With Us or Against Us

by Tony Judt

  much tied to the import-substitution model of the colonial era and it

  had transformed itself into a major importer of raw materials from the

  neighboring states and as an exporter of manufactured goods (partic-

  ularly electrical goods) destined for Western markets.

  Singapore’s unique ethnic profile and history also meant that its

  identity was shaped by considerations informed by the colonial past:

  the country’s Chinese majority population were mainly the descen-

  dants of Chinese workers who had been brought to Southeast Asia by

  the British to fulfill the needs of the British colonial economy, and

  were thus beholden to the Western colonial authorities. With the sale

  of Singapore to the British by the Sultan of Johor in the nineteenth

  century, ethnic and political divisions appeared between the Chinese

  community and the original Malay–Bugis inhabitants of the island

  (then reduced to a minority) and these tensions have remained till

  today. Singapore’s proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia—both of which

  are often described as the two Malay “giants” surrounding the tiny

  Chinese city-state—has also added to the anxiety of the Singaporeans

  and was skillfully exploited by the country’s longest serving leader,

  Lee Kuan Yew, in order to lay the foundations for a maximalist state

  apparatus bent on social policing and the elimination of meaningful

  political contestation in the state.

  Singapore’s dealing with the “Muslim problem” was also colored

  by the idiosyncrasies of its political elite from the PAP party and its

  intellectual figurehead Lee Kuam Yew, who was widely regarded as

  one of the most conservative and reactionary leaders of the region.

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  Uncle Sam to the Rescue?

  231

  Under Lee, Singapore had actively engaged and traded with South

  Africa, had close links with Israel and was the only Third World country

  that followed the United States and Britain (then under Ronald

  Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, respectively) out of UNESCO. Fearful

  that Islamic activism might open the way for stronger ties between

  Muslims in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Lee Kuan Yew and

  the leaders of the Singaporean governmental, military, and intelli-

  gence institutions sought to find ways to diffuse the “threat” of Islamic

  resurgence and to isolate Singaporean Muslims from the influence of

  Islamic radicalism abroad.

  The opportunity to do so came with the “revelation” of Al Qaeda

  documents in Afghanistan—whose authenticity remains disputed or

  at least unverified—indicating the presence of Islamic militant cells in

  Singapore, which were aiming to attack a number of Western targets

  (such as the American and British embassies) and to cause discord and

  strife between Malaysia and Singapore. In time, the Singaporean author-

  ities began arresting and detaining a number of Singaporean Muslims

  who were accused of being members of the Jama’ah Islamiyah group,

  which was said to be working toward the reunification of Malaysia,

  Singapore, and Indonesia via militant means, with the objective of

  creating an Islamic super-state in the heart of ASEAN. These arrests,

  while courting international condemnation from civil society and

  human rights NGOs the world over, were, nonetheless, carried out

  and in due course, the profile of Singapore as a reliable ally in the war

  against terror rose accordingly.

  Like Singapore, Thailand has also used the rhetoric of war against

  terror as a pretext for a closer realignment with the West (and the

  United States in particular) and renewed repression of its Muslim

  minority in the Southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Satun, and

  Narathiwat. Though the conflict between Bangkok and the Southern

  Thai–Muslim provinces bordering Malaysia had reached its peak in

  the mid-1980s, violence and civil strife have returned to the area in the

  wake of 9/11.

  It should not, however, be assumed that this renewed violence is

  mainly due to the activities of militant Islamic cells and groups oper-

  ating in the provinces. Over the past few years, a number of contro-

  versial developmental projects initiated by the Thai government, as

  well as cross-border joint development projects between Malaysia and

  Thailand, have resulted in popular unrest among the local population

  in the areas. Compounding the problem has been the Thai police and

  army’s reputation for siphoning off profits from such projects and

  profiting from the racketeering operations that have been going on

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  F arish A. Noor

  there for decades. Increased economic competition for finite resources,

  Bangkok’s strong grip on the southernmost provinces, and the appalling

  human rights record of local law enforcement agencies have all con-

  tributed to a general decline in law and order in the area.

  But the discourse of the war against terror served its purpose as it

  allowed Bangkok to step up its campaign to eliminate local resistance

  in the area and to impose harsh standards of policing—often unregu-

  lated by a critical local media or watchdogs—in Pattani and the neigh-

  boring provinces. This has merely led to a renewed cycle of violence

  and the remobilization of Islamist forces, which had been dormant for

  some time. The Thai government that had been installed in the wake of

  the 1998 Asian financial crisis was widely regarded as a reformist-minded

  administration peopled by pro-democracy civil society actors and

  democrats. Following 9/11 and the adoption of the rhetoric of the

  war against terror by the Thai leadership, it was clear that the democratic

  claims and credentials of the Thai governmental elite had been com-

  promised by their own dealings with the Muslim minority in the south of

  the country. It is the Philippines, however, that stands out the most as far

  as its own ideological U-turns and realignment of policies are concerned.

  If the new political elite of Bangkok was regarded as being liberal

  and democratic in its profile and outlook, the political elite of Manila

  were thought to be even more so in the wake of the fall of Ferdinand

  Marcos. Yet, a cursory survey of Filipino politics from 1986 onward

  would suggest that the presence of the United States in the Philippines

  is as strong today as it ever was.

  Corazon Aquino took over as president of the Philippines immedi-

  ately after the fall of Marcos, but even under her government, the

  stamp of U.S. political, economic, and military interests was clear. Her

  period of government was characterized by growing instability, the

  inability of the Philippines government to steer the country away from

  dependency on U.S. direct capital investment, and growing discontent

  and insurgencies in the central and southern island provinces.

  In 1986, Aquino proclaimed the setting up of a new national

  Constitution, but even that could not help to contain growing dis-

  content among the population. One major populist move she attempted

  to perform was to support the anti-U.S. air and naval base
s campaign,

  which had grown popular in the country. Under Aquino, the Americans

  were asked to vacate their naval and air bases in Subic Bay and Clarke

  Air Base, but this in turn, plunged the country into further economic

  crisis because, in retaliation, the United States merely moved its bases

  of operations to Okinawa, Korea, and Singapore, while depriving the

  Philippines of much needed foreign revenue income. Further instability

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  Uncle Sam to the Rescue?

  233

  led to an attempted coup d’e-tat against the government in 1989,

  which in turn forced Aquino back into the hands of the Americans.

  Faced with rebellious military units and commanders, Aquino had no

  choice but to ask for American help. American military intervention

  came in the form of U.S. war planes and aerial maneuvers, which

  helped control the 1989 failed coup against her government. In the

  end, Aquino was forced to step down by the very same groups that

  supported her. In 1992, she was replaced by Fidel Ramos.

  Fidel Ramos was a supporter of Ferdinand Marcos for more than

  two decades. Ramos’s adherence to both free market ideology and

  U.S. military dominance was evident in his support for the Pentagon’s

  policy of rest and recreation in the Philippines (widely understood as

  the U.S. military’s use of Philippine women as prostitutes). He also

  supported and promoted further U.S. capital/business penetration

  into the Philippines. He formulated the “Industrial Philippines 2000

  vision” project, which was aimed at making the Philippines an indus-

  trialized country by the year 2000, and to this end, he actively courted

  further U.S. investment. He hosted the 1996 APEC conference in

  Manila, where he openly supported the U.S. line of argument. Less

  known are the efforts he and his administration have made on behalf

  of the U.S. military in the Philippines.30

  To renew its presence in the Philippines, the Pentagon turned to

  the policy of military access. This operated through an executive

  agreement implemented by the military forces of the United States

  and the host country. Executive agreement also governed the U.S.

  and Philippine military in matters concerning the bases during the

  Marcos regime. In the eyes of many Filipinos the present access agree-

  ment violated the post-Marcos constitution that requires Senate

  approval of a U.S. military presence in the Philippines. As a high-ranking

  military official of the Marcos dictatorship, Ramos supported the U.S.

  bases; as President Aquino’s Minister of defense, he continued this

  support; as a candidate for president in 1992, he declared for access,

  and shortly after his election, the Pentagon got its access agreement.31

  Fidel Ramos also followed the lead of Ferdinand Marcos, in his will-

  ingness to open the Philippines to foreign capital, with minimal

  restraint. Like Marcos, he paid solicitous attention to the claims of the

  U.S. military, covered over when politically expedient by gestures of

  nationalist intent. Due to his openly pro-U.S. and pro-capitalist ori-

  entation, opposition against Ramos also grew and he was later voted

  out of office. He was then replaced by Joseph Estrada.

  Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Erap) rose to power on a wave of populist

  support and anti-Americanism, which he tried to use to his advantage.

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  F arish A. Noor

  But, in time, he proved to be just as corrupt and ineffective as the

  previous leaders and was forced out of office, on corruption and embez-

  zlement charges. During his period of office, he was actively courting

  U.S. support to help suppress the Moro resistance movement in the

  south, which only led to worsening of ties between the Christian and

  Muslim communities. He was later forced out of office and put on

  trial on corruption charges. He was replaced by Gloria Macapagal

  Aroyyo, daughter of the former president Diosdido Macapagal.

  Like her father, Gloria Macapagal Aroyyo has proven to be a close

  ally and supporter of U.S. interests in the Philippines and the region.

  Like all her predecessors—Marcos, Aquino, Ramos, Estrada—she

  has not been able to deal with the chronic problem of economic

  underdevelopment, dependency on foreign (especially American)

  capital, and the growing unrest in the central and southern island

  provinces. By turning to the United States, Aroyyo hoped to win its

  support and investment in order to help build the country’s economy

  and contain the threat of militant uprisings in the outer islands.

  Even before the 9/11 bombings in New York and Washington,

  which the Bush administration has been using as a basis for launching

  its global war against terror, the Aroyyo government was busy trying

  to win American military and economic support. Arroyo and her

  defense secretary Angelo Reyes tried to negotiate with the Americans

  over expanding U.S. military presence in the Philippines as part of a

  larger security network in Asia, poised against regional security threats

  including anti-American “terrorist groups” and China. Philippine

  military leaders supported this move in order to increase the level

  of U.S. arms spending and aid into the country, which was at only

  $US2 million a year. Many senior Philippine commanders were keen to

  initiate and follow up on the country’s arms modernization program.

  Following the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping incident on Basilan island on

  May 27, 2001, the Philippine government and army were given the

  chance to renew their links with the U.S. government and armed forces.

  U.S. officials immediately agreed on joint counter-terror and surveil-

  lance cooperation tactics, and both sides agreed that further U.S.-

  Philippines cooperation in the field of arms and information gathering

  would be intensified. Three months later, Arroyo offered to open

  Subic Bay port facilities for the resupply, repair, and maintenance of

  U.S. warships.

  After the 9/11 bombings, a 25-member U.S. Special Operations

  assessment team visited the Philippines for two weeks in October to

  review Filipino forces fighting the Abu Sayyaf. The visit led to the

  offer of attack helicopters, advanced communication gear, night vision

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  Uncle Sam to the Rescue?

  235

  equipment, surveillance capabilities, and even bloodhounds to track

  and destroy the Abu Sayyaf members. The Pentagon also promised a

  10-fold increase in military assistance—from $1.9 to $19 million in

  2002 and every year thereafter. In a subsequent Manila visit, Admiral

  Dennis Blair, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, also

  pledged to increase intelligence sharing.

  Prodded by her defense and military advisers during her Washington

  visit, Arroyo pledged a deeper and long-term cooperation with Bush

  in his antiterrorist campaign. This deeper and long-term cooperation,

  which practically goes beyond fighting the Abu Sayyaf, led to further

  deals that extended military rights that the American forces used to

  enjoy under the U.S.-Philippine bases p
act. A joint statement said

  that the two presidents discussed an integrated plan including a joint-

  training package, equipment needed for increased troop mobility, a

  maintenance program to enhance overall military capabilities, specific

  targeted law enforcement and counter-terrorism cooperation, and a

  new bilateral defense consultative mechanism. The Bush government

  then increased defense and economic aid commitments to $US40

  million.

  Between 1999 and 2003, the government of Aroyyo has overturned

  many of the post-Marcos constitutional blocks and legal restrictions

  that would allow the Americans to come back and establish their power

  in the country. The most recent infringement of the post-Marcos con-

  stitutional set up was the war games between U.S. and Philippine forces

  code-named Kalayaan-Aguila 2002 or Mindanao Balikatan 02-1, held

  in Basilan and Zamboanga and led by the American Special Operations

  Forces (SOFs). Kalayaan-Aguila 2002 marks the largest U.S. military

  intervention engaged in actual combat against real human targets

  on Philippine soil since the Philippine–American War (1899–1901).

  It deployed the largest number of U.S. troops for combat in the

  Basilan–Zamboanga area since the Moro Wars (1901–1911).32

  Arroyo, who was actively courting the political support of the

  United States for the 2004 presidential elections, completely disre-

  garded the post-Marcos Constitution, which prohibits foreign military

  troops on Philippine soil, unless covered by a treaty to be concurred

  in by the Senate. All the existing security agreements of the Philippines

  and the United States—Mutual Defense Treaty, Military Assistance

  Agreement, Visiting Forces Agreement—do not have provisions for

  the deployment of foreign military forces, advisers, foreign military

  trainers, or coordinators in actual combat operations. Philippine under-

  secretary for foreign affairs Lauro Baja admitted that this form of

  operation in an actual combat zone is not even covered by any

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  F arish A. Noor

  Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries. But

  by then, the Philippines’ realignment back into the fold of U.S.