The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Capture of Fort George

  The campaign along the Niagara front in 1813 had a promising start, but in the end reverses and mismanagement cost the United States all that it had gained. The principal target of American troops here was Fort George, located on the Canadian side where the Niagara River empties into Lake Ontario. The British fort was garrisoned by 1,000 regulars under the command of Brigadier General John Vincent. Vincent also had 350 militia and 50 Indians available for service. There were an additional 750 British troops stationed at other posts along the Niagara frontier, and several hundred militia from the surrounding area might be called upon as well.75

  In May 1813 the United States assembled a force of 4,000 troops across from Fort George. For two days the fort was bombarded by batteries from the American side of the river. On May 27 Chauncey laid down an artillery barrage from the lake to cover a landing of American troops west of the fort. The landing—a joint operation directed by Winfield Scott and Oliver Perry—put American troops in a position to attack the fort from the rear. The British came out to meet the invaders but were outgunned and outnumbered. Forced to give ground, they abandoned the fort and fled south. Scott pursued the British but was ordered to return to Fort George by Major General Morgan Lewis, who was temporarily in command. The British lost 350 killed, wounded, and captured in the Battle of Fort George compared to American losses of only 140.76

  Since the loss of this fort exposed British positions all along the Niagara frontier, Vincent ordered the evacuation of the other British positions—at Chippawa, Queenston, and Fort Erie—each of which was subsequently occupied by American troops. Although the United States now controlled the entire frontier, the failure to follow up on the initial victory proved costly, for Vincent was able to regroup his forces—about 1,600 men—at Burlington Heights at the western end of Lake Ontario.

  The Battles of Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams

  In early June Dearborn ordered two brigades—about 2,500 men—to challenge the British at Burlington Heights. These troops were led by two political generals, William Winder and John Chandler, neither of whom had much military experience. Chandler, the senior of the two brigadiers, assumed command. After skirmishing with the British, most of the Americans made camp at Stoney Creek, seven miles from the British camp. The site chosen was excellent, but Chandler’s troops were spread out too much to effectively support one another.77

  In the predawn hours of June 5 a British force of 750 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey silently approached the American camp. Having learned the countersign, perhaps from a paroled prisoner, the British captured or bayoneted the American sentries and then launched their attack. The surprise was complete. According to one British soldier, “The [British] men set up a tremendous shout, which continued along the whole line and was the cause of throwing the enemy into the greatest disorder and Confusion imaginable.”78 The Americans almost prevailed by the sheer force of their numbers, but when the British overran their artillery batteries, the Americans were forced to retreat. In the confusion both Winder and Chandler blundered into British units and were captured. Although the United States suffered fewer losses—about 170 men compared to 215 for the British—the Americans had decamped in such haste that they had left their dead and equipment on the field.79

  The retreat from Stoney Creek, coupled with the appearance of Yeo’s squadron, rendered American positions on Canadian soil less secure, and Major General Dearborn ordered all the garrisons on the Canadian side of the river consolidated at Fort George. This, however, only increased the partisan warfare on the front. One of the leading partisans was Cyrenius Chapin, a Federalist doctor living in Buffalo who secured a major’s commission and organized a unit of mounted volunteers. Chapin’s men conducted looting raids across the river that bore little resemblance to any form of recognized warfare, and the unit was soon known as “Dr. Chapin and the Forty Thieves.” To protect against such raids and to harass any Americans who ventured from Fort George, the British established outposts near the American stronghold.80

  In late June Major Chapin persuaded American officials at Fort George to attack a British outpost sixteen miles away that was garrisoned by fifty men under Lieutenant James FitzGibbon. The force chosen for the mission, about 600 strong, was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Boerstler and included Chapin and thirty-eight of his men. FitzGibbon learned of the impending attack from a Canadian woman, Laura Secord, who walked twenty miles through rough and unfamiliar territory at night to deliver the warning, and from Indians, who were monitoring the movements of the American force. On June 24 at Beaver Dams, a large body of Indians led by Captain Dominique Ducharme of the Indian Department ambushed Boerstler’s force. The Americans fought well but were running low on ammunition when FitzGibbon arrived with his men. Running a good bluff, FitzGibbon exaggerated the size of his force and raised the specter of an Indian massacre. In response, Boerstler surrendered.81

  FitzGibbon gave the Indians full credit for the victory at Beaver Dams. “They beat the American detachment into a state of terror,” he said, “and the only share I claim is taking advantage of a favorable moment to offer them protection from the tomahawk and scalping knife.”82 But FitzGibbon got most of the credit. As Mohawk leader John Norton shrewdly put it, “The Cognawauga Indians fought the battle. The Mohawks or 6 Nations got the plunder, and Fitzgibbon got the Credit.”83 Although Chapin and some of his men were captured, they managed to seize control of the boats that were taking them to York and returned safely to Fort George, where they were treated like heroes.84 Even so, Boerstler’s defeat went down hard in Washington. Republican congressmen were so furious that they forced the administration to remove Dearborn from command. “The news of Boe[r]stler’s capture threw us into an indignation,” said Charles J. Ingersoll. “We have deposed Gen. Dearborn, who is to be removed to Albany, where he may eat sturgeon and recruit.”85

  The Siege of Fort George and Burning of Newark

  The British and their Indian allies now established a loose siege of Fort George. They also brought the war home to Americans all along the Niagara frontier. On July 5 a small party of Canadian militia crossed the river, attacked a blockhouse called Fort Schlosser, and made off with the supplies there. A week later another British force burned the military post at Black Rock and carried off additional supplies. These raids were designed to force the American troops to evacuate Fort George or to overextend themselves.86

  Fort George, which was now under the direction of Brigadier General George McClure of the New York militia, had become increasingly vulnerable. Most of the regulars had been transferred east, leaving only 250 men to defend the entire frontier. In addition, lack of pay had turned McClure’s best militia into “a disaffected and ungovernable multitude” and made it impossible to recruit additional volunteer militia.87 Everyone knew that the pay was in arrears and that (despite the onset of winter) the only housing available was tents. Few citizen soldiers were willing to serve in Canada anyway. On December 10, 1813, McClure ordered Fort George abandoned. He was supposed to burn the fort but botched the job and instead burned the nearby village of Newark to deny British troops shelter there. The inhabitants were given only a few hours notice in winter weather to vacate their homes.88 “Every building in Newark is reduced to ashes,” McClure reported; “the Enemy is much exasperated and will make a descent on this frontier if possible.”89

  The British Capture Fort Niagara

  McClure’s prediction proved correct. Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond, who had assumed command of the British forces in this theater of operations, was furious over the callous treatment of Newark’s civilians and authorized retaliation. On December 19 a British force of 550 men under Colonel John Murray surprised the American sentries at Fort Niagara (across the river from Fort George), extracted the password, and then charged into the fort. The American commander, Captain Nathan Leonard, was reportedly drunk at his home three miles away, and those in the fort had ta
ken no precautions. “Our men,” said General McClure, “were nearly all asleep in their tents, the Enemy rushed in and commenced a most horrid slaughter.”90

  The British inflicted 80 casualties (mostly by bayonet) and took 350 prisoners, while suffering fewer than a dozen casualties themselves. Leonard was captured the next day when he returned to the fort. The British also acquired a huge quantity of war material. According to Governor Daniel D. Tompkins of New York, “The quantity of cannon, muskets, shot, shells, powder, fixed ammunition, clothing & other supplies in Fort Niagara was immense. The acquisition of them will be of the greatest importance to the British, & an irreparable loss to us.”91 The British retained control of Fort Niagara—an important beachhead on American territory—until the end of the war.

  Lewiston and Buffalo Burned

  As soon as Fort Niagara was secure, a British force under Major General Phineas Riall (pronounced “Rile”) crossed into American territory and destroyed Lewiston as well as several smaller towns nearby.92 The Indians who accompanied Riall got drunk and left a ghastly scene at Lewiston. According to an American who later visited the town: “The sight we here witnessed was shocking beyond description. Our neighbors were seen lying dead in the fields and roads, some horribly cut and mangled with tomahawks, others eaten by the hogs.”93

  American officials tried to rally the militia to end these depredations but without much success. Most of the men in the region had already stood several drafts and were unwilling to serve again. According to McClure, even those who responded to the call were more interested “in taking care of their families and property by carrying them into the interior, than helping us to fight.”94 Few were willing to serve under McClure anyway. He was blamed for the recent reverses and was so universally detested that he had to withdraw from the front. “The gross insults which I have received from many at Buffalo,” he said, “will apologise for my absence.”95

  Anticipating that Buffalo and Black Rock would be targeted next, Major General Amos Hall, who succeeded McClure in command, was able to assemble 2,000 men (mostly militia). Riall landed near Black Rock with about 1,400 regulars and Indians on December 30. The militia units sent to investigate were routed, and eventually Hall’s main force had to give way, too. The American units that offered the stoutest resistance were a group of defectors, known as Canadian Volunteers, and a small band of men under Cyrenius Chapin (who now had a brevet commission as a lieutenant colonel). The Canadian Volunteers escaped capture (and thus execution for treason), but Chapin was taken prisoner and sent under heavy guard to Quebec. Later that day the British looted and burned both Black Rock and Buffalo.96 Lewis Cass, who saw Buffalo a week later, called it “a scene of distress and destruction such as I have never before witnessed.”97 Thus by the end of the year, the Niagara Valley was in flames, and the American position along the entire front had collapsed. “The whole frontier from Lake Ontario to Lake Erie,” lamented Governor Tompkins, “is depopulated & the buildings & Improvements, with a few exceptions, destroyed.”98

  Sir George Prevost was eager to put an end to the depredations, and in a proclamation offered to give up this kind of predatory warfare if the Americans followed suit.99 American officials were receptive to this overture. They disavowed the destruction of Newark and did not retaliate for the burning of the settlements on the American side of the river.100 But in the field, American commanders followed their own counsels and often took the advice of the renegade Canadian Volunteers, who used the war to settle old scores. Hence, the Niagara frontier continued to be subjected to depredations that ultimately contributed to the British decision to burn Washington.

  The Campaign against Montreal

  The Niagara frontier was exposed in the second half of 1813 because most of the regulars stationed there had been shipped east for service on the St. Lawrence front. Although a major offensive in this theater was not part of the administration’s original planning, from the beginning Armstrong had waffled on the objectives of the campaign. Although he remained committed to attacking Kingston, he asked the cabinet in July to approve Montreal as an alternative. Then in October, after the British had reinforced Kingston, he ordered his generals to target Montreal. By this time, however, it was so late in the season that the chances of success were remote.101

  It was not only the War Department’s indecision that doomed the campaign against Montreal. The United States had suffered a major setback on Lake Champlain as well. This lake, which lies between New York and Vermont, empties into the Richelieu River, which in turn flows into the St. Lawrence River between Montreal and Quebec. Together these waterways form a natural invasion route that could be used to ferry troops and supplies in either direction. Whoever controlled these waters—particularly Lake Champlain—controlled the region.

  The United States held the balance of power on Lake Champlain until mid-1813, when Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, who was in charge of the American squadron, ordered Lieutenant Sidney Smith to patrol the northern reaches of the lake with the Eagle and Growler, each of which mounted 11 guns. On June 3 the overeager Smith sailed into the shallow waters of Isle-aux-Noix, a small, fortified British island at the northern end of the lake. When Smith tried to withdraw, he found that his ships could not maneuver because the water was too shallow. The British mounted an artillery attack from the shore, and after a three-and-a-half hour engagement both ships were disabled and forced to surrender.102 The acquisition of these vessels, which were renamed Chub and Finch, gave the British naval superiority on Lake Champlain and deprived the United States of an important supply route. “The loss of our command of Lake Champlain at so critical a moment,” said Madison, “is deeply to be regretted.”103

  If the lateness of the season and the loss of Lake Champlain undermined the chances for a successful campaign, so too did poor leadership in the field. The man in charge was Major General James Wilkinson, a longtime Spanish spy with an appetite for booty and intrigue. Winfield Scott (who was once suspended from the army for publicly maligning Wilkinson) considered him an “unprincipled imbecile,” and John Randolph claimed that the general was the only man he knew “who was from the bark to the very core a villain.”104

  Wilkinson had long commanded troops in the Southwest, but his despotism in New Orleans during the Burr Conspiracy in 1806 and his known ties to Spanish officials had thoroughly alienated local Republicans. Moreover, he had so mismanaged his command in 1809 that he had lost nearly half his army—over 1,000 men—to disease and desertion. By 1813 it was said that some Louisiana militia “positively refused to serve under General Wilkinson” and that the state’s two senators would go into opposition unless he were removed from command.105

  To quell this incipient rebellion, the administration ordered Wilkinson to the Canadian frontier. Wilkinson was promoted to major general but was expected to serve under Dearborn. When the debacle on the Niagara frontier forced Dearborn’s removal, Wilkinson became the ranking officer. After a leisurely trip north, Wilkinson established himself at Sackets Harbor and assumed command over the whole eastern theater of operations. But Major General Wade Hampton, a haughty South Carolinian who headed a large force at Plattsburgh, considered his superior so despicable that he refused to take orders from him. Armstrong tried to appease Hampton, first by assuring him that his orders would come from Washington and then by visiting the field in person to facilitate coordination, but his efforts were in vain.106

  The plan of operations called for Wilkinson to lead one army from Sackets Harbor down the St. Lawrence River and approach Montreal from the west, while Hampton approached from the south with a second army from Plattsburgh. The campaign did not get under way until October, and neither commanding officer showed much confidence in the plan. Moreover, when Armstrong left the front in early November, any prospect of cooperation between the two generals vanished.107

  The Battle of Châteauguay

  On September 19, Hampton moved his army, about 6,000 strong, by boat from Plattsburgh to the
head of Lake Champlain. From there Hampton marched into Canada. Although his militia (about a quarter of his force) refused to cross the border, he had little trouble fighting his way into Odelltown. Here he faced the prospect of more British resistance and a lack of water because the local wells had dried up. Hence, he veered west toward the Châteauguay River, where he made camp at Four Corners, New York, and awaited further orders.108 Although he had a sizeable force at his disposal, his regulars were mostly new recruits and his officers untested. “The perfect rawness of the troops,” he complained, “has been a source of much solicitude to the best informed among us.”109

  In mid-October, after receiving orders from Armstrong to target Montreal, Hampton marched his army, about 3,800 men, north along the Châteauguay River, fighting rain and bad roads along the way. Fallen trees and bridges destroyed by the enemy added to Hampton’s woes. But eventually he found himself face to face with the enemy, about 1,800 troops, mostly French Canadian fencible units and militia plus 150 Indians, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Salaberry, an experienced combat veteran. De Salaberry had prepared strong defensive works (including abatis) to repel the invasion.

  Hampton sent Colonel Robert Purdy and 2,300 men across the river to try to get beyond de Salaberry, recross the river, and thus threaten him from the rear. At the same time, Brigadier General George Izard led an advance up the west bank. The result was the Battle of Châteauguay, fought on October 26. Neither wing of Hampton’s attack had much success. On the east bank, Purdy was hampered by ignorant guides and was harassed by Indians and militia. Some of his junior officers deserted and hid in the underbrush by the river. Purdy made it no further north than a point just across the river from de Salaberry’s army, and once he got this far he sustained fire from enemy units on the west bank.