No Better Place to Die- The Battle of Stones River

by Peter Cozzens

  Rosecrans spurred his horse across the valley, making his way through a “tangled mass of mules and wagons” until he found the two roadmaster cars, drawn together, that served as Right Wing headquarters. On the floor of one of these cars, by the light of a candle stuck in a bayonet socket, Rosecrans and McCook conferred. Although prisoners confirmed that only Wood's brigade was present at Triune, McCook expressed concern that Hardee was there with his entire corps. Rosecrans shared McCook's conviction, but he was not troubled by it. Rather, he directed his Right Wing commander to advance on the town at daylight and press Hardee. Three contingencies were allowed for: If Hardee offered battle, were defeated, and retreated toward Shelbyville, McCook would pursue with one division, sending the remaining two on to Murfreesboro; should Hardee retreat on Shelbyville without a fight, McCook would pursue with two divisions; and, in the event Hardee fell back on Murfreesboro, McCook would follow with his entire command.

  McCook acknowledged the instructions, and Rosecrans started back to headquarters. Again the party became lost. They rode aimlessly for an hour until the trail on which they were traveling ended abruptly at a fence along the edge of a wood. Rosecrans lost his temper. Jumping his horse over the fence, he galloped into the forest. A few staff officers rode after him, the remainder elected to stay on the trails. Fortune smiled on the Ohioan. After spending fourteen hours in the saddle, climaxed by his night ride, Rosecrans arrived safely at Hamilton's Church at 1:00 A.M. Those members of his staff who had stayed on the trails stumbled into camp two hours later.8

  Hampered by incomplete intelligence, Bragg too passed an exasperating night. His cavalry had been unable to develop fully the nature of the Federal advance during the day; not until 2:00 P.M. did Wheeler report Crittenden's advance along the Murfreesboro Pike and McCook's movement on the Nolensville Pike to Bragg. Even then, he said only that Wharton and he were warmly engaging the columns. Sometime later, the Stewart's Creek telegraph operator confirmed Wheeler's dispatch, wiring that he could hear small-arms fire from the direction of Lavergne and cannonading from the direction of Nolensville. It was well after dark before Wheeler was able to gather from prisoners’ statements that the Federal army was engaged in a general forward movement. This information was not received at army headquarters until 9:30 P.M.

  Bragg's exasperation with his mounted arm would continue throughout the campaign. Deprived of his finest cavalry lieutenants, Forrest and Morgan, and their veteran troopers, Bragg was left with a young, inexperienced brigadier general and three understrength brigades. It is intriguing to speculate on the havoc Bragg could have wrought on the advancing Federal columns had he had his full complement of cavalry.

  Bragg was surprised and troubled by the swiftness of the Federal advance. Crittenden, outside Lavergne, was eight miles nearer Murfreesboro than Hardee, twenty-four miles away via the Salem Pike. Should McCook succeed in taking Triune, his column would be only seventeen miles away. If Hardee were withdrawn to Murfreesboro by way of the Salem Pike, Federal cavalry would be able to interdict his marching columns via two high-quality country roads that ran perpendicular to the Salem Pike while McCook's infantry came up in support.

  Despite the obvious need for action, Bragg was reluctant to order a concentration at Murfreesboro until the objective of the approaching Federals had been ascertained. Fairly sure, however, that the principal threat lay west of Stones River, Bragg issued orders at midnight directing McCown to march at once from Readyville to Murfreesboro. As the success of a concentration at Murfreesboro, should it appear necessary, would depend largely on the ability of the cavalry to conduct an effective delay, Bragg next summoned Wheeler to headquarters. He pointedly asked his chief of cavalry how long he could hold the enemy on the roads. Four days, replied Wheeler. His fears calmed, Bragg wired Hardee to be prepared to abandon Eagleville and march to Murfreesboro at a moment's notice.9

  Hardee also was anxious for information regarding Rosecrans's dispositions and intentions. To obtain it, he sent Major W. D. Pickett of his staff forward to reconnoiter the Federal camp near Nolensville. Pickett rode to the outpost of the Eighth Texas Cavalry, then on picket duty, where he was joined by its commander, Colonel Tom Harrison. Together, they crept to within 150 yards of the Union camp. Perched on a ridge, Pickett and Harrison could see the brightly burning campfires of several divisions of infantry shimmering the length of the valley. It was enough to convince them that a general advance of the Army of the Cumberland had begun. Pickett briefed Hardee, who passed the information on to Bragg at 4:00 A.M., adding that—although he believed the Federal objective to be Shelbyville—he was prepared to march to Murfreesboro, should Bragg so direct.

  Despite Hardee's uncertainty regarding McCook's objective, his telegram convinced Bragg that the time had come for a concentration at Murfreesboro. Movement orders were issued, and Bragg awaited the arrival of his scattered units.

  McCown was already across Hickory Creek; his men would enter Murfreesboro at 9:00 A.M. after a grueling night march. It would take Hardee considerably longer. Leaving Wood at Triune with Wharton's cavalry to contest McCook's advance and protect his flank, Pat Cleburne had his division on the road before dawn; nevertheless, his men would spend the entire day slogging along the Salem Pike, turned to mire by the constant rainfall.10

  Although Cleburne would complain later in his after-action report of the “cold, drenching rain” that slowed his rate of march to a crawl, the miserable weather in reality was a godsend to the Confederates: the same storm front that brought cooler temperatures and rain was preceded by a dense blanket of early morning fog that limited visibility to less than 150 yards and hampered the Federal advance. Observing the sky that morning, Rosecrans remarked: “Not much progress today, I fear.”

  McCook thought otherwise. The Right Wing commander decided to send Johnson's division forward with the expectation that the fog would soon lift. He was disappointed. After marching two miles, his infantry encountered light resistance; in the mist, confused skirmishers fired into their cavalry screen, toppling several members of the Third Indiana Cavalry before McCook called a halt.

  Wood and Wharton, meanwhile, reformed their lines under the cover of the fog. Fearing that a rapid Union advance after the fog lifted would overwhelm his skirmish line, Wood called back the Forty-fifth Mississippi and Darden's battery of light artillery from their exposed position one and a half miles north of Triune to the south bank of Nelson's Creek. The remainder of the brigade he posted on a hill immediately south of town, while Wharton's troopers fanned out to protect the flanks and delay forward of the Forty-fifth Mississippi.

  At 1:00 P.M. the fog lifted, and McCook resumed the advance. After firing a few rounds, Wharton's cavalry retired across the creek with the men of the Forty-fifth, who destroyed the bridge behind them. The Federals were right behind. As Battery B, First Ohio Artillery, shelled the Rebel positions across the creek with deadly accuracy, Richard Johnson shook out his lead units and prepared to attack. But Nature once again favored the Confederates: the rain that had earlier cut the fog now turned to sleet; moments later, a blistering wind came up and threw hail across the road, cutting visibility to a few feet. At McCook's command, the infantry halted to wait out the storm.

  Taking stock of the strength of the Federal attackers and the feebleness of their own defenses, Wood and Wharton agreed that they stood little chance of holding on once McCook renewed his attack, and so decided to withdraw under cover of the storm. The artillery was sent to the rear, followed shortly by the infantry. Only the cavalry remained to contest the crossing.

  A little before 4:00 P.M. the storm stopped as suddenly as it had begun, and the Union line of battle splashed across Nelson's Creek. Wharton's troopers delivered a parting volley, then galloped down the Eagleville Pike to join the infantry three miles north of Eagleville.

  McCook chose not to pursue. It was getting dark. As night settled in and the temperature dropped, a fine sheet of ice began to form on the muddy pike, making the
footing hazardous for the already exhausted Federals. Orders went out to Stanley and Johnson to bivouac a mile south of Triune. Sheridan, who had followed in support of Johnson during the day, made camp in Triune. Davis, meanwhile, stopped at the intersection of the Nolensville Pike and Bole Jack Road, a mile north of town.11

  To the northwest, Thomas's divisions passed an uneventful day slogging over what to many must have seemed the worst roads in Tennessee. It took Negley nearly the entire afternoon to cover the five miles between Nolensville and Stewartsboro, and his men reached the latter town only at dusk, in time to bivouac for the night on Crittenden's right rear. Rousseau had an even more difficult time of it; with cannon and limbers frequently mired up to the hubs, his division did not enter Nolensville until nightfall.12

  Out on the Murfreesboro Pike, at least, the weather proved more cooperative. Although a drenching rain fell throughout the day, the fog lifted early, allowing Crittenden to start shortly before noon. His objective for the day was the bridge over Stewart's Creek, which must be taken intact. The mission fell to Wood. Aware of the difficulty of the task, Crittenden hedged, dispatching the brigade of Colonel William Hazen down the Jefferson Pike to seize the bridge east of Smyrna as an alternate crossing site.

  Marching through “densely wooded country, in a drenching rain storm,” Wood's men entered Lavergne shortly after noon. They found the town in ruins, “a pitiful exhibition to the devastation of war,” wrote Corporal Ebenezer Hannaford of the Sixth Ohio. “Half a dozen of the smaller houses still remained, blackened chimneys standing lone and desolate above gray beds of ashes—significant monuments of the folly and crime of rebellion—told the fate of the rest.” Wood's men did not pause to reflect on the destruction, but pushed on beyond the town. They covered the five miles to Stewart's Creek so quickly that Wheeler's pickets on the north bank were thrown into confusion. Those on the right of the pike fell back hastily across the bridge, leaving it aflame behind them. Those on the left were less fortunate; trapped in the rear of Brigadier General Milo Hascall's brigade, the majority surrendered. Hascall's shirmishers, meanwhile, had come up to find the surface of the bridge ablaze. Joined by members of the Third Kentucky, they ran forward into Confederate fire. Under a hail of bullets they tossed the burning logs and debris into the water, and by their actions saved the structure. The importance of securing the bridge intact could not be overstated. As Wood later explained in his report, “it was a matter of cardinal importance to secure possession of the bridge, as its destruction would entail much difficulty and delay in crossing the stream and, perhaps, involve the necessity of constructing a new bridge.”13

  Hazen also accomplished his mission in a spectacular fashion. Before moving out, he placed ninety troopers of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry under Captain James Mix in advance of the infantry, with orders to spur their mounts at the first sight of the enemy and not to rein them until they had crossed the bridge. Mix obeyed Hazen's instructions to the letter. Three miles north of Stewart's Creek, he encountered resistance. His troopers charged, the Confederates fled, and a “steeplechase was made of the whole affair.” Captain Mix drove the panicked Rebels across the bridge and held it until Hazen arrived with the infantry. There the brigade camped for the night.

  This day, on the Jefferson Pike, it was clearly the Union cavalry that gave a better account of itself. Indeed, Wheeler's cavalry had been hurled into precipitate retreat all along the line. Now, as night fell, they regrouped south of Stewart's Creek with Maney's infantry, a mere ten miles from Murfreesboro.14

  Wheeler's poor performance only added to the anxiety and uncertainty at army headquarters. Wiring Johnston that night, Bragg could say only that Rosecrans was advancing on him in great strength and that all available troops should be sped to the Army of Tennessee to oppose him. With his subordinates, however, Bragg displayed more confidence. In a letter to Cheatham and Withers, he expressed his belief that Rosecrans's objective was Murfreesboro. In truth, Bragg could ill afford to think otherwise, having by now committed his army to a defense along Stones River. As the sun set on 27 December, all Confederate units except those detailed to delay the Federal advance were at Murfreesboro, awaiting further orders. They came at 9:00 P.M., in the following memorandum for general and staff officers:

  1st. The line of battle will be in front of Murfreesborough; half of the army, left wing, in front of Stone's River; right wing in rear of river.

  2d. Polk's corps will form left wing; Hardee's corps, right wing.

  3d. Wither's division will form first line in Polk's corps; Cheatham's, the second line. Breckinridge's division forms first line Hardee's corps; Cleburne's division, second line Hardee's corps.

  4th. McCown's division to form reserve, opposite center, on high ground, in rear of Cheatham's present quarters.

  5th. Jackson's brigade reserve, to the right flank, to report to Lieutenant-General Hardee.

  6th. Two lines to be formed from 800 to 1,000 yards apart, according to the ground.

  7th. Chiefs of artillery to pay special attention to posting of batteries, and supervise their work, seeing they do not causelessly waste their ammunition.

  8th. Cavalry to fall back gradually before enemy, reporting by couriers every hour. When near our lines, Wheeler will move to the right and Wharton to the left, to cover and protect our flanks and report movements of enemy; Pegram to fall to the rear, and report to commanding general as a reserve.

  9th. To-night, if the enemy has gained his position in our front ready for action, Wheeler and Wharton, with their whole commands, will make a night march to the right and left, turn the enemy's flank, gain his rear, and vigorously assail his trains and rear guard, blocking the roads and impeding his movements every way, holding themselves ready to assail his retreating forces.

  10th. All quartermasters, commissaries, and ordnance officers will remain at their proper posts, discharging their appropriate duties. Supplies and baggage should be ready, packed for a move forward or backward as the results of the day may require, and the trains should be in position, out of danger, teamsters all present, and quartermasters in charge.

  11th. Should we be compelled to retire, Polk's corps will move on Shelbyville and Hardee's on Manchester pike; trains in front; cavalry in rear.

  Braxton Bragg,

  General Commanding.15

  Criticism of Bragg's selection of the line of defense came almost immediately. Hardee, in particular, considered the ground peculiarly unsuited to the defense: “The open fields beyond town are fringed with dense cedar brakes, offering excellent shelter for approaching infantry, and are almost impervious to artillery. The country on every side is entirely open, and…accessible to the enemy.” Moreover, Stones River could be crossed anywhere, he argued; at the usual fords, the water was no more than ankle deep. The greatest danger, however, lay not in the then low level of the river, but rather in how quickly it might swell to an “impassable torrent” during a violent rainstorm. If that occurred, Hardee warned, Bragg's two wings would be isolated from one another on opposite banks of the river.16

  Hardee's assertions were well founded. Bragg did not know the ground his army was committed to defend. Six hundred yards beyond Breckinridge's assigned position lay a commanding prominence known locally as Wayne's Hill. From it, artillery batteries could enfilade Polk's right on the west bank of Stones River. Its importance to the Confederate defense should have been obvious; yet, inexplicably, Bragg made no provision for its occupation. Considering that Bragg had been in Murfreesboro since November, his failure to better acquaint himself with the terrain is inexcusable.

  As the troops broke camp Sunday morning, 28 December, and marched out to their designated positions, other shortcomings in the line of battle became apparent, particularly on the east side of Stones River. There Breckinridge deployed his division between the river and the Lebanon Pike, a mile and a half northwest of Murfreesboro. On the left, Brigadier General Roger Hanson placed his Orphan Brigade astride the river, along the
edge of a wood of oak. When Chalmer's brigade settled into position along the west bank a short time later, it was discovered that a gap of some two hundred yards existed between Chalmer's right and Hanson's left, making mutual support difficult. Again, no steps were taken to correct the error in alignment.

  Colonel J. B. Palmer's brigade fell in on Hanson's right, along the edge of a large, cultivated tract. Next came the brigade of Brigadier General William Preston, deployed across an open field, its right resting in a narrow belt of timber. Here the line was broken by a field three hundred yards wide, east of which Brigadier General Dan Adams lined up his regiments. Brigadier General John Jackson's independent command, temporarily assigned to Breckinridge, rested on high ground to the right of the Lebanon Pike, thus completing Hardee's first line of battle. Eight hundred yards to the rear, Pat Cleburne's division paralleled that of Breckinridge.

  Withers's division was generally less exposed in its front-line position on the west bank, the exception being Chalmer's brigade, which occupied the high though largely open ground southeast of the Cowan house, near the intersection of the Nashville Turnpike (the name given the Murfreesboro Pike as it passed through town) and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. To compensate for the absence of natural cover, Chalmers set his men to work constructing temporary breastworks. To Chalmers's left, Anderson—recently relegated to brigade command—also had his troops fortifying their wooded line. Colonel A. M. Manigault, whose command ran alternately through cedar brakes and across cultivated tracts, elected not to entrench. On its return from outpost duty that night, Colonel J. Q. Loomis's brigade was placed on Manigault's left, extending the Confederate line of battle to the Franklin road. Cheatham's division, meanwhile, did not break camp and move up until Monday morning.17