The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  All three governors—Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, Roger Griswold of Connecticut, and William Jones of Rhode Island (no relation to the secretary of the navy of the same name)—refused to meet the requisition. Acting with the full support of their councils (and in the case of Massachusetts, with the approval of the state supreme court as well), the governors grounded their refusal on the Constitution. Strong and Griswold argued that, internal disorders aside, the militia could not be called out unless the country were invaded or were in imminent danger of invasion, and that no such contingency existed.

  Moreover, since the states were constitutionally charged with appointing the militia officers, the Connecticut council and the Massachusetts court held that their troops could not serve under regulars. Rhode Island, on the other hand, did not raise this objection, doubtless because Dearborn’s order called for a suitably high-ranking state officer to accompany the troops. Governor Jones merely said that the militia would be called out when, in his opinion, the Constitution required it.23

  The three governors refused to comply with Dearborn’s request both to protest the war and to ensure that they retained control over their militia. Convinced that the assault on Canada was unjust and unwise, they were unwilling to subject their militia to the rigors of garrison duty in support of the venture. Moreover, rumors were rife that citizen soldiers called into service would be marched to Canada.24 Already militia units from New York, Pennsylvania, and the western states were being called up for service on the northern frontier, and New Englanders feared that their militia would meet the same fate.25 In order to dissociate themselves from an unjust war and to retain control over their only means of defense, New England officials refused to comply with Dearborn’s request.

  President Madison condemned this decision, claiming that it was based on “a novel and unfortunate exposition” of the Constitution and that it undermined the very basis of the Union. If the United States could not call up militia in time of war, he said, “they are not one nation for the purpose most of all requiring it.”26 Joseph Story claimed that every judge on the Supreme Court agreed with the administration’s position, and Eustis and Dearborn argued that the president could bypass the governors and call the militia directly into service.27 But Madison—ever cautious—refused to press the matter. Although privately he expressed hope that the militia would turn out voluntarily, none did.28

  The Militia Problem: Connecticut

  Even though New England leaders were uncooperative in 1812, they had no objection to calling out their militia when the enemy actually threatened. In different ways, too, each state tried to resolve the command problem. Connecticut was the least flexible. Her officials were unwilling to place the militia under United States officers under any circumstances. To assure control, they simply assigned a high-ranking state officer to any troops called into service. Massachusetts and Rhode Island were more cooperative and tried to compromise whenever possible. But in the end their compromises broke down, and they found themselves in much the same position as Connecticut.

  Connecticut officials called out their first militia in June 1813 to protect Captain Decatur’s squadron of ships in New London harbor. Governor John Cotton Smith (who had succeeded Griswold) said that he was “heartily disposed” to assist Decatur, and militia and state troops remained on duty in the city for about five months.29 Although the number of troops in service fluctuated, it was usually about twenty companies, many of which were understrength. Normally these troops would have rated no more than a brigadier general, but the army’s representative in the city, Brigadier General Henry Burbeck, would outrank any militia officer of the same grade. Hence state officials assigned the command to Major General William Williams. Burbeck was a Federalist and acceded to this arrangement. Although under a state officer, the troops were considered in federal service and were supplied and paid by the federal government.30

  This arrangement worked smoothly enough in 1813, but the following year it broke down. In early 1814 Burbeck began to quarrel with state officials, perhaps because he resented his anomalous position. In addition, he came under growing fire from political enemies in New England. A Boston Republican told Monroe that Burbeck had repeatedly said “that the war is unjust, unnecessary & impolitic, & that the administration have not talents to carry it on.” Similarly, friends of the government in New London told the president that Burbeck “has not the confidence of any of the Republicans, and they think him not deserving the confidence of the Administration.”31 In response to these complaints, the War Department transferred Burbeck out of the district in May 1814.32

  After Burbeck’s departure, the regular command in New London devolved temporarily on Colonel Jacob Kingsbury. State officials described Kingsbury as “a Connecticut Man in every respect” and a “discreet and excellent officer”—meaning that he was a reliable Federalist.33 Neither his rank nor his politics disposed Kingsbury to challenge the state. Instead he accepted the existing command arrangement and expressed hope that Connecticut would “avoid as far as possible, the burdens of this war.”34

  Kingsbury was the army’s ranking officer in New London until July 1814, when the new district commander, Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushing, arrived on the scene. Fresh from Massachusetts, where a compromise had enabled him to command the militia, Cushing would settle for nothing less in Connecticut. Able and charming, he soon won the hearts of the people in the city and the respect of many officers in the militia. Unlike Burbeck, however, he insisted on commanding any troops called into service.35

  Shortly after Cushing’s arrival, a British squadron appeared off the coast. State officials responded by calling out a brigade of militia. These troops and their replacements remained on duty for about three months. During the first month they were under the direction of two militia brigadiers, first Jirah Isham and then Levi Lusk, both of whom considered themselves under Cushing’s command. This arrangement evidently met with the approval of the militia as well as the people of New London.36 “Brigr Gen Cushing is the Gentleman and the Soldier,” said Isham. “His vigilance, his attention to our Troops, his attachment to this State, his opposition to any surrender of our State rights . . . all conspire to forbid his being superseded in the command here.”37 State officials, however, were determined to put their own man in charge. Hence Governor Smith ordered Major General Augustine Taylor to take command.38

  Taylor arrived in New London in September. Acting on orders from the governor, Lusk put his brigade under Taylor’s command.39 Cushing was furious. Summoning Lusk to an interview, he warned the state officer that if he disobeyed orders he would “be considered as engaged in a mutiny, & be treated accordingly” and that if he withdrew his troops “it would be considered as desertion and treated accordingly.”40 When these warnings failed, Cushing threatened to use force and even paraded his regulars in front of Taylor’s headquarters. Unwilling to be intimidated, Taylor called out the militia for inspection. Badly outnumbered and facing the prospect of a hopeless and bloody confrontation, Cushing retired from the field.41 But claiming that the militia units had been withdrawn from national service, he ordered federal agents to stop supplying and paying them.42 This meant that for the last five months of the war, from September 1814 to February 1815, the state had to assume responsibility for any militia called into service.

  The Militia Problem: Massachusetts

  Officials in Massachusetts were more flexible, largely because of the influence of Governor Strong. Unlike the governor of Connecticut, who insistently focused on the command issue, Strong was more interested in securing proper deployment of the troops. When he refused to meet the War Department’s initial request in 1812, he left the command issue to his supreme court while addressing himself to the absence of any immediate threat and to defects in Dearborn’s plan of deployment. Shortly thereafter, he demonstrated that effective use of the militia was his chief concern by dispatching three companies for service to the Maine frontier. These troops remained on du
ty for three months in 1812, commanded by a regular officer and supplied by the federal government.43

  There were few calls on the Massachusetts militia in 1812 or 1813, but the following year was different. In the spring of 1814, the British blockaded the Massachusetts coast and began raiding and ransoming exposed towns. Royal officials took special interest in those ports that harbored American warships. At first, state officials eagerly cooperated with Captain William Bainbridge to protect his squadron in Boston harbor. Small detachments of militia were called out for service at Marblehead and Charlestown, and an additional 3,000 troops were held in readiness. Later, however, state officials complained that the ships at Charlestown were a liability and urged Bainbridge to move them to an unprotected part of the harbor to spare Boston from bombardment. Bainbridge indignantly rejected this suggestion.44 He also let it be known that if Boston surrendered to the British without offering resistance (as Alexandria, Virginia, had done), “he should certainly Fire upon the Town.”45

  Massachusetts officials also had trouble with the army. In the spring of 1814 the state struck a bargain with District Commander Thomas Cushing to coordinate efforts to defend Boston. Governor Strong agreed to permit Brigadier General Cushing to command any militia called out to garrison the forts in the harbor or to protect other vital points near Boston. In return, Cushing promised to interpose no regular officer between himself and the militia, agreeing in effect to keep the militia and regular units under his command entirely separate. This arrangement seemed to satisfy everyone, but before it could be put to the test of a full-scale alarm, Cushing was transferred to Connecticut.46

  Cushing was succeeded by Major General Henry Dearborn, who assumed command in June 1814. Dearborn continued Cushing’s command arrangement but evidently thought it applied only to Boston. Hence in July, when he called out 1,300 militia because of “the threats and daily depredations of the Enimy,” he put a regular officer in charge of each of the posts to which the troops were assigned.47 Moreover, in accordance with the new code of army regulations drawn up by John Armstrong in 1813, Dearborn organized the troops into companies of 100 men each. In thus dismantling the state’s existing organization (which was based on 64-man companies), Dearborn deprived some officers of their command, forced some men to serve under unfamiliar officers, and subjected all to a new system of drill and tactics. For men who regarded their militia duties with a deep sense of pride and tradition, this was a serious affront indeed.48

  Dearborn’s actions led to a host of complaints from displaced officers and disaffected men alike. Such were the objections that when Dearborn asked for an additional 5,000 men in September, Governor Strong complied but insisted on placing the troops under state officers.49 Strong took this step reluctantly (because the state would have to supply and pay the troops), and he continued to cooperate with federal officials whenever possible. He allowed those units already in federal service to finish their tours, and he supplied 300 troops for service under a United States officer in Portsmouth. Moreover, in an effort to continue the arrangement for the defense of Boston, he assigned 1,400 men to serve in the harbor ports under Dearborn’s son, Henry A. S. Dearborn. Although the younger Dearborn was a brigadier in the militia, he was permitted to take his orders from his father.50

  Governor Strong also sought to cooperate with federal officials in the defense of Maine, which was too remote to be properly supervised from Boston. Shortly after the breakdown of the command agreement in Massachusetts, Strong dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Sumner, to stave off trouble in Maine. Sumner’s principal task was to organize the defense of Portland, whose open harbor and exposed shipping invited attack.51 Portland, which was called Falmouth in 1775, had been burned by the British that year, and the townspeople feared that “the destressing scenes” of the Revolution might be repeated.52

  With the governor’s aide serving as mediator, a plan for defending the city was drawn up by the Portland Committee of Public Safety, Brigadier General John Chandler of the United States Army, and Major General Alford Richardson of the state militia. The plan called for maintaining 1,900 militia in service, some commanded by state officers and others by regulars.53 This arrangement met with “the greatest satisfaction” of all concerned, and state officials praised Sumner for leaving Portland “in so tranquil a state.”54

  This tranquility, however, did not last, for state officials had reckoned with neither the plans of the War Department nor the wishes of the Republican militia of Maine. On September 20, the day after the troops were called into service, orders arrived from Washington transferring Chandler to Portsmouth and assigning the command in Portland to Lieutenant Colonel Horatio Stark. Although Stark was conciliatory enough, his rank seriously compromised the command agreement. The militia, in any case, had already begun to voice objections to serving under regular officers.55

  Part of the problem was in Richardson’s division. Some of the men deserted and had to be brought back by force, and some of the officers protested against serving under regulars.56 The citizen soldiers of Oxford County were even more troublesome. Although this county was the most Republican in the state, its militia showed little interest in making sacrifices for the war.57 According to Sumner, they were “undisciplined, badly armed, miserably provided, and worse commanded.” Such was the “spirit of disaffection” among these troops that Sumner could see no way of implementing the command agreement except by using force, which meant using militia against militia.58 Since a British attack on Portland seemed imminent, Sumner decided instead to put all the troops under Richardson’s command. This quieted the men in Richardson’s own division, although the Oxford militia remained obstreperous for the duration of the campaign, often refusing to perform routine duties or to take orders from anyone.59

  Officials in Boston were distressed by the breakdown of the Portland agreement, but believing that Sumner had done all he could, they supported his resolution of the problem.60 But this meant that in Maine, as well as in Massachusetts proper, most of the militiamen were serving under state officers. Hence, Massachusetts, like Connecticut, had to assume financial responsibility for militia called into service in the last five months of the war.

  The Militia Problem: Rhode Island

  Officials in Rhode Island also tried to cooperate with the army, but they too met with disappointment. Although Rhode Island was spared from British raids in the first two years of the war, by the summer of 1814 her citizens were apprehensive. American officials had long recognized that the state offered an attractive target for enemy operations because of its accessibility by water in all seasons, its spacious and weatherproof harbor, and its ample stock of provisions.61 The British had occupied Newport during the Revolution, and the inhabitants feared that they would “experience the horrors of War and Conquest” again.62 These fears were well founded. Vice Admiral Alexander Cochrane very nearly targeted Rhode Island instead of Baltimore in September 1814.63

  In the hope of forestalling an attack, Governor Jones called out four companies of militia in the summer of 1814. These troops were placed in federal service, partly in the hope of getting federal money and partly out of respect for the regular officer in charge of the city’s garrison. But federal agents in Rhode Island were so destitute of funds that the state had to pick up the bill for these as well as five additional companies called out to protect Connecticut.64 “From the present State of the Treasury,” Monroe told Governor Jones, “much dependence must be placed on the local authorities and the banks of your State.”65 Thus Rhode Island, like her two sister states, found herself burdened with her defense costs in the last months of the war.

  Trouble in New Hampshire and Vermont

  Trouble over the militia was not restricted to the staunchly Federalist states in southern New England. There were also difficulties in New Hampshire. This state had a Republican governor in the first year of the war, and he readily complied with requests for troops and agreed to place them under reg
ular army officers.66 By 1814, however, Federalists had won control of the state and they were less cooperative. In the spring of that year, Governor John Taylor Gilman reported that such was the fear of an enemy attack on Portsmouth (where the ship-of-the-line Washington was under construction) that people there were “moving their Shipping up the River and Valuable Effects out of Town.”67 To protect the city, Gilman called out seven companies of militia, but he refused to place the troops under regular officers. Federal agents responded by withholding supplies, and Gilman, acting on the advice of the state legislature, sent the men home.68 Later that summer, however, when the British again threatened Portsmouth, Gilman called out 1,500 men, and this time he let them serve under regular officers.69

  There was also trouble in Vermont. In September 1813 Republican Governor Jonas Galusha ordered a brigade of militia to New York to assist Major General Wade Hampton in his ill-fated foray into Canada. The following month, after an inconclusive election, the Vermont legislature chose Federalist Martin Chittenden as governor. Chittenden waited until Hampton’s campaign was over and then issued a proclamation ordering the militia home. The troops, he said, were needed for local defense and could not serve under regular officers anyway.70