M. de Murnan has served in quality of Engineer under General Du Portail since the first of March last with the Promise of a majority from the Committee of arrangement at Valley Forge. He has never yet received his commission.
This, I promise has been forgotten in a crowd of more important matters. With the greatest respect and esteem—I have the honor to be
Sir, Your most Obed. Serv.
G. WASHINGTON.20
DUPORTAIL SENT TO BOSTON
General Washington ordered General Duportail on September 29 to go to Boston to examine the state of the fortifications and to form a plan to protect the town and the French fleet against a possible attack, especially on Dorchester Heights and at Roxbury. He was to concentrate on defense by land, while the Comte d’Estaing would focus on defense by water, thereby ensuring mutual support. He also wrote to Admiral d’Estaing and Major General William Heath, who commanded Boston, to inform them of his orders.21
Duportail reported his findings to Washington and Major General William Heath on October 20. He considered the possibilities of both sea and land attacks on Boston, made both with and without the French fleet present in the harbor, and he described fortifications that might be constructed on Boston Neck; the Dorchester, Charlestown, and Nantasket Peninsulas; and various harbor islands. He recommended the immediate construction of a redoubt for 50 men and an entrenchment on Boston Neck, two redans with batteries on Dorchester Heights, one work for 250 men on Noddles Island, and a fort on Peddocks Island. He noted that he learned the previous day the British had embarked five thousand or six thousand troops at New York. He feared they were on their way to Boston but didn’t think they would attack with that number of troops. He then thought that either they would embark more troops or would come to seize Newport. He decided to stay in Boston until he could ascertain British intentions.22
DEFENSE OF THE DELAWARE
General Washington’s first care in June 1778, after the British had evacuated Philadelphia and Congress had returned to that city, was to provide for the defense of the Delaware River. To this end, he ordered General Duportail there immediately after the Battle of Monmouth. Washington wrote to Benedict Arnold, then in command at Philadelphia,
I have sent General Duportail to examine what defences may be essential for its security and to make me a report as soon as the nature of the business will admit. In order to facilitate this, I am to request that you will give every aid in your power which he may consider material for informing his judgment and making a well digested plan. For particulars I refer you to General Duportail’s instructions.23
He then sent the following letter to the president of Congress on October 22:
Immediately after the action at Monmouth, I sent General Duportail to form a plan of fortification for the Delaware. While he was in the execution of this task, he was called away at General Lee’s insistence as witness in his trial. After this was over, I thought it was necessary he should turn his attention to the Highland posts; and lately the possibility of an enterprise against the French fleet and the town of Boston determined me to send him to that place, to take measures for their common security. Previous to this, however, he had sent Colonel Laumoy to prepare the way, by taking plans of the river and the country adjacent to Philadelphia; these points I deemed it material to mention; and I submit to Congress the propriety, as Colonel Laumoy is not yet returned, of their directing a number of men to prosecute the defences.24
Washington didn’t get Duportail’s report until the end of October and concurred with General Heath that it was too late in the season to undertake a large construction project. He referred consideration of his proposal to General Gates, who was appointed by Congress to take command in Boston, which he did on November 6. Washington approved of Duportail’s decision to remain in Boston but expressed his ardent desire for him to come to Philadelphia as soon as possible to make that city secure.25 Congress took no action on the plan of fortification, probably because it was too expensive.26
Two factions divided Congress in the fall and winter of 1778–1779. One supported Silas Deane and his transactions in France, and the other was bitterly opposed to him and his work there. Consequently, the important business of the country was delayed, and the French engineers found themselves practically ignored by Congress. Duportail and his companions decided they would return home. Washington’s pleading induced them to defer their decision. The French minister, Conrad Alexandre Gérard, understood the situation in Congress and urged them to be patient, assuring General Duportail that everything would come right in the end.
4
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1779
General Duportail delivered his plan for fortifying Boston in October 1778 and requested clarification of his and his companions’ status for the campaign of 1779. He stated that his furlough was to expire in February and that he and his companions would have to return to France if they were no longer needed in America. Congress did nothing about the plan for their continued service to the army.
Faced with the possibility of losing the French engineers, General Washington pleaded their cause to Congress. Duportail, Radière, and Laumoy expressed their gratitude in a letter dated January 15, 1779. Gouvion said that he would agree to whatever his companions did. They were pleased with Washington’s efforts to allow them to remain in the service of the United States through the next campaign, and they consented with “no conditions to the continuance of our residence in America.” They also considered it their duty to state “that being determined to remain here by our desire of serving and of being useful to the United States, if the means of usefulness should disappear on any account whatsoever we shall be desirous of preserving the liberty of returning into our country. Sensible of the interest which your excellency is so kind as to take in this affair, we beg you to accept our most humble thanks.”1 Minister of War Conrad Alexandre Gérard was also pleased with Washington’s support and asked the king’s consent, which the officers of engineers needed.2
Duportail wrote to Washington on January 27, 1779,
The Inhabitants of Boston have a prejudice which may one day be fatal to them—they imagine their Town impregnable—Struck with seeing it at high Tide surrounded with water, and joined to the main only by a narrow neck—they appear not to have remarked that twice in twenty four hours the water ebbs and leaves on each side of the Passage two or three hundred yards uncovered—they repeat one after the other that the ground is miry and impracticable—I have caused people to walk there in several directions—and they did not sink at all—the bottom is very good and as there is no fortification on the sides of the Town—I see no difficulty in the enemys making himself master of it—if we suppose him in possession of the adjacent Country.
Many people believed that the enemy would act as they had in the past and expected that the British would only attack Boston by land. However, they might send enough ships into port to capture whatever vessels may be there and bombard and burn the town, or they could send a squadron against French fleets coming to Boston.3
Congress passed an act on February 2, directing Washington to send an engineer to South Carolina to serve in the Southern Department. He directed General Duportail to send one of his engineers to Charlestown to take orders from Major General Benjamin Lincoln or the officer commanding in that department. Duportail sent Laumoy.4
Busy completing a similar project for Boston, Duportail apparently did not turn his attention to Philadelphia until early 1779. When he approached the Board of War for men and equipment, the Board of War wrote a letter to Joseph Reed, governor of Pennsylvania, on February 22, requesting support from the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council for the French military engineer.5
DEFENSES OF PHILADELPHIA
The commander in chief again sent General Duportail to Philadelphia at the beginning of March 1779 with a message for Congress regarding the defenses of the Delaware. The Board of War directed him to take his request to Governor Reed, probably because of lack of
funds. Governor Reed at first promised to supply the chief of engineers with a boat and men to conduct an examination, but he later recanted his offer, apparently offended that the request did not come directly to him. Duportail explained that he simply followed instructions and that, being a stranger, he knew nothing of “what was due the different powers.”6
Very much annoyed, Duportail wrote of his difficulties to Colonel Alexander Hamilton, asking him to explain the situation to the commander in chief. He added that the governor was about to visit camp, and he very much hoped that General Washington would speak to him about the importance of the work. Duportail’s insistence on keeping virtually all information from Reed and his council members caused irritation and led them to withhold cooperation. His instructions requested and expected “that he will not Communicate the Knowledge he shall acquire of the depth of the River or other important Circumstances of our defence to more persons than are absolutely necessary for his assistance.”7
Washington responded on March 30,
I am sorry to find by yours of the 20th that you have met with so many delays and disappointments in the prosecution of your plan for taking a survey of the Delaware. Although I am anxious to see you in Camp I shall be very unwilling to recall you while there is the least prospect of your rendering any service. I must therefore desire you to point out to that public Body before which you may have your affair [paper torn] disadvantage of your remaining so long in Philadelphia and to request them to enable you to execute your Business immediately or if that cannot be done in a short time to permit you to return to the Army, where the preparations for the ensuing Campaign call for your attendance.8
In the meantime, Governor Reed visited headquarters and conferred with the commander in chief. The Pennsylvania Council soon made a favorable decision, and Washington wrote to General Duportail on April 17, “I am glad that the Council have come to a resolution which will enable you to proceed; and I hope you may receive every aid necessary to execute the Business with satisfaction and despatch. It is agreeable to me that you retain such of the Gentlemen as you think proper to assist you in your operations.”9
Duportail completed his portion of the survey and presented a draft of the fortifications proposed for Philadelphia and the Delaware River to the Pennsylvania Council by May 14. The council adopted a resolution of gratitude on that date and authorized a $2,000 payment for Duportail and $1,000 and $600 for his assistants, Colonel Radière and Major Jean-Louis-Ambroise de Genton, Chevalier de Villefranche.10
Duportail’s title was changed to commandant of the Corps of Engineers and Sappers and Miners on May 11, 1779. Later, he and Colonel Alexander Hamilton were sent to meet with Admiral d’Estaing and deliver confidential dispatches to him regarding a joint operation with the French fleet and the Continental Army and to confer with him about combined operations when the French fleet reached northern waters. However, the French and American forces were repulsed at Savannah on October 9, and only one ship made it to the Chesapeake. After a time, with no sign of the French fleet on the Delaware, the operation was aborted. There is no further mention of Duportail’s connection with the defenses of the Delaware.
DUPORTAIL AT WEST POINT
As the British were beginning the systematic reduction of the South, Jean-Louis-Ambroise de Genton, Chevalier de Villefranche, was left in charge of the defense of the Delaware, while Laumoy proceeded south to assist in the construction of the defensive works there. Duportail went north to take command at West Point. He was ordered on June 9 to furnish a draft of West Point and its environs, including the communication with the camp. Washington was greatly relieved to have his commandant of engineers at that important post and had readily consented to allow Colonel Engineer Thaddeus Kosciusko to join General Gates at New York before accompanying him to the defense of the South.11
Brigadier General Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point on July 16, capturing the British position with a vast amount of stores of all kinds. British retaliation prevented the Continental Army from garrisoning the height. They destroyed the fort after removing the stores and withdrew.
The British Army took possession again of both Stony and Verplanck Points, constructed new defenses, and replenished their magazines. As British troop movements to the south seemed to indicate the arrival of reinforcements, the American generals, uncertain of the enemy’s intentions, wanted to attempt the recapture of Stony and Verplanck Points, hoping to repulse the British. Duportail was ordered on July 20 “to appoint engineers to superintend and direct the new works on the heights east and west of the river.”12
The commander in chief convened a Council of War on July 26 to discuss the situation.13 As was his custom, he requested opinions be sent in writing. Duportail’s memorial, dated July 27, 1779, clarified the matter, as he saw it:
West Point being to us a point which it is of the greatest importance to preserve and to put once for all in a state of defence. I think that we ought not to touch the fund of troops necessary to the defence of this post, in its present state, and to the construction of the works already undertaken. According to what his Excellency has been pleased to submit to our view, it appears that we have there about 5000 men—This is perhaps more than sufficient to receive the enemy till the rest of the army can arrive to their succour, but it is not too much for the work we are carrying on—I therefore think it best to leave them there—The question then is what we can do with the rest—can we attack Stony Point or Verplank’s point?
The English having augmented considerably the number of their troops at Stony Point, laboring to inclose their works and probably keeping themselves more upon their guard than heretofore, I think that we ought not to attack them, because we should be likely to lose a good many men and perhaps without success—Besides according to my conception of the matter we should not have any great advantage by gaining possession of Stony Point; because we must be also masters of Verplank’s—Here then is another fort to be attacked and taken, which can hardly be hoped for, the enemy being advertised to go to the succour of the one by the capture of the other; and after all we should be masters of both places, I do not see what would result from it to us, so very advantageous. Our army (after leaving the necessary army at West Point) not being in a state to make head during the campaign below King’s ferry, I do not see what good we should derive from the possession of these places—the army could not go farther down on this account and as to the communication by water, a single English frigate always has been able and always would be able to hinder it. If we should attack Stony point, it could only be to possess ourselves of the garrison and of the magazines, but though we have succeeded once without loss, we must not believe that we should succeed in the same manner a second time; and it would not be prudent to risk the loss of a great number of men upon hopes not well founded, who may become very useful to us.—The arrival of Lord Cornwallis and the strong appearances of an embarcation seem to indicate that the English have received, or are sure of receiving, a reinforcement which enables them to send troops to Carolina or elsewhere—Perhaps therefore until we know with what number of troops we shall have to do, it will be proper not to adventure our troops in expeditions more than uncertain.
We cannot propose to ourselves to attack Stony point by regular approaches.—The ground which is on a level with it, or which commands it, is too distant for the batteries erected there, to be able to batter the works with advantage and render them more easy to be carried with assault, in which it must ultimately end. Besides, by the disposition of the roads, we should run great risk of losing our cannon mortars etc.
What I say respecting the attack of Stony Point sword in hand, applies itself to Verplank’s point—But as to attacks by means of batteries Ver-plank’s point is very susceptible of them, and I think if the enemy should be imprudent enough to abandon Verplank’s point to its own force, and there is no body of troops near enough to support it, we ought not to hesitate to make the attack because we risk nothing.—If the ene
my arrives in time to bring them succour we get rid of the business by retiring; I think therefore we ought always to be ready for this enterprise.
Though I do not think that we ought to attack Stony point or Verplank’s point by assault or otherwise unless in some extraordinary circumstances which may present themselves, nevertheless it appears to me essential to menace them continually.—I should then have been glad if 10 or 1500 men had been left at the outlet of the mountain about Stony Point and a like corps at the Continental village. These corps will absolutely risk nothing unless they should suffer themselves to be surprised—and even this would be very difficult—they could be turned on neither side and they have always their communication secure with West Point. By showing themselves, always ready to attack the forts, they oblige the enemy to have within reach to support them, corps of at least three thousand men to have nothing to fear.—Then, which will appear singular, the possession which the enemy have of Verplank’s and Stony points will turn against them and become an advantage to us.—For here are 5000 men employed to maintain a point which is of no great consequence to us.—Let us add to these the number of men they must have at New York for the security of that place and on this side of King’s bridge to support readily the three thousand men advanced, unless they keep their men upon the water; and we shall see that the enemy by having posted themselves at King’s ferry have imposed on themselves the necessity of establishing a chain of posts from King’s ferry to New York, which will prevent them from having so many for different operations; and thus we shall perhaps save the country from pillage.14
Washington's Engineer Page 10
