As a result, Athens shelved the suspicions about the team’s status and the suggestions to deny it further support. The team was considered safe and uncontrolled; preparations began to provide another W/T operator equipped with enough medical supplies to attempt to save the operator’s injured arm.
* * *
On December 12, the Sigurimi increased the pressure to get the Americans to send the replacement radio operator. They radioed that Premçi was very weak from his infected hand. The transmissions indeed were very slow. Then, they failed to make contact at scheduled times on December 15, 18, 21, and 24. On December 27, Athens center radioed: “Matter discussed with King. Sending radio operator and two parachutes at DZ G-1531 January 3–7. Confirm DZ and date.”
On December 31, Apple informed center that there would be some friends at the DZ to await for the radioman and that the password and counter-password would be “Kruja” and “Korabi” respectively.
Athens chose Ahmet Kabashi as the replacement W/T operator. Between 1949 and 1951, Kabashi had carried out several infiltrations into Albania from Italy and Greece in missions sponsored by the Office of Special Operations. He had proven to be mature, courageous, dedicated, reliable, and security conscious in the accomplishment of these missions. When the OSO curtailed its involvement in Albania, Kabashi had been transferred into the rolls of the Office of Policy Coordination. They held him for future use at an Athens safehouse, where he received W/T training. Kabashi consistently received commendatory evaluations on his progress and no derogatory information was uncovered during this period.43
Fiend staff in Athens saw Kabashi’s drop as an opportunity to rectify a number of security shortcomings that had plagued the Apple operation up to that point. Kabashi received specific instructions to answer control questions properly and to respond to the case officer’s danger signals immediately. A number of redundant danger signals were put in place as a fail-safe way to clarify once and for all whether or not Apple was under the control of the Sigurimi.
If the team was not under control, Kabashi would encipher the word Gur, which meant “rock” in Albanian, immediately after the message number, followed by the message text. If the team was under control, Kabashi wouldn’t encipher this keyword. In addition, if the team was not under control, Kabashi was instructed to incorporate the phrase “The snows have arrived” in his very first message upon parachuting in.
Gordon Mason chose two case officer control questions rather than the customary one, and he selected questions that were unlikely to confuse the team in the field into believing that they were legitimate questions. The first control question was, “Is your Letër Njoftim in order?” The Letër Njoftim was the identity card that every citizen in Albania was required to carry at all times. The negative control answer was: “My Letër Njoftim is no good.” The positive control answer was: “Yes, my Letër Njoftim is in order.” The second control question was, “Do you need any lek?” referring to the Albanian currency. The negative control answer was “Send us maps.” Mason chose the nonsense answer to the question on purpose, to avoid a lucky guess by the opposition or confusion by the agents in the field, similar to the “rifles” question that had been used earlier. Indeed, a direct answer to the question would indicate positive control.44
After delays due to the weather conditions, Kabashi was parachuted on the night of January 29–30, 1953. He radioed his first message to center in the morning of January 31: “66-1 Gur-Gur [pause] The snows have arrived. Radio operator arrived well. Received two parachutes. Thank the pilots for good drop.”45
Thus, in less than thirty-six hours, the Sigurimi had been able to extract all the security codes from Kabashi and convince him to participate in their deception. To fully debrief Kabashi in such a short amount of time, it’s possible the Sigurimi used a cooperative Zenel Shehi. Kabashi’s instructions in Athens prior to departure had been: “Upon making contact with Apple team you will come under the command of Captain Zenel. He has been fully instructed of your responsibilities and will make all decisions pertaining to the security and operations for your team.”46
Regardless of what methods the Sigurimi used to turn him, Kabashi remained fully cooperative until the end of the operation. While Premçi seems to have found several opportunities to send indications that the team was under control, Kabashi consistently sent negative control responses to all challenge signals received from center.
Between February and April, Apple sent a number of messages indicating contacts with Communist forces and reporting the names of supporters in order to add the appearance of realism to the communications and entice more supply drops from the base. For example, on February 4, Apple reported their location to be in the Dibra area near the Yugoslav border, where they had been forced to move after Communist forces, alerted by the January 29 drop, had begun operations in their old location. On the way, the team said they had encountered armed civilians and engaged them in a firefight. No one on the team was lost, and one Communist civilian was killed. Premçi’s poor physical condition and the snow were hampering the progress of the team, they said. Based on this information, on February 8 Athens carried out a diversionary drop to aid the team in eluding the security forces.47
* * *
When he was parachuted to the team at the end of January, Kabashi had carried a letter with the following instructions:
We feel that your captain [Zenel Shehi] should return to the base to report to us and to his King in the springtime. After this he will return to you. We propose two methods for his reaching the base. First, we could send Hamit [Matiani] to meet him at a prearranged time at the rendezvous point which you would send us. Secondly, we could arrange for Hamit to meet him at the point where you received your first food supplies on your route last year. However, the final decision as to time and place must be left to the captain and we would do our best to have Hamit meet him and act as his escort back to the base.48
Hamit Matiani had eluded Communist forces for years. His ability to evade traps and escape unharmed had become a legend. The Sigurimi recognized a golden opportunity to have Matiani delivered to their hands. On February 13, they radioed that Shehi agreed to exfiltrate, but he required the assistance of Matiani as guide. On April 16, to sweeten the deal, they said that Shehi was ready to return with Premçi and “one friend who pretends to be a Communist.”
On the night of May 1–2, Matiani was parachuted at a DZ site in the Biza Plateau approximately ten miles northeast of Tirana.49 With him dropped Naum Sula and Gani Malushi—longtime followers of Matiani and veterans of OSO operations in Albania since 1949. Matiani was equipped with one RS-5 radio set and a special signal plan calling for contacts every other day once they had started the journey to Greece. Matiani himself carried the signal plan, cipher pads, and danger signals. The password to be used on the night of the drop was “Puka,” with counter-password “Përmeti.” The supply containers dispatched with Matiani carried food, clothing, arms, ammo, and numerous other operational items that the Sigurimi had requested. Matiani carried gold on him that he was to turn over to Branica, who would be in charge during Shehi’s absence.50
Upon their return to Athens, the covert plane crew reported that they had to make three passes over the DZ, consuming eight minutes time. This extraordinary procedure was dictated by the hesitation of Matiani, who was supposed to be the first agent to jump.51 Matiani had completed parachute jumps before and was praised by the aircrew for his swift and decisive jumps. Was his hesitation caused by a premonition that this drop would be his last? We’ll never know. What we do know is that he was promptly captured upon landing and that very night was taken to Hazbiu, who supervised his interrogation and debriefing.
* * *
On May 4, Apple acknowledged receiving three agents and four containers and announced that Sula had injured his legs and ribs falling in a wooded area “because of a poor drop by the pilot.” The news of Sula’s injury was not a surprise for Athens, since it was his first jump
and he was considered the least capable of the three men on Matiani’s team.
At this point, the Sigurimi played out the communications so as to prolong the benefits of control as much and to the widest extent possible. Athens had ordered Shehi’s exfiltration, so on May 12 Apple radioed that the exfiltration group composed of Matiani, Sula, Malushi, Shehi, Premçi, and an unidentified friend had separated from Branica and Kabashi who remained behind.
The next day, Matiani’s group established W/T contact with the base according to the communication signals and plan Matiani had received from Athens before his departure. Thus, it had taken Sigurimi twelve days to extract from Matiani all the danger signals and any other control signs that the Athens base expected in his messages.
On May 15, Matiani’s group radioed that they would have to change the planned exfiltration route, which was the same one Matiani had used the previous year. Sula and two other members of the group, the message said, were too weak to walk the mountains. Sigurimi knew that unless they changed the original plan, the base would be able to cross-reference their progress reports against known checkpoints along the route. By controlling the exfiltration route, Sigurimi was clearly in position to make more realistic reports and respond to queries they might receive from Athens. The route they proposed was sensible because it went very close to Matiani’s home region, where the team could receive aid in the event of trouble.52
Other communications described a slow exfiltration progress hampered by the poor physical condition of three of the six-member team: Shehi had dysentery, Sula was injured from the drop, and Premçi was weakened due to illness following the breaking of his hand in November 1952.53 They requested food and medicine but at the same time stated they were unable to receive a drop. The Sigurimi had a good opportunity to receive supplies and still keep the operation active, but they chose not to exploit it. Painting a realistic scenario for the center helped them in the long run by removing any potential doubts that the team was controlled. Indeed, after Ulmer performed a thorough review of this team’s radio messages, he cabled headquarters on August 18, 1953: “The writer finds it extremely difficult to believe that if the group were controlled the opposition would play them back for the short period that they did without fully exploiting the potential before closing this circuit down.”54
On June 5, the team reported that they had run into an ambush near Vithkuqi, twelve miles from the Greek border, in which Matiani was wounded. They stated that their difficulty was caused by center’s attempt to infiltrate additional teams in the area through which they were attempting to exfiltrate. Athens saw a trace of Matiani’s hand in this message. In past operations he had always been adamant that other groups be kept out of the border area during his exfiltration attempts.55 It’s clear that by this time the Sigurimi had been able to debrief Matiani on even the smallest nuances of his way of working and was able to weave the information into their messages to the Americans.
On June 10, the team radioed that they were unable to move because of Matiani’s condition and requested: “Send us a guide to cross the border and withdraw Matiani from us or else chances are we will have to put him in a base here.”
Creating the illusion that the team was within reach of the Greek border, Sigurimi was attempting to discover and neutralize additional American assets in the area, such as internal supporters who could be called upon to serve as guides or houses where teams could find refuge. Ulmer would later write: “I personally discount the belief that the opposition would be willing to settle for so little gain as one guide, when so much was available to them for the asking.”56
Athens saw the request for a guide as suspicious and a good indication the team was controlled. Center radioed a suggested exfiltration route, which they had planned after long discussions with the Greek border guard units. Greek patrols would be placed in positions to fire upon pursuit forces and clear the exfiltration route for the team. Then, on June 13, Athens requested that, “If Hamit is unable to travel then Zenel and one man should exfiltrate to receive medicine, help and further instructions.”57
The response two days later said that Matiani refused to stay behind and that the team would follow base’s instructions. They made their last contact on June 18, reporting their position to be approximately twelve miles from the border. The base’s outgoing message on the same day cautioned the team move carefully, instructed them to attempt to cross in the next two nights, and informed them that the recommended border crossing area had been quiet for one week.58
The Sigurimi staged a firefight to give the impression of an ambush in the area and spread rumors about the killing of the agents, which they knew would not fail to reach the base. Indeed, a team that exfiltrated from Albania on July 26 reported learning of a gun battle against a group fitting the description of Matiani’s team about June 20, in which all members were killed, with the exception of Matiani who poisoned himself after expending his ammunition.
Athens would not hear any more news about the members of this team until December 1953.
* * *
While tracking the progress of Matiani’s team, Athens had maintained contact with Branica and Kabashi, who they thought had stayed behind. In the last two weeks of May, communications with them centered on coordinating the drop of additional agents and supplies. On May 18, the team suggested the use of the same DZ that Matiani and his team had used on May 1. To add a dose of realism in the communications, when the base set the drop window between May 29 and June 4, the Sigurimi sent a message complaining about the security involved in a six-day waiting period at the DZ.
On the night of June 4–5, a three-man team composed of Haxhi Gjyla, Zenun Gjolena, and Nuri Plaka, as well as the leader of a second team, Pal Nikolla, were dispatched. The two remaining men of Nikolla’s team missed the five-second safe jump window when one of them froze at the door of the aircraft for a few seconds and blocked the other. The aircrew reported they made an accurate drop at seven hundred feet over the DZ.59
The mission of the new teams was to remain with Branica and Kabashi until they became familiar with the conditions within the country and then move to their respective areas of operation—Elbasani in central Albania for Gjyla’s team and Mirdita in the north-central part of the country for Nikolla’s team.60
The morning after the drop, on June 5, the team radioed that the airplane had made the drop from high altitude and they were surprised that not all the members of Nikolla’s team had parachuted. They asked whether there would be another drop later that night. The base replied that there would not be another drop and that Nikolla should remain with Branica and Kabashi until he received further instructions. On June 10, the base informed Branica that it would drop arms during the period of June 17–20 and asked that Nikolla be informed that his radio operators would be sent later. They also asked for news of Gjyla’s team, since they had failed to enter in radio contact with the base according to their communications plan.
The Sigurimi sent a reply on the same day, which contradicted the message they had sent on June 5. It stated that the drop had been made away from the DZ and they had no contact with the persons dropped. They reported they had to leave after dawn because Communist forces had appeared in the DZ zone. They had heard rifle fire in the DZ area but did not know what had happened.
It is hard to explain this contradiction on the Sigurimi’s part. It is clear that they first sought to entice Athens in sending in the remainder of Nikolla’s team, and failing to do so immediately, they tried to provide a reasonable explanation for the disposal of the four agents parachuted on the night of June 5. If the agents were not killed on the night of the drop, it is possible they died under torture without revealing their W/T signal plan; or they could have been eliminated because the Sigurimi didn’t have sufficient resources to exploit several playback operations concurrently. Athens would hear nothing further about the fate of the four agents parachuted on the night of June 5 until December 1953.
* * *
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On June 12, Athens notified headquarters that, as a result of the contradictory exchanges of June 5 and 10, it was handling the Branica and Matiani teams as probably controlled by the opposition. On June 19 Branica’s team radioed a list of required supplies. They further stated that their local contacts were losing confidence in the team due to the failure of the June 4 resupply mission and subsequent delays in sending needed supplies. For the first time, the base raised one of two case officer control challenges given Kabashi, “Do you need lek?” He replied the next day “We want maps,” which was interpreted by Athens to indicate negative control, although the actual prearranged response was “Send us maps.”
Alerted by the challenge and to put center’s doubts at rest, the Sigurimi sent a message on June 25 with some information about the four missing agents from the June 5 drop. The message stated that Pali Lushi (interpreted by the base to mean Pal Nikolla) had sent one of his people to Branica’s relatives to say that they were in the Mirdita zone. The message said that Branica would attempt to make contact and requested a drop as soon as possible.
The ruse worked. Athens reported to headquarters on June 26 that it continued to recognize the possibility of control of the team but felt warranted in taking a calculated risk to maintain the operation, particularly in view of the latest report of and indirect contact with Nikolla. Headquarters concurred with the plans. When Athens proposed to determine independently the fate of the missing agents, headquarters turned them down, citing as one of the reasons the belief that Branica who was “operative and apparently not controlled,” could provide them that information.
After repeated exchanges to set up the time and DZ, the supply drop was completed on July 22. On the 26th, Apple advised that the airplane had made a bad drop and they had received only three of the five bundles, apparently an attempt by the Sigurimi to push Athens to make another drop.
Operation Valuable Fiend Page 23
