Third Reich Victorious

by Unknown

  With the Soviets’ last mobile reserve blunted, the Germans completed their withdrawal by July 20, managing to take 53,000 tons of supplies out with them. They destroyed every military installation and burned grain crops as they went. The Soviets could point to a huge tract of land liberated in Operation Kutusov, but they had lost over 550,000 casualties and 80 percent of their armor. The Germans had been hurt too, losing almost half their tanks and guns, but the targeted armies of the offensive were intact and effective behind a strong defensive position.

  To the south, Zhukov’s offensive continued as the two wing attacks started on time but barely made progress against German defenses. The added pressure, however, kept the German armies pushed apart and interfered with their effectiveness in dealing with the crisis. Zhukov’s infantry became embroiled for days around the towns of Graivoron and Borisovka, trying to encircle and destroy the elements of five German infantry divisions. Counterattacks by the 11th Panzer and “Grossdeutschland” Divisions held the escape routes open and got most of the troops out, though they were severely hampered by heavy artillery fire from the encroaching Soviets.

  Map 11. Kutusov and Rumianstev Offensives

  The rescue efforts around Borisovka delayed the German response to the invading tank armies, but ensured that the 1st Tank Army was operating with minimal infantry support. On July 10 two Panzergrenadier divisions, the 1st SS “Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler” and 2nd SS “Das Reich” launched a counterattack at the exposed Soviet spearhead near Bogodukhov. The next day the 3rd Panzer Division and 10th Panzer Brigade, with some 200 new Panther tanks, struck the embattled Soviets from the opposite flank. The new tanks showed they were superior to the enemy tanks they faced—when they worked. Far too many fell victim to mechanical failure. However, the two flank attacks shattered the 1st Tank Army and severely damaged the tank corps preceding the 40th Army’s advance that attacked the 3rd Panzer with a flank attack of its own.

  While the 1st Tank Army was battling for survival, Zhukov set up his set-piece assault on Kharkov. He planned to have the 53rd Army and part of the 5th Guards Tank Army attack the city from the northwest, while the Southwestern Front’s 57th Army attacked it from the southeast. A direct frontal attack by the 7th Guards Army, and an encircling move by the remainder of the 5th Guards Tank Army, would force the Germans to evacuate the city or be trapped inside.

  But the loss of the 1st Tank Army left the German mobile forces free to concentrate on the threat to Kharkov. The III Panzer Corps, recently arrived from the Mius battle, would move directly up the Donets from Izyum and attack the 57th Army in the flank with Totenkopf in support. Liebstandarte and Das Reich would attack the encircling tanks, and Army Group South’s main reserves, the 17th Panzer Division and 5th SS Panzer Wiking would attack the Soviet threat in the northwest.

  The two sides collided on July 15. The next two days of swirling tank battles saw both sides lose heavily. But the concentrations that the Germans could throw at the exposed Soviet spearheads proved too much. A divided 5th Guards Tank Army took a toll on the attacking Germans, but was completely shattered, with 95 percent of its armor destroyed. Without an armored shield, the Soviet infantry units were forced to halt their own attacks and defend. Both the 57th and 7th Guards fell back after resisting the German assaults for several days, opening up the rest of Zhukov’s forces to flank attacks from the southeast. By July 21 the Soviet attack was spent. There was general movement back toward the river lines, but Soviet troops held multiple towns and villages, creating a patchwork of isolated islands of resistance in the sea of German armor. The Germans had little infantry strength to deal effectively with these isolated positions, and their armor was battered and exhausted.

  The Soviets held on to some bridgeheads over the Donets, but the significant victory they were seeking fell terribly short. Two more carefully built-up tank armies had been ruined and over 2,000 tanks destroyed in three weeks of intense fighting. Another 480,000 men had fallen, nearly half during the pull-back and mop-ups. The Germans had suffered as well, losing 60 percent of their armor, but had taken the tremendous body shot the Soviets had prepared and stayed intact.

  For now the East quieted down as both sides licked their wounds.

  The Battle in the West

  When the news that the Germans were cancelling their Kursk offensive to build a strategic reserve came out of Moscow, the Allies were stunned. Nervous intelligence officers tapped every source they had looking for signs that the Germans were moving more troops into Sicily. They identified Rommel’s new command in northern Italy but little else. Ultra gave no indications of major movements—but it had also given no warning of Zitadelle’s cancellation.7 When the Soviets struck in the east and pinned the Germans down, Allied fears subsided and Husky continued.

  On July 9, 1943, Axis aerial reconnaissance found the huge Allied invasion armada—2,600 ships carrying 180,000 men—moving toward Sicily; Husky was beginning.

  On Sicily, the Axis forces were better prepared for the invasion, thanks to the two-month respite following the fall of Tunisia, but nowhere near prepared enough. In nominal command of the 230,000 Italians and 40,000 Germans was sixty-six-year-old Gen. d’Armata Alfredo Guzzoni. Recalled out of retirement, the energetic Italian had only been on the island six weeks—enough time to know his defenses were inadequate. His mobile and coastal divisions were poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly supplied, and poorly led. Only his “Livorno” Assault and Landing Division was close to strength. His troops were divided into two corps. The XVI Corps had the task of defending eastern Sicily with the “Napoli” Division and two coastal divisions. The XII Corps defended the western half of the island with the “Aosta” and “Assietta” Divisions and three coastal divisions. In addition to these corps, there were three separate naval fortress areas at Messina-Reggio, Trapani, and Augusta-Syracuse that were better armed and prepared for defense.

  In reserve, Guzzoni held the Livorno Division and the two German divisions under his “command.” He wanted to keep all three concentrated for one massive counterattack once the main Allied landing was identified. However, Kesselring disagreed with the dispositions, wanting the German divisions split to cover both sides of the island. Guzzoni gave in. The Hermann Göring Panzer Division, newly arrived in Sicily and at full strength, was stationed to guard the west. In the center Kesselring placed the 15th Panzer, supplemented by a company of Tiger tanks. With the exception of a regimental group posted near Catania, 15th Panzer was concentrated. Its men and officers had been on the island for months and knew the area well. Hitler named Maj. Gen. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, an experienced Panzer commander as well as a diplomat, to head up Germany’s forces on Sicily, ostensibly under Guzzoni.

  Fortunately, von Senger and Guzzoni held similar tactical views on how to defend the island, despite the difference in dispositions—each intended to counterattack with the weight of his reserves. Von Senger, and his immediate superior, Kesselring, especially wanted an immediate attack against the chaotic beachheads.

  On the night of July 9 the first phase of Husky went into action as the British 1st Airborne’s 1st Airlanding Brigade was transported over the island in 169 gliders. The mission of these 2,000 paratroops was to land outside Syracuse near the Ponte Grande Bridge and hold it until relieved by the 5th Infantry Division the following day. Unfortunately, the glider convoy broke apart due to antiaircraft fire, high winds, and smoke that obscured the target area. Sixty-nine gliders landed at sea, killing over 250 troops. The rest of the gliders were scattered over the island—only twelve landed anywhere near their target. With incredible courage, a single platoon captured the bridge and by daylight had collected some ninety troops to hold the vital span.

  The second air phase of the operation went as poorly as the first. Paratroops of the 505th Regimental Combat Team from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division were supposed to be dropped northeast of Gela around midnight to block any enemy movement toward the U.S. landing beaches. Many of the 266
C-47 aircraft lost their way flying to Sicily and encountered the same conditions that had fractured the glider convoy. The 3,000 paratroops were scattered over 1,000 square miles of the island. As a result, this elite fighting force was reduced from a potent weapon to a scattered nuisance.

  The landings commenced at 0300, July 10, 1943. The British landed the 50th Northumbrian and 5th Divisions of Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey’s XIII Corps between Avola and Cassible southwest of Syracuse, with support from the 3rd Commando and 1st Special Raiding Squadron. Farther south around Pachino, Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese’s XXX Corps put the 1st Canadian and 51st Highland Divisions ashore with the 231st Brigade in direct support. There was little organized resistance to the landings; most of the problems came from the high seas that pushed landing craft as much as 6,000 yards off course. But by mid-morning the British had troops ashore and were beginning to push out toward their first objectives.

  To the west, the U.S. 7th Army was also landing at the same time. The independent 3rd Infantry Division landed on both sides of Licata, taking the small port handily with the help of the 3rd Ranger Battalion. East of them, the 36th Division, part of Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley’s II Corps, landed at Gela, where it met stiff resistance. The first attack into the port was repulsed, but the second, aided by engineers and Rangers, was successful. Finally, Bradley’s other division, the 45th Infantry, landed unopposed near Scoglitti.

  Resistance picked up as the landing forces moved off their beachheads. In the first major setback elements of the 5th Division, moving to relieve the 1st Airborne troops holding the Ponte Grande Bridge, arrived too late. After holding out for hours, the paratroops, reduced to fifteen men, surrendered when their ammunition ran out. By mid-afternoon, when the relieving troops finally arrived, their initial advance was repulsed, then the charges reset by the enemy brought the bridge down in front of them. Movement toward Syracuse was halted while the engineers gathered equipment to rebridge the river.

  Axis counterattack plans began with the movement of the 15th Panzer toward the U.S. beaches. The 45th Division, supported by the M4 Sherman tanks of the 753rd Tank Battalion, captured Comiso airfield and was advancing against the field at Biscari. They overran the Italian defenders but ran head on into the Germans. The Shermans were no match for the Tigers that accompanied the attack and the infantry had to fall back, suffering heavy casualties as they retreated.

  Early on July 11 the counterattack hit the beachhead in full force. The green 36th Division, a Texas National Guard unit, held its own for a while, but without enough antitank support, began caving in before the Panzers. While the 15th Panzer pushed forward, another Italian-German force struck Gela itself, forcing the U.S. defenders out. A counterattack by engineers and Rangers retook the town briefly, but it fell again to another concerted Axis effort. The Ranger battalion was virtually destroyed in the fighting. The survivors joined the 36th Division at the beachhead, where naval gunfire aided the defense.

  But the potential disaster at Gela became secondary to the disaster that befell the British that day. General Montgomery came ashore early that morning and, while moving forward, a lone Bf 109 strafed his entourage, killing his chief of staff and seriously wounding the 8th Army commander himself. News of Monty’s wound spread quickly and the loss of their beloved leader devastated the troops, bringing the entire army to a virtual halt.

  Offshore, Patton responded to the crises on the beaches by landing the last regiment of the 36th Division and an initial task force from the 2nd Armored Division to counter the Panzers. The reinforcements stabilized the situation, but the U.S. 7th Army found itself with two separated beachheads, both under sporadic attack, and no port, which limited supply. The Germans beat back several counterattacks, inflicting losses on the American tankers as they kept their pressure up.

  That night Patton also committed another reserve—the 82nd Airborne’s 504th Parachute Regiment. Unfortunately, bad luck dogged this airborne attempt as much as the first two. As the transports approached Sicily, the Allied fleet, still nervous from a day of Axis air attacks, opened fire with a withering antiaircraft barrage, with 23 aircraft shot down and many others damaged in the horrific mistake. The paratroops lost 10 percent of their number before the drop, including their assistant division commander, and were scattered over a wide area.

  While the 7th Army struggled to fight off Axis counterattacks, the British struggled with their personal loss. Alexander, as stunned as the army by Montgomery’s loss, seemed unable to cope with the situation. On July 12, more than a day after Monty’s injury, Alexander came out of his funk to announce that XXX Corps commander Leese would take over command. Leese was an obvious choice; he was Monty’s protégé and a good corps commander. But he was far more volatile with his subordinates than Monty and prone to obscene outbursts. With the change in command finally made, Leese attempted to get the 8th Army rolling again.

  Guzzoni, Kesselring, and von Senger were aware that the attacks at Gela had probably done as much damage as they could. Allied naval support and increasing air attacks were providing enough of a shield to keep the Panzers from pushing the landings into the sea. They could replace infantry losses by combing the German rear area units, but they had also lost a lot of tanks, including virtually all their Tigers, losses that were almost impossible to replace. And with both German divisions attacking the Americans, little stood in the way of the British except the Italians, who, apart from the Livorno Division, were surrendering in large numbers. Von Senger sent orders to his division commanders to pull back from the beaches, out of naval gunfire range, and commence mobile delaying tactics.

  Kesselring debated sending more troops to the island, given the poor performance by the Italian coastal divisions. He was still concerned that the Allies would land on the Italian mainland and cut off Sicily. While the situation clarified, he dispatched his elite paratroops to the airfields near Augusta to bolster the defenders.

  On July 15, Leese finally got the 8th Army moving again, sending the 5th and 50th Divisions straight at Syracuse. But the delay had cost the British heavily. Rather than a few assorted troops in their path, and the bulk of the enemy engaged with the 7th Army, they found an enemy substantially strengthened with high quality troops. The 5th was bloodily repulsed in its attack, but the 50th managed to force and hold a bridgehead across the Anapo River. Though fighting was bitter, both Syracuse and Augusta fell four days later.

  As the XIII Corps operated on the coast, the XXX Corps moved inland. The 51st Division attacked Palazzola on the main highway and was making progress against the Italians when the 15th Panzer struck from the flank. The Highlanders were thrown back several miles before regrouping to stop their pursuers. As soon as resistance stiffened, the Panzers pulled back. Later that night the Germans struck at a brigade from the 50th Division before pulling back into fortifications around Palazzola.

  Map 12. Sicily

  In the American sector, the German retreat allowed the 7th Army to retake Gela from its tenacious Livorno defenders. Inland, a task force from the 2nd Armored pushed ahead, slowed by a series of well-defended positions that compelled the Americans to try slow flanking maneuvers. Their opponents, the Hermann Göring Panzergrenadiers, battle-hardened and tested in Tunisia, pulled out of each position just prior to the attacks and withdrew to fresh defenses. By July 20, however, the Americans had advanced enough to secure the beachhead and Patton went on the defensive to regroup, resupply, and add badly needed replacements to his bloodied regiments.

  With a storm hampering operations, Patton and Leese met with Alexander to discuss further plans. The meeting became as stormy as the weather. Leese began by attacking Patton for U.S. “failures.” The British commander was livid at the attacks by the 15th Panzer which had severely hurt his troops and stalled their drive. In his view, the U.S. combat troops were not protecting his flanks as the invasion plan envisioned. He presented these views in an angry, foul outburst that shocked everyone in the room. Alexander, who silently agreed with his
subordinate, did nothing to tone down the remarks. Patton, who had earlier received a stinging rebuke from Eisenhower for the airborne disasters, finally exploded, citing Leese’s unimaginative tactics as the reason the British were not moving. Alexander eventually stepped in to quell the recriminations. Although the shouting subsided, the participants remained volatile and angry.

  As the meeting proceeded, the commanders ran headlong into a problem that had been ignored throughout the Husky planning sessions. There had been little thought to operations after the landings were established. Taking the city of Messina quickly to trap Axis forces on the island and prevent reinforcements was the obvious goal, but there had never been a master plan or strategic blueprint on how to accomplish that goal, nor had there been any coordination between armies, either through their own efforts or through the 15th Army Group. Now, with the bitterness of the earlier words still ringing, the Allies had to come up with plans.