MEMORIALS
Duportail’s memorial and those of the other officers must have completely answered Washington’s questions because there was no further mention of an attack. The British abandoned both posts on October 21, justifying Duportail’s judgment.
Major General Alexander McDougall was ordered on August 14, “with generals Knox and Du Portail [to] make a visit to all the works on both sides of the River, and ascertain the number of cannon and the sizes which will be necessary for their defence.” They were “to distinguish between a full complement of cannon, which it would be expedient to have and the number which is absolutely necessary.”15 General Washington received the report on August 20 and decided that the forts receive a “speedy and ample supply of powder” because the scarcity of it prevented them from undertaking any offensive or defensive operations.16
Duportail sent his review of British options at West Point on the same day:
To bar the river from the North in a suitable location is one thing the extreme importance of which everyone is presently aware. It is known that the depth of this river is considerable enough so that warships or frigates at least can go up it almost to Albany and that the breadth or the nature of its banks is such that enemy ships would find innumerable spots where in no manner would it be possible to damage them from the river bank. The enemy, by constant sailing of its frigates or small armed boats would prevent communication from the North to the south below Albany. Since the country above is still quite new sparsely populated and since there are few roads and besides the enemy, most of the river up to Albany, has the greatest facilities to reinforce and maintain the army of English, Tories and savages that he has within reach in these cantons, it follows that the passages above Albany would soon be in their possession, consequently, all communication between the lands situated on one side of the river and those of the other would be completely broken; which would have very fatal consequences: the main ones are that all parts of the United States thus separated would be left to their own forces, without being able to call on any aid one from the other, which would weaken them considerably, against an enemy Which can maneuver anywhere he desires. . . . When one reflects on that, one is surprised that the English have not turned their sights to that point, that they have not undertaken an operation so easy for a long time and so decisive. They could have done it up to the time of last May, for at that moment the works at West Point, even though I prepared them, and until then, there had never been enough troops to make up for the insufficiency of the works. Thus were we in a constant dilemma in regard to this valuable post. Happily, the time for fear is passed, and now far from being apprehensive about seeing the enemy march on this place, we infinitely desire it, assured that he would find there his ruin and his dishonor, and we an opportunity to weaken him so as to be unable to maintain himself any longer in New York, without receiving considerable reinforcements; this is what we are going to try to show by the following study:
In order to judge correctly the effect of the fortifications built at West Point, . . . it is appropriate to examine the different undertakings that the enemy can plan against this post; the different means by which he can proceed in his operations, as much by the land as by water, and what we can contrast with if from our side, we supposing West Point left to its own forces, that is defending itself with its garrison. [Here Duportail considered four alternatives open to the British and reached the following conclusion.]
. . . It must . . . be admitted that the different undertakings that [I] have just . . . described lead only to breaking the chain in a hurry, without having time to carry it away nor to detach it from the woods in order to sink it. It is not probable that the enemy would expose himself to so much danger in order to cause a damage that can be easily repaired, if we prepare the means. I am inclined to believe that if he undertakes something against West Point it will be in a more solid and decisive way. This will be to make himself master following operations against all the forts of West Point either to hold them or to destroy them completely and thus procure for himself a free passageway on the river. . . .
Fifth Undertaking. The 5th undertaking is the probable plan. If one examines the terrain above Fort Clinton, one will see that the heights which overlook it or which look down on each other, are occupied rather extensively in two directions. On one side Putnam, Rockhill and [a redoubt]; from the other side Webbs, Willys, but also one sees a mountain which begins at Rockhill and which extends behind Putnam, Webbs and Willys and which perfectly dominates these works, so that this array of fortifications which prescribes a great deal at first look, is reduced to little for effect, because the enemy, supposedly in possession of this mountain can establish at the same time cannon and mortar batteries against Rockhill, . . . Putnam, . . . Webbs and Willys. . . . [T]hese last two works are not even tenable for very long under these conditions, being too prolonged. It will be necessary then to abandon them early and consequently the enemy would advance along the slope . . . and can set up his batteries against Clinton without even having taken Fort Putnam. It is evident then that the real point of attack against West Point is from the mountain M, O in question, since one comes all of a sudden from it to the attack on Putnam instead of making successive attacks on all the Forts above or below this Fort, as would be necessary coming from the other side. Now with respect to the difficulty to the enemy to get to this place, if there were no works, there would be none. This mountain is most accessible from any side and its slope from the west is such that cannon can easily be brought there, so that supposing the enemy, disembarked opposite Robinson’s, establishes himself on the mountain, sets up his batteries and fires his first cannon shot against Putnam, cannot require more than four or five days (since the batteries can be constructed even while the cannon are being brought up) it would be indispensable, then, to occupy this mountain; this is what we have done by the two works S, T. . . . I don’t think it any longer possible for the enemy to select it as his debarkation point; it is true that from there to the first battery . . . is more than a mile; but one must consider that it is not a question of firing on a work, on a small space, but on a multitude of boats, ships, horses, carriages, men; everything conceivable assembled in one spot where all the apparatus of an army munitions of all types being unloaded. It is clear that at a distance of more than a mile each cannon round Is almost sure and it must always strike something; that consequently one cannot select such a point to establish himself; moreover the enemy, getting off of his ships, will not expose himself by camping on the plain under the fire of these same batteries, he must then withdraw to the rear of this point. We can conclude that he will prefer to disembark at the other place. . . . This is already an advantage, to move further away the enemy’s disembarkation point; this stretches still more his communications, gives greater facility to attacking him, renders more difficult the transportation of artillery and munitions.
Let us suppose now that the enemy established on the plain at the required distance and on the mountain (U) opposite our redoubts, what decision will he make then? Will this be to advance on our left under the fires of [two of our] batteries . . . and those that can be set up on the same mountain for the attack on the redoubt Willys, then on Webbs, from there to Putnam or Clinton? The absurdity of such a plan is too palpable for there to be a need to show its effect. The enemy can do only one of these two things. He can advance by the mountain, . . . attack redoubt R in order to march against Rockhill, and from Rock-hill against Putnam; but it must be noticed that redoubt R, can only be attacked in strength because it is perhaps impossible for the enemy to bring up large cannon against it as long as he does not control Redoubts S and T, secondly because it would be covered by [a] Battery, . . . against that which one might set up opposite . . . after having taken redoubt R by strong attack he must likewise take Rockhill and then Putnam for . . . the enemy cannot find (neither at the Redoubt R nor at Rockhill) cannon suitable for firing on the works.
The other route
that the enemy can take to get to Putnam (which is still the central point to which he must come) is by the mountain . . . as we have already pointed out. He must then capture Redoubts S and T. If he captures only Redoubt T, he can easily establish his troops on the mountain, but he could only bring his cannon up there with an extraordinary, laborious and long toil, by the eastern slope; if he captures only Redoubt S he must bring his cannon along the Furnace [?] road, which can be regarded as almost impracticable, because it cannot be supposed in advance that he will bring his cannon through the valley under fire from Redoubts T and S and of their batteries. As to the difficulty itself of capturing the works, one can only set up batteries against them on the slope of the mountain opposite at more than 500 Toises, too great a distance to destroy them with cannon. There will be, moreover, in each of these redoubts an underground bomb-proof shelter to protect the garrison. The enemy must then always come to an attack in force and they are in such condition that the undertaking would certainly be very dangerous.
It seems to me that we have assured the defense of this mountain, as much as it is necessary to do it, in view of the number of troops the enemy can sacrifice to the attack of West Point. . . .
Munitions. We have supposed up to the present the post of West Point left to its own forces, that is, defended by its own fortifications with their garrisons. We will say a word on how to use the additional troops that should be on hand when the enemy appears or who should come in the course of the attack. First, as we have said, the first posts to be occupied are the points of debarkation. Since we think that the enemy cannot come from King’s Ferry by land, one might question that we do not advise stringing out troops in quantity on the roads and paths which lead from this area to West Point. Patrols only are necessary to warn that the fort at Montgomery not be surprised from the rear.
After that, the mountains opposite the redoubts R, S, T, being the first posts where the enemy must establish himself in order to push his operations against West Point, it is thus also one of the first that we must garrison. Some hundred men on these mountains making the approaches difficult by abatis will stop the enemy for a long time. We must reconnoiter, look for ways to attack them, to dislodge them. In areas of difficult access, covered with woods and rocks, this is quite long.
I will note here in passing that in a mountainous country if troops are placed on a mountain which has another one on its flank, . . . it is appropriate to put some men (as small a number as it might be) on this other mountain. This would prevent the enemy, who does not know their strength, from descending in the valley in order to turn the troops on the first mountain for fear of finding himself between two, or cut. There is place to apply this principle in the locations of which I am speaking here.
After occupying the mountains of which it was just a question, the location of the troops which we have more of as well as the natural retreat of those forward, if they were dislodged and on the mountain M, O, then they would place themselves in the rear of the abatis constructed between the redoubts S. T. and along the eastern and western slopes within range of defending these redoubts and to oppose themselves everywhere to the passage of the enemy. These troops, depending on their number, would construct in their rear, fortifications in the most favorable locations, leading to the type of works they can execute; in a word, they must use everything to defend this mountain for as long a time as possible for on it depends principally the defense of West Point, it cannot be repeated too much.17
Plans for the defense of West Point were complete by fall 1779 and only required improvements and maintenance. The complex now consisted of a mutually supporting system of forts, redoubts, and batteries designed to close the Hudson to enemy vessels.
The French military engineer Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban stressed the use of single massive fortresses, so Duportail viewed West Point’s scattered defenses with misgivings. However, Vauban noted that defenses ought to utilize and augment the surrounding natural terrain.
The Crown forces did not attack West Point that fall. Duportail proposed to reconnoiter Verplanck Point on the morning of September 30. A covering party of three hundred men alarmed the British, who opened fire on them with their artillery and sent a reinforcement from Stony Point to Verplanck Point.18 After the British abandoned Stony and Verplanck Points, Gouvion led a large detachment of soldiers to level the enemy works at Verplanck Point.
WINTER QUARTERS
Washington wrote General Duportail on September 22, 1779, about making preparation for winter quarters. He decided on the Highlands, and it became necessary to increase the accommodations at the different forts:
Head Quarters, West Point, Sept. 22nd 1779
Sir,
I am to request you will give instruction to your attendants attached to the different works—to turn their attention to the different barracks necessary at each to cover the men required to be constantly stationed for the immediate security of the respective posts—and the places at which it will be most proper to erect them—Were it not for the difficulty of transporting material to those high mountains to build barracks at each sufficient to cover the whole number of men required for its complete defence, I should give a preference to this; but the difficulty of transportation inclines me to desire only strong guards during the winter at each post, to put them out of the reach of a surprise and coup de main by a small detachment and consequently barracks proportioned to these.—I leave it to your judgment, what guards will be sufficient to answer this purpose and to regulate the arrangements for barracks accordingly—and I shall be obliged to you to make a report as speedily as possible.
I have the honor to be etc.
P.S. These barracks ought to be in the works where they will admit them—and where they will be so near as to always be sure of a communication on any sudden emergency and effectively protected by the fire from the works. How far can the bomb-proofs be made to answer the purpose?
General Duportail sent in a lengthy report two days later, covering the works.19 He was still in camp with Washington on October 3 when Washington wrote to General Wayne that General Duportail planned to reconnoiter the post of Stony Point the following day “to ascertain the distances from the enemy’s works to the places proper for the establishing of batteries.”20 He requested an escort to meet him and a reconnoitering party consisting of a regiment.
ARNOLD’S TREASON
Duportail was ordered south in 1780, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Gouvion in command of the defenses of the Highlands. When Gouvion left West Point to replace Duportail at Washington’s side, Major Villefranche replaced him in the Highlands. In August 1780, Washington sent Gouvion to examine the fortifications with Villefranche to correct any deficiencies. They found some matters needed urgent attention.
Gouvion’s report to the commander in chief, dated August 22, 1780, began as follows:
Sir,
I received last night the letter your Excellency has honored me with; your orders concerning the safety of this post shall be exactly complied with.
Villefranche soon directed more than four hundred men to repair the works, while a band of ten musicians eased their labor. Although the newly formed companies of sappers and miners should have assisted Villefranche, they were stationed instead at Dobb’s Ferry with the artillery until the end of October, when they moved to West Point for the winter. Construction and repairs lagged, and West Point became weaker.
General Benedict Arnold had been put in command of the post early that year, replacing General Robert Howe. While the work of strengthening the weaknesses in the fortifications was progressing, Arnold was secretly communicating with the enemy, plotting to deliver the whole into their hands. British spy master Major John André was captured on September 26, and Arnold fled, making his complicity evident. Washington arrived and immediately took possession of West Point. Surprise, terror, and consternation spread like wildfire, but Arnold’s treachery had some beneficial effects on the country at large. It rekin
dled the fires of patriotism, which were in danger of being extinguished.21
The situation of American affairs was extremely distressing. The allies had no decisive victory since Saratoga, and they progressively lost territory since General William Howe evacuated Philadelphia in 1778.22 D’Estaing’s fleet returned to the West Indies after the repulse at Savannah in the fall of 1779, leaving the entire Atlantic coastline exposed. The small fleet that had brought Rochambeau and his army had been anchored at Newport since July 1780, but both fleet and the army were too small for their respective commanders to attack the enemy safely until reinforcements arrived from France. The whole southern army remained prisoners at Charleston.
Little else happened in the Highlands throughout the harsh winter of 1779–1780, except the construction of barracks and the customary repairs to the great chain. Kosciusko attempted to build some fortifications, but the lack of artificers and laborers, a recurring problem at West Point, stymied him, as did the difficulty of transporting materials to the mountains.23
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