The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Churchill however was not ready to give up his favored plan. He asked if the decision had been affected by Roosevelt’s view that no diversion should be made; Eisenhower said it had not. To back up Eisenhower the British officers present at the meeting all sent their own cables to the Prime Minister, assuring him that they had examined the possibilities of ACCOLADE fully, fairly, and without prejudice and agreed with Eisenhower. Churchill finally conceded the issue, but not gracefully. In a long cable to the President he said he recognized that the activation of his plan was hopeless, and added, “I will not waste words in explaining how painful this decision is to me.” Years later he was still bitter. “The American Staff had enforced their view,” he wrote in his memoirs; “the price had now to be paid by the British.”21

  What Churchill meant was the immediate price in lives lost on Leros. But Eisenhower could have answered, with justice, that both British and American troops in Italy were suffering heavy losses, losses which would have been even higher without the air forces. The mountain fighting had become slow, tedious, and bloody. The Germans were amazingly proficient with demolitions, mines, and booby traps. The Allies had respected their opponent’s tactical performance in Sicily; in Italy, they almost stood in awe of Von Kesselring’s and his men’s abilities. In one sense Eisenhower could congratulate himself on his own performance in the new role of commander of a secondary theater, because he certainly was attaining his main objective: to threaten the enemy and force him to make a relatively heavier commitment to the battle than AFHQ had to make. By mid-October Eisenhower’s eleven divisions were engaging twenty-five German divisions, but the final offensive would have to wait until spring, when AFHQ could use its air superiority effectively. That meant a winter campaign in Italy, with carefully planned minor offensives that would seemingly have every chance of success.22

  But under the circumstances progress was exasperatingly slow. Because Von Kesselring needed time to get his Winter Line constructed, he ordered the Volturno River held until October 15. Fifth and Eighth Armies pushed forward in bitter fighting but they did not reach the Volturno until October 12. That night Clark sent each of his corps on a frontal assault with three divisions abreast. He gained some bridgeheads, but German artillery firing from high ground north of the Volturno delayed the construction or repair of bridges, and not until October 15 did Fifth Army make any real progress. From the fifteenth on, the Germans gradually fell back from one natural strong point to another, until they reached the Winter Line, which ran along the Garigliano River on the west across the high ground south of the Sangro River on the east. Tedder’s air forces proceeded to make the winter difficult but not impossible for the defenders, the chief limiting factor on air operations being the weather.

  Obviously an inferior force was going to have difficulty pushing back a superior one that was skilled in defensive operations, especially along a narrow peninsula cut by mountains and rivers. Eisenhower’s advantages over Von Kesselring were command of the air and sea, but bad weather prevented effective use of the air and a lack of landing craft limited the advantage of control of the sea. The apparent way to defeat the Germans was seemingly to outflank them, force them out of their prepared positions, and hit them while they were on the move. Along the Winter Line, however, Von Kesselring was so strong that there was no possibility of forcing a breakthrough which was needed to create flanks. An amphibious operation was the only answer.

  The trouble was that, again, the landing craft were not available. At Quebec the CCS had decided to concentrate the craft in England in preparation for OVERLORD and ordered Eisenhower to send eighty per cent of his LSTs and LSIs and two thirds of the remaining landing craft in the Mediterranean to the U.K. between the middle of October and early December. Eisenhower protested, to no avail. But after the capture of Foggia he decided the CCS had been right—OVERLORD should have priority. He told Alexander he did not intend to bother the CCS with any more requests for landing craft for Italy.

  Alexander had accepted Eisenhower’s view, but he had done so during the period when the Allies were sure they would get Rome without a major fight. The situation brought about by Von Kesselring’s decision to stand on the Winter Line changed the entire situation. On October 13 Alexander told Eisenhower that, while he was aware “you have decided to accept Combined Chiefs of Staff decision,” it was his duty to point out that the shortage of landing craft “will force us into frontal attacks which will undoubtedly be strongly contested and prove costly.” Eisenhower passed Alexander’s views on to Smith, who had gone to Washington to confer with Marshall about future strategy, and commented, “I refuse to raise again with the Combined Chiefs of Staff this question … but you might make personal inquiries to discover whether the production situation has improved sufficiently to warrant our asking for more.”23 Smith replied that the production situation had not improved, “but all concerned are aware of the great advantages that would accrue to us through additional equipment of this kind.”24 It emerged that the only way AFHQ could get landing craft support was by delaying departure of the vessels scheduled to go to England, and Eisenhower did not want to request such a delay since he knew it would have an adverse effect on OVERLORD.

  On October 21 Eisenhower had a Commanders’ Conference. Alexander held the floor, giving a full review of the battle situation and making his recommendations for the future. He argued persuasively for the retention of some landing craft for a month or so and convinced Eisenhower and his fellow deputies that the request had to be made. Alexander’s main point was that the most help AFHQ could give OVERLOAD would be to retain the initiative in Italy and prevent Von Kesselring from withdrawing divisions from the area, divisions which could be used to oppose OVERLORD. In view of the two-to-one German manpower superiority on the ground, there was a certain danger in this, as Von Kesselring might change his program to an offensive. Eisenhower was not particularly worried about that possibility, however, because of his faith in the air forces, and Alexander pointed out that if Von Kesselring did attack “the better it will be for OVERLORD and it then makes little difference what happens to us if OVERLORD is a success.”

  To retain the needed initiative, Alexander proposed a three-pronged thrust. He would begin by having Montgomery seize the high ground north of the Pescara River, then turn to his left (southwest) and drive up the valley of the Pescara River, threatening Rome from the rear. To give Montgomery a fair chance of success, Alexander wanted a sea-borne attack by an infantry brigade around the Germans’ east flank. Thus, while Montgomery was moving forward, Alexander wanted Clark to launch a frontal attack aimed at Rome. The third prong of the offensive would be an amphibious attack by an infantry division northwest of Rome. The crucial governing factor in the entire proposal, Alexander recognized, was landing craft. He urged Eisenhower to ask the CCS for a delay in the movement of the craft to the U.K., saying it simply had to be permitted “if we are to capture Rome in the near future and avoid a slow, painful and costly series of frontal attacks.”25

  Eisenhower thought about Alexander’s proposal for a week, then discussed it again with his deputies at another Commanders’ Conference. He finally decided that Alexander was right. On October 31 he asked the CCS to be allowed to retain some sixty-eight LSTs until January 5, or three weeks beyond their scheduled departure date. He said he was certain that a favorable decision from the CCS would lead to success in Italy, “which will have a great effect on OVERLORD.” He was reluctant to make the request, “but the enormous value to us of being able to use these additional LST’s for a comparatively short period … is so impressive from our local viewpoint …” that he felt he had to do it.26

  Churchill and the BCOS supported Eisenhower and Marshall gave in. On November 5 the CCS told Eisenhower that he could retain sixty-eight LSTs until December 15. Eisenhower immediately protested that the December deadline still made effective amphibious assaults difficult, and Alexander made a similar protest to Brooke.27 On November 7 Brooke privately t
old Alexander to plan on the assumption that the LSTs would remain until January 15. Brooke, however, had no authority to make any promises. Eisenhower meanwhile had talked to Clark, who wanted to lower the sights a little. Instead of an amphibious landing north of Rome, Clark thought it ought to be to the south, around Anzio. From that point the troops could drive inland and take the Alban Hills, which dominated the surrounding countryside and would cut Von Kesselring’s communications between Rome and the front lines. If everything worked, the Allies might even cut off and destroy the Germans facing Fifth Army. Clark also felt there was no point in launching the attack on Anzio until Fifth Army was farther north. Eisenhower agreed with him and adjusted the plan accordingly.

  Everything still hinged on availability of landing craft. “The situation appears to me to hang in the balance,” Eisenhower told the CCS, in asking once again to be allowed to keep the LSTs until January. “Naturally I do not wish to interfere with the preparations for OVERLORD but I have felt it my duty to lay before you my requirements, leaving it to you to judge the priorities.”28

  Until the CCS said otherwise, however, Eisenhower had to proceed on the assumption that the orders stood and that the LSTs would sail for England in mid-December. On November 9 he told Alexander that although he had sought in every possible way “to avoid a mere slugging match along a wide front,” he had come to the conclusion that Alexander should try to build up Fifth and Eighth Armies “while depending upon our air forces to make the enemy’s maintenance more and more difficult.” Small end runs might be possible, and Alexander should keep the possibility of a stronger sea-borne operation in mind, “but for the present it would seem to be more advantageous to continue an intensive buildup than to set aside craft hoping to make an attack by a reinforced division.”29 The next day Eisenhower learned that the CCS would be meeting in two weeks at Cairo and that he and his deputies would be going there to testify. The whole question of world-wide strategy could be reviewed; as a part of the review, of course, the CCS would deal with AFHQ’s request for help in landing craft. Eisenhower thought a verbal presentation of AFHQ’s case “by far the best way of raising the question again,” and so advised Alexander.30

  The Anzio operation, in short, was still uncertain. Alexander meanwhile took Eisenhower’s advice and decided to start the first two thrusts in his over-all plan. On November 20 Eighth Army opened its offensive. Montgomery quickly established some small bridgeheads on the north bank of the Sangro River, but then torrential rains held him up for a week. Not until December 2 was his whole army across the Sangro. Then both the rains and German resistance increased. Ammunition resupply in the mountains became difficult, casualties mounted, tanks and artillery bogged down in the mud. Montgomery had few reserves, so when his men did win small local victories he could not exploit them. The weather prevented the air forces from helping. In mid-December Montgomery called off the offensive. The Pescara, which Alexander had hoped to reach in late November, was not crossed until June of 1944.31 Clark’s offensive, which began on December 1, ran into similar difficulties. Eisenhower made a series of trips to the front, inspected the positions, talked to officers and men, brought in what supplies he could, but was unable to get the offensive rolling. Von Kesselring had imposed a stalemate.

  The relative inactivity on the Italian front allowed Eisenhower to catch up on other matters, including his personal correspondence. He even managed to take a full day off and go partridge hunting with Smith. He had to do a great deal of entertaining, as VIPs poured into Algiers. In October alone Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, Donald Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board, James Landis, director of the Office of Civilian Defense, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Secretary Hull, W. Averell Harriman, ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Mountbatten, Field Marshal Smuts, and others passed through Algiers. Eisenhower grumbled about it, but managed to have at least one meal with each of them. He did feign illness in order to avoid having to dine with a group of touring senators.32

  He decided that one way to escape the VIPs was to move his headquarters closer to the front lines. He wanted to keep AFHQ on the march anyway, because he did not want the staff digging in at one location, particularly in a large, comfortable city like Algiers. The staff did not get its required work done when the officers had comfortable billets and social obligations, and the troops resented it when they saw staff officers living in splendor. Eisenhower told Smith to set up an advanced headquarters at Naples and to be prepared to move the AFHQ headquarters there when it was captured. It took more than a month to arrange the move, and when it did come it accomplished none of Eisenhower’s purposes. Smith had picked a sumptuous villa for himself, Butcher had found another for Eisenhower (Prince Umberto’s hunting lodge), and other officers had equally palatial billets. Headquarters itself was the Caserta Palace north of Naples. Eisenhower’s office was a room large enough to serve as a railway station. He protested, in vain. A conqueror’s complex had settled on the staff, and the members insisted on living in accordance with their rights.33

  One officer who could not enjoy the fruits of victory in this manner was Admiral Cunningham. Churchill had selected him to replace Pound, who was ill, as First Sea Lord. The admiral was due to leave Algiers on October 17; Eisenhower arranged a ceremony for him, complete with a band playing “Rule Britannia.” As Cunningham’s plane took off, Eisenhower had a member of the crew hand a letter to the admiral. “It is a sad day for the North African Theater that sees you leave us,” Eisenhower wrote. Every man in AFHQ had come to look on Cunningham “as one of the solid foundation rocks upon which has been built such success as we have achieved.” The real purpose of the letter, however, was to give Eisenhower an opportunity to express his personal “profound sense of loss” at Cunningham’s departure. He thanked the admiral for his unfailing support, his wise counsel, and his brilliant leadership, and wished him “good luck and Godspeed.”34

  After the ceremony Eisenhower returned to the St. Georges Hotel. There he found a letter for him from Cunningham, thanking him for all he had done. Two weeks later Cunningham wrote again. He told Eisenhower it had been a great experience for him to see the forces of two nations, made up of men with different upbringings, conflicting ideas on staff work and basic “apparently irreconcilable ideas,” brought together and knitted into a team.

  In a final tribute, Cunningham declared: “I do not believe any other man than yourself could have done it.”35

  * Sir Ian Jacob maintains that Churchill’s main motive was to open a supply line to Russia by bringing Turkey into the war. Jacob to author, October 15, 1968, author’s possession.

  CHAPTER 21

  The Big Appointment

  By September 1943 it was clear that Operation OVERLORD was to be one of the largest military undertakings in man’s history. For eight months nearly all human and material resources of two great nations would be directed toward the one objective of mounting an amphibious assault on a small bit of the coast of western France. OVERLORD’s needs came before all else, as Eisenhower and the other commanders in the Mediterranean, as well as the Allied leaders in the Pacific and elsewhere, were discovering. From July 1943 onward, Eisenhower geared his operations to the question, Will this help or hinder OVERLORD?

  Command of OVERLORD was the most coveted in the war, perhaps in all history. The commander would have tremendous forces at his disposal. His fighting men would be highly trained and magnificently equipped. He could call on all the mighty air and sea power the Allies had. The field commanders would be the best the U.S. and the U.K. had to offer. To serve him on his staff, the Supreme Commander could pick the most talented men available. If the operation was a success he could take much of the credit for the defeat of Nazi Germany and would go down in history as one of the great captains. No reward would be too great for the commander of OVERLORD.

  Fittingly, the story of the selection of the commander is one of high purpose, resolve, and thoughtful consideration. It involved little intrig
ue or back-door Army politics. In theory, the choice of the commander rested with the CCS, but in fact, since members of the CCS were candidates, the Chiefs deferred to the heads of government. Churchill in turn bowed to Roosevelt, since the Americans would ultimately be making twice the commitment in men and material as the British. So it came down to Roosevelt, a man who had the reputation of often being haphazard in his administrative arrangements and remarkably casual in picking his top officials.

  One favorite Roosevelt technique of decision-making was to leak a story to the press and then gauge the reaction. The obvious choice for the position was Marshall. He had been the force behind OVERLORD, the one responsible for its birth, the one who insisted upon its importance all along. In early September 1943 stories began to appear in American newspapers stating that his appointment as OVERLORD commander had been decided upon. Many commentators took this as a matter of course, but two important objections did appear. First, political opponents of the President charged that he was trying to replace Marshall as Chief of Staff with a political general who would manipulate the awarding of war contracts in such a way as to insure Roosevelt’s re-election. The criticism was so widespread that Stimson and Marshall felt it necessary to issue a public denial. Second, professional armed forces journals, along with Marshall’s colleagues on the JCS, objected to Marshall’s going to OVERLORD because they wanted him to retain his position in the Army and on the CCS. Roosevelt listened to the criticisms and kept his own counsel.1