Third Reich Victorious

by Unknown

  These imminent threats to vital Allied interests imposed daunting operational and logistical requirements. The 9th and 10th Armies, with their supporting air components, would have to be reinforced to preclude any further Axis progress toward Baku, the Persian Gulf, or Suez. This would divert at least one American armored division, a large number of scarce fighter and bomber squadrons, and significant logistical assets away from the anticipated struggle in Tunisia and southern Europe.25 The constriction of the Iran corridor to Russia also meant that Britain and the U.S. would have to resume the vulnerable Murmansk convoys at the earliest feasible date in order to demonstrate support for their Soviet ally. The urgent need to relieve pressure on the USSR also led to renewed strains on the alliance as both the Americans and Russians increased their calls for a Second Front in Western Europe early in 1943.

  The Germans also faced crucial strategic decisions in mid-November, 1942. The most important issue was the future employment of Army Group A. It was clear to everyone in Hitler’s headquarters that the drive to conquer Stalingrad would continue. Yet, with every available unit needed to reinforce Tunisia, maintain the Reich’s defences in Western Europe, and repress the growing insurgency in Yugoslavia, a significant number of German formations would have to be maintained to bolster the Turks in the Transcaucasus, keep pressure on the Allies, and prepare for an offensive to Baku and points south in the spring. Several divisions at least would be required to pursue the retreating Russians to the lower Volga, and several might be sent to Stalingrad once they had refitted, but would they be enough to tip the scales in the Wehrmacht’s favor? Luftwaffe assets were even more scarce than ground troops. Stretched to its limits to prosecute the fighting at Stalingrad and in North Africa while supporting land operations and defending the Reich against the Anglo-American bombers, the German air arm could barely maintain a token presence in Turkey. Would those few squadrons be adequate to counter the growing Allied air strength? None of these questions had easy answers, but Hitler, the dull rumble of battle from Stalingrad notwithstanding, took satisfaction in his success in the Caucasus and looked forward to 1943 with great anticipation.

  The Reality

  Our scenario examines the serious German efforts to enlist Turkey in the Axis cause from 1940 through 1942 and the actual inducements and threats presented to Ankara during that time. Germany’s strategic situation in the spring and summer of 1942, the state of Turkey’s military preparedness, Allied plans and the basic Allied forces available, are also factual. Proceeding from this factual foundation, we can use the scenario as a historical laboratory to consider two questions. What would have had to change to allow such a significant alteration of Turkey’s actual behavior? And if the Turks did join Hitler, what would have had to happen to ensure success?

  For the first question, the key factor for Turkey’s participation in the war was its leadership. Inönü, Saracoglu, Menemencioglu, and Cakmak, though divided in other ways, were all united in their desire to keep Turkey out of the war. They certainly feared the Soviet Union, but were equally wary of becoming another of Hitler’s puppets. For them, the best outcome was one in which Berlin and Moscow held one another in check and thus created international space in which Turkey could pursue its own interests unencumbered. At the same time, Turkey’s leaders held German military power in high regard and exhibited an especially deep alarm at the prospect of air attack on their cities. They thus resisted London’s approaches and carefully steered a course between both sides to avoid what they were sure could only be ruinous involvement in the conflict raging all around them.

  To make this scenario work in our narrative, therefore, differences among the Turkish leaders were exaggerated to permit a coup and the rise of a fictional pro-German clique. In fact, although these men might have had leanings one way or another, they remained Turks first and foremost, keeping their own national interests firmly in view at all times. It was also necessary for our purposes here to ignore President Inönü’s tight control of the country. As Saracoglu and others discovered, they all served at the president’s pleasure and found themselves dismissed if their views or activities strayed too far from his intentions.

  The second question this scenario illuminates concerns the requirements for military success against the USSR, assuming that Germany had coaxed Turkey into joining the Axis. The answer is deceptively simple: more German ground and air forces. It is unlikely that the Turks, given the state of their army and air force, could have prevailed alone in an attack into the Transcaucasus. The Soviets did send six divisions and four brigades north from the Turkish frontier in August as Army Group A drove south from Rostov, but they always kept a close watch on Turkey and did not denude the border.

  In addition there were Red Army troops available in Iran and in the Stavka Reserve that could have been used (albeit at a cost in transportation and logistic assets) had Turkey shown signs of tying its fate to Germany’s. Depletion of the Stavka Reserve might have had an effect on the abortive Operation Mars, the counterpart offensive to Uranus in central Russia during November 1942, but it is highly unlikely that Stalin would have allowed any diminution of the forces committed to the key struggle at Stalingrad.

  We must not underestimate the severe pressure Operation Blue exerted on the Soviets, but a real prospect of victory in the Transcaucasus could only have come with the insertion of German troops. Burdened, however, with Rommel’s expeditionary corps, counterinsurgency requirements in the Balkans, and the need to guard against Allied adventures in Western Europe (made most vivid to Hitler by the Dieppe raid in August 1942), on top of the truly staggering commitment in the East, there were simply not enough German forces on hand to conduct Operation Blue properly, never mind provide an additional expeditionary command in Turkey, without giving up some other cherished commitment. Any diversion to Turkey could only have come at the expense of Army Groups A and B.

  This piece has focused on ground troops, but the provision of adequate air support would have proven much more problematic. Even Army Group A found itself nearly stripped of Luftwaffe assets by late summer as the fight for Stalingrad intensified. The Turks probably could have held off the limited British and Commonwealth assets in the Middle East and Iran/Iraq as portrayed here, but barring astoundingly good Axis luck or abysmally poor Russian performance, significant achievements in the Transcaucasus were unlikely without a substantial German presence beyond the lone corps in this scenario.

  Bibliography

  Blau, George, The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (US Army War College, Carlisle, 1983).

  Border Troops in the Great Patriotic War (Nawka, Moscow, 1968).

  Brett-James, Antony, Ball of Fire (Gale & Polden, Aldershot, 1957).

  Boog, Horst; Rahn, Werner; Stumpf, Reinhard; and Wegner, Bernd, Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1990).

  Conner, Albert Z., and Poirer, Robert G., Red Army Order of Battle in the Great Patriotic War (Presidio, Novato, 1985).

  Deringil, Selim, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989).

  Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Westview, Boulder, 1984).

  Grechko, Andrei A., Battle for the Caucasus (Progress, Moscow, 1971).

  Gwyer, J.M.A., and Butler, J.R.M., Grand Strategy (HMSO, London, 1964).

  Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in the Second World War (HMSO, London, 1981).

  Howard, Michael, Strategic Deception (HMSO, London, 1990).

  Joslen, H. F., Orders of Battle of the Second World War (HMSO, London, 1960).

  Kershaw, Ian, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Penguin, London, 2000).

  Kolinsky, Martin, Britain’s War in the Middle East (Macmillan, London, 1999).

  Krecker, Lothar, Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg (Kloster-mann, Frankfurt, 1964).

  Lucas, James, Hitler’s Mountain Troops (Arms & Armour, London, 1992).

  Motter, T.H. Vail, Un
ited States Army in World War II, The War in the Middle East, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1952).

  Moyzisch, L. C., Operation Cicero (Coward-McCann, New York, 1950).

  Oender, Zehra, Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Olden-bourg, Munich, 1977).

  Papen, Franz von, Memoirs (André Deutsch, London, 1953).

  Playfair, I.S.O., The Mediterranean and the Middle East (HMSO, London, 1960).

  Sandhu, Gurcharn Singh, The Indian Armour (Vision, New Delhi, 1987).

  Schramm, Percy E., ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Bernard & Graefe, Munich, 1982).

  Schultz, Friedrich, Reverses on the Southern Wing (US Army War College, Carlisle, 1983).

  Shtemenko, S. M., The Soviet General Staff at War 1941-1945 (Progress, Moscow, 1985).

  Tarnstrom, Ronald, Balkan Battles (Trogen, Lindsborg, 1998).

  Tieke, Wilhelm, The Caucasus and the Oil (Fedorowicz, Winnipeg, 1995).

  US Army, European Command Historical Division, “Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941/1942),” MS #C-067b.

  Weber, Frank G., The Evasive Neutral (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1979).

  Weinberg, Gerhard, A World at Arms (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994).

  Ziemke, Earl F. and Bauer, Magna E., Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (US Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 1987).

  Notes

  1. Statistics drawn from Ziemke & Bauer Moscow to Stalingrad, 283-95.

  2. Actual quote cited in Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, 506.

  3. Actual quotes taken from “Decisions Affecting the Campaign in Russia (1941/1942),” US Army, European Command Historical Division, MS #C-067b; and Ziemke & Bauer, 296. Both are from Halder, but the second actually dates to November 1941, before the great defeats of the winter.

  4. Actual quotes from May and March 1942, cited in Kershaw, 513-14.

  5. Hitler on August 5, 1942, quoted in Boog, et al., Der Globale Krieg, vol. VI of Das deutsche Reich und der zweite Weltkrieg, 117.

  6. Actual Jodl assessment quoted in Krecker, Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg, 225. The Bulgarian Army was seen as keeping Turkey in check.

  7. An actual incident from early 1941 recorded by the Sicherheitsdienst officer in the Ankara embassy, in Moyzisch, Operation Cicero, 7-9.

  8. On Papen’s recommendation, Hitler did write a letter to Inönü in February 1941, and the Germans hosted General Erden on a tour of the Eastern Front in November of that year.

  9. Quotes paraphrased from Weber, The Evasive Neutral, 146, citing exchanges between the German Foreign Ministry and von Papen in May 1942.

  10. Fall Gertrud was actually the German contingency plan for military occupation of Turkey, Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, vol. III, 1349-50.

  11. Actual quote cited in Oender, Die türkische Aussenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 150.

  12. Hitler quote from November 23, 1940, in Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, 112.

  13. Von Papen quote from May 13, 1941, in ibid., 117.

  14. The quote refers to Inönü’s attitude toward the briefing he received from Erden after the latter’s tour of the Eastern Front in 1941. Cited in ibid., 131.

  15. Papen, Memoirs, 479.

  16. Actual quotes from Turkish officers in Deringil, 38-39. Thanks to David Ryan for invaluable assistance with order of battle data, and to Rudi Garcia for concept review. Thanks also to Kate Flaherty, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives, for her prompt and courteous help with the photos.

  17. The second quote is actually from a historian, the first is from a British air attaché’s report in 1937. Both in ibid., 33-35.

  18. Actual quote in Schultz, Reverses on the Southern Wing, 145. The German corps was actually organized as indicated under General de Angelis.

  19. Quotes are actual. Hitler quote in Lucas, Hitler’s Mountain Troops, 133. Actual assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff, March 1940 in Deringil., 94.

  20. Quotes from Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. III, 83-103.

  21. Though little known, the Allied units mentioned here and later actually served in the Middle East, Iraq, and Iran during the second half of 1942, though often at reduced strength. Of the British forces, only the XXII Corps and “Northern Iraq Force” are invented. The Soviet 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies are invented, but represent likely command arrangements in the face of an invasion. The Transcaucasus Front and 12th Army were real, but had been disestablished by October 1942; they are retained here for command and control purposes. The Soviet 53rd Army was in Central Asia.

  22. Quotes from actual reports in Border Troops in the Great Patriotic War, 450ff.

  23. First quote is actual, cited in Schramm, vol. II, p. 617. Second quote is fictional.

  24. Actual Stalin quote on September 12, 1942, cited in Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 189.

  25. The planning for an American armored division and for a major U.S. air presence in the Middle East or Persia/Iraq are actual.

  Known Enemies and Forced Allies

  Sicily and Kursk, 1943

  John D. Burtt

  “It is better to have known enemies than a forced ally.”

  —Napoleon

  Introduction

  The huge meeting room was silent as the assembled generals watched Khozyin (“the Boss”) warily as he paced the floor, cigarette smoke exploding from his lips accentuating his dangerous anger. The news they had delivered was bad, and Josef Vissarianovich Stalin was not known to “enjoy” bad messages. Their summer attacks against the fascists had been hideously expensive in terms of men and tanks; and worse, the offensives had gained little.

  “What of our allies?” Stalin demanded suddenly, with biting sarcasm.

  “The same,” Marshal Georgi Zhukov replied. “No appreciable movement.”

  “They are waiting for us to destroy the fascists and ourselves,” Stalin snapped, throwing the reports on the table. “No longer,” he sighed, accepting the unthinkable. The abhorrence he felt at discussing an armistice with the fascists was only slightly less nauseating than the disgust he felt at the Western Allies for forcing it on him.

  The Situation

  In late 1942, Allied and Soviet offensives shattered the fragile stalemate that existed between the European belligerents. In North Africa, the British 8th Army attacked Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel’s Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) at El Alamein. After two weeks of intense combat, the supply-starved and outnumbered Axis forces were forced into retreat. To make matters worse, Allied troops landed to the west in Algeria and Morocco on November 8, 1942, threatening to trap Rommel between converging forces. Then on the Eastern Front in mid-November, Soviet spearheads broke through the flank forces on either side of the German 6th Army as it struggled in the morass of Stalingrad. Within days the army was cut off and surrounded.

  Hitler reacted as he always had in other crises, demanding that his forces hold at all costs. Rommel was able to get his particular hold order rescinded quickly, but the delay trapped three good Italian divisions. Hitler ordered German troops to Tunisia to hold a bridgehead open between the converging Allied forces.

  As his troops retreated, Rommel flew to Germany to meet with his Führer; he intended to demand adequate supplies or a complete withdrawal from Africa. However, his timing was poor. Caught in the middle of the 6th Army’s developing crisis, Hitler had little time for Rommel and less patience. He categorically refused to consider a withdrawal from Africa and demanded Rommel return to his troops and stop the 8th Army. The field marshal left the meeting a very discouraged man.