The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  “Uncle Sam” Makes an Appearance

  There was another development in this theater in 1812 that went unnoticed at the time but loomed large for the future. That was the first appearance of the phrase “Uncle Sam.” In late December, the Bennington (Vermont) News-Letter carried a letter from a Federalist who had been drafted into militia duty. “Now, Mr. Editor,” the conscripted citizen soldier asked, “pray if you can inform me, what single solitary good thing will, or can ac[c]rue to (Uncle Sam) the U.S. for all the expence, marching and countermarching, pain, sickness, death &c. among us?”140 This was the first known reference to “Uncle Sam.”

  The following spring a broadside celebrating American victories was published in eastern New York that included doggerel with two more allusions to “Uncle Sam.” The first appeared in a couplet under a picture of Napoleon: “If uncle Sam needs, I’d be glad to assist him,/For it makes my heart bleed we live at such a distance.” The second, which was under a picture of Commodore John Rodgers, predicted that John Bull and his Indian allies would suffer the same fate as Major General John Burgoyne in 1777: “He builds on the Indians that now with him join’d,/But if Uncle Sam lives, they will all be Burgoyn’d.”141

  Thereafter references to “Uncle Sam” proliferated, first in New York and New England, and then elsewhere in the country. The early references usually carried a negative connotation, and often referred to the U.S. Army rather than the government. Indeed, by 1814 the British sometimes referred to American soldiers as “Uncle Sams.”142

  Conventional wisdom holds that this nickname originated with an army contractor named Sam Wilson who lived in Troy, New York. Wilson employed people (including some relatives) who called him “Uncle Sam,” and somehow this name got transferred to the U.S. government. Although the evidence for this connection is far from conclusive, there is no denying that the war launched what would one day be a powerful symbol for the nation and its government.143

  The Failure of American Arms

  Uncle Sam had little to cheer about on the northern frontier in 1812 because the invasion of Canada had failed on all three fronts. The “blustering, bullying, mountain laboring campaign,” said a Federalist newspaper in Vermont, had produced nothing but “an unbroken series of disaster, defeat, disgrace, and ruin and death.”144 Armies had surrendered at Detroit, Frenchtown, and Queenston; much of the Northwest had been overrun by Indians; and no headway had been made against British positions on the St. Lawrence. “The series of misfortunes,” said Albert Gallatin, “exceeds all anticipations made even by those who had least confidence in our inexperienced officers and undisciplined men.”145

  The principal reason for America’s failure was poor leadership. The administration’s strategy pushed the focus of American operations too far west, the War Department failed to give proper direction to commanders in the field, and most of the army’s senior officers were incompetent. Some of the junior officers, like Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, John Wool, and Zebulon Pike, had shown promise; and the rank and file had proven adequate, although most were still raw recruits without battlefield experience. As for the militia, they were a major disappointment. When forced to take the offensive, more often than not they had proven undisciplined, unreliable, and unwilling to leave the country. “Volunteer militia,” the Washington National Intelligencer conceded, “are not precisely the species of force on which to rely for carrying on war, however competent they may be to repel invasion.”146 The entire campaign showed how difficult it was to build an army overnight. “The degraded state in which the military institutions have been retained,” concluded the Philadelphia Aurora, “comes now upon us with a dismal sentence of retribution.”147

  The Rival Navies

  The war at sea went much better for the United States in 1812, although not because of superior leadership in the cabinet. The secretary of the navy was Paul Hamilton, a South Carolina rice planter with little knowledge of naval affairs. Hamilton was an alcoholic who was sometimes drunk by noon, and Nathaniel Macon thought that he was “about as fit for his place, as the Indian prophet would be for Emperor of Europe.”148 Hamilton’s one claim to his office was that he was an advocate of preparedness, though parsimonious Treasury policies and congressional opposition doomed his schemes to expand the navy.149

  A decade of Republican hostility had taken a heavy toll on the navy, but seventeen ships still survived in 1812. Seven were frigates. The Constitution, President, and United States were rated at 44 guns; the Constellation, Chesapeake, and Congress at 36 guns; and the Essex at 32 guns. Another frigate, the Adams, was being cut down to a 28-gun corvette and would later go to sea as a sloop-of-war. There were also nine smaller vessels rated at 10 to 20 guns. Most of the ships carried more guns than they were rated for, and most also carried extra crewmen.150

  The frigates were the heart of the navy. Inspired by Philadelphia shipwright Joshua Humphreys, the three heavy frigates—or “44s” as they were called—were bigger and sturdier than other frigates. They carried heavier guns (24-pounders rather than 18-pounders) and their thick hulls were better able to withstand enemy broadsides. In fact, they were “superfrigates,” capable of outfighting and outsailing other ships in their class and of outrunning anything larger.151

  The nation also had the advantage of a rich maritime tradition. Officers and men alike were excellent seamen and skilled marksmen with naval guns and small arms. Most of the officers had seen action in the Quasi-War (1798–1801) or in the War with Tripoli (1801–1805). Many of the men had fought in those wars, too, or had served on British warships. The morale of the service was high, and the men were trained to perfect their skills. In addition, the navy did not face the same logistical problems as the army. The fleet was small, and once supplied a ship could remain at sea for months.152

  In spite of its high morale, the navy had trouble keeping its ships fully manned. The army siphoned off potential recruits (even some with extensive naval experience) because of the large bounties it offered. The competition from privateers was even greater. Privateering was an attractive alternative to naval service: the tour of duty was shorter (usually a two- or three-month cruise instead of a year), the prospect of an armed engagement was less, and the chances of large profits greater.153

  It was particularly difficult for the navy to find men to serve in the gunboat flotillas attached to the major ports or in the squadrons on the northern lakes. Flotilla duty was dull and lake service rigorous, and neither offered much prospect of prize money. Although men could be transferred from the navy’s oceangoing vessels to the lakes or flotillas, this encouraged desertion and discouraged reenlistments.154

  The War at Sea

  The usual term of service for navy personnel was a year, and normally there was no bounty.155 The pay ranged from $6 a month for boys and landsmen to $20 for sailmakers. Ordinary seamen earned $10, able-bodied seamen $12, and gunners $18.156 Most could earn more on a merchantman and a lot more on a lucky privateer. To compete, the navy began offering incentives on some stations as early as 1812, a practice that became almost universal by the end of the war. By then new recruits could expect to receive a bounty (ranging from $10 to $30), three months’ advance pay, and a 25 percent boost in pay. The navy demanded a two-year commitment in exchange for these incentives but sometimes had to settle for a year or even six months. Even so, the incentives went a long way toward securing the men that were needed.157

  Even with a full complement of men, the tiny American fleet hardly seemed a match for the Mistress of the Seas. For more than a century Great Britain had ruled the waves, and on paper her naval superiority was overwhelming. She had over 500 ships in service, including 115 ships-of-the-line and 126 frigates. Yet her fleet was scattered all over the world in 1812, engaged in patrol, convoy, and blockade duty. Indeed, at the beginning of the war she had only one small ship-of-the-line, five frigates, and nineteen smaller vessels on the Halifax station. Although additional ships were assigned to the Newfoundland and West
Indian stations, they were charged with protecting the North Atlantic fisheries and Britain’s huge Caribbean trade and thus were not available for service on the American coast.158

  The Royal Navy faced other problems. Its manpower needs had soared from 45,000 in 1793 to 145,000 in 1812, which meant that most of its ships were chronically undermanned. A lack of skilled workers and materials at the navy yards in the New World meant that ships in need of a major overhaul had to be sent home. In addition, after Trafalgar, the Admiralty prohibited live-fire training to save on gun powder, and this undermined the readiness of the gun crews.159

  The British were reluctant to divert any warships from the European theater because Napoleon was rebuilding his fleet in the Mediterranean. In addition, they hoped that the repeal of the Orders-in-Council would put an end to the American war. Even when it became evident that the war was likely to continue, they feared that closing the sea lanes would deprive their troops in Spain and their colonists in the West Indies and Canada of much-needed provisions. Consequently, they retained only a modest naval presence in American waters until 1813.160

  U.S. Naval Strategy

  American officials recognized that the nation’s fleet might be useful but could not agree on how to deploy it. James Monroe wanted to keep the ships in port, while Albert Gallatin thought they should cruise in American waters to protect returning merchantmen, whose value he estimated at $4 million to $6 million in the first month of the war. Two captains in the service, Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge, wanted to send the ships abroad to cruise separately, while a third, John Rodgers, thought they should operate in squadrons.161

  The administration adopted a plan based on Gallatin’s and Rodgers’s recommendations. The ships were divided into two squadrons (later increased to three) and ordered “to afford to our returning commerce, all possible protection.”162 But this order arrived after Rodgers, who was in charge of one of the squadrons, had set sail in search of a rich British convoy en route from Jamaica to England.163 Although he never caught up with the convoy, his cruise nonetheless had a dramatic effect on British naval strategy. Rodgers’s squadron chanced upon the British frigate Belvidera (42 guns), and in the ensuing chase Rodger’s flagship, the President (54 guns), exchanged fire with the British ship. Both sides suffered some casualties, one of whom was Rodgers, who sustained a broken leg when one of the President’s guns burst. The Belvidera made its escape, taking word to Halifax that the war had begun and that an American squadron was off the U.S. coast.

  Vice Admiral Herbert Sawyer, commander of the Halifax station, wanted to post a British cruiser in front of each American port to intercept returning merchantmen. But when he learned that Rodgers was at sea with a large squadron, he gave up this plan, fearing that his vessels might be picked off one at a time. More by accident than design, the tiny U.S. navy had come up with a strategy that prevented the British from blockading the American coast. Instead, Sawyer kept his ships together and spent most of his time searching for Rodgers’s squadron. As a result, he was able to make only one sweep through American waters, and his catch was poor. “We have been so completely occupied looking for Commodore Rodgers’s squadron,” a British officer complained, “that we have taken very few prizes.”164

  Because the British did not patrol American waters, most American merchant vessels were able to reach home safely. “Nearly as great a proportion of homeward bound merchantmen have escaped capture,” Governor Tompkins reported, “as has been customary during the last three or four years of peace.”165 The windfall for the United States was considerable. The flood of goods replenished the nation’s stockpiles and buoyed the customs revenue. In addition, returning seaman helped fill out the crews of American warships and privateers that were fitting out for sea.166

  The Constitution Shines

  Some American warships cruised separately in 1812, and their record of accomplishments was impressive. Captain Isaac Hull, the nephew of the disgraced army general, commanded the U.S. Frigate Constitution (55 guns), the nation’s best frigate. After putting to sea, Hull ran into the Halifax squadron—consisting of a ship-of-the-line and four frigates—which gave chase. Normally, Hull could have outdistanced his pursuers, but he lost his wind. To keep the British at bay, he mounted guns on his stern and undertook several laborious maneuvers to propel his ship. First he used his small boats to tow the ship; then (after discovering that he was in shallow water) he used his boats to drop his kedge anchor ahead, his men then pulling the Constitution forward (a maneuver known as “kedging”). Later, when a slight breeze picked up, Hull ordered his men to water down the sails to better hold the wind. The chase continued for fifty-seven hours, the British keeping pace by matching Hull’s maneuvers. The Constitution finally slipped away, eventually putting in at Boston.167 The escape was the talk of the nation, and even the British conceded that it was “elegant.”168

  Without waiting for new orders, Hull took on supplies and set sail again.169 On August 19, about 750 miles east of Boston, the Constitution, still carrying 55 guns, encountered H.M. Ship Guerrière (49 guns), a ship commanded by Captain James R. Dacres (pronounced Da-kers) and described by the British Naval Chronicle as “one of our stoutest frigates.”170 After considerable maneuvering, Hull’s ship delivered a powerful and destructive raking fire. An American on board the British ship said the Constitution’s double-shotted first fire (700 pounds of metal delivered at close range) sounded like “a tremendous explosion” and forced the Guerrière to “reel, and tremble as though she had received the shock of an earthquake.”171

  Although the Guerrière returned the fire, her masts were soon destroyed, her hull damaged, and much of her crew knocked out of action. This left Dacres with no choice but to surrender. “She was left without a Spar Standing,” the American captain reported, “and the Hull cut to pieces, in such a manner as to make it difficult to keep her above water.” Unable to salvage the British ship, Hull removed her crew and ordered her set on fire and sent to the bottom.172

  In the first major engagement of the war at sea, the U.S. Frigate Constitution defeated the light British frigate Guerrière. British round shot bounced off the thick hull of the American ship, thus earning her the nickname “Ironsides.” The victory of the Constitution gave a huge boost to American morale, which had plummeted after the defeats on the Canadian frontier. (Engraving by Alonzo Chappel. Library of Congress)

  During the battle, a seaman on the Constitution saw a shot bounce off the ship and exclaimed: “Huzza, her sides are made of iron.” Thereafter, the Constitution was affectionately known as “Ironsides” and then “Old Ironsides.”173 The American victory was particularly gratifying because the British ship (which had “Guerrière” painted on her mainsail and “Not the Little Belt!” on her foresail) had been one of the most obnoxious British vessels operating along the coast before the war.174 The American victory ended the talk of keeping the fleet in port, and other naval victories soon followed.

  On December 29, off the coast of Brazil, the Constitution, now carrying 54 guns and commanded by Bainbridge, met H.M. Ship Java (49 guns), a frigate under the command of Captain Henry Lambert. Both captains demonstrated excellent seamanship, but once again superior American firepower and marksmanship carried the day. American gunners destroyed most of the rigging of the Java and killed or wounded a large portion of the British crew. “The Enemy was completely dismasted,” Bainbridge reported, “not having a Spar of any kind standing.”175 Unable to move, the Java surrendered. After removing the crew and passengers (which included Lieutenant General Thomas Hislop, the governor of India), Bainbridge sent the British ship to the bottom.176

  Other Naval Engagements

  On October 15, the U.S. Frigate United States, carrying 56 guns and commanded by Decatur, was cruising 600 miles west of the Canaries when it encountered a British frigate, H.M. Ship Macedonian (49 guns), Captain John S. Carden commanding. Although the United States was known as “the Wagon” because it was such a poor sai
ler, Decatur nonetheless outmaneuvered his foe, keeping his distance to take advantage of his powerful long-range guns and his crew’s marksmanship. In the ensuing battle, the United States got off seventy broadsides, the Macedonian only thirty. A sailor on the British ship described the damage done by the American guns: “Grapeshot and canister were pouring through our portholes like leaden hail; the large shot came against the ship’s side, shaking her to the very keel, and passing through her timbers and scattering terrific splinters, which did more appalling work than the shot itself.”177

  By the time the Macedonian was able to close, she had lost most of her spars and rigging and a third of her crew, forcing Carden to strike his colors. When Decatur boarded the vessel, he found “fragments of the dead scattered in every direction, the decks slippery with blood, [and] one continuous agonizing yell of the unhappy wounded.”178 A prize crew sailed the Macedonian into Newport Harbor, the only time a British frigate has ever been brought into an American port as a prize of war. Based on the erroneous notion that the American ship had defeated a British ship of equal size, the government gave the officers and crew of the United States $200,000 in prize money, the largest award made for the capture of a single ship during the war. The Macedonian remained on the rolls of the American navy for many years thereafter.179