The Supreme Commander

by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Two weeks later Eisenhower added another army group to his command. The DRAGOON forces contained one French and one American army, organized into Sixth Army Group. Once they made contact with Patton’s right wing, they were scheduled to come under SHAEF’s control. Devers commanded the group. Eisenhower had not been consulted on Devers’ selection but he assured Marshall that the rumor that he was opposed to Devers was untrue. He did not know Devers well, he said, but all reports indicated that he was doing a fine job.18 The DRAGOON forces made rapid progress after the initial landing, driving north along the Rhône Valley route, and on September 15, the link-up having been achieved, Eisenhower assumed command of Sixth Army Group.

  The complexities of paratrooper organization brought about another command change. Parachute and glider troops used in airborne operations were part of the ground force organization, while the aircraft which carried the troops, furnished escorts, and resupplied the airborne units were under air force command. The problem was further complicated because both U.S. and British air and ground forces were involved.19 After lengthy discussion the solution was to form the First Allied Airborne Army (August 16) and put it under the command of Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton. First Allied Airborne Army included the American and British airborne divisions plus the IX Troop Carrier Command. August was a frustrating month for Brereton, for whenever he planned a drop he found that the ground armies had overrun the objective before he could execute the operation. To add to his problems, Troop Carrier Command was involved in supplying the forward troops, so he could not count on having his planes ready when he needed them.20

  The big bombers presented another problem. When Eisenhower took command of the Strategic Air Forces in April it had been clearly understood that once OVERLORD was a success they would revert to their previous independence. On September 2 Spaatz informed Eisenhower that the CCS, at their coming meeting in Quebec, would make the change, taking the bombers away from Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander immediately wired Marshall, saying he “would regard any such change as a serious mistake.…” He thought all the available forces should be kept under one command and pointed out that there had been no clashes of policy or even sharp differences of opinion on the proper use of the air forces since the April dispute. Both Spaatz and Harris were happy with the present arrangement.21

  Eisenhower also asked Arnold for his help. “The basic conception underlying this campaign was that possession of an overpowering air force made feasible an invasion that would otherwise be completely impossible,” he said, and he felt that argument still held. “The air has done everything we asked.” It had destroyed the German Air Force, disrupted communications, neutralized beach defenses, and made the breakthrough possible. The Strategic Forces had meanwhile been committed “to the greatest extent possible” to destroying German industrial and oil targets. But the front lines had moved so far forward so rapidly that airfield construction had fallen behind. Only big bombers could now reach the forward areas. To separate them from SHAEF would make co-ordination difficult if not impossible. Spaatz, Eisenhower added, agreed completely.22

  The CCS, however, decided otherwise. On September 14 they took command of the strategic air forces away from Eisenhower and gave it to Portal and Arnold, with Spaatz and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, Air Marshal Norman Bottomley, as the executive agents. Eisenhower would still have the right to call on the heavy bombers during an emergency in the land battle. The Supreme Commander decided the new arrangement would be satisfactory because of the “goodwill of the individuals concerned” and the assurances that his operations would be supported. He knew he could count on Spaatz, and he had been pleasantly surprised by Harris, who had helped enthusiastically and “become exceedingly proud of his membership in the ‘Allied team.’ ” Harris wrote Eisenhower a warm letter, saying how delighted he had been to be of service, assuring the Supreme Commander of his future support, and concluding, “I wish personally and on behalf of my Command to proffer you my thanks and gratitude for your unvarying helpfulness, encouragement and support which has never failed us throughout the good fortunes and occasional emergencies of the campaign.…” Remembering all the difficulty he had had in bringing Harris over in the first place, Eisenhower kept the letter as one of his most cherished mementos of the war.23

  Even with the loss of the Strategic Air Forces, SHAEF continued to grow in size. Hardly had the tents and trailers been set up in Granville for the initial 1500 officers and men than the available space proved insufficient. In addition the fighting lines had gone far beyond the Seine and Eisenhower felt Granville was too far behind the front. He therefore ordered another forward move as soon as possible. He also wanted SHAEF Main brought over from London to the Continent, since the need to be at a major communications network was imperative. Still, he insisted that SHAEF Main avoid a large city, particularly Paris, where there were “too many temptations to go night clubbing.” Versailles was chosen as the new site, and on September 6 Eisenhower, who had been keeping in touch with his commanders by jeep and plane, directed that SHAEF Main move there as soon as possible. On September 20 the new headquarters opened. By then Eisenhower had already had built a small advance headquarters outside Reims, with the tents and trailers set up on the grounds of the Athletic Club of Reims, which had the advantage of putting him near a golf course.24 SHAEF did not move again until February 1945.

  The command structure was thus complete and it remained essentially the same to the end of the war. Eisenhower had gathered firmly into his hands control of the Allied land forces from Holland to the Mediterranean and from the German border westward to the Atlantic. He also commanded the U.S. air and ground forces in the United Kingdom. He had one British, one Canadian, one French, one Allied airborne, and 4 U.S. armies, plus the British and U.S. tactical air forces, under his direct command. He had first call on the Strategic Air Forces for support of his ground operations. The total force available to him for the final blow against the Nazi regime was, clearly, enormous. It was now the Supreme Commander’s task to see to it that the AEF was used effectively to bring about this final blow.25

  Part III

  THE GERMAN RECOVERY

  [September 1944–December 1944]

  VERTICAL bargaining in the upper reaches of the American executive [or in the Allied Expeditionary Force] reflects what might be called the principle of the inverse strength of the chain of command. On the organization chart, the lines of authority fan out from the top executive down level by level to the lowest subordinate. Actually, however, the lines at the bottom of the chart usually should be darker than those at the top, which might well be dotted or light gray. As one moves up a hierarchy the lines in the chain of command weaken and even tend to dissolve. Hierarchical control becomes less important; bargaining relationships more important. The reasons include the greater difficulty in replacing top level personnel, the wider span of lateral associations possessed by top executives [generals], and their broader and more diversified fields of responsibility (which make it more difficult for the superior to enforce his will on any single issue). The President [Supreme Commander] may be the most powerful man in the country, but relatively speaking he has less control over his cabinet [or army and army group commanders] than a lowly VA section chief has over his clerks or a corporal over his squad. Consequently, at the higher levels of government, relationships, even among hierarchical superiors and subordinates, tend towards egalitarianism and usually involve substantial bargaining. A hierarchical superior can control his subordinate by determining the goals which the subordinate is to pursue, controlling the resources available to the subordinate, or doing both.

  Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense:

  Strategic Programs in National Politics

  (London, 1961), pp. 148, 151.

  CHAPTER 12

  Arnhem and Antwerp

  On August 19, 1944 Eisenhower decided to cross the Seine. At the same time he declared his intention to take personal c
ommand of the whole land battle soon and outlined a plan of campaign beyond the Seine that would send Montgomery to the northeast, toward Antwerp and eventually the Ruhr, with Bradley heading straight east from Paris toward Metz. Montgomery disagreed with the latter decision, and on August 22 sent his chief of staff, De Guingand, to see Eisenhower. De Guingand carried with him a note from Montgomery to Eisenhower in which Montgomery argued that the quickest way to end the war was to send the bulk of the AEF northward to clear the coast to Antwerp, establish a powerful air force in Belgium, and advance into the Ruhr. The force had to operate as a single unit under single control, which was “a WHOLE TIME job for one man.” Montgomery warned that “to change the system of command now, after having won a great victory, would be to prolong the war.”1

  Montgomery’s note called into question not only Eisenhower’s recent orders but also the original pre-OVERLORD plan. SHAEF planners had set the ultimate objectives of the AEF in early May 1944 in accordance with the CCS directive to Eisenhower which ordered him to undertake operations “aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” The planners selected the Ruhr as the “heart of Germany.” Berlin was “too far east to be the objective of a campaign in the West,” and in addition, the German economy could not survive the loss of the industrial region of the Ruhr. But although the planners wanted to concentrate on the Ruhr, they considered it dangerous to attack by a single route and thus narrow the advance and open it to a concentrated enemy attack. SHAEF planners preferred “a broad front both north and south of the Ardennes,” which would give the AEF the advantage of maneuver and thus the ability to shift the main weight of attack to exploit opportunities.2 On the question of a single command the SHAEF staff had always assumed that Eisenhower would take personal charge as soon as there were two army groups operating in Europe.

  For two hours De Guingand discussed the issues with Eisenhower, but the Supreme Commander would not change his mind. When De Guingand reported this result to Montgomery, the Twenty-first Army Group commander invited Eisenhower to come to his tactical headquarters at Condésur-Noireau for lunch the next day, August 23, to go over future operations. Eisenhower accepted.

  Early on the morning of the twenty-third Montgomery flew to Laval to see Bradley, hoping to persuade the American general to support his plan so that the two army group commanders would present a solid front to the Supreme Commander. Montgomery thought that Bradley agreed with his conception. It called for giving U. S. First Army to Twenty-first Army Group for the drive to the Ruhr and stopping Patton’s Third Army where it was. He was shocked to learn that in fact Bradley now proposed to make the major AEF effort south of the Ardennes. Bradley felt that the U. S. First and Third Armies together could march through the middle of France to the Saar and beyond that river to the Rhine in the vicinity of Frankfurt.3 Taken aback by Bradley’s responses, but not ready to give up, Montgomery returned to his own headquarters for his luncheon with Eisenhower. The Supreme Commander would have to choose between the views of his two principal subordinates, each of whom wanted a single thrust in his own area, or else insist on his own plan calling for a broad front advance that would involve them both equally.

  Eisenhower drove to Condé for the meeting from his small advance headquarters in the Normandy apple orchard. Smith had come over from London to attend the meeting with him, but when they arrived Montgomery said that he wanted to see Eisenhower alone and that Smith had to stay outside. Montgomery then tried his best to be tactful, but he had already set Eisenhower on edge by locking Smith out and he now made matters worse by proceeding to give him a lecture, as if he were patronizing a student at a staff college. He outlined the situation, said the “immediate need [was] for a firm and sound plan,” discussed logistics, outlined his own plan on a map, declared that if Eisenhower’s plan were followed the result would be failure, and told Eisenhower that he “should not descend into the land battle and become a ground C-in-C.” He explained that the Supreme Commander “must sit on a very lofty perch in order to be able to take a detached view of the whole intricate problem,” and that someone must run the land battle for him.

  Eisenhower told Montgomery of the reaction in the United States to the original announcement about the command shift and of Marshall’s insistence that because of American public opinion he, Eisenhower, had to take control of the land battle. Montgomery said that he felt so strongly about the need for unified control of the armies that if American public opinion were the only stumbling block, he would be willing to serve under Bradley. Eisenhower interrupted to say that he had no intention of doing anything of the sort, but he also made it clear that he did not intend to change the proposed command changes and would take personal control on September 1.

  Unable to change Eisenhower’s mind on the question of command, Montgomery shifted to the subject of plans. He wanted Patton stopped where he was, with all his supplies cut off and given instead to forces operating under the control of Twenty-first Army Group. He wanted the First Allied Airborne Army and the U. S. First Army assigned to him for the drive north and northeastward. He insisted that even to get Antwerp he would need at least twelve American divisions. He explained that this was partly because he would have to drop off Canadian divisions as he moved along the coast to invest and capture ports and partly because of the strength of the German resistance he faced.

  The two generals argued for an hour. Eisenhower conceded a bit, but he refused to give Montgomery everything he wanted. He agreed to issue a directive giving Montgomery the objectives of destroying the enemy forces in his front, seizing the Pas de Calais area and the airfields in Belgium, and pushing forward to Antwerp. The eventual mission of Twenty-first Army Group would be to advance eastward on the Ruhr. Bradley, meanwhile, would be directed to thrust forward on Twelfth Army Group’s left, with his principal offensive mission to support Montgomery. At the same time, Twelfth Army Group would be directed to clean up the Brittany Peninsula and “begin building up, out of incoming forces, the necessary strength to advance eastward from Paris toward Metz.” Montgomery could have control of the Airborne Army, and he would have the “authority to effect the necessary operational coordination between” his right and Bradley’s left wing (U. S. First Army).4

  “It has been a very exhausting day,” Montgomery wrote Brooke after the meeting, but he was satisfied. Although he felt Eisenhower should have dismissed from his mind completely the idea of advancing from Paris toward Metz with Third Army, he was pleased at getting “operational control” over First Army.5 Brooke too was satisfied. The CIGS regarded Eisenhower as “essentially a staff officer with little knowledge of the realities of the battlefield,” and had remarked when he heard that Eisenhower intended to take command in Europe that this was “likely to add another three to six months on to the war.”6 If Montgomery would now have First Army under him, however, Eisenhower’s presence would not be so disastrous.

  The following day, August 24, Eisenhower outlined his thinking to Marshall. “The decision as to exactly what to do at this moment has taken a lot of anxious thought,” he explained, “because of the fact that we do not have sufficient strength and supply possibilities to do everything that we should like to do simultaneously.” He was giving priority to Montgomery’s attack on the left because of the importance of the objectives there—the V-weapon launching sites, the airfields in Belgium, and Antwerp. But he still wanted Bradley to complete the conquest of Brittany and keep enough strength in the Paris area to protect the supply lines originating in Cherbourg. “In addition to all the above,” he added, “I want Bradley to build up quickly, from incoming divisions, a force in the area just east of Paris so as to be ready to advance straight eastward to Metz.”

  Eisenhower said he had hoped to be able to carry out both operations (toward Antwerp and Metz) simultaneously, but that the AEF was not strong enough to do it. “I cannot tell you how anxious I am to get the forces accumulated for starting the thrust eastward from Paris,” he add
ed. “I have no slightest doubt that we can quickly get to the former French-German boundary but there is no point in getting there until we are in position to do something about it.”7

  Eisenhower had lunched with Montgomery on August 23. On August 29 he issued the new directive. During that time he spent two days with Bradley, who protested vigorously at giving control of First Army to Montgomery. So did Eisenhower’s G-3, Major General Harold R. Bull, and his G-2, the British Major General Kenneth Strong. As a result, when Eisenhower issued the directive, he bowed to this advice and did not give Montgomery operational control of First Army. Instead, Montgomery was “authorized to effect,” through Bradley, “any necessary coordination between his own forces” and First Army.8

  The plan that Montgomery thought Eisenhower had agreed to was further watered down by Bradley’s actions. Eisenhower had made it clear in a letter of August 24 and again in his directive of August 29 that he wanted Bradley to build up his forces east of Paris and to “prepare to strike rapidly eastwards towards the Saar Valley.…”9 Bradley nevertheless on August 25 told Patton to advance to Reims and “be prepared to continue the advance rapidly in order to seize crossings of the Rhine river from Mannheim to Koblenz.”10 The next day Patton began the race toward the Meuse, which he crossed on August 30. This put him more than a hundred miles east of Paris and not much more than that distance from the Rhine. He was, however, out of gas. Eisenhower had ordered that priority in supplies for Twelfth Army Group go to Hodges’ First Army so that Hodges could support Montgomery’s advance. On August 30 Patton received only 32,000 gallons of the 400,000 gallons of gasoline he had demanded. Still, he wanted to push on. When Major General Manton S. Eddy reported that his XII Corps had stopped because if it went any farther its tanks would be without fuel, Patton told him “to continue until the tanks stop and then get out and walk.” Patton realized that when his tanks ran dry Bradley and Eisenhower would have to give him more gasoline—even at the expense of Hodges’ First Army.11