The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  The Occupation of Maine

  The British did not limit their operations on the New England coast to petty raids and plundering. They also launched a major amphibious campaign against Maine. British officials coveted northern Maine because it jutted into Canada, blocking the development of a direct overland route between Halifax and Quebec. The Canadian-American boundary here was in dispute because of an ambiguity in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. By occupying part of Maine the British hoped to rectify the border in their favor.

  The first step the British took was to seize Moose Island in Passamaquoddy Bay, which was claimed by both nations but occupied by the United States. On July 11 Captain Thomas Hardy transported 1,000 men under Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pilkington from Halifax to Eastport, which was located on Moose Island. Eastport was protected by Fort Sullivan, which was garrisoned by eighty-five men under the command of Major Perley Putnam. Putnam surrendered without offering any resistance. Since the island was considered British, the inhabitants were required to take an oath of allegiance or leave. About two-thirds of the residents took the oath.97

  The British next targeted a much broader stretch of the coast of Maine. To oversee this operation, London officials tapped Sir John Sherbrooke, who held the title of lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia but was actually the province’s chief executive officer. Sherbrooke was ordered to occupy “that part of the District of Maine which at present intercepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec.”98

  In accordance with this mandate, Rear Admiral Edward Griffith ferried 2,500 men under Sherbrooke to Castine on Penobscot Bay on September 1. Castine was protected by a small redoubt manned by forty soldiers commanded by Lieutenant Andrew Lewis. Facing an overwhelming force, Lewis fired several rounds of artillery and then blew up his redoubt and fled. The British next sailed up the Penobscot River, meeting only token resistance along the way. Captain Charles Morris had earlier sailed the U.S. Sloop Adams (28 guns) up the Penobscot to refit at Hampden after an Atlantic cruise. In response to the British threat, Morris developed an effective plan of defense, but it depended on the local militia. When the British approached, the militia gave way, leaving Morris with little choice but to burn his ship and flee with his crew to Portland. The British occupied the river up to Bangor, where they seized or destroyed a number of merchant vessels. Later they occupied the port town of Machias. This gave them effective control over 100 miles of the Maine coast.99

  The British seized all public property in eastern Maine and some private maritime property as well. The inhabitants were given a choice of taking an oath to keep the peace or leaving the area. They were also urged to take an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. Those who took this oath were accorded the commercial privileges of British subjects, which meant they could trade freely with Canada and other British provinces. Castine became a British port of entry and a resort town for British military officers on leave. Most of the inhabitants welcomed the region’s new status because it meant increased trade with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.100 “It is scarcely possible to conceive the joy of the inhabitants,” said a Massachusetts newspaper. “At the striking of the flag, some huzza’d, and others, men of influence, observed, ‘now we shall get rid of the tax gathers,’ ‘now the damned democrats will get it.’”101

  American officials halted all mail service to the occupied territory and hatched a scheme for reconquest. The plan called for sending an army of regulars and militia overland to make an assault on Castine from the rear. The War Department asked Governor Caleb Strong of Massachusetts to call up the necessary militia and to provide part of the funding, but the state’s resources were stretched so thin that Strong demurred. In addition, his advisers told him, probably correctly, that it would be almost impossible to succeed without “a naval force that shall command the Bay of Penobscot.”102 The administration finally shelved the plan when it was leaked to the press. Hence eastern Maine (like Prairie du Chien, Mackinac Island, and Fort Niagara) remained in British hands until the war was over.103

  British Raids in the Chesapeake

  Far more demoralizing to Americans than British operations in New England was their invasion of the Chesapeake. In 1814 London officials ordered Major General Robert Ross “to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada.” At the same time, Prevost, who was angry over the burning of Dover and other depredations in Upper Canada, asked Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane to “assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages.”104 The British had successfully targeted the Chesapeake in 1813, and both Ross and Cochrane regarded it the best place to achieve their goals in 1814. The bay’s extensive shoreline remained exposed, and the region’s two most important cities—Washington and Baltimore—offered inviting targets.

  To prepare for the coming campaign, the British established a base on Tangier Island in early April. In accordance with the request from Governor Prevost, Rear Admiral Cochrane in July ordered the commanders on his station “to destroy & lay waste such Towns and Districts upon the Coast as you may find assailable” and to explain to their victims that they were only retaliating for similar depredations committed by American commanders in Upper Canada. Cochrane realized that it would be unwise to completely alienate a population that sold him provisions and other supplies. Hence, he issued a secret companion order that authorized his commanders to spare those places that either supplied the British with necessities or that agreed to pay tribute.105

  Although it was difficult to counter the British raids in the Chesapeake, the depredations in 1813 had prompted Joshua Barney, a Revolutionary War hero and accomplished privateer captain, to suggest developing “a flying Squadron” of shallow-draft barges or row-galleys, each armed with a naval gun, to annoy small British vessels and deter raids.106 Congress approved of Barney’s proposal, and the secretary of the navy put Barney in charge of the flotilla.107 Barney spent the ensuing winter overseeing the construction and manning of the boats. The flotilla was put into service in the spring of 1814, but almost immediately it was targeted by the British squadron in the Chesapeake.108

  Rear Admiral Cockburn dispatched a naval force under Captain Robert Barrie to find Barney’s boats. On three separate occasions in June, Barrie engaged Barney in tributaries of the Patuxent: once in Cedar Creek and twice in St. Leonard’s Creek. Each time Barney managed to beat back the attack. Slipping into the Patuxent’s main branch, Barney sailed upriver and took refuge at Pig Point. When again threatened by a British force on August 22, Barney ordered his flotilla blown up to prevent it from falling into enemy hands.109

  Washington Threatened

  These operations were conducted perilously close to the nation’s capital, but little was done to prepare Washington for defense. “The shameful neglect of the administration to provide an adequate defence for the capital,” said a Federalist newspaper, “is a just cause of loud complaint among all parties.”110 Armstrong was convinced that Washington would never be attacked because it had no strategic significance. “Baltimore is the place,” he said; “that [city] is of so much more consequence.”111 Nor did Armstrong believe that fortifications offered the best way of protecting cities. “Bayonets,” he claimed, “are known to form the most efficient barriers.”112 With an eye on economy, Armstrong also believed that militia should be called out only after the target of British operations was known.113

  Other officials in Washington were slow to perceive the danger, too. Not until July 1 did the president authorize the creation of a special military district embracing the nation’s capital with Brigadier General William Winder in charge. Winder appeared to be knowledgeable about military affairs, but the only action he had seen was at Stoney Creek in 1813, when he had been captured and then paroled. His only real asset was that he was the nephew of the Federalist governor of Maryland, whose cooperation was deemed essential for the proper defens
e of the region.114

  Winder had only 500 regulars at his disposal, and the militia called into service were slow to respond. Winder’s inexperience told early, and he seemed overwhelmed by the task before him. He spent much of his time traveling through the countryside inspecting the terrain, while the real work of planning strategy and preparing defense works remained undone. In fact, Winder moved around so much that one of Armstrong’s directives—which was characteristically sent by regular mail—followed the district commander around for more than three weeks.115 The British seemed to sense the confusion in all this. “Jonathan,” said a Royal Navy officer, “is so confounded that he does not know when or where to look for us and I do believe that he is at this moment so undecided and unprepared that it would require but little force to burn Washington.”116

  By mid-August Cochrane and Ross were in the Chesapeake with twenty warships and several transports filled with veterans from the Peninsular War. Also present was Read Admiral George Cockburn, who knew the area because he had overseen predatory raids the previous year. After sailing up the Patuxent River, the British landed 4,500 men at Benedict, Maryland, on August 19–20. Guided by two local renegades (one of whom was a victim of leprosy), the British marched to Upper Marlboro, where they were joined by Cockburn.

  Ross ordered a halt at Upper Marlboro to consider his options. Cochrane, who remained with the fleet, got cold feet, and urged a withdrawal, but Cockburn persuaded Ross to continue.117 “Having advanced to within sixteen miles of Washington,” Ross later said, “and ascertaining the force of the enemy to be such as might authorise an attempt at carrying his capital, I determined to make it.”118 Leaving 500 marines at Upper Marlboro, Ross marched his troops toward Bladensburg, where he could cross the Eastern Branch of the Potomac (now the Anacostia River) and approach Washington from the northeast.

  By this time American officials realized their peril and began frantically putting the capital in a state of defense. Winder recognized the city’s vulnerability from the northeast and ordered most of the bridges there destroyed. There was no attempt, however, to harass the enemy or obstruct his approach even though he was marching through a dense forest. Secretary of State James Monroe volunteered to serve as a cavalry scout—surely the only time a member of the cabinet has performed this duty. The information he picked up was not vital, although several times he found himself perilously near British units.119

  Additional militia units were called out, but there was scarcely enough time to prepare them for battle. Most of the men were short on sleep and hungry. The militiamen were joined by 500 regulars under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Scott. Also present was Captain Barney, who was in charge of 600 sailors and marines and five artillery pieces (three 12-pounders and two 18-pounders). The American force—perhaps 6,000 troops in all—was arrayed in three lines facing the eastern branch of the Potomac River. The third line was too far away to support the first two, and Monroe (who had no authority in the matter) redeployed the troops so that the second line could not support the first. Brigadier General Tobias Stansbury, the Maryland militia officer in charge of these troops, evidently realized that the new deployment was potentially disastrous, but believing that Monroe’s order had Winder’s approval, he did not challenge it. The president and other civilian officials arrived on the scene just before the battle began and were on the verge of crossing the bridge into the approaching British columns when they were warned off by a War Department clerk who was serving as a volunteer scout. No doubt the 100-degree temperature added to everyone’s discomfort.120

  The Battle of Bladensburg

  About 1:00 p.m. on August 24, just as the last militia units took their places, the British appeared on the opposite side of the river. What they saw did not impress them. Most of the American troops, said one officer, “seemed [like] country people, who would have been much more appropriately employed in attending to their agricultural occupations, than in standing, with their muskets in their hands.” One British officer, fooled by their motley appearance, was not even sure they were Americans. “Are these Yankees?” he asked, “or are they our own seamen got somehow ahead of us?”121

  The defenders had neglected to destroy the bridge although the water was shallow enough to ford anyway. Despite taking heavy casualties, first one British brigade and then another got across the river. The British outflanked the first American line, forcing it to fall back. Among those wounded in the initial assault was the former attorney general, William Pinkney. Just as the British were attacking the second line, Winder—who had radiated confusion and defeatism from the outset—ordered it to fall back. Panic gripped the troops, and the withdrawal turned into a rout—immortalized in wit and poetry as “the Bladensburg races.”122 The British use of small Congreve rockets, which did little actual damage but could terrify even hardened veterans, probably contributed to the panic.

  Only Barney’s troops, who anchored the third line, held firm, tearing into the advancing British units with grapeshot from their heavy guns. The British routed the militia protecting Barney’s flank and then stormed his position. By this time Barney had run out of ammunition anyway. Although he was wounded and captured, most of his men got away. By 4:00 in the afternoon, the British controlled the battlefield. “The rapid flight of the enemy,” said Ross, “and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being taken.”123 Mindful of how exhausted and overheated his troops were, Ross did not pursue the fleeing militia but instead rested his men for the next two hours. The United States suffered only 70 casualties in the Battle of Bladensburg, while the British sustained 250. The disparity in these figures suggests that with more disciplined troops the United States might have prevailed.124

  The British Occupy Washington

  By the time the battle was over, most people—soldiers, officials, and residents alike—had fled from Washington. Dolley Madison oversaw the removal of cabinet records and White House treasures (including a portrait of George Washington), but she had to sacrifice her personal property.125 Most of the other government records were saved, although House clerks were hampered by the lack of transportation. “Everything belonging to the office,” they reported, “might have been removed in time, if carriages could have been procured; but it was altogether impossible to procure them, either for hire, or by force.”126

  President Madison showed up at the White House after his wife had departed. The secretary of the treasury, George Campbell, had given the president a pair of dueling pistols, but Madison had no occasion to use them. He left them in the White House. They were probably stolen by local predators who slipped in after the president had left but before the British arrived. By prearrangement, the president and cabinet were supposed to rendezvous in Frederick, Maryland, but Madison departed with Attorney General Richard Rush for Virginia instead. On the way they were joined by Monroe and reportedly were subjected to various insults for mismanaging the war.127

  Dolley Madison (1768–1849) served as Thomas Jefferson’s unofficial White House hostess and then transformed the Executive Mansion into the social center of Washington during her husband’s presidency. Not only did she single-handedly invent the First Lady’s role, but she also saved White House treasures when the British threatened the city in the summer of 1814. (Based on a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

  The British marched into Washington about 8:00 p.m. Ross looked in vain for someone to parley with in order to establish the terms of surrender. The British took sniper fire from one house and responded by burning it to the ground. A group of British officers headed by Cockburn entered the White House. “We found a supper all ready,” one recalled, “which many of us speedily consumed . . . and drank some very good wine also.”128 Having satisfied their appetites, the British took some souvenirs and then set fire to the building. According to an American who later viewed the ruins, nothing survived but a shell: “unroofed, marked walls, cracked, defaced, blackened with the smoke of fir
e.”129 The British also burned the Capitol building (which included the Library of Congress), the Treasury, the building housing the War and State departments, and the arsenal on Greenleaf’s Point.130

  Dr. William Thornton, an English-born Federalist who was the superintendent of patents, saved the patent office by convincing the British that it contained private property—“models of the arts . . . useful to all mankind”—and that to burn it “would be as barbarous as formerly to burn the Alexandrian Library, for which the Turks have been ever since condemned by all enlightened nations.”131 The U.S. Marine Corps buildings also survived, probably because the British did not realize what they were. Captain Thomas Tingey, acting on orders from the secretary of the navy, set fire to the navy yard, which was the best-stocked facility of its kind in the country. Tingey also burned two fine new ships that were under construction, the heavy frigate Columbia and the sloop Argus.132

  Some British officers took special pleasure in the destruction they wrought. “Cockburn was quite a mountebank,” reported the National Intelligencer, “exhibiting in the s[t]reets a gross levity of manner, displaying sundry articles of trifling value of which he had robbed [from] the president’s house.” Most private buildings were spared, but the British burned two rope walks, and Cockburn personally oversaw the destruction of the contents of the semi-official National Intelligencer, amusing spectators “with much of the peculiar slang of the Common Sewer in relation to the editors.” The paper’s owners took this surprisingly well. When the Intelligencer resumed publication, it carried an editorial praising the British for their restraint. “Greater respect was certainly paid to private property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his marauding parties. No houses were half as much plundered by the enemy as by the knavish wretches about the town who profited of the general distress.”133