The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  New Trade Restrictions

  Such was the extent of this illegal trade and such was the administration’s faith in economic coercion that Madison decided in late 1813 to seek a broad range of new restrictions. The government hoped not only to stamp out trade with the enemy but also to increase the economic pressure on Britain. In a confidential message sent to Congress on December 9, the president said: “To shorten, as much as possible, the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the enemy should feel all the pressure that can be given to it.” Toward this end, the president recommended four new restrictions: (1) an embargo prohibiting all American ships and goods from leaving port; (2) a complete ban on the importation of certain commodities customarily produced in the British Empire, such as woolen and cotton goods and rum; (3) a ban against foreign ships trading in American ports unless the master, supercargo, and at least three-quarters of the crew were citizens or subjects of the flag flown by the ship; and (4) a ban on ransoming ships. Together these measures were designed to halt the flow of supplies to British armies in Canada and Europe and British ships in American waters, tighten the non-importation system, prevent the British from fraudulently using neutral flags, and put an end to the use of ransoming as a cover for illegal trade.101

  Congress had rejected the president’s recommendation for an embargo the previous summer but was more compliant this time. The Senate, which had killed so many other restrictive proposals, was now willing to follow the administration’s lead, in part because of the exigencies of war. In addition, public pressure had been exerted on three senators who had opposed the embargo in the previous session. “Messrs Giles, and Stone and Anderson,” said the National Intelligencer, “have thought better of their votes, and will now yield their suffrages in favor of the measure.”102

  Federalists fought a spirited but futile rearguard action against the embargo, offering a host of amendments to ameliorate its impact and outlining its likely effects on commerce, agriculture, and government revenue.103 Zebulon Shipherd called the measure “an engine of tyranny, an engine of oppression,” and the Maryland House of Delegates later compared it to one of the Coercive Acts adopted by Britain in 1774. “The bitter tribulation of the Boston port bill,” said the delegates, “is again to be realized on an infinitely more extended scale.”104

  The Republicans met these attacks with a stony silence. “The duty of the friends to the embargo,” said the National Intelligencer, “was to act, not to speak.”105 Thus only eight days after submitting his request to Congress, Madison signed the embargo into law.106 One of the reasons that Congress acted so quickly was that news of the measure had leaked to the press. According to one Federalist, congressional action on the proposal was “the subject of newspaper paragraphs” and was “as well known in the principal cities of the Union as in this Hall.”107

  Modeled after the enforcement act of 1809, the embargo of 1813 was more sweeping than any previous restriction. All ships were embargoed in port and the export of all goods and produce prohibited. The coasting trade was outlawed except in bays, rivers, sounds, and lakes, and fishing vessels could venture to sea only after posting heavy bonds. Government officials were given broad powers to enforce the law, and the penalties for violation were heavy.108

  The embargo proved too sweeping even for its supporters. A week after the measure became law, Treasury Secretary Jones sent a circular to all customs officials interpreting a section of the law that appeared to sanction seizures on the vaguest of suspicions. Jones instructed collectors to impound goods only if circumstances clearly indicated that a violation was intended.109 Congress also had to pass legislation to ameliorate the harshest effects of the measure. Nantucket, an island thirty miles off the coast of Massachusetts, was given special permission to import food and fuel, and coasting vessels trapped away from home were allowed to return.110

  The embargo could not halt all trade, but according to the customs collector at Boston, the only loophole was a clause that allowed privateers to sail. After leaving port, these vessels sometimes discharged their crews and sold their provisions abroad.111 Federalist fishermen in Boston complained that their Republican counterparts in Marblehead were permitted to go to sea while they were not, but in general the measure was fairly enforced.112 The main problem, as Federalists pointed out, was that it further undermined American prosperity and cut into government revenue. It punished the entire nation, said one Federalist, “because of a few sinners.”113

  Repeal of the Restrictive System

  Even though the president finally got the embargo he wanted, Congress was unresponsive to his request for other restrictions. Most Republicans were reluctant to go as far as the president, even in time of war. Moreover, the same truce ship that brought news of Britain’s peace initiative at the end of December also brought reports of Napoleon’s defeat at Leipzig. This battle shattered the Continental System and opened all of northern Europe to British trade.114 As a result, the restrictive system as a coercive instrument lost much of its effectiveness. Although bills were introduced to tighten the non-importation system and outlaw the ransoming of ships, these proposals failed to become law.115

  Besides killing the prospects for additional restrictions, the news from Europe also led to a clamor for the repeal of the embargo and non-importation law. Federalists made several attempts to repeal these laws, and Republicans, looking for ways to generate badly needed revenue, lent a sympathetic ear.116 Even Robert Wright, a pro-embargo Republican, wondered if it might not be wise to sheathe “the two-edged sword, the embargo . . . during the [peace] negotiation.”117 Madison himself eventually came around to this view, and on March 31, 1814—less than four months after recommending the new restrictions—he asked Congress to repeal both the embargo and non-importation act. Goods that were owned by the enemy, he said, should still be barred from the United States. The export of specie should also be banned to prevent an unfavorable balance of trade from draining the nation’s banks.118

  Madison’s change of heart stunned nearly everyone. “The shock produced by this political earthquake,” said a Republican newspaper, “is tremendous.”119 The president’s about-face was greeted with “utter astonishment” in Washington and caused a particular sensation among the most devoted restrictionists, some of whom were said to be “pretty warm . . . and a little violent.”120 According to one observer, there was “much pouting and no small degree of execration . . . among [the president’s] zealous supporters, some of whom, I am told, will oppose the Bill with bitterness in the House, as they certainly do out of it.”121 Most Republicans, however, were willing to follow the president’s lead. “In the present state of Europe,” said Niles’ Register, “it is pretty generally agreed that the embargo ought to be raised.”122 With victory at hand, longtime opponents of the restrictive system found it difficult to contain their joy. “I have not for a long time seen the feds look in as so good humor,” commented Nathaniel Macon; “they have all a smile on their countenance.”123

  A bill repealing the embargo and non-importation law passed both houses by large majorities.124 In fact, the mood of Congress had swung so much against restrictions that another bill to outlaw the export of specie failed to win a majority in either house.125 John C. Calhoun doubted whether even “the most strenuous efforts of our customhouse officers” could halt the export of specie, and a Federalist said “you might as rationally . . . prevent the ebb and flow of the tide.”126 With the repeal of the embargo and non-importation act and the defeat of the ban on specie exports, Americans were now barred only from trading directly with the enemy, importing enemy-owned goods, or using enemy licenses.

  Enemy Aliens

  Schemes to raise men and money and restrict trade with the enemy consumed much of the administration’s time during the war, but other war-related issues demanded attention, too. Among these was the regulation of enemy aliens.127 More than 10,000 British subjects lived in the United States during the war, mainly in New York and Pennsylvania.
128 Most were permanent residents who for one reason or another had never taken out citizenship papers. Although few posed any real threat, all were enemy aliens, and the government had to devise regulations to ensure that they provided no aid or information to the British.

  The basic legislation governing American policy was the alien enemies act of 1798, which was still in force in 1812. This law gave the government broad powers over enemy aliens but also decreed that they be accorded a “reasonable time” to depart from the United States with their property.129 Shortly after the declaration of war, Congress fixed the grace period at six months.130 At the same time, the State Department ordered all enemy aliens who remained in the country to register with United States marshals.131

  Initially, government officials treated British subjects with indulgence, stretching the letter of the law to avoid hardship. The State Department freely granted passports for the removal of property long after the grace period had expired, and many aliens—known and trusted in their communities—did not bother to register.132 Although the government in early 1813 ordered enemy aliens to move to a place (chosen by the local marshal) that was at least forty miles from the tidewater, all except merchants could secure permission from the marshal to remain, and even merchants could seek an exemption from the State Department.133 Such were the indulgences granted by the government that in May 1813 Monroe told a British official that enemy aliens enjoyed “almost equal rights with American Citizens.”134

  By this time, however, the administration had already begun to adopt tougher policies. In February 1813 the government prohibited enemy aliens from traveling without a passport secured from a marshal or customs collector.135 The following July, in response to British depredations in the Chesapeake, the State Department stopped granting passports for the removal of British property. “The conduct of Great Britain,” Monroe said, “has not been such as to authorise a relaxation of the rules.”136 Then in November, John Mason, who had been put in charge of enemy aliens (as well as British prisoners of war) adopted tougher rules to prevent British subjects who had moved to the interior from visiting the enemy. “The lenity shown Enemy Aliens,” he complained, “has been frequently abused.” To avoid future abuses, Mason ordered all British subjects living beyond the tidewater to sign “a parole of honor” not to travel more than five miles from their assigned place or to correspond with the enemy.137 This completed the government’s code of regulations, which even with the recent additions remained comparatively lenient.

  Prisoners of War

  The administration also had to establish rules to regulate the treatment of prisoners of war, and this proved more vexing.138 Although there was no international agreement on the subject, warfare in this era was carefully limited and highly professional, and each nation professed to favor humane treatment. The precedents, however, were vague, and prisoners on both sides complained of crowded, cold, and dirty housing, foul rations, and physical abuse.139

  Since officers were considered gentlemen, they received special treatment. Most were given the freedom of a town or larger area, and some were sent home on an extended parole if they pledged to refrain from fighting until officially exchanged. Militia were often sent home, too, because they were considered part-time soldiers. Enlisted men, on the other hand, were confined until they were actually exchanged. The United States favored the use of state penitentiaries located near (but not too near) the northern frontier, particularly in Massachusetts and Kentucky. Great Britain, on the other hand, utilized a host of prison ships and several jails, the most important of which were on Melville Island in Halifax and at Dartmoor in England.140

  In theory men taken at sea were treated like those captured on land, but in practice the British handled them differently. Some 2,200 Americans who were in the Royal Navy when war broke out refused to fight against their country. They were confined as prisoners of war but were not deemed eligible for release or exchange until their citizenship was proven. Once their citizenship was established, those who had been impressed into British service were released, while those who had volunteered (or had been impressed and then accepted the royal bounty) were exchanged. Because communication was slow and documentation that satisfied the British was hard to find, most of these men languished in prison for the duration of the war.141 The United States, by contrast, discharged all British seamen who claimed to be deserters from the Royal Navy.142 Much to the dismay of the Navy Department, however, Captain David Porter allowed his men to tar and feather a British subject who was discharged from his ship at the beginning of the war.143

  The British housed American captives in prisons at Halifax and Dartmoor as well as in old hulks that had been converted into prison ships. The prisons were usually dark and dank, but the prison ships were worse, providing an especially fertile breeding ground for disease. The prison ship Saratoga, which was anchored at Dartmouth, was the home of eighty Americans in 1814. (United States Military Magazine, May, 1841)

  In order to discourage privateering, the British refused to parole or exchange anyone from a privateer that mounted fewer than 14 guns. In addition, royal officials held some mariners trapped in the British Isles in 1812 as prisoners of war and sought to make prison life hard on all maritime prisoners in the hope of inducing them to enlist in the Royal Navy. Great Britain also insisted that British prisoners who were put on a neutral vessel at sea or dropped at a neutral port by American privateers were not on parole. These men, the British claimed, had been released outright and were not subject to exchange. The British objective was to force American privateers to keep their prisoners until they returned to the United States, an inconvenience that was likely to interfere with normal cruising.144

  To regularize the treatment and exchange of prisoners, the two warring nations negotiated a series of conventions. The first was signed in Halifax on November 28, 1812.145 American officials were unhappy with this agreement and refused to ratify it. Hence a new one was signed on May 12, 1813. The second convention bound both nations to treat prisoners “with humanity, conformable to the usage and practice of the most civilized nations during war.” It prohibited corporal punishment, fixed the daily ration, defined the terms of parole, authorized the use of cartel ships for exchanges, and set the places where exchanged prisoners were to be delivered. The convention also established the rates of exchange. (A rear admiral or major general was worth thirty privates; a petty officer or noncommissioned officer was worth two).146

  This agreement was never ratified by Great Britain. Besides mandating a more varied and generous ration than British officials favored, the convention provided for paroling maritime prisoners at sea. Nevertheless officials of both countries in the New World generally adhered to the terms of the agreement. Only in 1814, after learning that American prisoners in Halifax, Jamaica, and Barbados had been put on a smaller ration, did American officials reduce the ration of British prisoners in the United States.147

  Both sides adopted liberal parole policies in 1812, but this changed when a bitter controversy erupted over the treatment of prisoners of doubtful nationality.148 As a result of the Battle of Queenston Heights, the British had captured a large number of American soldiers, including twenty-three—mostly Irishmen—who had been born in the British Isles. Although some of these men were naturalized American citizens and others had lived in the United States for many years, royal officials considered them all British subjects. The twenty-three were therefore clamped into irons and shipped to England to be tried for treason. The men reportedly offered to atone for their “treason” by taking up arms against the United States, but this did not appease British officials.149

  Winfield Scott, who was himself captured at Queenston Heights, protested British actions but to no avail. When Scott was later paroled, he went to Washington to inform American officials of the problem.150 The president secured authority from Congress to retaliate and then ordered twenty-three British soldiers put in close confinement as hostages for the safety of the Ame
ricans.151 Sir George Prevost, governor-general of Canada, responded by confining forty-six American officers and noncommissioned officers and threatened to put two Americans to death for every British soldier executed. Prevost also threatened “to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity” if any of the British prisoners were harmed.152 American officials responded by confining British officers in American hands, which prompted the British to confine the remaining American officers they held. Thus by early 1814, all the officers held by either side in the New World were in close confinement with the threat of retaliatory execution hanging over their heads.153

  For Winfield Scott (1786–1866), the War of 1812 was a launching pad for a military career that spanned nearly half a century. Scott did a superb job training his men for the campaign on the Niagara front in 1814, and he developed a reputation for being a fearless, even reckless, battlefield commander. Scott achieved greater fame in the Mexican War and closed out his career advising President Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War. This daguerreotype from later in his career celebrates his participation in the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, which was sometimes called the Battle of Niagara. (Robert Tomes, Battles of America by Land and Sea)

  British officials were livid over the threat of American retaliation, and most English newspapers followed their lead. “If Mr. Madison dare to retaliate by taking away the life of one English prisoner,” warned the London Courier, “America puts herself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then be absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and laws of war.” The confinement of the British officers, added the Times, was “a wanton and barbarous act of cruelty.” Any violence against them would “justify severe retaliation.”154