Operation Valuable Fiend

by Albert Lulushi

  “An operation that was supposed to be kept under the wraps of secrecy was known in all relevant details by anyone in the region that had an interest in Albania,” Wisner said. By November 4, 1949, the Office of Special Operations had received a thorough accounting of the status of the Albanian infiltration parties from their sources inside the Greek army intelligence, which had been able to extract the details from British agents as they exfiltrated to Greece.1 The Italians had just as much if not more information. Just a few days after the first landing, McCargar had received a visit from James Angleton, who brought with him a report he had obtained from an OSO source within Italian Naval Intelligence. McCargar recalled that Angleton read to him passages from the report providing a fully detailed description of the landing, including accurate details about the boat, its passengers, their equipment, and the purpose of their mission.2

  Wisner brought up concerns the Department of State had expressed, that their activities could start a chain reaction that might involve the US in the hostilities or at the very least seriously affect the precarious position of the Yugoslav government. He then proposed that the OPC and SIS explore the possibility of utilizing other means, such as psychological or economic warfare to accomplish the objectives in Albania, while deemphasizing paramilitary operations. “I have been thinking,” Wisner said, “of the idea of giving the Albanians the impression that our interest does not lie in any attempt to overthrow the Hoxha Government.”3

  Philby replied that the British shared fundamentally the same concerns with the operation and that the onset of winter was an opportunity to review the plans. The British were similarly worried about the security of the operation, since it was clear that the French, Italian, and Greek intelligence services were obviously well informed. Philby stated that one of the chief sources of the leaks was the conversations and correspondence between the Albanians themselves. Given that it was impossible to get them to maintain silence, Philby suggested carefully developing a formula under which the political leaders in the NCFA were generally informed but had no access to details of paramilitary operations. “It might be possible,” he added, “to keep the political leaders so busy with other activities that they could not take a hand in, or have full knowledge of the operations.” Wisner agreed with this suggestion.4

  Philby didn’t think it was necessary to abandon clandestine operations. Given the lack of sufficient information on which to make future decisions about Albania, London would be very reluctant to stop the reconnaissance. Philby felt they should continue to acquire additional recruits and devise new methods for their use, including the possibility of “hit and run” operations, that is, the infiltration of agents followed by their rapid exfiltration to Greece. On their way out, they could bring additional personnel with them. Combined with skillful interrogation, such operations might produce good intelligence results, Philby said.

  McCargar brought up the need to analyze how much information the Soviets had on the Albanian operations. “I have a feeling that our British friends don’t care as much as we do about how much the Soviets know,” he suggested. To which Philby replied that there was no difference in opinion between the two sides on the seriousness of Soviet knowledge; the Foreign Office probably felt the same in this respect as the State Department. He pointed out, however, that the satellite states had plenty of proof of British SIS operations, but none of the espionage trials to date had brought to light any genuine cases.

  Wisner supported McCargar’s assertion that the British were always less concerned about the security implications of the Albanian operation. He brought up the example of the Valuable plan, which made no efforts to camouflage the involvement of the British in agent training and conduct of the operation. Philby replied with a smile that the Foreign Office was always happier when there was no British mission in Albania.5

  The discussion then moved to the effects of psychological and economic warfare on the stability of the regime in Albania. Wisner considered these methods as benign ways for accomplishing the collapse of the regime without eliciting Soviet intervention against Albania or Yugoslavia that armed operations might provoke. He asked openly whether the British really favored the overthrow of the Albanian government. After some contemplation, Philby said he would ask London for a firm answer, adding however that “in the entire history of British foreign policy, this question has never been answered.” With regard to Soviet intervention, he said that the Soviets would act against Yugoslavia if they wished, regardless of Albania, which was not important enough to sway them one way or the other. In conclusion, Wisner invited SIS officials to travel from London in order to present and discuss concrete proposals, views, and recommendations on alternative methods on the operation.6

  * * *

  During the meetings held in early December in Washington, the British and American services reevaluated the objectives and future conduct of Operation Valuable Fiend. The major change was to deemphasize the active pursuit of regime change in Albania. From that point forward, the activities would focus on creating and maintaining, both inside and outside of Albania, capabilities that would allow the British and Americans to exploit to their advantage any developments that might arise in Yugoslavia or Albania. Actions taken toward Albania would aim to weaken or eliminate the usefulness of Albania as a base of operations against Yugoslavia. At the same time, they wouldn’t be aggressive to the point of triggering repercussion against Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc.

  In order to accomplish these objectives, the OPC and SIS agreed to move the emphasis away from challenging the Albanian regime through paramilitary means and toward propaganda and other destabilizing activities, including agent infiltrations, clandestine broadcasts in the name of the NCFA, leaflet drops, deception rumors, overt press activities, and measures to exacerbate the already difficult economic situation in Albania. Over time, a handful of subprojects sprung up to make it easier to manage these activities and keep them compartmentalized for increased security.

  Neither the British nor the Americans shared the reevaluation of Fiend objectives with members of the NCFA who continued to embrace the concept of a force of a thousand armed Albanians, known as the follow-up force, that would start the insurgency after the initial infiltration teams had laid the groundwork. The case officers began to draw the attention of the Albanian leaders to the fact that it would be financially difficult to maintain a large number of refugees when the International Relief Organization camps closed down. They began carefully to feed the idea of emigration to other countries, without raising suspicions that they had abandoned the idea of the follow-up force.

  Future agents that would participate in infiltration activities would remain in the country as long as possible. At a joint meeting between OPC and SIS officers, they decided that “All agents exfiltrated should be treated as couriers coming out to report and should be reinfiltrated with the minimum delay. This procedure to be prosecuted ad nauseam in the hope that ultimately the agents might think it safer to stay in Pixieland [cryptonym for Albania].”7 The disposal of agents who for physical or psychological reasons could not be reinfiltrated and were rejected for future operations remained an open problem.

  * * *

  As the OPC began the planning and execution of the rescoped Albanian plan, they discovered that running the effort jointly with the British was proving to be a frustrating experience. While the Americans had shown some deference to the British on the planning and execution of the initial infiltrations, they intended to assert themselves and take the lead as the operation progressed, especially since, according to their estimates, the Americans were probably carrying 90 percent of the total cost of British-American operations in Albania.8 The British on their end dragged their feet on a number of cases and resisted American efforts to seek cooperation of the French, Greek, and Italian Services.9

  The leaks about the operation continued and became more widespread. On March 27, 1950, the New York Times carried an article by Cyrus L. Sulzberger
datelined Istanbul, reporting on US-British policy and activities on Albania. The OPC identified certain statements in the article that could have come only from official sources with insider knowledge of their plans. Sulzberger wrote that Washington and London had coordinated their positions in the last few months and moved away from their desire to overthrow the puppet government of Hoxha. At the moment they were content to see the Communist regime remain in power for fear that Moscow could use any move to upset the Albanian regime as an excuse to take violent action against Yugoslavia, which would “serve as the traditional Balkan ignition of the powder keg—inherent in that area.”10

  The State Department became very concerned over this apparent leak and began querying diplomats in Rome, Belgrade, Athens, and Istanbul for clues on the source of information for Sulzberger. The OPC put forth the theory that the article was a deliberate leak from the British. It informed Philby of the concern and requested that he ask the SIS to investigate, since Sulzberger had excellent sources among both British and US government officials.11

  McCargar was acquainted with Sulzberger and met him in an attempt to understand whether he had received the information from American or British sources. McCargar wrote about the encounter: “I gave him the usual bureaucratic reproach for irresponsible journalism. His answer was quick. ‘Look, friend,’ he said. ‘That story did not come from any confidential briefing. If I could put it together, so could the Russians and a lot of other people. Take it as a measure of how well your arrangements are working.’ I found the logic irrefutable.”12

  Wisner convened a meeting on February 27, 1950, with Carmel Offie, his special assistant, Merritt K. Ruddock, the OPC liaison to the SIS in London, and James McCargar to review the status of US-British relationship in Fiend. Wisner began by counting all the ways in which the British had failed to play their part in the operation. The list was long: the British had not provided bases and propaganda boat facilities; had seriously hurt the security of the operation by the conduct of their agents in Italy; had conducted Valuable in an unprofessional fashion; had sabotaged the concept of a general policy headquarters in Washington; had generally slowed down the operations; and had perhaps established some sort of covert unilateral relationship with Tito.

  The OPC for its part had shown a lack of clarity in executing the operation and had not made sufficient real operational contributions. Reaching back for language from his days as a lawyer, Wisner observed, however, that “the weight of errors and omissions was against the British” and that this was the main reason the OPC should go ahead on a more independent basis. “We should approach the British on a friendly and conciliatory, non-recriminatory basis,” Wisner said, “but we should definitely get a firm and clear agreement that we intend to give ourselves more flexibility in the future.”

  They decided that the OPC and the British would continue to run the operation jointly at the policy level and on certain economic and propaganda activities, but on operational matters connected with infiltration activities the OPC would disengage itself and handle them on a unilateral basis. Either service was entitled to make separate approaches to other national services for assistance or collaboration on certain specific phases of the operation.

  The second major decision that Wisner and his team made at the meeting was to reprioritize the OPC activities in the Balkans. While the Albanian operation had been their top priority in the second half of 1949, in early 1950 the OPC had launched an operation against Bulgaria under the code name QKSTAIR, structured in the mold of Fiend. Given the opportunities that a target like Bulgaria presented, there was consensus that Fiend should have a lower priority than in the past and its size should be cut back. Nevertheless, Wisner urged his team to push the smaller operation with all possible vigor.13

  * * *

  The OPC’s efforts to establish relations directly with other services encountered strong resistance by the Office of Special Operations, who felt that this was an encroachment in their jurisdiction. The OSO saw the Valuable phase of Fiend as nothing more than an intelligence operation, and asserted that the Office of Policy Coordination had no jurisdiction to conduct intelligence operations. The OSO’s position was that they could provide the OPC with assets, liaison functions, and support as needed in countries like Greece, Italy, and France where the OSO had operated for years. There was no reason for the OPC to establish redundant and parallel structures that would only confuse the other services. The OPC’s position was that the OSO was trying to tell them how to do their job.14

  The OSO was also upset that the OPC had chosen to turn to the British to execute the first infiltrations in Albania without taking into consideration the agents that the OSO already had inserted in the country as part of Project Charity, jointly run with Italian Naval Intelligence. Project Charity had been the brainchild of James Angleton, the OSO station chief in Italy during 1947 to 1948. Its purpose was to mount joint operations to parachute teams of agents into Albania to collect and report intelligence for use by both the Italians and the Americans.

  The OSO had provided a C-47 aircraft in October 1948 for use in airdrops of personnel, as well as supplies and funds for the operation. The Italians provided the case officers to handle the teams and the housing and training of the agents in Italy. The immediate objective of the plan was the infiltration of two-agent teams by air, equipped with W/T sets tied into a base station in Italy, to make contact with established resistance groups, collect intelligence, survey the local situation, establish a communication base, and arrange for the continued reception of operational supplies and personnel as required. Washington assigned specific intelligence targets, including collecting information on resistance groups, internal political situation, various defense installations, and the order of battle of the Albanian armed forces.

  Ismail Vërlaci worked with the Italian intelligence and the OSO to recruit team members from displaced persons (DP) camps in Italy and Greece. He selected them based on their family connections and familiarity with the Elbasani and Mirdita areas of Albania where resistance groups were still operating. The plan entered the operational phase on February 15, 1949, when four agents forming two teams each with separate W/T communications parachuted in the Serishti district of Mirdita in the north-central part of the country. Alush Leshanaku and Xhevdet Bloshmi formed one team that planned to operate in the Elbasani region about forty miles south of the drop zone. They lost the W/T equipment and couldn’t communicate with the center in Italy, so they made their way to Greece. By April 28, they had arrived in Athens, where Greek army intelligence debriefed them.15 Leshanaku returned to Italy, where he helped train additional agents for the operation. He was parachuted again in early 1950. After several months of operations in Albania, the Sigurimi caught up with him and killed him.16

  Ndue Pjeter Gjonmarkaj and Ndue Mëlyshi formed a second team destined for the Mirdita region. They were able to establish a base of operations there, where they created an organization called Komiteti i Maleve, or the Mountains’ Committee. On behalf of the committee, they roamed the area harassing officials of the regime and their supporters. The most spectacular action of the Mountains’ Committee was the ambush and assassination of Bardhok Biba, a relative of Gjon Markagjoni who had turned against the tribal system to become the ranking Communist official for Mirdita and a deputy in the National Assembly. On the morning of August 7, 1949, Biba was leading a group of villagers drafted to work as volunteers in labor brigades. As he entered a narrow mountain path between the villages of Kaçinarri and Shupali, two shots rang out and Biba fell dead on the spot. The villagers searching the area after the ambush found a document signed by Ndue Pjeter Gjonmarkaj with the decision by the Mountains’ Committee to assassinate Biba.

  Biba was among the most fervent supporters of Hoxha in the traditionally anti-Communist north-central part of Albania, and his assassination jolted the Communist regime into action. The First Division of the army and the Special Pursuit Brigade of the ministry of interior were d
ispatched to Mirdita immediately to comb the area villages for anyone remotely suspected of opposing the regime. The minister of interior, Mehmet Shehu, personally supervised the efforts to clear the area and capture the assassins. “Don’t fret, because starting from today the Party and Comrade Enver [Hoxha] will be like your son,” he told Bib Marka Kola, the eighty-year-old father of Bardhok Biba, at the funeral. When Shehu vowed to avenge many times over the murder of his son, Kola said: “My son is gone and nothing will bring him back. If you find the man who pulled the trigger, do with him what you wish, but don’t make the people of Mirdita pay for my son’s sake.”17

  Despite this plea for moderation, Shehu’s reprisals were swift and merciless. On August 17, 1949, four villagers were hanged;18 ten more were shot and dumped in a common grave, some of them still alive.19 Mehmet Shehu gathered two thousand villagers from the area at the execution site and in a fiery speech vowed not to leave the area until he had shot one hundred and one men to revenge Bardhok Biba. After the massacre, Shehu ordered the indiscriminate imprisonment of three hundred men and the deportation of four hundred families, including women, children, and the elderly, to Tepelena and Lushnja internment camps in the south of Albania. Luckily, the terror campaign was cut short at the end of August when the government units were withdrawn hastily and sent south to counter Greek national army units, which were pushing the remnant forces of the Greek Communist guerrillas across the frontier.20

  CHAPTER 8

  Labor Services Company 4000

  Spring 1950 brought two significant changes in personnel for Project Fiend. Colonel Gratian M. Yatsevitch replaced James McCargar as the overall operation commander in Washington, while E. Michael Burke took over for Robert Low in Rome as commander in the field.