The content of the first messages sent by the Sigurimi are below, together with the messages that Athens received on its end:
Message Sent by the Sigurimi24 Message Received by Athens Center25
13. A plane circled on the 25th. Police forces and population are moving. It is not yet known when they will leave. Cancel DZ until second notice. 13. Date 5. Circulating the plan. They are put in forced movement (garble) population. It is not yet known when they will depart. Begin 7 until the second understanding.
14. In Mat, they are working to build a hydroelectric power station. More than 300 people work there volunteers and with pay, most are from Burreli. 15. In Mat they are working to fix the center. About 3,000 workers volunteers but with pay. Most of them are from the North (garble of four letters).
There are significant discrepancies between what was sent and what was received: the first message to arrive in Athens contained an unusual extent of garbling and the request to cancel the upcoming supply drop was missing altogether; the second message was miss-numbered, going from 13 to 15, skipping 14. Perhaps these variances and omissions can be explained by taking into account the unavoidable information loss in the process of enciphering and transmitting messages from the field and receiving, deciphering, and translating them at the center. However, another very plausible explanation is that Premçi was risking his life by intentionally distorting the messages dictated by the Sigurimi captors in order to attract his control officer’s attention to their situation.
* * *
Two days later, Athens replied, informing Apple to expect eight parachutes at the prearranged DZ between July 7 and 10. The Sigurimi team was elated to receive the reply—it showed that their first communications hadn’t aroused suspicions. But after the initial jubilation, puzzling questions began to surface. How did the Americans expect only two men to haul a load of eight parachutes? Were they so naïve as to think the team could wait for four days at a DZ without being detected—especially after it had asked to cancel the DZ because police forces were in the area and it wasn’t known when they would leave.
The reason the Sigurimi had requested cancellation was that the DZ location was close to villages where Shehi had tried to establish contact before his capture. When the villagers saw the supplies fall from the sky with Shehi nowhere around to collect them, they might suspect he had been captured, and the Sigurimi wanted to avoid spreading that rumor at all costs.
After weighing all the pros and cons, they decided not to set up a reception for the drop, supposing the plane would go back if the pilot didn’t see the signals from the ground. They were astonished when the plane showed up on the night of July 6–7 and, after circling several times, dropped the parachutes over the mine of Bulqiza, apparently confusing its lights with reception signals from the team. The local forces in the area collected a wealth of supplies, including a radio set, arms, food, and ammunition.26
Sigurimi decided to turn their adversary’s somewhat perplexing behavior to their advantage by taking the upper hand in the exchanges with the control center. The first message after the drop, on July 12, stated that the plane had circled for one hour over Bulqiza, the pilots had made the drop without seeing their signals, the police had found the material, and the team had been forced to hide in wooded areas. A second message on the same date took a harder stance: “We know the situation here. That is why each drop should be made as we like and where our signals are.”27
Next, Sigurimi trained their sights on Halil Branica and decided to lure him into parachuting into Albania. From questioning Shehi and reviewing notes they had found on him, they knew Branica had been part of the original team and had been forced to turn back. They assumed the Americans were waiting for the right opportunity to send him in. In several messages sent on July 15 and 18, they fed center information about the situation on the ground that included military unit locations and the coordinates of a DZ they had found in Mati. Then, on July 25, the team urgently requested the dispatch of Branica to develop contacts in the Mati area:28 “We are in a situation to await Halil. Good DZ. The situation is quiet. Halil is very necessary because he will give us first hand authority for a larger zone of action and more bases especially in Mat. Being three of us movement will be safer.”29
Athens replied right away, telling them to wait for Branica on August 4. The Sigurimi wanted to capture Branica alive and unhurt, so they could proceed immediately with debriefing him for information and instructions he was expected to bring with him. They set up the trap so that he wouldn’t suspect foul play immediately on landing or have an opportunity to react against capture, either by opening fire or by poisoning himself. On August 3, Apple sent reception information for Branica: “Friends of ours will be at the DZ to hide the supplies. If he is not found immediately, Halil is to give the password Berat; the counter password is Burrel.”30
Branica was parachuted on August 4, along with fourteen thousand pounds of supplies, including an RS-1 radio set. Apple contacted center on August 6 to confirm Branica’s safe arrival. To inject a dose of realism, the Sigurimi wrote that the team had received only three of the five containers dropped by the plane and that security forces were searching the area. Later, they reported that the radio was missing the transmitting unit. The case officers in Athens reviewing the messages assumed that the communications staff had mistakenly packed a power supply unit instead of the transmitter. On September 6, Apple received another complete RS-1 with spare parts.31
* * *
After receiving the report of Branica’s safe arrival, Athens radioed, “Good job, Halil and Apple.” Not knowing that Apple was the code name of the team, Sigurimi took it for a hidden code word meant for Branica. They tried to get him to reveal its meaning, but Branica steadfastly rejected their inducements to cooperate, even after the Sigurimi told him that Shehi and Premçi had been collaborating. To make the story more convincing, Sigurimi arranged for Branica to encounter Shehi smartly dressed in a fancy suit, conferring amicably with a uniformed officer of the Sigurimi in Tirana.32 Nevertheless, Branica refused to cooperate until the end.
In later analysis after the fiasco became clear, the CIA counterespionage staff at headquarters recognized that the officers in Athens should have raised the case officer challenge before parachuting Branica, especially in light of the fact that all the reception details, including the DZ and passwords had been set up by Apple.33 But they didn’t pay attention. It was only on August 12 that Athens issued the challenge question, “How many rifles have you?” Sigurimi scrambled trying to figure out how to respond to the challenge. Shehi and Premçi, although fairly cooperative up to that point, refused to reveal the right answer to the challenge. Left with no options, Sigurimi ignored the challenge in exchanges on August 13, 15, 16, 18, and 24.
The base rechallenged Apple on August 24 and 27. On August 28, Sigurimi replied with a direct answer to the question by reporting the number of arms on hand: “We have one rifle, two automatic guns, three pistols on us plus three pistols and three automatic guns for spares. The rest, we gave to friends.”34
Rather than take this answer to be a signal of control, meaning that the operator was under duress and the mission likely compromised, Athens reissued the challenge on August 28, only to receive a similar reply on September 3. Gordon Mason, the CIA case officer for the team, explained this situation by commenting that, “it is improbable that the team had forgotten its instructions on this signal, but due to the impending resupply drop, it may have been interpreted as a straight question.”35 To support his belief that the team was not controlled, he pointed out that other control signals embedded in the radio communications continued to be negative.
However, in June when a similar resupply drop was impending, Apple had not confused the control challenge from the case officer. The constant reiteration of the question by Athens this time would have easily called their attention to the fact that center was raising the control question, making Mason’s explanation hard to credit
. Also, why the long delay in responding if the team was uncontrolled but misconstrued the questions?
The later counterespionage review of the Apple operations concluded that CIA staff had failed to recognize the possibility that Premçi could have yielded the radio communication control signals to his captors to demonstrate that he was cooperating with them without revealing the second layer of security, which was the case officer control question and expected answer. Such redundant challenge/response exchanges were included in communication plans with agents with precisely such an eventuality in mind.36 The chief of CIA’s Communications Security Division wrote: “One general feature which seems to be common to many instances of controlled operations is the unconscious effort on the part of all concerned to rationalize the appearance of security checks when used to indicate control. Such a reaction is natural when considered in terms of the case officer’s identification with the Agent. Obviously, however, . . . such a rationalization negates the entire purpose of such checks.”37
After the resupply mission was completed successfully on the night of September 6–7, Athens reported to headquarters: “As this station has implied, a possibility existed that Apple may have been under control, due to their failure to answer the case officer’s danger signal. We now feel that failure to answer properly may have resulted from Apple’s desire to receive certain items on this resupply attempt.”38
It would have been reasonable for Athens at this point to raise the case officer control challenge, if for no other reason than to test the validity of their hypothesis that the team had misconstrued the challenge because of the impeding supply drop. But they did not raise it. As a means of testing the bona fides of Apple, center asked for “friends” to exfiltrate in messages on September 5 and 16 and October 6. The Sigurimi ignored these requests in their replies, without raising any suspicions.39
Instead, during the month of October, Sigurimi sent several bits of information in an effort to inject realism, build up the team’s potential, and mislead the Americans. On October 3, they requested that “for many reasons” there be no drops in October. On October 10, they asked that King Zog be informed that his influence was great in Tirana, Kruja, Mati, Martaneshi, and Peshkopi; they also requested the dispatch of new agents. On October 27, they reported an indirect contact with a sergeant major of the police in Peshkopi.40
Sigurimi’s efforts to divert base’s attention seem clearly to have been successful. In October, Fiend staff in Athens reviewed the communication traffic and reported to headquarters that they were “impressed and gratified” by the successful utilization of the team’s radio equipment and time schedule. The team had made contact every three days—as allowed by communications security regulations. Seventy-five percent of the radio traffic had been related to Apple’s support and primary mission, with the remaining traffic strictly of an intelligence nature. Apple had reported to have extended their network with contacts in Peshkopi and Burrel and was working to obtain contacts in other areas. They stated that they could do a better job if other teams were sent to these areas.41
* * *
Things were going very well for the Sigurimi until October 29, when Premçi managed to escape from his holding cell in Tirana with the assistance of the police officer assigned to guard him. A pursuit party was formed immediately to attempt to recapture him at any cost. Premçi and his friend fell into an ambush in the mountains northeast of Tirana but managed to evade capture. At that point, Mehmet Shehu ordered the Sigurimi to capture Premçi if possible but to find ways to continue the operation without Premçi.
On November 3, pursuit forces killed Premçi in the forests of Martaneshi. On the same day, Athens received a message from Apple stating that Premçi was sending with his left hand because he had fallen and broken his operating hand. The CIA communications staff in Athens analyzed the new “fist,” the term used to describe the unique pattern of dots and dashes that distinguishes every Morse wireless operator. Upon receiving their analysis, Ulmer immediately informed Yatsevitch at headquarters that, although the message had negative radio communication control signals, it had been sent by a new fist operating at a speed far below normal, giving credence of the left-hand explanation they had received. Yet the sharp dots in the transmission indicated that, on the contrary, a trained fist was sending the messages. This was suspicious, for Premçi, like the rest of the wireless operators trained by the CIA at the time, had received training on only one hand. The communications officer who had instructed Premçi added that he highly doubted Premçi was capable of using his other hand, although in theory it was possible.
The base immediately (on November 3) raised the case officer control challenge, “How many rifles have you?” Apple didn’t respond to the challenge in contacts on November 6, 12, 15, and 18. On November 15, Apple radioed, “Tahir is very ill.” Then, on November 24: “Tahir is no longer able to work. His hand is very bad. We ask to return or else send us another radio man.” Asking to return was a calculated risk on the part of the Sigurimi—they knew Athens would consider it practically impossible for the team to exfiltrate at that time because of deep snows, mountainous terrain, and general winter weather conditions.
On November 18, Athens, in response to headquarters’ instructions, asked for specific positive intelligence, in order to assess the possibility of control: “How many friends do you have ready to receive our arms? Who is known to oppose the regime in the areas where you are?” The Sigurimi crafted the response to reflect the reality on the ground, which they suspected the CIA was able to cross-check with other sources. “If hostilities broke, dozens are ready to take up arms, mainly in the area of Bulqiza,” they radioed. Then, they send the names of six people in the area they knew the CIA would recognize as regime opponents. Indeed, the names were cross-checked against registries and did not raise any suspicions in Athens or at the headquarters.
The Americans issued the challenge again on November 24 and 27. On November 29, Apple responded by giving the number of arms on hand, which should have been taken as an indication that the team was controlled. Gordon Mason, the case officer for the team, discounted that possibility, again advancing as a reasonable explanation that his challenge had been misunderstood as an inquiry for purposes of resupply. Given that Apple continued to provide uncontrolled replies to radio communication danger signals, Al Ulmer, the Athens station chief, wrote to Yatsevitch in Washington that the “case officers who trained and dispatched the team consider it of the highest caliber and feel confident the team would have found some clear way of showing control if it existed.”
On December 3, Apple claimed to have forgotten the content of the base’s challenge message and asked it be repeated. To add more evidence of Premçi’s “forgetfulness,” the Sigurimi omitted from the radio message the standard cryptographic control signal that was supposed to be added at the end of all messages to indicate positive or negative control. Athens hypothesized that since the other radio communication danger signals were regular and since this was the first time confirmation crypto signals were omitted, Premçi had forgotten to include them when he was recopying the message.42
In their next message, the Sigurimi decided to put some pressure on Athens. They radioed: “Broken hand not set right. Wound infected. Tahir is very weak. He cannot function as planned. We demand you notify King Zog about the situation. Hasten a decision or we’ll be forced to make a decision ourselves.”
* * *
On November 26, CIA officers visited King Zog to inform him of the situation. They asked him for possible questions they could ask the radio operator to determine whether he was actually in touch with the team leader and sending for him. On December 8, Zog replied with two questions to be passed to the team:
Are you in good condition?
Do you remember in whose hands you left your silver cuff links before your departure?
Zog had discussed the first question with Shehi and Branica prior to their departure from Cairo. It was to be their c
ode word, to which they would respond in one of three ways: “Good condition” meant “The people believe in us and help us by putting themselves at the king’s disposal.” “Very good condition” meant “We are in contact with government officials and army officers in our favor.” “Situation in our favor” meant “People are ready to take up arms; there are armed actions against the government and officials are participating in them.” From the responses Zog expected to receive from his officers on the ground, it’s obvious how disconnected he was from the real situation in Albania at the time.
Only Shehi, Zog, and the queen knew the subject of the second question. Before his departure from Cairo, Shehi, who had been Geraldine’s bodyguard since 1939, entrusted to her a box of precious items, among which were a pair of silver cuff links. So the answer to the question posed was expected to be something like “To the Queen (or Mistress) of the house.”
Athens radioed both questions on December 12. Although Sigurimi had found the first question and the three expected answers in a notebook captured on Shehi, they either overlooked this question or didn’t bother to answer it. Instead, they focused on the cuff link question. Their assumption was that the Americans had been digging into Shehi’s and Branica’s belongings in Athens for something recognizable and yet simple they could query them on. Branica and Shehi, upon questioning confirmed that they indeed had left cuff links in their luggage in Athens. So, on December 13, Apple radioed the following message: “The silver cuff links are in our suitcases. Zenel’s and Halil’s. Don’t bother us unnecessarily.”
Athens overlooked the fact that the first question was unanswered. Fiend staff in Athens searched Shehi’s suitcases left in the safehouse and indeed found the cuff links as stated. When Zog learned of the radio reply, he said that he felt that the team’s answer, while not as expected, was accurate and genuine since they had no prearranged control signals and the leader probably had more than one set of cuff links.
Operation Valuable Fiend Page 22
