That Dark and Bloody River
Page 53
All of the Moravian Indians, headed by the Delaware convert who was originally named Netawatwees but who now called himself Abraham, went into a series of councils with the hostiles. Abraham argued that the Moravian Indians were not spies for the Americans or anyone else. Monakaduto, in turn, declared that, as Indians, they should support their fellows and take up weapons and join them in the continuing fight against the Americans. Abraham disagreed, saying they were now Christians and did not intend to take up the hatchet against anyone, American or otherwise; that they were, in fact, neutral, had always been so and meant to stay that way. Monakaduto was becoming irritated and he now warned them that, being in the path of war between the Indians and whites, they were in great danger and that they should have sense enough to see this and move away voluntarily. Once more Abraham respectfully declined on behalf of the Moravians.
On August 15, leading the 300 warriors that had remained behind at Half King’s Town on the upper Sandusky, Pimoacan, Coon, Pachganshehilas and Wingenund arrived at Gnadenhütten. The force included a contingent of Delawares from Lower Sandusky, another of Shawnees under Shemeneto and a final group of 40 Munceys from the upper Allegheny.
Monakaduto related to them that he had been counciling here with the Moravians almost daily since their arrival but that none of the talking had brought the Christian Indians closer to voluntarily leaving this area. At that juncture the elderly Delaware chief Pachganshehilas—Hailstone—said that perhaps the converts might be convinced more readily by a fellow Delaware than by a Wyandot of the danger they were in and that he would endeavor to make them see it would be to their benefit to leave here. Calling all the Moravian Indians to assemble, he spoke to them for a long while, alternately wheedling and haranguing, and finally ending with the warning: “Think on what I have now said to you and believe this: If you stay where you are now, one day or another the Shemanese will speak fine words to you and, at the same time, murder you!”
The Moravian Indians deliberated among themselves and, after more discussions with Pachganshehilas, their spokesman, Abraham, declined the offer of an allegedly safer place to live, far away from here on the Tuscarawas where they already had their villages, their chapels, their crops and livestock, their homes. “As for the danger we are supposedly in,” Abraham concluded, “God has protected us in the past and we trust Him to do so in the future.”
At this, the patience of Matthew Elliott reached the breaking point. He stepped forward with an angry wave of his hand. “What do you know of God?” he railed condescendingly. “Can you really be so ignorant as to believe that because you have been, as they say, ‘converted’ and changed your name from Netawatwees to Abraham, that this provides you protection of God? I tell you that God will not help you here once we begin to attack these Americans in earnest. The whites will try to retaliate and you will be killed. Can’t you understand that it is for your own protection that we have requested you to leave? We hoped you would be wise enough to do so without being forced. Instead, we find you a stupid, stubborn old man.”
After more hours of discussion with Monakaduto and the other chiefs, Elliott became convinced that all had finally reached the limit of their patience in trying to deal with these stubborn Moravians. Assured by Monakaduto that the problem would now be taken care of without further ado, Elliott nodded and turned his attention to preparing his few English and French assistants, along with 250 warriors, to march for the upper Ohio.
David Zeisberger was unaware of what decisions had been reached in the council with the chiefs, but the fact that Elliott was now readying a large war party alarmed him. A few days ago he had written a letter to Col. Gibson at Fort Pitt that he had been unable yet to smuggle out to him. Now, though he knew full well his life was jeopardized by doing so, he retired to a secluded spot and hastily penned a second, more urgent letter to Gibson, warning him of the force under Monakaduto and Elliott that was preparing to strike somewhere on the upper Ohio, though whether in numerous small raiding parties or in a mass assault, he did not know. However, he was certain Wheeling would be a priority target.
Moments after finishing the letter, Zeisberger had handed it, along with that earlier letter, to a trusted Moravian youth who, having received his instructions, slipped away into the forest with them, heading for Fort Pitt. With luck, those letters would be in the hands of Col. Gibson within a week. Zeisberger, watching him go, had the feeling that it might be the last intelligence he would be able to get off to the Americans.
True to his word, Monakaduto had no further patience with the Moravians. Less than an hour later, in a peremptory manner, he ordered them to gather up what few personal belongings they had. They were to be escorted to Upper Sandusky, where a plot of ground would be allotted for them to build their own village. When the dismayed Moravians asked what about their corn and other crops that were ripening in the fields, and their cattle, hogs and poultry, Monakaduto told them all those must be left behind for use of the various war parties as they needed them. As for the German missionaries, Heckewelder and Zeisberger, they would be taken along as captives and sent to Detroit to be tried on charges of treason and spying for the Americans.
Now the Moravians, in the custody of Pimoacan and Wingenund and some 60 of their warriors, resignedly began gathering up some of their things preparatory to the long walk to the upper Sandusky via the trail leading up the Walhonding. With Matthew Elliott still at his side, Monakaduto ordered a large force of the warriors, including his three sons, Scotach, Scoleh and Dakadulah, to remain here at Gnadenhütten with him to organize new raids against Wheeling and the other white settlements, those assaults to be initiated as quickly as possible.427
[August 19, 1781—Sunday]
The friction between Col. Daniel Brodhead and his officers had continued to grow over these past months, though it was not so pronounced as the anger that was exhibited toward him by the citizenry, who were now convinced that in their own need and danger, he had betrayed them; that Brodhead had usurped, for his own personal gain in land acquisition, funds that should have rightfully gone to the relief of the people.
The fact that an investigation ordered by Gen. Washington into the allegations lodged against Col. Brodhead was now under way left little room for confidence among his subordinates. Torn in their allegiance and confused as to how they should proceed, they found themselves in a state of limbo that Col. John Gibson knew was detrimental not only to themselves but to the entire frontier. With the Indian threat as great as it was, there was no room for continued dissension among the officers.
Taking it upon himself to bring some order out of this chaos, Gibson discussed the matter with Col. Brodhead, then assembled the officers and suggested a course of action to which, after some further discussion, all agreed. With that and with the unanimous concurrence of the subordinate officers, Gibson officially announced himself in command of Fort Pitt and wrote a letter to Brodhead that stated for the record the decision reached, under which the officers of Fort Pitt had already been acting unofficially for some time:
Head Quarters, Fort Pitt
August 19th, 1781.
To Colonel Brodhead:
Agreeable to your request, we now inform you that, from the letters of his Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, to you, which have been shewn us by Captain John Finley, that it is our opinion we cannot, with propriety, be commanded by you, until you have cleared yourself of the charges which have been exhibited against you and which are now depending.
At the same time we wish to assure you that we entertain the greatest respect for you, and was it not for the present situation of affairs, there is not one of us but would wish to serve under you.
We are, Sir, your most obedt. hble. servants,
John Gibson, Colonel, Commanding Fort Pitt
In succession the remaining 13 officers stepped to the desk and signed below Gibson’s bold signature, their own names and stations:
Fredk. Vernon, Major, 8th Pennsylvania Regiment
Uriah Springer, Captain, 7th Virginia Regiment
Benjn. Biggs, Captain, 7th Virginia Regiment
Saml. Brady, Captain, 8th Pennsylvania Regiment
William Martin, Captain Lieutenant of Proctor’s Artillery
Lewis Thomas, Lieutenant, 7th Virginia Regiment
John Harrison, Lieutenant, 7th Virginia Regiment
Archibald Read, Lieutenant, 8th Pennsylvania Regiment
John Ward, Lieutenant, 8th Pennsylvania Regiment
Jacob Springer, Lieutenant, Virginia Regiment
Jacob Coleman, Engineer, Virginia Regiment
Joseph Wrinlock, Ensign, Virginia Regiment
John Beck, Ensign, 8th Virginia Regiment
[August 24 1781—Friday]
Undeterred by the fractious behavior of his officers and the growing antipathy toward him among the settlers, Col. Daniel Brodhead still thought of himself as commander of Fort Pitt and only momentarily indisposed. Knowing he had long been a favorite of Gen. Washington, he now wrote to him in a manner that he hoped would subtly portray himself as having been taken advantage of and just as subtly hinting for intervention by the commander-in-chief as to reinstatement:
An Expedition against the Sandusky Towns is in contemplation. The troops will be rendezvoused at Fort McIntosh on the 4th and 5th of next month. The country appears to be desirous to promote it, and I intend to command it, if the militia and volunteers do not suffer themselves to be induced into a belief that I have no right to command. If they should, I shall be at a loss how to act, being unwilling to give up my command and as unwilling to prevent the expedition taking place. I will attempt to be governed by prudence.
And mere yards away, in his own quarters in Fort Pitt, Col. Gibson was also writing to the commanding general, though he was more concerned with the condition and safety of the frontier than with his personal station:
General Clark is gone down the river with about 400 men, composed of Colonel Crockett’s Regiment of Virginia State Troops, Captain Craig’s Company of Artillery, except one Captain Lieutenant, one Sergeant, and six matrosses who remain here, the rest volunteers and militia.
I delivered to him all the articles he demanded of me, agreeably to your Excellency’s instructions, and which I thought could, consistently with the safety of the garrison, be spared. As many of the troops in this Department were quite naked, and all of them thro’ want of clothing rendered unfit for a long campaign, the General concluded it would be best for them to remain here, and proposed that I should endeavor to call out as many militia or volunteers as would enable me, with the regular troops, to make a short excursion against the Wyandotte Towns, at the same time that he should begin his march from the mouth of the Miami River against the Shawanese, and which was to be about the 4th of September, and would of course attract the attention of the greatest part of the Indians.
Colonel Brodhead returned the 11th instant to this place. He informed me that your Excellency had ordered him to return to this post, and that after the depositions were taken relative to the charges exhibited against him, and it would suit his own conveniency, that then he was to repair to Head Quarters to take his trial. I then informed him of General Clark’s proposal and, after some time, shewed him a letter which I had received from Colonel Cannon, a principal gentleman of Youghiogheny County, requesting my attendance on the 14th instant at Pentecost’s Mills, as there was to be a general meeting of the County, and that it would be a very proper time to engage the people to turn out, or at least to know their opinion. Previous to this, General Clark had informed Colonel Cannon something of this kind would be attempted.
Colonel Brodhead approved much of the plan, and informed me that we would both go, and try what could be done. On the evening preceding the meeting, I asked Colonel Brodhead if we should set off the next morning. He then shewed me a letter from Mr. Fowler to him, requiring his attendance next day to be present at the taking of depositions in support of the charges exhibited against him, and said, “You see, my friend, these fellows are determined to give me no respite, and that I must go down the country soon. I would therefore advise you to go and try to engage them to turn out with you. I shall give you every assistance in my power and, as so many reports have been spread to my disadvantage thro’ the country, my going might possibly retard the people in turning out. Besides, I might see a number of the damned rascals who signed the remonstrance and their presence would be disagreeable to me—in particular that rascal, Colonel Cannon, should I meet him, I would spit in his face.”
The next morning I went to Pentecost’s Mills where a number of people were collected, the principal of whom I informed my intention. They asked me if Colonel Brodhead was to command. I told them the present situation of his affairs prevented his commanding, that he was obliged to go down the country, but that he had assured me he would give every assistance in his power in furthering the intended excursion. They then asked me to commit my proposals to writing, which I did. The purport of which was that the 4th day of September should be fixed on as a day of general rendezvous at Fort McIntosh; that from the unsettled dispute respecting territory, they should consider themselves as volunteers, and choose their own officers; that each man should be well mounted on horseback and bring with him 30 days’ provision, and that the whole should bring as many spare horses as would mount 150 regular troops, for which number I engaged they should be paid a generous hire and, if killed or taken by the enemy, that they should also be paid.
They unanimously approved of my proposals and requested me to go to another meeting the next day, which was to be held a few miles from thence. I went there and found near 600 collected, and everyone present most heartily agreed to my former proposals, and those fit for service promised to go.…
The only thing I dread is that the expedition will fall through, which must engender the loss of General Clark and his army, should Colonel Brodhead persist in re-assuming the command, as the people in general are prejudiced against him and are determined not to serve under him, tho’ with what propriety, time must discover.
We have been much distressed for provision, owing to the change of the Executive of the State of Pennsylvania in their commissioners of purchase, and the rapid depreciation of the State money; and had it not been for a supply of twenty-seven thousand weight drawn from General Clark’s magazine, and for some salt in store which we exchanged for beef, we could not possibly have maintained this post.
Gibson broke off writing at a tapping on his door, and an ensign entered with two separate folded documents, which he extended to the commander.
“Sir,” he said, “these have just arrived by a Moravian runner. They, uh …” he hesitated, evidently discomfited, “… they were handed to Colonel Brodhead first.” Gibson’s gaze narrowed, but he said nothing and the ensign continued. “As soon as he read them, sir, he returned them to the runner and relayed him on to this office. I’m sorry, sir. I knew nothing about it until they were handed to me. The runner says they are from Zeisberger and to tell you they are urgent.”
“Thank you,” Gibson said, accepting the letters. “Please ask him to wait, that I’d like to talk with him in a few minutes. In the meanwhile, provide him with some food and coffee.”
“Yes, sir.” The ensign saluted and left the room, closing the door behind him.
Gibson unfolded the letters, noted the dates and read the earliest one first, then the other. Finishing, he sighed and set them aside on the edge of his desk, planning to enclose them with his own letter he was presently writing. He then strode to the door, opened it and spoke briefly to the ensign, who nodded, saluted and left at quick speed. Gibson then returned to his desk to hastily finish the letter to George Washington:
I have received, since writing the above, two letters from Rev. Mr. Zeisberger at the Moravian Towns on the Muskingum. The intelligence contained therein is very alarming. I have sent to alarm the country, and hope they will turn out.…
Even as Col. Gibson put the finishing
touches on his letter to Gen. Washington, Col. Brodhead, in his own quarters, had summoned an express rider, who was now standing ready and waiting to carry the dispatch the colonel was swiftly writing, addressed to Col. David Shepherd at Fort Henry in Wheeling:
Fort Pitt, August 24th, 1781
Sir:
I have this moment received certain intelligence that the enemy are coming in great force against us and particularly against Wheeling.
You will immediately put your garrison in the best posture of defence and lay in as great a quantity of water as circumstances will admit, and receive them coolly; they intend to decoy your garrison, but you are to guard against stratagem, and defend the post to the last extremity.
You may rely on every aid in my power to frustrate the designs of the enemy, but you must not fail to give the alarm to the inhabitants in your reach and make it as general as possible, in order that every man may be prepared at this crisis.
D.B.
Col. commanding W.D.
To the commanding officer at
Ft. Henry (Wheeling.)
[August 25, 1781—Saturday]
The large bison that had been killed the evening before had been butchered during the night and the soldiers were looking forward to their morning repast of the considerable quantity of meat that would soon be cooking over several fires. For many, it would be the first time they had ever tasted buffalo meat and, having heard how good it was, they were looking forward to it.
Four or five miles below the mouth of the Great Miami, some 500 miles below Pittsburgh and still 100 miles above the Falls of the Ohio, Col. Archibald Lochry’s lead boat had just scraped ashore, and he stepped out at once. He had decided he would let his detachment of 106 men have three full hours in which to eat and rest before continuing downstream. Perhaps by that time Maj. Craycraft would have returned with dispatches from Gen. Clark.