one portion of the old German Empire still defied Hitler’s grasp: Poland. And Hitler, for the first time since 1919, wavered. His trepidation did not stem from the fact that an attack on Poland would bring Britain and France immediately to its aid, as he welcomed the conflict with the Royal Navy. Rather, as his confidant, Dönitz, later recorded, Hitler feared the failure of his army. Dönitz recalls Hitler telling him, “Ah, Karl, at sea I am like a lion, brave and fierce, but on land I am such a coward.”16 Only in June did he finally order the implementation of Case White, the invasion of Poland, for September 1, 1939. In mid-August, at the last joint planning session of the German High Command before the invasion, the Führer spoke with great passion. Victory, he explained to his generals and admirals, is never certain. Nothing is without risk. Hitler anticipated victory, yet ominously warned that “we may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall drag a world with us … a world in flames.”17

  A World in Flames, 1939-45

  On the eve of the invasion that would drag Europe into the conflagration that already appeared to be consuming Asia, the Kriegsmarine had not achieved quantitative parity with its primary enemy, the Royal Navy. Great Britain enjoyed an advantage in capital ships (battleships, battle cruisers, pocket battleships) of 15:4, in carriers of 5:4, in cruisers of 56:3, in destroyers of 159:53. Only in submarines did the advantage rest with Germany, 131:54. Both sides also featured coastal defense forces, mostly older vessels. Germany accepted it as a given that France would enter the war on the British side, but its substantial navy (six capital ships, one carrier, eighteen cruisers, 58 destroyers, 76 submarines) would be committed in the Mediterranean, watching Germany’s reluctant ally, Italy (four capital ships, 21 cruisers, 48 destroyers, 104 submarines).18

  Still, Hitler, Raeder, and Dönitz realized that their navy possessed several advantages. Most of the German ships had been constructed in the past seven years, no ships were in refit, and the German admirals could dictate the tempo of initial operations. Perhaps more important, the Royal Navy faced obligations that stretched the length and breadth of the globe-spanning British Empire, while the numerically weaker forces of the Kriegsmarine could be concentrated in northern European waters. Finally, the element of tactical surprise could be exploited to the utmost.

  Part of that surprise centered upon innovative carrier and U-boat tactics. By 1939 the concept of Rudeltaktik (“pack/group tactics”), pioneered by Dönitz and refined by Raeder, had been applied at all levels of the Kriegsmarine. The Rudel was a permanent organization (as distinct from a task force), composed for surface forces of (ideally) a carrier, a battleship, a cruiser, and twenty destroyers supported by two fast oilers and three fast replenishment vessels. As a permanent organization, the men and ships of each Rudel had served together for months (years, in many cases) and had developed a level of group expertise superior to that of any contemporary naval task force. With a top speed of 29 to 30 knots, a cruising range of 11,000 to 12,000 miles, a force projection radius of 250 miles, and the ability of the carrier to replace its planes while at sea (replenishment vessels carried twenty spare planes), the German carrier group would be a deadly opponent when commanded with skill and daring.

  The U-boat Rudel consisted of ten boats, usually nine medium-range Type VIIC (770 tons) and one Type IXC (1,120 tons) to operate as a command/control vessel, though two of the eleven functional groups in 1939 contained all Type IXC boats (allowing them to station at any point in the Atlantic Basin). Dönitz (disappointed at the failure of German industry to meet his production demands) realized that his wolf packs could not afford the heavy losses experienced by U-boats in the Great War once Britain adopted a convoy system. He also agreed with Hitler that complete isolation of the British Isles was not feasible, and that, based upon Germany’s own experience, such a blockade could not return the short-term results needed to defeat their foe. Thus he determined that the primary objective of his U-boat force was to weaken the Royal Navy through attrition—sinking merchant tonnage would be a secondary objective.

  Once a convoy had been spotted by a wolf pack, the radar-equipped command/control boat would race to shadow the convoy and concentrate its flock.19 As soon as concentration had been achieved, two U-boats would target the merchantmen, drawing escorts to their location. The remaining members of the Rudel would sink those escorts. If elimination of the escort could be accomplished, the defenseless convoy could be sunk at leisure (and without endangering precious U-boats). Dönitz’s standing order stipulated that no attacks would take place without concentration being achieved. By the end of August 1939, six of the eleven wolf packs crowded the Western Approaches, another cruised near Gibraltar, while two crept stealthily toward Scapa Flow, primary anchorage of the Royal Navy. The time to test mettle and tactics rapidly approached.

  At dawn on September 1, 1939, the German war machine smashed across the Polish border in what would be a short campaign—a proving ground for the Blitzkrieg (“lightning war”) tactics of Hitler’s generals. But Hitler’s attention focused westward that morning, to London, where at 0600 the German ambassador delivered a declaration of war to the British prime minister’s office, and to Scapa Flow, where at 0605 his German eagles would descend on the anchored British lions of the Home Fleet.

  Over the past weeks, three of the four German carrier groups had scattered across the Atlantic, ostensibly to show the flag or to train. Carrier Group (CG) I (CV Graf Zeppelin, BB Scharnhorst, sixteen destroyers, and support vessels) was on a return voyage from the South American coast, scheduled to reach Kiel on September third.20 CG II (CVL Günther Luck, B Admiral Graf Spee, a light cruiser, twelve destroyers, and support vessels) had sailed in mid-August for the port of New York with the new German ambassador to the United States onboard. CG III (CVL Gorch Fock, B Admiral Scheer, a light cruiser, fourteen destroyers, and support vessels) neared the Straits of Gibraltar, en route to Italy. Only CG IV (CVL Fritz Heinzen, B Deutschland, a light cruiser, eleven destroyers, and support vessels) remained in port through the waning days of August, to slip its moorings quietly late on August 30 for a run to the North Sea.

  By the evening of August 31, CG II had detached DD Hans Lody to convey the ambassador to New York, then reversed its course and steamed to within 150 miles west of Scapa Flow. CG I had slowed its journey home, and cruised some 200 miles northeast of the British naval base. Since nearing British territorial waters, it had been shadowed by HMS Sheffield; but, low on fuel, that ship had broken contact (with an exchange of friendly signals) earlier in the day. CG IV, after a rapid passage through the Skagerrak, held position 150 miles southeast of Scapa Flow. At 0100 on September 1, commanders of the three naval forces announced the existence of a state of war between the Third Reich and its archnemesis, Great Britain. Personal messages from Hitler and Admiral Raeder called for vengeance upon the fleet that had starved German children in 1919, and exhorted men and officers to make the opening blow of the new conflict a victory “für Führer, für Reich, für Volk!”

  At 0603 the first wave of planes—four Me Bf 109T fighters, eight Fi 167 torpedo bombers, and eight Ju 87C dive bombers from CG II—screamed over the unprepared British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow.21 Within minutes, fourteen fighters, twenty-one torpedo bombers, and twen
ty-four dive bombers from CG I and CG III joined the assault. By 0630 the last of the raiders had departed, unable fully to evaluate damage to the Royal Navy because of the heavy pall of smoke blanketing the harbor. And that damage was severe. Two fleet carriers, Glorious and Ark Royal, burned fiercely before sinking. Two Great War vintage battleships, Queen Elizabeth and Warspite, had slipped beneath the cold waters minutes after taking two torpedo hits each. BC Renown, its magazine penetrated by a bomb, exploded, then sank in seconds—over a thousand men died with it alone. BB Royal Sovereign, serving as flag for the Home Fleet, lost its A-turret to a bomb and its propellers to a torpedo. The final tally was three capital ships, two carriers, a heavy cruiser, and three destroyers sunk, for the cost of four German planes. Additionally, of the remaining seven veterans of the British battle line at anchor that morning, all except the battle cruiser Hood carried some mark of German bombs and torpedoes, while Bf 109s had savaged every plane at Scapa Flow’s airfields. Even then, the trial by fire of September 1, 1939, for the Home Fleet was far from complete.

  Expecting additional attacks from the German carriers, survivors of the Home Fleet sortied for southern bases and their own air cover. But the German carriers had no intention of risking a second attack. After recovering planes, CG I steamed for Kiel and the first of many “heroes’ welcomes” for the Kriegsmarine. CG II made maximum speed for the South Atlantic, and CG IV moved at flank speed toward Halifax, Nova Scotia. Torment by air for the Home Fleet had ended for the day, but their disorganized flight stumbled into the waiting U-boats of Submarine Groups I and V. Vice Admiral Kurt Slevogt, commanding SG I, was a model of Teutonic efficiency that day. He applied the convoy attack paradigm to the Home Fleet, using one submarine as a decoy while others lined up shots on its would-be attackers. By 2300, Slevogt’s tally included eight destroyers and three cruisers without the loss of a single U-boat. SG V’s commander failed to control the engagement. Committing his own boat to the attack early in the day, he paid the ultimate price. Two more of his boats fell to British depth charges, though it is probable that one of them managed to attack the Royal Sovereign, damaged and under tow, which capsized at 1651 that afternoon when a single torpedo struck it amidships.