The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Like the sedition act in 1798, the violence in 1812 boomeranged on the war party. The Washington Benevolent Society of Maryland launched a campaign to drum up subscriptions for the Federal Republican, and Federalists across the country responded. More than 200 subscribers were signed up in Boston, another 70 in Providence, and an additional 42 in Franklin County, Pennsylvania.131 By December 1812 $2,000 had poured in.132 Although this did not cover the paper’s losses, which were estimated at $3,000 to $5,000 in the June riot alone, the Federal Republican nonetheless flourished.133 Thus, instead of silencing the paper, the Baltimore mob made the Federal Republican one of the most widely read newspapers in the country.

  Revulsion against the violence also contributed to Federalist election victories in Maryland, New York, and New England.134 In addition, the violence politicized the war by showing that, for some Republicans at least, the conflict was merely a pretext for suppressing dissent. The effect was to accelerate the movement of Federalists in the middle and southern states back into opposition. By the fall of 1812, Federalists everywhere opposed the war, not simply because they considered it unjust and unwise but also because they saw it as a threat to their basic liberties as well. In short, instead of stifling dissent, Republican violence only added fuel to the growing anti-war fire.

  Chapter 4

  The Campaign of 1812

  On December 16, 1811, after the debate on the war preparations had been under way for more than two weeks, John Randolph raised a specter that was to haunt contemporaries and historians alike. “Agrarian cupidity,” he said, “not maritime right, urges the war. Ever since the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations came into the House, we have heard but one word—like the whip-poor-will, but one eternal monotonous tone—Canada! Canada! Canada!”1 Randolph exaggerated, since at no time during the debates did territorial expansion overshadow the maritime issues. Even in the West, where expansionist sentiment ran deep, the maritime issues dominated public discussion in the run-up to the war, mainly because westerners blamed the Orders-in-Council for their economic woes.2 Nevertheless, some historians later seized upon Randolph’s words to prove that this war was undertaken to acquire territory, that the maritime issues were merely a pretext for seizing Canada.3

  The Lure of Canada

  There is no denying that territorial expansionism was a potent force in this era. Republican leaders worked assiduously to pry Louisiana and the Floridas loose from their European overlords, and government and frontiersmen alike pushed Indians off their lands with callous disregard for their rights.4 Many Americans also coveted Canada, if only to put an end to British influence over American Indians. But the desire to annex Canada did not bring on the war. Rather it was maritime issues—particularly the Orders-in-Council and impressment. “Canada was not the end but the means,” said Henry Clay, “the object of the War being the redress of injuries, and Canada being the instrument by which that redress was to be obtained.”5

  Most Republicans considered Canada a logical target because of its weakness vis-à-vis the United States. Not counting Indians, about 7.7 million people lived in the United States in 1812, compared to only 500,000 in Canada.6 The United States also had almost 12,000 regulars in uniform, while the British could muster only 10,000 in Canada, and only 8,000 in the two provinces where the fighting was likely to occur: Upper Canada (modern-day Ontario) and Lower Canada (modern-day Quebec).7 Additional enlistments, short-term volunteers, and militia drafts were likely to tip the balance still further in America’s favor, especially since Great Britain could ill afford to divert resources from the war in Europe.

  John Randolph of Roanoke (1773–1833) was an Old Republican from Virginia who believed in small government. A fierce opponent of the war, he regularly voted with the Federalists. Randolph never matured physically, but his boyish looks belied a sharp tongue. (Portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

  Republicans counted on another advantage, too. In Lower Canada, north of the St. Lawrence River, two-thirds of the inhabitants were of French origin and thus of uncertain loyalty, and many of the rest were recent American immigrants. The loyalty of people in Upper Canada, north of the Great Lakes, was equally problematical because most of the population there was American by birth. Although some were Loyalists who had fled north during or after the Revolution, after 1792 there had been a steady flow of new immigrants from south of the border eager to take advantage of free land and low taxes. By 1812 these immigrants—optimistically called “Late Loyalists”—constituted 60 percent of the population in the province.8 Loyalists were staunchly committed to British rule and in 1811 had remonstrated against “the sudden and indiscriminate influx of foreigners, sometimes openly, and at other times secretly hostile to the British Government,” but nothing had come of their protest.9 Despite a request from the administration, the legislature of Upper Canada refused to require men serving in the militia to renounce foreign allegiance.10 By the time the war began, Major General Isaac Brock, the civilian head and military commander in Upper Canada, claimed that most of the people in his province were “essentially bad.” They were “either indifferent to what is passing, or so completely American as to rejoice in the prospects of a change of Governments.”11

  Republicans counted on this disaffection to facilitate the conquest of Canada. One reason they had gone to war without adequate preparation was the expectation that American troops would be welcomed in Canada. Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York predicted that “one-half of the Militia of [Canada] would join our standard,” and many Republicans shared this view.12 Jefferson claimed that “the acquisition of Canada this year, as far as the neighborhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching,” and Clay boasted that “the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at our feet.”13 Most Republicans, in other words, expected what John Randolph called “a holiday campaign.” With “no expense of blood, or treasure, on our part—Canada is to conquer herself—she is to be subdued by the principles of fraternity.”14

  Federalists did not dispute that Canada might be conquered, but they vigorously denied that it was a legitimate target. They preferred to settle American differences with Great Britain on the high seas, believing that a war against Canada was unjust. “Canada has issued no Orders in Council,” said Congressman Samuel Taggart of Massachusetts. “She has not impressed our seamen, taken our ships, confiscated our property, nor in any other respect treated us ill. All the crime alleged against Canada or the Canadians, is that, without any act of their own, they are connected with, and under the protection of a nation which has injured us on the ocean.”15

  Federalists regarded the invasion of Canada as not only unjust but also unwise. Ever since the Louisiana Purchase they had openly opposed expansion, believing that any new territory would only enhance Republican strength and undermine national stability. The acquisition of Canada, declared the Maryland House of Delegates, would be “worse than a doubtful boon.” It would “enfeeble” the United States, said a Massachusetts Federalist, by increasing those “jarring materials” which made up the country. “The strength of the nation,” added a Delaware congressman, is “already too much scattered.”16

  Annexationist Fever

  Federalists assumed that Canada would be annexed because Republicans never made clear what they planned to do with the territory once it was conquered. Since Canada was not an end in itself, presumably it would be held for ransom on the maritime issues, but what if Canada were conquered and the British still balked at concessions? The administration remained silent on this matter, probably to keep its options open. As late as 1814 Federalist Joseph Pearson of North Carolina insisted that Republican leaders had never clarified their position. “Do they mean to plant their standard on the walls of Quebec, apportion out the lands to the conquerors, and sing a requiem to ‘free trade and sailors’ rights’? These questions never have been satisfactorily answered.”17

  Some Republicans made no secret of their
desire to keep Canada, and this sentiment grew as the war progressed. “It appears to be the universal opinion of the Republicans,” said the Boston Chronicle in 1813, “that the Canadas ought in no event to be surrendered. . . . Too much valuable blood has already been shed, and too much treasure expended, to permit us to indulge for a moment the idea of resigning this country.” Any treaty that does not secure Canada, a Georgia senator told the president, “will be very ungraciously received.”18 Annexationist fever was particularly strong in the West, where toasts were drunk to the acquisition of Canada, and a resolution on the subject was offered in the Kentucky legislature.19 According to one critic, by 1814 the message from the West “was unequivocal—Canada must not, shall not be given up.”20

  Long before this, Monroe had conceded privately that public opinion might make it “difficult to relinquish Territory which had been conquered.”21 In the meantime, the administration had to decide how to govern occupied territory. At the beginning of the war, Congress considered proposals to establish temporary government in Canada and to guarantee the rights of Canadians, but these measures were killed in the Senate.22 Hence the administration was left to its own devices.

  The War Department instructed its commanders in the field to promise Canadians nothing more than protection for their persons, property, and rights.23 But some officers went further. On the Detroit frontier, Brigadier General William Hull issued a proclamation to Canadians that said: “You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the dignified station of freemen.”24 Likewise, on the Niagara frontier, Brigadier General Alexander Smyth announced to his men that “the time is at hand when you will cross the streams of Niagara to conquer . . . a country that is to be one of the United States.”25 The War Department approved of Hull’s proclamation, and although it reprimanded Smyth, it did so privately.26 The administration’s failure to repudiate either proclamation made it all the more difficult to reconcile domestic opponents to the war.

  The War Department Overwhelmed

  The decision for war was a momentous one, and the president was fully aware of this. When the British minister visited Madison the day after the declaration of war, he found other Republicans celebrating, “but the President was white as a sheet and very naturally felt all the responsibility he would incur.”27 Nevertheless, Madison did his best to encourage his department heads. According to one observer, “He visited in person, a thing never known before, all the offices of the departments of war and the navy, stimulating every thing in a manner worthy of a little commander in chief, with his little round hat and huge cockade!”28 This may have given heart to Madison’s subordinates, but what the nation really needed was more energy and efficiency, both of which were sorely lacking.

  Conditions were particularly bad in the War Department, which was poorly organized and understaffed. According to War Hawk George M. Troup, “In the wretched, deplorably wretched condition of the War Department, it was impossible either to begin the war or to conduct it.” The work load of the department, heavy in time of peace, was staggering in time of war. “No man in the country,” claimed Troup, “is equal to one-half the duties which devolve on the present Secretary.”29 Although the department had eleven clerks, none had more than a year’s experience.30 Moreover, when the president asked Congress to authorize two assistant secretaries of war, the Senate balked, apparently because the creation of new supply departments was expected to lighten the work load.31

  The secretary of war, William Eustis, was a good politician, but he lacked administrative skills and never mastered his duties. Overwhelmed by the task before him, he devoted himself to details and failed to give proper direction to the commanders in the field. He sometimes bypassed the chain of command, corresponding directly with junior officers, and, according to one senator, he spent much of his time “reading advertisements of Petty retailing merchants, to find where he may Purchase 100 shoes, or 200 hats.” “Our Secretary at War,” concluded a Pennsylvania congressman, “is a dead weight in our hands. . . . His unfitness is apparrent to every body but himself.”32

  Sad State of the Army

  Conditions in the army were not much better. The senior officers, headed by two major generals and six brigadiers, inspired little confidence, most owing their appointment to politics. According to Winfield Scott, “the old officers had, very generally, sunk into either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking.”33 Although there were some promising junior officers, it took time for them to rise to positions of significant authority. The administration had an opportunity to appoint additional officers on the eve of the war, but it was slow to act. “The army appointments,” said one Republican, “cannot be made until names from all the states come in, and there is great tardiness.”34 According to Scott, the government relied heavily on the recommendations of Republican congressmen, “who unfortunately pressed upon the Executive their own particular friends & dependents, &, in some cases—menials.”35 As a result, few of the new officers had any experience or knew much about the art of war. “Our Army,” complained Peter B. Porter in 1813, “is full of men, fresh from Lawyer shops & counting rooms, who know little of the physical force of man—of the proper means of sustaining & improving it—or even the mode of its application.”36

  Most of the enlisted men were inexperienced, and morale in the ranks was low. Infractions of discipline were common, and these multiplied as the army grew. Desertion was common—so common, in fact, that less than four months into the war President Madison felt obliged to issue a proclamation pardoning all deserters who returned to duty within four months.37 Although Congress outlawed whipping in 1812, army officers had other means of maintaining discipline. Deprivation of pay or spirits, public penance, and paddling as well as other corporal punishments were common. In more serious cases, the offender might be branded on the face, his ears might be cropped, or he might be executed.38

  Those who enlisted in the army at the beginning of the war had a five-year commitment, though later recruits were given the option of enlisting for the duration of the war.39 At first the bounty was $31 and 160 acres of land, but because enlistments lagged, Congress gradually increased the incentives to $124 and 320 acres of land.40 This was a princely sum—probably the highest bounty ever paid by any army in the world. The cash bounty alone was as much as many unskilled laborers earned in a year, and even if the land sold for only $1.00 an acre, the total bounty was more than most people made in two years. This enormous bounty did much to spur enlistments, although the army did not become an effective fighting force until the last year of the war.

  Volunteers and Militia

  Initially the administration planned to rely on short-term volunteers, but Congress gave the president authority to appoint the officers only after war had been declared.41 As late as mid-August, the law remained “a dead letter” in Pennsylvania because volunteers continued to offer their services to the state instead of the national government.42 The incentives offered to U.S. Volunteers were in any case too paltry to be effective. The government paid no bounty but simply allowed men who served at least a month to keep their weapons. Only six regiments were raised during the war, and one army officer claimed that those he inspected were little better than organized bandits who wasted public property, insulted private citizens, and freely engaged in “desertion, robbery, [and] disorderly & Mutinous Conduct.”43

  Nor could the militia, who were in disarray everywhere except in New England and the West, play the active role that Republican leaders envisioned for them. They were inefficient and unreliable and costly as well. “The expences of the Militia are enormous,” said a Republican general, “& they are of little comparative use, except at the commencement of war, & for special emergencies.—The sooner we can dispense with their services, the better.”44 In short, after a decade of neglect, the nation’s land forces were not up to the task at hand.

  Payment and Supply Problems

  The system for paying the troops broke do
wn from the beginning. At the start of the war privates were paid $5 a month, noncommissioned officers $7 to $9, and officers $20 to $200.45 To stimulate enlistments, Congress in late 1812 raised the pay of privates and noncommissioned officers by $3.46 At $8 a month, privates still earned less than the $10 to $20 that most unskilled laborers made, but as the bounty increased, army wages soared well above the civilian average.47

  By law army pay could not be more than two months in arrears “unless the circumstances of the case should render it unavoidable.”48 But even in the first year of the war, when the government had ample resources, administrative inefficiency and slow communication kept many troops from receiving their pay on time. In October 1812 men who had enlisted five months earlier “absolutely refused to march untill they had recd. their pay,” and other troops also mutinied for want of pay.49 As the war progressed, the problem of paying the troops became almost unmanageable. By the fall of 1814 army pay was frequently 6 to 12 months in arrears, and in some cases even more.50

  The system for supplying the troops was also grossly inefficient.51 To cut expenses, Congress had abolished the quartermaster and commissary departments in 1802.52 Thereafter the army was supplied by civilian agents who were eager to maximize their profits. According to one officer, many of the agents were “perfectly ignorant of military affairs.”53 In March 1812, Congress reestablished the quartermaster and commissary departments, but it was months before either department was staffed and working, and the authority granted to each was vague and overlapping.54 The legislation creating these departments, Madison complained, “was so inadequate, that the War office, otherwise overcharged, was obliged for some time to perform the functions of both.”55 Even when operational the supply departments were woefully inefficient, and troops in the field frequently had to go for months at a time without shoes, clothing, blankets, or other vital supplies.56